explaining that “if the Ohio scheme is in- deed unconstitutional, surely the Ohio courts are better posi- tioned to determine—unless and until the Ohio legislature weighs in—how to comply with the mandate of equal treat- ment”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that “if the Ohio scheme is in- deed unconstitutional, surely the Ohio courts are better posi- tioned to determine—unless and until the Ohio legislature weighs in—how to comply with the mandate of equal treat- ment”
- recognizing that “[pjlaintiffs need not demonstrate that there is a ‘guarantee’ that their injuries will be redressed by a favorable decision” but “only that a favorable decision is likely to redress” their injuries
- noting that an adequate legal remedy “must be one cognizable in federal court ” (internal quotation marks omitted)
- holding that comity required plaintiffs’ claim to proceed originally in state court where plaintiffs alleged “discriminatory taxation in violation of the Commerce and Equal Protection Clauses”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by JMCB, LLC v. Bd. of Commerce & Indus., 293 F. Supp. 3d 580 (2017)
The Court bases this on two grounds: (1) the fact that the State Defendants have waived any objection to comity, and (2) Levin 's holding and reasoning, which are distinguishable from this case.
Distinguished by Petrella v. Brownback, 980 F. Supp. 2d 1293 (2013)
Levin is clearly distinguishable, as that case turned on the Supreme Court’s disfavor of the federal courts’ interference with state taxation schemes.
The opinion
SEPARATE OPINIONS
Justice Kennedy,
concurring.
The Court’s rationale in Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88 , 124 S. Ct. 2276 , 159 L. Ed. 2d 172 (2004), seems to me still doubtful. Nothing in the Court’s opinion today expands Hibbs’ holding further, however, and on that understanding I join the opinion of the Court.