Opinion

State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Pildner

  • 40 Ohio St. 2d 101
  • 69 Ohio Op. 2d 509
  • 321 N.E.2d 600
  • 1974 Ohio LEXIS 384
Court
Ohio Supreme Court
Filed
Dec 31, 1974
Status
Published
Author
Coerioan
On the bench
Brown, Celebrezze, Coerioan, Herbert, Neill, Stern
Cited by
17 cases
Authority
More cited than 97.2%

Overruled by Preferred Risk Insurance v. Gill, 30 Ohio St. 3d 108 (1987)

conflict arose where insurer obtained information that insured acted intentionally, thus removing the claim from the scope of coverage

How later courts described this case

  • conflict arose where insurer obtained information that insured acted intentionally, thus removing the claim from the scope of coverage

Written by the judges who cited it.

Later courts went against this

  • Overruled by Preferred Risk Insurance v. Gill, 30 Ohio St. 3d 108 (1987)

    In such an action, the insurer may proceed to demonstrate that the facts alleged in the underlying tort complaint differ from the actual facts ascertained by the insurer, and that the actual facts remove the insured’s conduct from coverage.3 As both Transamerica and Pildner,4 supra, are inconsistent with this determination, they are hereby overruled.5
    Ohio Supreme CourtMay 20, 1987Read it

The opinion

CoeRioan, J.

Appellant, State Farm & Casualty Company, maintains that the suit against its insured, Pildner, is excluded from coverage under its homeowner’s policy because the injury suffered by the appellee Bryan was intentionally inflicted by the insured. Appellant urges that the insured’s conviction of the crime of intentional wounding is admissible to prove the exclusion from coverage, and appellant asks, therefore, that this court declare that- ap *104 pellant is not obligated to defend the insured in the suit giving rise to this action.

It is not necessary for this court to consider the question of the admissibility of the insured’s conviction of “intentional wounding.” The duty of an insurer, under a policy of liability insurance, to defend an action against an insured is dependent upon the scope of the allegations of the complaint in the action against the insured. Where the allegations of the complaint bring the action within the coverage of the policy, the insurer is required to defend, regardless of the ultimate outcome or its liability to the insured. Motorists Mutual v. Trainor (1973), 33 Ohio St. 2d 41 ; Lessak v. Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. (1958), 168 Ohio St. 153 ; Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Continental Cas. Co. (1945), 144 Ohio St. 382 ; Bloom-Rosenblum-Kline Co. v. Union Indemnity Co. (1929), 121 Ohio St. 220 .

In the present case, the Bryans’ complaint alleges only negligent injury. Appellant admits that liability for negligent injury is within the scope of coverage under the terms of its homeowner’s policy, and appellant has a duty to defend the insured in that action. The Court of Common Pleas was, therefore, correct in dismissing appellant’s complaint for declaratory judgment for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, since no facts giving rise to a justiciable controversy were presented in the complaint.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is, therefore, reversed.

Judgment reversed.

0 ’Neill, C. J., Herbert, Stern, Celebrezze, W. Brown and P. Brown JJ., concur.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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