stating, in reference to the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s exhaustion requirement, “[Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 15(d) does authorize a court to permit a party to supplement a pleading even though the original pleading is defective in its statement of a claim for relief or defense. But that rule does not and cannot overrule a substantive requirement or restriction contained in a statute”
How later courts described this case
- stating, in reference to the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s exhaustion requirement, “[Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 15(d) does authorize a court to permit a party to supplement a pleading even though the original pleading is defective in its statement of a claim for relief or defense. But that rule does not and cannot overrule a substantive requirement or restriction contained in a statute”
- finding that the text “[n]o federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined” in § 1997e(e) means that the statute’s bar on monetary relief absent a showing of phys- ical injury applies only to actions that were commenced at the time that the plaintiff was confined in prison
- holding that because the plaintiffs were incarcerated when they commenced the action, notwithstanding the fact that they were released from confinement during the pendency of the action, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) applied “with full force and effect to them.”
- holding that the PLRA does not prevent a former prisoner from filing suit after his release, and therefore dismissal of an action under the PLRA must be "without prejudice to re-filing the claim if and when the plaintiff is released.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
ANDERSON, Chief Judge,
concurring specially:
I concur in the result, and in much of the reasoning of the majority. I agree with the majority that the statutory language evinces a congressional purpose to discourage, indeed to bar, a prisoner from bringing a suit for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury. I do not believe that it is contrary to the statutory language to routinely dismiss such suits, even if the prisoner has been released *986 after the filing of the suit. Indeed, I believe dismissal would be the appropriate action in most such circumstances; and that dismissal would best serve the congressional language and purpose.
However, I agree with the dissent that Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(d) would provide some discretion in a district judge to entertain a supplemental pleading setting forth the fact of a prisoner’s release, and to avoid dismissing a case under some of the more unusual circumstances described by the dissent. In my judgment, a district court should exercise such discretion only rarely (for example, when a prisoner had a color-able claim of physical injury which has been tried to a jury and when a dismissal would involve a manifest waste of judicial resources).
Because it is clear to me that the instant case is not one in which the district judge would exercise discretion to avoid dismissal, a remand would be futile. Accordingly, I concur in the judgment affirming the district court.