holding that the denial of a motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds was not a “final order” within the meaning of R.C. 2953.02 and 2505.02 and that, therefore, a defendant could not appeal the denial of a motion to dismiss based on double jeopardy grounds until after the trial was concluded
How later courts described this case
- holding that the denial of a motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds was not a “final order” within the meaning of R.C. 2953.02 and 2505.02 and that, therefore, a defendant could not appeal the denial of a motion to dismiss based on double jeopardy grounds until after the trial was concluded
- applying prior version of R.C. 2505.02, which contained present-day language said by appellant to be applicable herein: order affects a substantial right in an action which in effect determines the action and prevents a judgment
- nor is it an order that affects a substantial right made in a special proceeding or upon a summary application in an action after judgment
- pointing out that the court of appeals was bound by the prior decision Thomas
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Superseded by statute, as recognized in State v. Anderson
53 Ohio St.3d 243 , 559 N.E.2d 1353 (1990), superseded by statute as stated in State v Anderson, 138 Ohio St.3d 264 , 2014-Ohio-542 , 6 N.E.3d 23
The opinion
Holmes, J.,
dissenting. I would follow this court’s prior determination in State v. Thomas (1980), 61 Ohio St. 2d 254 , 15 O.O. 3d 262, 400 N.E. 2d 897 .
Sweeney, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion.