explaining that “a violation of Section 2 may be established . . . without proof of discriminatory intent” but that an inquiry into causation may be relevant when the record suggests that “disparate electoral results [are] principally caused by a factor other than race” (footnote omitted)
How later courts described this case
- explaining that “a violation of Section 2 may be established . . . without proof of discriminatory intent” but that an inquiry into causation may be relevant when the record suggests that “disparate electoral results [are] principally caused by a factor other than race” (footnote omitted)
- holding that white-white elections may be county in the State, and, like the six neighboring counties of considered, but are less probative than those involving black rural west Tennessee, has a large African-American candidates
- noting Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit have not yet determined under a totality analysis “whether section 2 plaintiffs . . . must demonstrate that their diminished opportunity to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice is being caused by the interaction of racial bias in the voting community and the challenged scheme”
- holding that white on white elections are probative of racial polarization and, therefore, implicitly holding that some white candidates can be truly “black preferred”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
EDMONDSON, Circuit Judge,
concurring in the opinion in part and concurring in the result, in which COX, BIRCH and DUBINA, Circuit Judges, join:
For me, the point that determines the outcome of the case is this one: The State of Florida’s legitimate interest in maintaining linkage between jurisdiction and the electoral bases of its trial judges is, as a matter of law, great and outweighs (either at the vote-dilution-finding stage or at the remedy stage) whatever minority vote dilution that may possibly have been shown here. See Houston Laivyers’ Assoc, v. Attorney General, 501 U.S. 419, 424-26 , 111 S.Ct. 2376, 2380 , 115 L.Ed.2d 379 (1991); League of United Latin Amer. Citizens v. Clements, 999 F.2d 831 , 868 (5th Cir.1993); see also, Holder v. Hall, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 2581 , 129 L.Ed.2d 687 (1994). So, I concur in today’s result.
I also concur in Parts 111(A) and 111(B)(1) of Chief Judge Tjoflat’s opinion. I understand Part V of the Chief Judge’s opinion to conclude that each of the remedies discussed is precluded given the State’s interest in and right to formulate its own judicial system. I concur in this conclusion, which I see as the holding of this case. But I cannot agree (and I doubt the Chief Judge means to say) that a remedy must undermine the administration of justice in the state courts before that remedy would fall beyond the power of the federal courts to impose under the Voting Rights Act.
I do not say that the rest of the Chief Judge’s opinion is wrong. But, I believe the conclusions reached in the other parts are unessential to deciding this ease; and to decide nothing about what seem to be unnecessary issues seems best.