concluding that physician did not violate privilege where physician did not refer to a loathsome disease or claimant communications but rather merely stated his medical opinion of claimant’s reactions to the tests he administered
How later courts described this case
- concluding that physician did not violate privilege where physician did not refer to a loathsome disease or claimant communications but rather merely stated his medical opinion of claimant’s reactions to the tests he administered
- [stating that the] “[b]lackening of the character results from testimony concerning a loathsome disease.”
- “Blackening of the character results from testimony concerning a loathsome disease.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
KELLEY, Judge,
concurring.
I agree with the majority that Dr. Holla’s testimony in this case is not barred by the physician-patient privilege, 42 Pa. C.S. § 5929. I write separately because I believe that the admissibility does not turn on whether the testimony concerns a “loathsome disease,” but rather on the fact that no communication between patient and doctor was involved.
Construing a prior statute, 1 our Supreme Court narrowly interpreted the term “information” to include only communications made to the physician by the patient. Phillips Estate, 295 Pa. 349 , 145 A. 437 (1929). Where a doctor bases his diagnosis on examination and observation, rather than communications by the patient, the privilege is inapplicable. Id. Our *497 courts have since applied this same interpretation to the language of the present statute. See In re June 1979 Allegheny County Investigating Grand Jury, 490 Pa. 143 , 415 A.2d 73 (1980); In re “B”, 482 Pa. 471 , 394 A.2d 419 (1978).
Furthermore, Superior Court, more than a half century ago, applied the ruling in Phillips Estate to a workmen’s compensation proceeding, refusing to exclude testimony based solely on a doctor’s observations as opposed to a confidential communication. Massich v. Keystone Coal & Coke Co., 137 Pa.Superior Ct. 541, 10 A.2d 98 (1939). I believe that this case answers the question left unanswered by the majority; that a workmen’s compensation proceeding is not a “civil matter brought by such patient, for damages on account of personal injuries” so as to fall within the exception found in 42 Pa.C.S. § 5929.
CRAIG, P.J., joins in this concurring opinion.
. Act of June 7, 1907, P.L. 462, formerly, 28 P.S. § 328, repealed by the Act of April 28, 1978, P.L. 202.