noting that a defendant is entitled to the assistance of counsel -8- J-S15030-23 at his parole revocation hearing because the assistance of counsel is required at every stage of a criminal proceeding where substantial rights of a criminal accused may be affected
How later courts described this case
- noting that a defendant is entitled to the assistance of counsel -8- J-S15030-23 at his parole revocation hearing because the assistance of counsel is required at every stage of a criminal proceeding where substantial rights of a criminal accused may be affected
- upholding the constitutional right of a convicted parolee to a revocation hearing and counsel, and, after failure of the board to afford the parolee those rights, remanding for a new revocation hearing
- prisoner has due process right to be heard by whole Board which must evaluate whether reasonable cause exists to believe parole has been violated; no reference to a delegation of authority to conduct the revocation hearing as in 28 DCMR 219.4 (1987)
- rejecting claimed violations of constitutional protections against double jeopardy and bills of attainder
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Manderino:
I concur in the majority except on the issue of a defendant’s right to credit for time spent on parole. Under no circumstances can a defendant be deprived of his freedom, either totally or partially, beyond a period of time equivalent to the maximum sentence imposed by judicial authority.
An individual who receives a maximum sentence and is never paroled serves only the maximum period and is not subjected to any partial limitation of his freedom for any period of time other than the maximum period.
An individual who is paroled for a period of time and then returned to serve the remaining balance of his maximum term fulfills his obligation of total incarceration for the maximum period originally authorized by his judgment of sentence and in addition has suffered the partial limitation of his freedom during the period of parole.
The cumulative effect constitutes a total penalty in excess of the maximum penalty originally imposed by the judgment of sentence. Such a result is without legislative or constitutional authority.