holding that "federalism and comity concerns ... should play a significant role in determining whether to treat as one body two governmental entities that are separate and distinct under state law," and that "substantial deference" should be accorded to "a state lawmaking body's determination of whether two or more governmental entities are separate and distinct" for Title VII purposes
How later courts described this case
- holding that "federalism and comity concerns ... should play a significant role in determining whether to treat as one body two governmental entities that are separate and distinct under state law," and that "substantial deference" should be accorded to "a state lawmaking body's determination of whether two or more governmental entities are separate and distinct" for Title VII purposes
- holding that the four factor test does not apply perfectly in the context of state or local governmental entities, and holding that courts should "begin with the presumption that governmental subdivisions denominated as separate and distinct under state law should not be aggregated for purposes of Title VII"
- holding that conspiracies under color of state law are actionable
- “[W]here a state legislative body creates a public entity and declares it to be separate and distinct, that declaration should be entitled to a significant degree of deference, amounting to a presumption that the public entity is indeed separate and distinct for purposes of Title VII.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
ANDERSON, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in all of Judge Carnes’ opinion for the court, except Part III.E. In applying the new test for determining whether two state or local governmental entities will be treated as a “single employer” under Title VII, I agree with Judge Kravitch (and for the reasons she articulates) that there remain genuine issues of material fact, thus making summary judgment inappropriate.