holding that officers who were inside plaintiffs premises during the execution of the search warrant “were participants in the detention of the [plaintiffs]” and there *1170 fore were not entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs’ claim under the Fourth Amendment
How later courts described this case
- holding that officers who were inside plaintiffs premises during the execution of the search warrant “were participants in the detention of the [plaintiffs]” and there *1170 fore were not entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs’ claim under the Fourth Amendment
- finding “ ‘triable issues’ regarding the reasonableness of the detention, particularly as to whether it continued after the officers knew or a reasonable officer would have known that a serious mistake had been made”
- reversing, in part, grant of qualified immunity on Fourth Amendment claim of unnecessary destructiveness, because record was unclear whether some property damage occurred after officers learned they were in wrong house; noting that if officers had engaged in complained-of conduct — ransacking home, dumping garbage on floor, removing items from drawers and closets, destroying backyard fence, and digging up backyard — before they knew they were in wrong home, “the officers could have reasonably believed, under [existing] precedents, that the way they conducted the search was lawful”
- finding that excessive force is “ordinarily a question of fact for the jury”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
REINHARDT, Circuit Judge,
dissenting from Section B.3:
I think that Section B.3. is both unnecessary and undesirable. It makes little sense *982 to segment, and attempt to analyze with such particularity, each aspect of the search, when the search in general will in any event be carefully examined in its entirety in subsequent proceedings in the district court. I also do not believe that we are in a position at this point to make the factual determination that is necessary to support a conclusion that the officers are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to any “ransacking” that occurred prior to the time they observed that they were in the wrong house; this is particularly true because the district court made no such factual determination itself, but relied instead only on its inability to determine which of the officers was responsible for the “ransacking.” I would, therefore, let the fact-finder determine the officers’ liability with respect to the entire search.