stating "it may be generally stated that a licensee takes his license subject to its attendant perils and risks, that the licensor owes him no duty except to refrain from wantonly or willfully injuring him, and that he should exercise ordinary care after discovering him to be in peril'" (quoting Hannan v. Ehrlich (1921), 102 Ohio St. 176, 185-86, 131 N.E. 504, 507)
How later courts described this case
- stating "it may be generally stated that a licensee takes his license subject to its attendant perils and risks, that the licensor owes him no duty except to refrain from wantonly or willfully injuring him, and that he should exercise ordinary care after discovering him to be in peril'" (quoting Hannan v. Ehrlich (1921), 102 Ohio St. 176, 185-86, 131 N.E. 504, 507)
- finding it well settled that in order to establish a premises-liability negligence claim, one must show “the existence of a duty, a breach of that duty, causation, and damages”
- “The rule of proximate cause “ ‘requires that the injury sustained shall be the natural and probable consequence of the negligence alleged; that is, such consequence as under the surrounding circumstances of the particular case might, and should have been foreseen or anticipated by the wrongdoer as likely to follow his negligent act.’ ” Ross v. Nutt (1964), 177 Ohio St. 113, 114, 29 O.O.2d 313, 314, 203 N.E.2d 118, 120, quoting Miller v. Baltimore & Ohio Southwestern RR. Co. (1908), 78 Ohio St. 309, 325, 85 N.E. 499, 504”
- where there is no obligation of care or caution, there can be no actionable negligence
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
H. Brown, J.,
dissenting. For the most part, I agree with the general statements of the law as set forth by the majority. I do take issue with the assertion, “[i]n other words, we must equate foreseeability with the proximate cause of decedent’s death.” In the law of negligence, the concepts of foreseeability and proximate cause are *147 not interchangeable and should not be equated. But my reason for dissent is not so much grounded upon disagreement with legal pronouncements as it is upon the application of those pronouncements to the facts of the case before us.
The issues below were resolved against the plaintiff on summary judgment. Thus, the facts should be construed most strongly in plaintiffs favor. Civ. R. 56(C); Wills v. Frank Hoover Supply (1986), 26 Ohio St. 3d 186, 188 , 26 OBR 160, 161, 497 N.E. 2d 1118, 1120 . The majority has not done that.
I
In my opinion, it is foreseeable that people will attempt to inhale helium from tanks used to pump helium into balloons. This is done (and has even been done on television) to experience a peculiar change in the sound of one’s voice. What is not perhaps foreseeable is that death can be the consequence of such playful behavior. Thus the case against the supplier of the helium tanks should have been decided on the issue of whether the warning placed on those tanks was adequate. Reasonable minds can differ on whether the warning in this case was adequate to put one on notice that death could result from the inhalation of helium.
II
Since the plaintiff’s decedent was a ticket purchaser to a high school football game, he properly entered the Belmont County Fairgrounds as a business visitor. The issue is whether he lost this status by reason of his behavior after coming on the premises. Factual issues remain to be decided. These include: (1) whether the area in which the game was played was a physically separated part of the fairgrounds, (2) how that separation was accomplished and made known to those who came to the game, (3) whether the game-going public had made a practice of using that part of the grounds where the injury occurred. Thus, a determination of the legal status of the plaintiff’s decedent is premature.
For these reasons I respectfully dissent. I would affirm the judgment rendered by the court of appeals. 4
Sweeney, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion.
*148 APPENDIX
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Although I would reach the same decision as was rendered by the court of appeals, my reasons for reaching that decision are somewhat different.