concluding that citizens "have a right under the First Amendment not to have the value of their vote diminished because of the political views they have expressed through their party affiliation and voting history. Put simply, partisan vote dilution, when intentionally imposed, involves the State penalizing voters for expressing a viewpoint while, at the same time, rewarding voters for expressing the opposite viewpoint."
How later courts described this case
- concluding that citizens "have a right under the First Amendment not to have the value of their vote diminished because of the political views they have expressed through their party affiliation and voting history. Put simply, partisan vote dilution, when intentionally imposed, involves the State penalizing voters for expressing a viewpoint while, at the same time, rewarding voters for expressing the opposite viewpoint."
- explaining that "partisan vote dilution ... involves the State penalizing voters for expressing a viewpoint while, at the same time, rewarding voters for expressing the opposite viewpoint" and noting that "[t]his targeting of a citizen's viewpoint is typical of First Amendment violations in other contexts"
- finding unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering where "Democratic officials ... worked to craft a map that would specifically transform the Sixth District into one that would predictably elect a Democrat by removing Republicans from the District and adding Democrats in their place"
- finding partisan intent where the consultant hired to draw the map "prepared district maps using [a political consulting firm's] proprietary [Democratic Performance Index] metric to assess the likelihood that a district would elect a Democratic candidate"
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
RUSSELL, District Judge, concurring:
I entirely concur in Judge Niemeyer's fine opinion for the Court. There is an illegal, partisan gerrymander in Maryland, and it succeeded in flipping the Sixth District.
I agree with Judge Niemeyer that evidence of impact on election results is relevant and germane to the adjudication of associational claims, and that such evidence is non-problematic in that context. However, I also agree with Chief Judge Bredar's separate conclusion that a First Amendment retaliation claim is sufficiently stated and justiciable without reference to the results of particular elections . Accordingly, on the record of this case, in addition to joining Judge Niemeyer, I join Chief Judge Bredar's narrower opinion because I agree that the Plaintiffs have proven that they were the victims of First Amendment retaliation wholly apart from the impact on any election. In my view, Plaintiffs prevail on both the broad theory articulated by Judge Niemeyer and the *530 narrow one expressed by Chief Judge Bredar.