Opinion

In re Appeal of Suspension of Huffer from Circleville High School

  • 47 Ohio St. 3d 12
  • 546 N.E.2d 1308
  • 1989 Ohio LEXIS 298
Court
Ohio Supreme Court
Filed
Nov 22, 1989
Status
Published
Author
Holmes
On the bench
Brown, Douglas, Holmes, Moyer, Resnick, Sweeney, Wright
Cited by
77 cases
Authority
More cited than 15.1%

concluding that the issue of local school board’s authority to make rules and regulations was capable of repetition, yet evading review, “since students who challenge school board rules generally graduate before the case winds its way through the court system.”

How later courts described this case

  • concluding that the issue of local school board’s authority to make rules and regulations was capable of repetition, yet evading review, “since students who challenge school board rules generally graduate before the case winds its way through the court system.”
  • finding the first exception to the mootness doctrine applied since a student that challenged the school board's rules will often graduate prior to the case making its way through the court system
  • identifying exceptions to the mootness doctrine

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

Holmes, J.,

dissenting. For this writer to be dissenting from the position of a school board and the exercise of a board’s broad discretionary power is a most unusual position, but this I must do under the facts of this case. My usual stance is one supportive of the sound exercise of the board’s administrative authority to operate its school program. In this regard see my most recent comments in dissent in the case of Phillips v. South Range Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1989), 45 Ohio St. 3d 66, 72-74 , 543 N.E. 2d 492, 498-500 . Here, however, there has been an abuse of that discretion, not in the promulgation of this particular local rule, but in the application of such rule.

I believe that the school board did exercise its judgment properly in promulgating a rule that reasonably would tend to aid in the control of substance abuse. However, I concur with Justice Brown’s statement in his dissent that the facts here do “not lead me to invoke the spectre of ‘the current drug and alcohol crisis.’ ”

I am in agreement with Justice Brown that the school board does not have to meet the same standard as utilized for determining whether one is “under the influence of alcohol” for purposes of the motor vehicle statutory violations. But, as he stated, there should be shown to be some evidence in addition to the odor upon the breath of *19 the student to establish that the student was under the influence. Here, Mark Huffer returned to his school in order to join the practice session of a sport in which he was actively involved. There was no showing or even any suggestion that Mark was boisterous, rowdy, loud or unruly either before, during, or after this practice session. To the contrary, the only statement supportive of a violation of the board’s rule emanated from the assistant coach who had been wrestling with Mark and had smelled alcohol on Mark’s breath, and conveyed this information to the coach, who informed the principal.

It appears that Mark wrestled with the wrong opponent in that match. The bottom line, however, is that the principal and the board overreacted in unreasonably applying the rule to the facts of this case. I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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