holding that in personal injury action, “[pjayment of the expense of treatment is not essential to a recovery. If plaintiff is liable for the debt incurred, that is all that is necessary.”
How later courts described this case
- holding that in personal injury action, “[pjayment of the expense of treatment is not essential to a recovery. If plaintiff is liable for the debt incurred, that is all that is necessary.”
- "Payment of the expense of treatment is not essential to a recovery. If plaintiff is liable for the debt incurred, that is all that is necessary."
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Prentis, C. J., and Eres, J.,
dissenting:
We concur in the order of reversal, but dissent from the order remanding the case, because we think there was sufficient evidence to support the verdict of the jury in favor of the defendant on the first trial, and that judgment should have been entered thereon in favor of the defendant.