Opinion

State ex rel. Lipschutz v. Shoemaker, Director, Adult Parole Authority

  • 49 Ohio St. 3d 88
  • 551 N.E.2d 160
  • 1990 Ohio LEXIS 77
Court
Ohio Supreme Court
Filed
Feb 28, 1990
Status
Published
Author
Sweeney
On the bench
Brown, Douglas, Holmes, Moyer, Only, Resnick, Sweeney, Wright
Cited by
42 cases

concluding that unadjudicated illegal conduct was properly considered as part of a prisoner's "pattern of criminal or delinquent behavior"

How later courts described this case

  • concluding that unadjudicated illegal conduct was properly considered as part of a prisoner's "pattern of criminal or delinquent behavior"
  • “A grand jury proceeding is the quintessential form of an ex parte, nonadversarial proceeding where many of the procedural safeguards of a trial do not exist.”
  • affirming parole board's consideration of unadjudicated illegal conduct to determine inmate's pattern of criminal behavior
  • “An indictment is a mere accusation, but it indicates that a grand jury had found probable cause to believe in the truth of the accusation.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

Sweeney, J.,

dissenting. In my view, the majority has committed a grave error in permitting the Parole Board to consider an indictment upon which a conviction was never obtained. Since such a decision has the potential of opening a veritable Pandora’s box by permitting over-indictment abuses by prosecutorial authorities, I must respectfully but vigorously dissent from this decision.

By permitting the Parole Board to *91 consider an indictment upon which no conviction was returned, the majority has completely undermined our time-honored rule of law that a person is presumed innocent until proven guilty.

Ohio Adm. Code 5120:1-1-08 clearly provides that “* * * the parole board may take into consideration * * * (K) The nature of the offense for which the inmate was convicted. ” (Emphasis added.)

While the majority concedes that the foregoing provision “does not authorize consideration of wrongdoing not resulting in conviction,” it casts aside all sense of logic, fairness and reasonableness by asserting that the Administrative Code provision does not “forbid the consideration of such wrongdoing.” I refuse to join such tortured analysis.

By its decision today, the majority has created a gaping loophole in the “presumption of innocence until proven guilty” standard. The practical effect of the majority opinion is to encourage prosecutors to over-indict suspects in order to deny them parole sometime down the line if the suspect is ultimately convicted of some of the indictments returned.

Since I firmly believe the Parole Board’s actions have denied relator his rights to due process and equal protection, I would grant the requested writ of mandamus since I feel the Parole Board has committed a clear abuse of discretion.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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