rejecting the general proposition that "a stronger showing of inadequacy is required when a governmental agency is involved as the existing defendant," and noting that "this circuit has declined to endorse a higher standard for inadequacy when a governmental entity is involved"
How later courts described this case
- rejecting the general proposition that "a stronger showing of inadequacy is required when a governmental agency is involved as the existing defendant," and noting that "this circuit has declined to endorse a higher standard for inadequacy when a governmental entity is involved"
- holding that proposed intervenors, who were applicants to the University of Michigan, had a substantial legal interest in the school's admissions process
- finding that proposed intervenors, who were applicants to University of Michigan, had a substantial legal interest in the school's admissions process
- finding that students had a substantial interest in whether their university employed race as a factor in university admissions programs
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
STAFFORD, District Judge,
dissenting.
I cannot agree that the proposed inter-venors in these cases have established their right to intervene as of right. I do not believe, nor do I think Michigan State AFL-CIO v. Miller, 103 F.3d 1240 (6th Cir.1997), compels us to find, that the proposed intervenors’ subjective fears are sufficient to satisfy their burden, however minimal, of showing that the University of Michigan will not adequately represent the proposed intervenors’ interests in these two lawsuits. Unlike the State of Michigan in Miller , the University of Michigan here has in no way “demonstrated that it will not adequately represent and protect the interests held by the [proposed inter-venors].” Miller, 103 F.3d at 1248 . There is nothing in the record of either case to suggest that the University of Michigan will not zealously defend its voluntarily-adopted admissions policies, will not present all relevant evidence in support of its admissions policies, will not resist unspecified pressures that could temper its ability to defend its admissions policies, or will not raise all defenses or make all arguments that the prospective intervenors may raise or make. Because I do not think that we should substitute our judgment for the informed judgment of the two respective trial judges who determined that, based on the record before them, intervention was not merited, I must respectfully dissent.