Maples v. Thomas

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2011 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

MAPLES v. THOMAS, COMMISSIONER, ALABAMA

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 10–63. Argued October 4, 2011—January 18, 2012

Petitioner Cory R. Maples was found guilty of murder and sentenced to

death in Alabama state court. In 2001, Maples sought postconviction

relief in state court under Alabama Rule 32. Maples alleged, among

other things, that his underpaid and inexperienced trial attorneys

failed to afford him the effective assistance guaranteed by the Sixth

Amendment. His petition was written by two pro bono attorneys,

Jaasai Munanka and Clara Ingen-Housz, both associated with the

New York offices of the Sullivan & Cromwell law firm. As required

by Alabama law, the two attorneys engaged an Alabama lawyer,

John Butler, to move their admission pro hac vice. Butler made

clear, however, that he would undertake no substantive involvement

in the case.

In 2002, while Maples’ state postconviction petition was pending,

Munanka and Ingen-Housz left Sullivan & Cromwell. Their new em-

ployment disabled them from representing Maples. They did not in-

form Maples of their departure and consequent inability to serve as

his counsel. In disregard of Alabama law, neither sought the trial

court’s leave to withdraw. No other Sullivan & Cromwell attorney

entered an appearance, moved to substitute counsel, or otherwise no-

tified the court of a change in Maples’ representation. Thus, Munan-

ka, Ingen-Housz, and Butler remained Maples’ listed, and only, at-

torneys of record.

The trial court denied Maples’ petition in May 2003. Notices of the

order were posted to Munanka and Ingen-Housz at Sullivan &

Cromwell’s address. When those postings were returned, unopened,

the trial court clerk attempted no further mailing. Butler also re-

ceived a copy of the order, but did not act on it. With no attorney of

2 MAPLES v. THOMAS

Syllabus

record in fact acting on Maples’ behalf, the 42-day period Maples had

to file a notice of appeal ran out.

About a month later, an Alabama Assistant Attorney General sent

a letter directly to Maples. The letter informed Maples of the missed

deadline and notified him that he had four weeks remaining to file a

federal habeas petition. Maples immediately contacted his mother,

who called Sullivan & Cromwell. Three Sullivan & Cromwell attor-

neys, through Butler, moved the trial court to reissue its order,

thereby restarting the 42-day appeal period. The court denied the

motion. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals then denied a writ

of mandamus that would have granted Maples leave to file an out-of-

time appeal, and the State Supreme Court affirmed.

Thereafter, Maples sought federal habeas relief. Both the District

Court and the Eleventh Circuit denied his request, pointing to the

procedural default in state court, i.e., Maples’ failure timely to appeal

the state trial court’s order denying his Rule 32 petition for postcon-

viction relief.

Held: Maples has shown the requisite “cause” to excuse his procedur-

al default. Pp. 11–22.

(a) As a rule, a federal court may not entertain a state prisoner’s

habeas claims “when (1) ‘a state court [has] declined to address

[those] claims because the prisoner had failed to meet a state proce-

dural requirement,’ and (2) ‘the state judgment rests on independent

and adequate state procedural grounds.’ ” Walker v. Martin, 562

U. S. ___, ___. The bar to federal review may be lifted, however, if

“the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the [procedural] default [in

state court] and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of

federal law.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U. S. 722, 750.

Cause for a procedural default exists where “something external to

the petitioner, something that cannot fairly be attributed to him[,]

. . . ‘impeded [his] efforts to comply with the State’s procedural rule.’ ”

Id., at 753. A prisoner’s postconviction attorney’s negligence does not

qualify as “cause,” ibid., because the attorney is the prisoner’s agent,

and under “well-settled” agency law, the principal bears the risk of

his agent’s negligent conduct, id., at 753–754. Thus, a petitioner is

bound by his attorney’s failure to meet a filing deadline and cannot

rely on that failure to establish cause. Ibid.

A markedly different situation arises, however, when an attorney

abandons his client without notice, and thereby occasions the default.

In such cases, the principal-agent relationship is severed and the at-

torney’s acts or omissions “cannot fairly be attributed to [the client].”

Id., at 753. Nor can the client be faulted for failing to act on his own

behalf when he lacks reason to believe his attorneys of record, in fact,

are not representing him.

Cite as: 565 U. S. ____ (2012) 3

Syllabus

Holland v. Florida, 560 U. S. ___, is instructive. There, the Court

found that the one-year deadline for filing a federal habeas petition

can be tolled for equitable reasons, and that an attorney’s unprofes-

sional conduct may sometimes be an “extraordinary circumstance”

justifying equitable tolling. Id., at ___, ___–___. The Court recog-

nized that an attorney’s negligence does not provide a basis for tolling

a statutory time limit. Id., at ___. Holland’s claim that he was aban-

doned by his attorney, however, if true, “would suffice to establish ex-

traordinary circumstances beyond his control,” id., at ___ (opinion of

ALITO, J.). Pp. 11–15.

(b) From the time of his initial Rule 32 petition until well after

time ran out for appealing the trial court’s denial of that petition,

Maples’ sole attorneys of record were Munanka, Ingen-Housz, and

Butler. Unknown to Maples, none of those lawyers was in fact serv-

ing as his attorney during the 42-day appeal period. Pp. 15–21.

(1) The State contends that Sullivan & Cromwell represented

Maples throughout his state postconviction proceedings, and that, as

a result, Maples cannot establish abandonment by counsel during the

42-day period. But it is undisputed that Munanka and Ingen-Housz

severed their agency relationship with Maples long before the default

occurred. Furthermore, because the attorneys did not seek the trial

court’s permission to withdraw, they allowed court records to convey

that they remained the attorneys of record. As such, the attorneys,

not Maples, would be the addressees of court orders Alabama law re-

quires the clerk to furnish.

The State asserts that, after Munanka’s and Ingen-Housz’s depar-

ture, other Sullivan & Cromwell attorneys came forward to serve as

Maples’ counsel. At the time of the default, however, those attorneys

had not been admitted to practice in Alabama, had not entered their

appearances on Maples’ behalf, and had done nothing to inform the

Alabama court that they wished to substitute for Munanka and Ingen-

Housz. Thus, they lacked the legal authority to act on Maples’

behalf before his time to appeal expired. Pp. 15–19.

(2) Maples’ only other attorney of record, local counsel Butler, did

not even begin to represent Maples. Butler told Munanka and Ingen-

Housz that he would serve as local counsel only for the purpose of en-

abling them to appear pro hac vice and would play no substantive

role in the case. Other factors confirm that Butler was not Maples’

“agent in any meaningful sense of that word.” Holland, 560 U. S., at

___ (opinion of ALITO, J.). Upon receiving a copy of the trial court’s

order, Butler did not contact Sullivan & Cromwell to ensure that firm

lawyers were taking appropriate action. Nor did the State treat But-

ler as Maples’ actual representative. Notably, the Alabama Assistant

Attorney General wrote directly and only to Maples, notwithstanding

4 MAPLES v. THOMAS

Syllabus

an ethical obligation to refrain from communicating directly with an

opposing party known to be represented by counsel. Pp. 19–20.

(3) Not only was Maples left without any functioning attorney of

record; the very listing of Munanka, Ingen-Housz, and Butler as his

representatives meant that he had no right personally to receive no-

tice. He in fact received none within the 42 days allowed for com-

mencing an appeal. Given no reason to suspect that he lacked coun-

sel able and willing to represent him, Maples surely was blocked from

complying with the State’s procedural rule. Pp. 20–21.

(c) “The cause and prejudice requirement shows due regard for

States’ finality and comity interests while ensuring that ‘fundamen-

tal fairness [remains] the central concern of the writ of habeas cor-

pus.’ ” Dretke v. Haley, 541 U. S. 386, 393. In the unusual circum-

stances of this case, agency law principles and fundamental fairness

point to the same conclusion: there was indeed cause to excuse Ma-

ples’ procedural default. Through no fault of his own, he lacked the

assistance of any authorized attorney during the 42-day appeal peri-

od. And he had no reason to suspect that, in reality, he had been re-

duced to pro se status. Pp. 21–22.

(d) The question of prejudice, which neither the District Court nor

the Eleventh Circuit reached, remains open for decision on remand.

P. 22.

586 F. 3d 879, reversed and remanded.

GINSBURG, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,

C. J., and KENNEDY, BREYER, ALITO, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined.

ALITO, J., filed a concurring opinion. SCALIA, J., filed a dissenting opin-

ion, in which THOMAS, J., joined.

Cite as: 565 U. S. ____ (2012) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-

ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 10–63

_________________

CORY R. MAPLES, PETITIONER v. KIM T. THOMAS,

COMMISSIONER, ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTIONS

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

[January 18, 2012]

JUSTICE GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court.

Cory R. Maples is an Alabama capital prisoner sen-

tenced to death in 1997 for the murder of two individuals.

At trial, he was represented by two appointed lawyers,

minimally paid and with scant experience in capital cases.

Maples sought postconviction relief in state court, alleging

ineffective assistance of counsel and several other trial

infirmities. His petition, filed in August 2001, was written

by two New York attorneys serving pro bono, both associ-

ated with the same New York-based large law firm. An

Alabama attorney, designated as local counsel, moved

the admission of the out-of-state counsel pro hac vice. As

understood by New York counsel, local counsel would

facilitate their appearance, but would undertake no sub-

stantive involvement in the case.

In the summer of 2002, while Maples’ postconviction

petition remained pending in the Alabama trial court, his

New York attorneys left the law firm; their new employ-

ment disabled them from continuing to represent Maples.

They did not inform Maples of their departure and conse-

2 MAPLES v. THOMAS

Opinion of the Court

quent inability to serve as his counsel. Nor did they seek

the Alabama trial court’s leave to withdraw. Neither they

nor anyone else moved for the substitution of counsel able

to handle Maples’ case.

In May 2003, the Alabama trial court denied Maples’

petition. Notices of the court’s order were posted to the

New York attorneys at the address of the law firm with

which they had been associated. Those postings were re-

turned, unopened, to the trial court clerk, who attempt-

ed no further mailing. With no attorney of record in fact

acting on Maples’ behalf, the time to appeal ran out.

Thereafter, Maples petitioned for a writ of habeas

corpus in federal court. The District Court and, in turn,

the Eleventh Circuit, rejected his petition, pointing to the

procedural default in state court, i.e., Maples’ failure

timely to appeal the Alabama trial court’s order denying

him postconviction relief. Maples, it is uncontested, was

blameless for the default.

The sole question this Court has taken up for review is

whether, on the extraordinary facts of Maples’ case, there

is “cause” to excuse the default. Maples maintains that

there is, for the lawyers he believed to be vigilantly repre-

senting him had abandoned the case without leave of

court, without informing Maples they could no longer

represent him, and without securing any recorded substi-

tution of counsel. We agree. Abandoned by counsel, Ma-

ples was left unrepresented at a critical time for his state

postconviction petition, and he lacked a clue of any need to

protect himself pro se. In these circumstances, no just

system would lay the default at Maples’ death-cell door.

Satisfied that the requisite cause has been shown, we

reverse the Eleventh Circuit’s judgment.

I

A

Alabama sets low eligibility requirements for lawyers

Cite as: 565 U. S. ____ (2012) 3

Opinion of the Court

appointed to represent indigent capital defendants at trial.

American Bar Association, Evaluating Fairness and Accu-

racy in State Death Penalty Systems: The Alabama Death

Penalty Assessment Report 117–120 (June 2006) (herein-

after ABA Report); Brief for Alabama Appellate Court

Justices et al. as Amici Curiae 7–8 (hereinafter Justices

Brief). Appointed counsel need only be a member of the

Alabama bar and have “five years’ prior experience in the

active practice of criminal law.” Ala. Code §13A–5–54

(2006). Experience with capital cases is not required.

Justices Brief 7–8. Nor does the State provide, or require

appointed counsel to gain, any capital-case-specific profes-

sional education or training. ABA Report 129–131; Jus-

tices Brief 14–16.

Appointed counsel in death penalty cases are also un-

dercompensated. ABA Report 124–129; Justices Brief 12–

14. Until 1999, the State paid appointed capital defense

attorneys just “$40.00 per hour for time expended in court

and $20.00 per hour for time reasonably expended out of

court in the preparation of [the defendant’s] case.” Ala.

Code §15–12–21(d) (1995). Although death penalty litiga-

tion is plainly time intensive,1 the State capped at $1,000

fees recoverable by capital defense attorneys for out-of-

court work. Ibid.2 Even today, court-appointed attorneys

receive only $70 per hour. 2011 Ala. Acts no. 2011–678,

pp. 1072–1073, §6.

——————

1 One study of federal capital trials from 1990 to 1997 found that de-

fense attorneys spent an average of 1,480 out-of-court hours prepar-

ing a defendant’s case. Subcommittee on Federal Death Penalty Cases,

Committee on Defender Services, Judicial Conference of the United

States, Federal Death Penalty Cases: Recommendations Concerning the

Cost and Quality of Defense Representation 14 (May 1998).

2 In 1999, the State removed the cap on fees for out-of-court work in

capital cases. Ala. Code §15–12–21(d) (2010 Cum. Supp.). Perhaps not

coincidentally, 70% of the inmates on Alabama’s death row in 2006,

including Maples, had been convicted when the $1,000 cap was in

effect. ABA Report 126.

4 MAPLES v. THOMAS

Opinion of the Court

Nearly alone among the States, Alabama does not guar-

antee representation to indigent capital defendants in

postconviction proceedings. ABA Report 111–112, 158–

160; Justices Brief 33. The State has elected, instead, “to

rely on the efforts of typically well-funded [out-of-state]

volunteers.” Brief in Opposition in Barbour v. Allen, O. T.

2006, No. 06–10605, p. 23. Thus, as of 2006, 86% of the

attorneys representing Alabama’s death row inmates in

state collateral review proceedings “either worked for the

Equal Justice Initiative (headed by NYU Law professor

Bryan Stevenson), out-of-state public interest groups like

the Innocence Project, or an out-of-state mega-firm.” Brief

in Opposition 16, n. 4. On occasion, some prisoners sen-

tenced to death receive no postconviction representation at

all. See ABA Report 112 (“[A]s of April 2006, approxi-

mately fifteen of Alabama’s death row inmates in the fi-

nal rounds of state appeals had no lawyer to represent

them.”).

B

This system was in place when, in 1997, Alabama

charged Maples with two counts of capital murder; the

victims, Stacy Alan Terry and Barry Dewayne Robinson

II, were Maples’ friends who, on the night of the murders,

had been out on the town with him. Maples pleaded not

guilty, and his case proceeded to trial, where he was rep-

resented by two court-appointed Alabama attorneys. Only

one of them had earlier served in a capital case. See Tr.

3081. Neither counsel had previously tried the penalty

phase of a capital case. Compensation for each lawyer was

capped at $1,000 for time spent out-of-court preparing

Maples’ case, and at $40 per hour for in-court services.

See Ala. Code §15–12–21 (1995).

Finding Maples guilty on both counts, the jury recom-

mended that he be sentenced to death. The vote was 10 to

2, the minimum number Alabama requires for a death

Cite as: 565 U. S. ____ (2012) 5

Opinion of the Court

recommendation. See Ala. Code §13A–5–46(f) (1994)

(“The decision of the jury to recommend a sentence of

death must be based on a vote of at least 10 jurors.”).

Accepting the jury’s recommendation, the trial court sen-

tenced Maples to death. On direct appeal, the Alabama

Court of Criminal Appeals and the Alabama Supreme

Court affirmed the convictions and sentence. Ex parte

Maples, 758 So. 2d 81 (Ala. 1999); Maples v. State, 758

So. 2d 1 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999). We denied certiorari.

Maples v. Alabama, 531 U. S. 830 (2000).

Two out-of-state volunteers represented Maples in

postconviction proceedings: Jaasi Munanka and Clara

Ingen-Housz, both associates at the New York offices of

the Sullivan & Cromwell law firm. At the time, Alabama

required out-of-state attorneys to associate local counsel

when seeking admission to practice pro hac vice before an

Alabama court, regardless of the nature of the proceeding.

Rule Governing Admission to the Ala. State Bar VII (2000)

(hereinafter Rule VII).3 The Alabama Rule further pre-

scribed that the local attorney’s name “appear on all no-

tices, orders, pleadings, and other documents filed in the

cause,” and that local counsel “accept joint and several

responsibility with the foreign attorney to the client, to

opposing parties and counsel, and to the court or adminis-

trative agency in all matters [relating to the case].”

Rule VII(C).

Munanka and Ingen-Housz associated Huntsville, Ala-

bama attorney John Butler as local counsel. Notwith-

standing his obligations under Alabama law, Butler

informed Munanka and Ingen-Housz, “at the outset,” that

he would serve as local counsel only for the purpose of

——————

3 In 2006, Alabama revised Rule VII. See Rule Governing Admission

to the Ala. State Bar VII (2009). Under the new rule, the State allows

out-of-state counsel to represent pro bono indigent criminal defendants

in postconviction proceedings without involvement of local counsel.

Ibid.

6 MAPLES v. THOMAS

Opinion of the Court

allowing the two New York attorneys to appear pro hac

vice on behalf of Maples. App. to Pet. for Cert. 255a.

Given his lack of “resources, available time [and] experi-

ence,” Butler told the Sullivan & Cromwell lawyers, he

could not “deal with substantive issues in the case.” Ibid.

The Sullivan & Cromwell attorneys accepted Butler’s

conditions. Id., at 257a. This arrangement between out-

of-state and local attorneys, it appears, was hardly atypi-

cal. See Justices Brief 36 (“The fact is that local counsel

for out-of-state attorneys in post-conviction litigation most

often do nothing other than provide the mechanism for

foreign attorneys to be admitted.”).

With the aid of his pro bono counsel, Maples filed a

petition for postconviction relief under Alabama Rule of

Criminal Procedure 32.4 Among other claims, Maples

asserted that his court-appointed attorneys provided con-

stitutionally ineffective assistance during both guilt and

penalty phases of his capital trial. App. 29–126. He

alleged, in this regard, that his inexperienced and under-

funded attorneys failed to develop and raise an obvious

intoxication defense, did not object to several egregious

instances of prosecutorial misconduct, and woefully un-

derprepared for the penalty phase of his trial. The State

responded by moving for summary dismissal of Maples’

petition. On December 27, 2001, the trial court denied the

State’s motion.

Some seven months later, in the summer of 2002, both

Munanka and Ingen-Housz left Sullivan & Cromwell.

App. to Pet. for Cert. 258a. Munanka gained a clerkship

with a federal judge; Ingen-Housz accepted a position with

the European Commission in Belgium. Ibid. Neither

attorney told Maples of their departure from Sullivan &

Cromwell or of their resulting inability to continue to

——————

4 Originally filed in August 2001, the petition was resubmitted, with

only minor alterations, in December 2001. See App. 22–24, 28–142.

Cite as: 565 U. S. ____ (2012) 7

Opinion of the Court

represent him. In disregard of Alabama law, see Ala. Rule

Crim. Proc. 6.2, Comment, neither attorney sought the

trial court’s leave to withdraw, App. to Pet. for Cert. 223a.

Compounding Munanka’s and Ingen-Housz’s inaction, no

other Sullivan & Cromwell lawyer entered an appearance

on Maples’ behalf, moved to substitute counsel, or other-

wise notified the court of any change in Maples’ represen-

tation. Ibid.

Another nine months passed. During this time period,

no Sullivan & Cromwell attorneys assigned to Maples’

case sought admission to the Alabama bar, entered ap-

pearances on Maples’ behalf, or otherwise advised the

Alabama court that Munanka and Ingen-Housz were no

longer Maples’ attorneys. Thus, Munanka and Ingen-

Housz (along with Butler) remained Maples’ listed, and

only, “attorneys of record.” Id., at 223a.

There things stood when, in May 2003, the trial court,

without holding a hearing, entered an order denying

Maples’ Rule 32 petition. App. 146–225.5 The clerk of the

Alabama trial court mailed copies of the order to Maples’

three attorneys of record. He sent Munanka’s and Ingen-

Housz’s copies to Sullivan & Cromwell’s New York ad-

dress, which the pair had provided upon entering their

appearances.

When those copies arrived at Sullivan & Cromwell,

Munanka and Ingen-Housz had long since departed. The

notices, however, were not forwarded to another Sullivan

& Cromwell attorney. Instead, a mailroom employee sent

the unopened envelopes back to the court. “Returned to

Sender—Attempted, Unknown” was stamped on the enve-

lope addressed to Munanka. App. to Reply to Brief in

——————

5 One of Maples’ attorneys observed, without contradiction, that the

trial court’s order was a “word for word copy of the proposed Order that

the State had submitted [with] its [December 2001] Motion to Dismiss.”

Id., at 300.

8 MAPLES v. THOMAS

Opinion of the Court

Opposition 8a. A similar stamp appeared on the envelope

addressed to Ingen-Housz, along with the handwritten

notation “Return to Sender—Left Firm.” Id., at 7a.

Upon receiving back the unopened envelopes he had

mailed to Munanka and Ingen-Housz, the Alabama court

clerk took no further action. In particular, the clerk did

not contact Munanka or Ingen-Housz at the personal

telephone numbers or home addresses they had provided

in their pro hac vice applications. See Ingen-Housz Veri-

fied Application for Admission to Practice Under Rule VII,

p. 1; and Munanka Verified Application for Admission to

Practice Under Rule VII, p. 1, in Maples v. State, No. CC–

95–842.60 (C. C. Morgan Cty., Ala.). Nor did the clerk

alert Sullivan & Cromwell or Butler. Butler received his

copy of the order, but did not act on it. App. to Pet. for

Cert. 256a. He assumed that Munanka and Ingen-Housz,

who had been “CC’d” on the order, would take care of filing

an appeal. Ibid.

Meanwhile, the clock ticked on Maples’ appeal. Under

Alabama’s Rules of Appellate Procedure, Maples had 42

days to file a notice of appeal from the trial court’s May 22,

2003 order denying Maples’ petition for postconviction

relief. Rule 4(a)(1) (2000). No appeal notice was filed, and

the time allowed for filing expired on July 7, 2003.

A little over a month later, on August 13, 2003, Ala-

bama Assistant Attorney General Jon Hayden, the attor-

ney representing the State in Maples’ collateral review

proceedings, sent a letter directly to Maples. App. to Pet.

for Cert. 253a–254a. Hayden’s letter informed Maples of

the missed deadline for initiating an appeal within the

State’s system, and notified him that four weeks remained

during which he could file a federal habeas petition. Ibid.

Hayden mailed the letter to Maples only, using his prison

address. Ibid. No copy was sent to Maples’ attorneys of

record, or to anyone else acting on Maples’ behalf. Ibid.

Upon receiving the State’s letter, Maples immediately

Cite as: 565 U. S. ____ (2012) 9

Opinion of the Court

contacted his mother. Id., at 258a. She telephoned Sulli-

van & Cromwell to inquire about her son’s case. Ibid.

Prompted by her call, Sullivan & Cromwell attorneys

Marc De Leeuw, Felice Duffy, and Kathy Brewer submit-

ted a motion, through Butler, asking the trial court to

reissue its order denying Maples’ Rule 32 petition, thereby

restarting the 42-day appeal period. Id., at 222a.

The trial court denied the motion, id., at 222a–225a, not-

ing that Munanka and Ingen-Housz had not withdrawn

from the case and, consequently, were “still attor-

neys of record for the petitioner,” id., at 223a. Further-

more, the court added, attorneys De Leeuw, Duffy, and

Brewer had not “yet been admitted to practice in Ala-

bama” or “entered appearances as attorneys of record.”

Ibid. “How,” the court asked, “can a Circuit Clerk in

Decatur, Alabama know what is going on in a law firm in

New York, New York?” Id., at 223a–224a. Declining to

blame the clerk for the missed notice of appeal deadline,

the court said it was “unwilling to enter into subterfuge in

order to gloss over mistakes made by counsel for the peti-

tioner.” Ibid.

Maples next petitioned the Alabama Court of Criminal

Appeals for a writ of mandamus, granting him leave to file

an out-of-time appeal. Rejecting Maples’ plea, the Court of

Criminal Appeals determined that, although the clerk had

“assumed a duty to notify the parties of the resolution of

Maples’s Rule 32 petition,” the clerk had satisfied that

obligation by sending notices to the attorneys of record at

the addresses those attorneys provided. Id., at 234a–235a.

Butler’s receipt of the order, the court observed, sufficed to

notify all attorneys “in light of their apparent co-counsel

status.” Id., at 235a–236a (quoting Thomas v. Kellett, 489

So. 2d 554, 555 (Ala. 1986)). The Alabama Supreme Court

summarily affirmed the Court of Criminal Appeals’ judg-

ment, App. to Pet. for Cert. 237a, and this Court denied

certiorari, Maples v. Alabama, 543 U. S. 1148 (2005).

10 MAPLES v. THOMAS

Opinion of the Court

Having exhausted his state postconviction remedies,

Maples sought federal habeas corpus relief. Addressing

the ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims Maples

stated in his federal petition, the State urged that Maples

had forever forfeited those claims. Maples did, indeed,

present the claims in his state postconviction (Rule 32)

petition, the State observed, but he did not timely appeal

from the trial court’s denial of his petition. That proce-

dural default, the State maintained, precluded federal-

court consideration of the claims.6 Maples replied that the

default should be excused, because he missed the appeal

deadline “through no fault of his own.” App. 262 (internal

quotation marks omitted).

The District Court determined that Maples had default-

ed his ineffective-assistance claims, and that he had not

shown “cause” sufficient to overcome the default. App. to

Pet. for Cert. 49a–55a. The court understood Maples to

argue that errors committed by his postconviction counsel,

not any lapse on the part of the court clerk in Alabama,

provided the requisite “cause” to excuse his failure to meet

Alabama’s 42-days-to-appeal Rule. Id., at 55a. Such an

argument was inadmissible, the court ruled, because this

Court, in Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U. S. 722 (1991), had

held that the ineffectiveness of postconviction appellate

counsel could not qualify as cause. App. to Pet. for Cert.

55a (citing Coleman, 501 U. S., at 751).

A divided panel of the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Ma-

ples v. Allen, 586 F. 3d 879 (2009) (per curiam). In accord

with the District Court, the Court of Appeals’ majority

held that Maples defaulted his ineffective-assistance

——————

6 In opposing Maples’ request for an out-of-time appeal, the State

argued to the Alabama Supreme Court that such an appeal was unwar-

ranted. In that context, the State noted that Maples “may still present

his postconviction claims to [the federal habeas] court.” 35 Record, Doc.

No. 55, p. 22, n. 4. The State’s current position is in some tension with

that observation.

Cite as: 565 U. S. ____ (2012) 11

Opinion of the Court

claims in state court by failing to file a timely notice of

appeal, id., at 890, and that Coleman rendered Maples’

assertion of “cause” unacceptable, 586 F. 3d, at 891.

Judge Barkett dissented. Id., at 895–898. She conclud-

ed that the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals had acted

“arbitrarily” in refusing to grant Maples’ request for an

out-of-time appeal. Id., at 896. In a case involving “indis-

tinguishable facts,” Judge Barkett noted, the Alabama

appellate court had allowed the petitioner to file a late

appeal. Ibid. (citing Marshall v. State, 884 So. 2d 898, 899

(Ala. Crim. App. 2002)). Inconsistent application of the

42-days-to-appeal rule, Judge Barkett said, “render[ed]

the rule an inadequate ground on which to bar federal

review of Maples’s claims.” 586 F. 3d, at 897. The inter-

ests of justice, she added, required review of Maples’

claims in view of the exceptional circumstances and high

stakes involved, and the absence of any fault on Maples’

part. Ibid.

We granted certiorari to decide whether the uncommon

facts presented here establish cause adequate to excuse

Maples’ procedural default. 562 U. S. ___ (2011).

II

A

As a rule, a state prisoner’s habeas claims may not be

entertained by a federal court “when (1) ‘a state court

[has] declined to address [those] claims because the pris-

oner had failed to meet a state procedural requirement,’

and (2) ‘the state judgment rests on independent and

adequate state procedural grounds.’ ” Walker v. Martin,

562 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 7) (quoting Coleman,

501 U. S., at 729–730). The bar to federal review may be

lifted, however, if “the prisoner can demonstrate cause for

the [procedural] default [in state court] and actual preju-

dice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law.” Id.,

at 750; see Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72, 84–85

12 MAPLES v. THOMAS

Opinion of the Court

(1977).

Given the single issue on which we granted review, we

will assume, for purposes of this decision, that the Ala-

bama Court of Criminal Appeals’ refusal to consider

Maples’ ineffective-assistance claims rested on an independ-

ent and adequate state procedural ground: namely,

Maples’ failure to satisfy Alabama’s Rule requiring a

notice of appeal to be filed within 42 days from the trial

court’s final order. Accordingly, we confine our considera-

tion to the question whether Maples has shown cause to

excuse the missed notice of appeal deadline.

Cause for a procedural default exists where “something

external to the petitioner, something that cannot fairly be

attributed to him[,] . . . ‘impeded [his] efforts to comply

with the State’s procedural rule.’ ” Coleman, 501 U. S., at

753 (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U. S. 478, 488 (1986);

emphasis in original). Negligence on the part of a prison-

er’s postconviction attorney does not qualify as “cause.”

Coleman, 501 U. S., at 753. That is so, we reasoned in

Coleman, because the attorney is the prisoner’s agent, and

under “well-settled principles of agency law,” the principal

bears the risk of negligent conduct on the part of his

agent. Id., at 753–754. See also Irwin v. Department of

Veterans Affairs, 498 U. S. 89, 92 (1990) (“Under our

system of representative litigation, ‘each party is deemed

bound by the acts of his lawyer-agent.’ ” (quoting Link v.

Wabash R. Co., 370 U. S. 626, 634 (1962))). Thus, when a

petitioner’s postconviction attorney misses a filing dead-

line, the petitioner is bound by the oversight and cannot

rely on it to establish cause. Coleman, 501 U. S., at 753–

754. We do not disturb that general rule.

A markedly different situation is presented, however, when

an attorney abandons his client without notice, and there-

by occasions the default. Having severed the principal-

agent relationship, an attorney no longer acts, or fails

to act, as the client’s representative. See 1 Restatement

Cite as: 565 U. S. ____ (2012) 13

Opinion of the Court

(Third) of Law Governing Lawyers §31, Comment f (1998)

(“Withdrawal, whether proper or improper, terminates

the lawyer’s authority to act for the client.”). His acts or

omissions therefore “cannot fairly be attributed to [the

client].” Coleman, 501 U. S., at 753. See, e.g., Jamison v.

Lockhart, 975 F. 2d 1377, 1380 (CA8 1992) (attorney

conduct may provide cause to excuse a state procedural

default where, as a result of a conflict of interest, the

attorney “ceased to be [petitioner’s] agent”); Porter v.

State, 339 Ark. 15, 16–19, 2 S. W. 3d 73, 74–76 (1999)

(finding “good cause” for petitioner’s failure to file a timely

habeas petition where the petitioner’s attorney terminated

his representation without notifying petitioner and with-

out taking “any formal steps to withdraw as the attorney

of record”).

Our recent decision in Holland v. Florida, 560 U. S. ___

(2010), is instructive. That case involved a missed one-

year deadline, prescribed by 28 U. S. C. §2244(d), for filing

a federal habeas petition. Holland presented two issues:

first, whether the §2244(d) time limitation can be tolled

for equitable reasons, and, second, whether an attorney’s

unprofessional conduct can ever count as an “extraordi-

nary circumstance” justifying equitable tolling. 560 U. S.,

at ___, ___–___ (slip op., at 1, 16–17) (internal quotation

marks omitted). We answered yes to both questions.

On the second issue, the Court recognized that an at-

torney’s negligence, for example, miscalculating a filing

deadline, does not provide a basis for tolling a statutory

time limit. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 19); id., at ___–___

(ALITO, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)

(slip op., at 5–6); see Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U. S. 327,

336 (2007). The Holland petitioner, however, urged that

attorney negligence was not the gravamen of his com-

plaint. Rather, he asserted that his lawyer had detached

himself from any trust relationship with his client: “[My

lawyer] has abandoned me,” the petitioner complained to

14 MAPLES v. THOMAS

Opinion of the Court

the court. 560 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 3–4) (brackets

and internal quotation marks omitted); see Nara v. Frank,

264 F. 3d 310, 320 (CA3 2001) (ordering a hearing on

whether a client’s effective abandonment by his lawyer

merited tolling of the one-year deadline for filing a federal

habeas petition).

In a concurring opinion in Holland, JUSTICE ALITO

homed in on the essential difference between a claim of

attorney error, however egregious, and a claim that an

attorney had essentially abandoned his client. 560 U. S.,

at ___–___ (slip op., at 5–7). Holland’s plea fit the latter

category: He alleged abandonment “evidenced by counsel’s

near-total failure to communicate with petitioner or to

respond to petitioner’s many inquiries and requests over a

period of several years.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 6); see id.,

at ___–___, ___ (majority opinion) (slip op., at 3–4, 20). If

true, JUSTICE ALITO explained, “petitioner’s allegations

would suffice to establish extraordinary circumstances

beyond his control[:] Common sense dictates that a liti-

gant cannot be held constructively responsible for the

conduct of an attorney who is not operating as his agent

in any meaningful sense of that word.” Id., at ___ (slip op.,

at 6).7

We agree that, under agency principles, a client cannot

be charged with the acts or omissions of an attorney who

has abandoned him. Nor can a client be faulted for failing

to act on his own behalf when he lacks reason to believe

his attorneys of record, in fact, are not representing him.

We therefore inquire whether Maples has shown that his

attorneys of record abandoned him, thereby supplying the

——————

7 Holland v. Florida, 560 U. S. ___ (2010), involved tolling of a federal

time bar, while Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U. S. 722 (1991), concerned

cause for excusing a procedural default in state court. See Holland, 560

U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 18). We see no reason, however, why the

distinction between attorney negligence and attorney abandonment

should not hold in both contexts.

Cite as: 565 U. S. ____ (2012) 15

Opinion of the Court

“extraordinary circumstances beyond his control,” ibid.,

necessary to lift the state procedural bar to his federal

petition.

B

From the time he filed his initial Rule 32 petition until

well after time ran out for appealing the trial court’s

denial of that petition, Maples had only three attorneys of

record: Munanka, Ingen-Housz, and Butler. Unknown to

Maples, not one of these lawyers was in fact serving as his

attorney during the 42 days permitted for an appeal from

the trial court’s order.

1

The State contends that Sullivan & Cromwell repre-

sented Maples throughout his state postconviction pro-

ceedings. Accordingly, the State urges, Maples cannot

establish abandonment by counsel continuing through the

six weeks allowed for noticing an appeal from the trial

court’s denial of his Rule 32 petition. We disagree. It is

undisputed that Munanka and Ingen-Housz severed their

agency relationship with Maples long before the default

occurred. See Brief for Respondent 47 (conceding that the

two attorneys erred in failing to file motions to withdraw

from the case). Both Munanka and Ingen-Housz left

Sullivan & Cromwell’s employ in the summer of 2002, at

least nine months before the Alabama trial court entered

its order denying Rule 32 relief. App. to Pet. for Cert.

258a. Their new employment—Munanka as a law clerk

for a federal judge, Ingen-Housz as an employee of the

European Commission in Belgium—disabled them from

continuing to represent Maples. See Code of Conduct for

Judicial Employees, Canon 4(D)(3) (1999) (prohibiting

judicial employees from participating in “litigation against

federal, state or local government”); Staff Regulations of

Officials of the European Commission, Tit. I, Art. 12b

16 MAPLES v. THOMAS

Opinion of the Court

(2004) (employees cannot perform outside work with-

out first obtaining authorization from the Commission),

available at http://ec.europa.eu/civil_service/docs/toc100_

en.pdf (as visited Jan. 13, 2012, and in Clerk of Court’s

case file). Hornbook agency law establishes that the at-

torneys’ departure from Sullivan & Cromwell and their

commencement of employment that prevented them from

representing Maples ended their agency relationship with

him. See 1 Restatement (Second) of Agency §112 (1957)

(hereinafter Restatement (Second)) (“[T]he authority of an

agent terminates if, without knowledge of the principal, he

acquires adverse interests or if he is otherwise guilty of

a serious breach of loyalty to the principal.”); 2 id., §394,

Comment a (“[T]he agent commits a breach of duty [of

loyalty] to his principal by acting for another in an under-

taking which has a substantial tendency to cause him to

disregard his duty to serve his principal with only his

principal’s purposes in mind.”).

Furthermore, the two attorneys did not observe Ala-

bama’s Rule requiring them to seek the trial court’s per-

mission to withdraw. See Ala. Rule Crim. Proc. 6.2,

Comment. Cf. 1 Restatement (Second) §111, Comment b

(“[I]t is ordinarily inferred that a principal does not intend

an agent to do an illegal act.”). By failing to seek permis-

sion to withdraw, Munanka and Ingen-Housz allowed the

court’s records to convey that they represented Maples.

As listed attorneys of record, they, not Maples, would be

the addressees of court orders Alabama law requires the

clerk to furnish. See Ala. Rule Crim. Proc. 34.5 (“Upon

the entry of any order in a criminal proceeding made in

response to a motion, . . . the clerk shall, without undue

delay, furnish all parties a copy thereof by mail or by other

appropriate means.”) and 34.4 (“[W]here the defendant is

represented by counsel, service shall be made upon the

attorney of record.”).

Although acknowledging that Munanka and Ingen-

Cite as: 565 U. S. ____ (2012) 17

Opinion of the Court

Housz severed their agency relationship with Maples upon

their departure from Sullivan & Cromwell, the State

argues that, nonetheless, Maples was not abandoned.

Other attorneys at the firm, the State asserts, continued

to serve as Maples’ counsel. Regarding this assertion, we

note, first, that the record is cloudy on the role other Sulli-

van & Cromwell attorneys played. In an affidavit submit-

ted to the Alabama trial court in support of Maples’

request that the court reissue its Rule 32 order, see supra,

at 9, partner Marc De Leeuw stated that he had been “in-

volved in [Maples’] case since the summer of 2001.” App.

to Pet. for Cert. 257a. After the trial court initially denied

the State’s motion to dismiss in December 2001, De Leeuw

informed the court, Sullivan & Cromwell “lawyers working

on this case for Mr. Maples prepared for [an anticipated]

evidentiary hearing.” Id., at 258a. Another Sullivan &

Cromwell attorney, Felice Duffy, stated, in an affidavit

submitted to the Alabama trial court in September 2003,

that she “ha[d] worked on [Maples’] case since October 14,

2002.” App. 231. But neither De Leeuw nor Duffy de-

scribed what their “involve[ment]” or “wor[k] on [Maples’]

case” entailed. And neither attorney named the lawyers,

other than Munanka and Ingen-Housz (both of them still

with Sullivan & Cromwell in December 2001), engaged in

preparation for the expected hearing. Nor did De Leeuw

identify the specific work, if any, other lawyers performed

on Maples’ case between Munanka’s and Ingen-Housz’s

departures and the firm’s receipt of the telephone call

from Maples’ mother.8

——————

8 The unclear state of the record is perhaps not surprising, given Sul-

livan & Cromwell’s representation of Maples after the default. As

amici for Maples explain, a significant conflict of interest arose for the

firm once the crucial deadline passed. Brief for Legal Ethics Professors

et al. as Amici Curiae 23–27. Following the default, the firm’s interest

in avoiding damage to its own reputation was at odds with Maples’

strongest argument—i.e., that his attorneys had abandoned him,

18 MAPLES v. THOMAS

Opinion of the Court

The slim record on activity at Sullivan & Cromwell,

however, does not warrant a remand to determine more

precisely the work done by firm lawyers other than Mu-

nanka and Ingen-Housz. For the facts essential to our

decision are not in doubt. At the time of the default, the

Sullivan & Cromwell attorneys who later came forward—

De Leeuw, Felice Duffy, and Kathy Brewer—had not been

admitted to practice law in Alabama, had not entered

their appearances on Maples’ behalf, and had done noth-

ing to inform the Alabama court that they wished to sub-

stitute for Munanka and Ingen-Housz. Thus, none of

these attorneys had the legal authority to act on Maples’

behalf before his time to appeal expired. Cf. 1 Restate-

ment (Second) §111 (The “failure to acquire a qualification

by the agent without which it is illegal to do an authorized

act . . . terminates the agent’s authority to act.”).9 What

they did or did not do in their New York offices is therefore

——————

therefore he had cause to be relieved from the default. Yet Sullivan &

Cromwell did not cede Maples’ representation to a new attorney, who

could have made Maples’ abandonment argument plain to the Court of

Appeals. Instead, the firm represented Maples through briefing and

oral argument in the Eleventh Circuit, where they attempted to cast

responsibility for the mishap on the clerk of the Alabama trial court.

Given Sullivan & Cromwell’s conflict of interest, Maples’ federal habeas

petition, prepared and submitted by the firm, is not persuasive evi-

dence that Maples, prior to the default, ever “viewed himself” as repre-

sented by “the firm,” see post, at 4, rather than by his attorneys of

record, Munanka and Ingen-Housz.

9 The dissent argues that the Sullivan & Cromwell attorneys had no

basis “to infer that Maples no longer wanted them to represent him,

simply because they had not yet qualified before the Alabama court.”

Post, at 6–7. While that may be true, it is irrelevant. What the attor-

neys could have inferred is that Maples would not have wanted them to

file a notice of appeal on his behalf prior to their admission to practice

in Alabama, for doing so would be “illegal,” post, at 7 (internal quota-

tion marks omitted). See also 1 Restatement (Second) §111, Comment

b, quoted supra, at 16. For the critical purpose of filing a notice of

appeal, then, the other Sullivan & Cromwell attorneys had no authority

to act for Maples.

Cite as: 565 U. S. ____ (2012) 19

Opinion of the Court

beside the point. At the time critical to preserving Maples’

access to an appeal, they, like Munanka and Ingen-Housz,

were not Maples’ authorized agents.

2

Maples’ only other attorney of record, local counsel

Butler, also left him abandoned. Indeed, Butler did not

even begin to represent Maples. Butler informed Munan-

ka and Ingen-Housz that he would serve as local counsel

only for the purpose of enabling the two out-of-state attor-

neys to appear pro hac vice. Supra, at 5–6. Lacking the

necessary “resources, available time [and] experience,”

Butler told the two Sullivan & Cromwell lawyers, he

would not “deal with substantive issues in the case.” Ibid.

That the minimal participation he undertook was incon-

sistent with Alabama law, see Rule VII, supra, at 5, un-

derscores the absurdity of holding Maples barred because

Butler signed on as local counsel.

In recognizing that Butler had no role in the case other

than to allow Munanka and Ingen-Housz to appear pro

hac vice, we need not rely solely on Butler’s and De

Leeuw’s statements to that effect. App. to Pet. for Cert.

255a–258a. Other factors confirm that Butler did not

“operat[e] as [Maples’] agent in any meaningful sense of

that word.” Holland, 560 U. S., at ___ (ALITO, J., concur-

ring in part and concurring in judgment) (slip op., at 6).

The first is Butler’s own conduct. Upon receiving a copy of

the trial court’s Rule 32 order, Butler did not contact

Sullivan & Cromwell to ensure that firm lawyers were

taking appropriate action. Although Butler had reason to

believe that Munanka and Ingen-Housz had received a

copy of the court’s order, see App. 225 (indicating that

Munanka and Ingen-Housz were CC’d on the order), But-

ler’s failure even to place a phone call to the New York

firm substantiates his disclaimer of any genuinely repre-

sentative role in the case.

20 MAPLES v. THOMAS

Opinion of the Court

Notably, the State did not treat Butler as Maples’ actual

representative. Assistant Attorney General Hayden ad-

dressed the letter informing Maples of the default directly

to Maples in prison. See supra, at 8. Hayden sent no copy

to, nor did he otherwise notify, any of the attorneys listed

as counsel of record for Maples. Lawyers in Alabama have

an ethical obligation to refrain from communicating direct-

ly with an opposing party known to be represented by

counsel. See Ala. Rule of Professional Conduct 4.2 (2003);

Ala. Rule Crim. Proc. 34.4 (requiring that the service of all

documents “be made upon the attorney of record”). In

writing directly and only to Maples, notwithstanding this

ethical obligation, Assistant Attorney General Hayden

must have believed that Maples was no longer represented

by counsel, out-of-state or local.10

In sum, the record admits of only one reading: At no

time before the missed deadline was Butler serving as

Maples’ agent “in any meaningful sense of that word.”

Holland, 560 U. S., at ___ (opinion of ALITO, J.) (slip op.,

at 6).

3

Not only was Maples left without any functioning attor-

ney of record, the very listing of Munanka, Ingen-Housz,

and Butler as his representatives meant that he had no

right personally to receive notice. See supra, at 16. He in

——————

10 Itbears note, as well, that the State served its response to Maples’

Rule 32 petition only on Munanka at Sullivan & Cromwell’s New York

address, not on Butler. App. 26. While the State may not be obligated

to serve more than one attorney of record, its selection of New York

rather than local counsel is some indication that, from the start, the

State was cognizant of the limited role Butler would serve. Conforming

the State’s Rule to common practice, in 2006, the Alabama Supreme

Court amended the provision on appearances by out-of-state counsel to

eliminate the requirement that such attorneys associate local counsel

when representing indigent criminal defendants pro bono in postconvic-

tion proceedings. See supra, at 5, n. 3.

Cite as: 565 U. S. ____ (2012) 21

Opinion of the Court

fact received none or any other warning that he had better

fend for himself. Had counsel of record or the State’s

attorney informed Maples of his plight before the time to

appeal ran out, he could have filed a notice of appeal

himself11 or enlisted the aid of new volunteer attorneys.12

Given no reason to suspect that he lacked counsel able and

willing to represent him, Maples surely was blocked from

complying with the State’s procedural rule.

C

“The cause and prejudice requirement,” we have said,

“shows due regard for States’ finality and comity interests

while ensuring that ‘fundamental fairness [remains] the

central concern of the writ of habeas corpus.’ ” Dretke v.

Haley, 541 U. S. 386, 393 (2004) (quoting Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 697 (1984)). In the unusual

circumstances of this case, principles of agency law and

fundamental fairness point to the same conclusion: There

was indeed cause to excuse Maples’ procedural default.

Through no fault of his own, Maples lacked the assistance

of any authorized attorney during the 42 days Alabama

allows for noticing an appeal from a trial court’s denial of

postconviction relief. As just observed, he had no reason

to suspect that, in reality, he had been reduced to pro se

status. Maples was disarmed by extraordinary circum-

stances quite beyond his control. He has shown ample

cause, we hold, to excuse the procedural default into which

——————

11 The notice is a simple document. It need specify only: the party

taking the appeal, the order or judgment appealed from, and the name

of the court to which appeal is taken. Ala. Rule App. Proc. 3(c) (2000).

12 Alabama grants out-of-time appeals to prisoners proceeding pro se

who were not timely served with copies of court orders. See Maples v.

Allen, 586 F. 3d 879, 888, and n. 6 (CA11 2009) (per curiam) (citing

Ex parte Miles, 841 So. 2d 242, 243 (Ala. 2002), and Ex parte Robinson,

865 So. 2d 1250, 1251–1252 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003) (per curiam)).

Though Maples was not a pro se petitioner on the record, he was, in

fact, without authorized counsel.

22 MAPLES v. THOMAS

Opinion of the Court

he was trapped when counsel of record abandoned him

without a word of warning.

III

Having found no cause to excuse the failure to file a

timely notice of appeal in state court, the District Court

and the Eleventh Circuit did not reach the question of

prejudice. See supra, at 10–11. That issue, therefore,

remains open for decision on remand.

* * *

For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of

Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit is reversed, and the case

is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

It is so ordered.

Cite as: 565 U. S. ____ (2012) 1

ALITO, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 10–63

_________________

CORY R. MAPLES, PETITIONER v. KIM T. THOMAS,

COMMISSIONER, ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTIONS

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

[January 18, 2012]

JUSTICE ALITO, concurring.

I join the opinion of the Court. Unbeknownst to peti-

tioner, he was effectively deprived of legal representation

due to the combined effect of no fewer than eight unfortu-

nate events: (1) the departure from their law firm of the

two young lawyers who appeared as counsel of record in

his state postconviction proceeding; (2) the acceptance by

these two attorneys of new employment that precluded

them from continuing to represent him; (3) their failure to

notify petitioner of their new situation; (4) their failure to

withdraw as his counsel of record; (5) the apparent failure

of the firm that they left to monitor the status of petition-

er’s case when these attorneys departed; (6) when notice of

the decision denying petitioner’s request for state post-

conviction relief was received in that firm’s offices, the

failure of the firm’s mail room to route that important

communication to either another member of the firm or to

the departed attorneys’ new addresses; (7) the failure of

the clerk’s office to take any action when the envelope

containing that notice came back unopened; and (8) local

counsel’s very limited conception of the role that he was

obligated to play in petitioner’s representation. Under

these unique circumstances, I agree that petitioner’s

attorneys effectively abandoned him and that this aban-

2 MAPLES v. THOMAS

ALITO, J., concurring

donment was a “cause” that is sufficient to overcome pe-

titioner’s procedural default.

In an effort to obtain relief for his client, petitioner’s

counsel in the case now before us cast blame for what

occurred on Alabama’s system of providing legal represen-

tation for capital defendants at trial and in state collateral

proceedings. See Brief for Petitioner 3–6. But whatever

may be said about Alabama’s system, I do not think that

Alabama’s system had much if anything to do with peti-

tioner’s misfortune. The quality of petitioner’s representa-

tion at trial obviously played no role in the failure to meet

the deadline for filing his notice of appeal from the denial

of his state postconviction petition. Nor do I see any im-

portant connection between what happened in this case

and Alabama’s system for providing representation for

prisoners who are sentenced to death and who wish to

petition the state courts for collateral relief. Unlike other

States, Alabama relies on attorneys who volunteer to

represent these prisoners pro bono, and we are told that

most of these volunteers work for large, out-of-state firms.

Id., at 4. Petitioner’s brief states that the Alabama system

had “a direct bearing on the events giving rise . . . to the

procedural default at issue,” id., at 3, but a similar combi-

nation of untoward events could have occurred if petition-

er had been represented by Alabama attorneys who were

appointed by the court and paid for with state funds. The

firm whose lawyers represented petitioner pro bono is one

of the country’s most prestigious and expensive, and I

have little doubt that the vast majority of criminal de-

fendants would think that they had won the lottery if they

were given the opportunity to be represented by attorneys

from such a firm. See id., at 9 (stating that it “seemed as

though Maples had won the lottery when two attorneys

working at an elite New York law firm . . . agreed to rep-

resent Maples pro bono”).

What occurred here was not a predictable consequence

Cite as: 565 U. S. ____ (2012) 3

ALITO, J., concurring

of the Alabama system but a veritable perfect storm of

misfortune, a most unlikely combination of events that,

without notice, effectively deprived petitioner of legal rep-

resentation. Under these unique circumstances, I agree

that petitioner’s procedural default is overcome.

Cite as: 565 U. S. ____ (2012) 1

SCALIA, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 10–63

_________________

CORY R. MAPLES, PETITIONER v. KIM T. THOMAS,

COMMISSIONER, ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTIONS

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

[January 18, 2012]

JUSTICE SCALIA, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS joins,

dissenting.

The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals held that Cory

Maples’ appeal from the denial of his state postconviction

petition was barred because he had not filed a notice of

appeal within the allotted time. The Court now concludes

that Maples has established cause for his procedural

default by reason of abandonment by his attorneys. Be-

cause I cannot agree with that conclusion, and because

Maples’ alternative argument fares no better, I would

affirm the judgment.

I

A

Our doctrine of procedural default reflects, and furthers,

the principle that errors in state criminal trials should

be remedied in state court. As we have long recognized,

federal habeas review for state prisoners imposes signifi-

cant costs on the States, undermining not only their prac-

tical interest in the finality of their criminal judgments,

see Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107, 126–127 (1982), but also

the primacy of their courts in adjudicating the constitu-

tional rights of defendants prosecuted under state law, id.,

at 128. We have further recognized that “[t]hese costs are

2 MAPLES v. THOMAS

SCALIA, J., dissenting

particularly high . . . when a state prisoner, through a

procedural default, prevents adjudication of his constitu-

tional claims in state court.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501

U. S. 722, 748 (1991). In that situation, the prisoner has

“deprived the state courts of an opportunity to address

those claims in the first instance,” id., at 732, thereby

leaving the state courts without “a chance to mend their

own fences and avoid federal intrusion,” Engle, 456 U. S.,

at 129. For that reason, and because permitting federal-

court review of defaulted claims would “undercu[t] the

State’s ability to enforce its procedural rules,” ibid., we

have held that when a state court has relied on an ade-

quate and independent state procedural ground in denying

a prisoner’s claims, the prisoner ordinarily may not obtain

federal habeas relief. Coleman, 501 U. S., at 729–730.

To be sure, the prohibition on federal-court review of

defaulted claims is not absolute. A habeas petitioner’s de-

fault in state court will not bar federal habeas review if

“the petitioner demonstrates cause and actual prejudice,”

id., at 748—“cause” constituting “something external to

the petitioner, something that cannot fairly be attributed

to him,” that impeded compliance with the State’s proce-

dural rule, id., at 753. As a general matter, an attorney’s

mistakes (or omissions) do not meet the standard “because

the attorney is the petitioner’s agent when acting, or

failing to act, in furtherance of the litigation, and the

petitioner must ‘bear the risk of attorney error.’ ” Ibid.

(quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U. S. 478, 488 (1986)).

See also Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U. S. 626, 633–634,

and n. 10 (1962).

When an attorney’s error occurs at a stage of the pro-

ceedings at which the defendant has a constitutional right

to effective assistance of counsel, that error may constitute

cause to excuse a resulting procedural default. A State’s

failure in its duty to provide an effective attorney, as

measured by the standard set forth in Strickland v. Wash-

Cite as: 565 U. S. ____ (2012) 3

SCALIA, J., dissenting

ington, 466 U. S. 668 (1984), makes the attorney’s error

chargeable to the State, and hence external to the defense.

See Murray, supra, at 488. But when the client has no

right to counsel—as is the case in the postconviction set-

ting, see Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U. S. 551, 555

(1987)—the client bears the risk of all attorney errors

made in the course of the representation, regardless of the

egregiousness of the mistake. Coleman, supra, at 754

(“[I]t is not the gravity of the attorney’s error that matters,

but that it constitutes a violation of petitioner’s right to

counsel, so that the error must be seen as an external

factor”).

B

In light of the principles just set out, the Court is correct

to conclude, ante, at 14, that a habeas petitioner’s proce-

dural default may be excused when it is attributable to

abandonment by his attorney. In such a case, Coleman’s

rationale for attributing the attorney’s acts and omissions

to the client breaks down; for once the attorney has ceased

acting as the client’s agent, “well-settled principles of

agency law,” 501 U. S., at 754, no longer support charging

the client with his lawyer’s mistakes. The attorney’s

mistakes may therefore be understood as an “external

factor,” ibid., and in appropriate circumstances may jus-

tify excusing the prisoner’s procedural default.

I likewise agree with the Court’s conclusion, ante, at 15,

that Maples’ two out-of-state attorneys of record, Jaasi

Munanka and Clara Ingen-Housz, had abandoned Maples

by the time the Alabama trial court entered its order

denying his petition for postconviction relief. As the Court

observes, ante, at 15–16, without informing Maples or

seeking leave from the Alabama trial court to withdraw

from Maples’ case, both Munanka and Ingen-Housz left

Sullivan & Cromwell’s employ and accepted new positions

that precluded them from continuing to represent Maples.

4 MAPLES v. THOMAS

SCALIA, J., dissenting

This conduct amounted to renunciation of their roles as

Maples’ agents, see 1 Restatement (Second) of Agency

§119, Comment b (1957) (hereinafter Restatement 2d),

and thus terminated their authority to act on Maples’

behalf, id., §118. As a result, Munanka’s and Ingen-

Housz’s failure to take action in response to the trial

court’s order should not be imputed to Maples.

It is an unjustified leap, however, to conclude that Ma-

ples was left unrepresented during the relevant window

between the Alabama trial court’s dismissal of his post-

conviction petition and expiration of the 42-day period for

filing a notice of appeal established by Alabama Rule of

Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1) (2009). Start with Maples’

own allegations: In his amended federal habeas petition,

Maples alleged that, at the time he sought postconvic-

tion relief in Alabama trial court, he “was represented by

Sullivan & Cromwell of New York, New York.” App. 256.

Although the petition went on to identify Munanka and

Ingen-Housz as “the two Sullivan lawyers handling the

matter,” id., at 257, its statement that Maples was “repre-

sented” by the firm itself strongly suggests that Maples

viewed himself as having retained the services of the firm

as a whole, a perfectly natural understanding. “When a

client retains a lawyer who practices with a firm, the

presumption is that both the lawyer and the firm have

been retained.” 1 Restatement (Third) of the Law Govern-

ing Lawyers §31, Comment f, p. 222 (1998). Admittedly,

in connection with the attempt before the Alabama trial

court to extend the time for appeal, Sullivan & Cromwell

partner Marc De Leeuw submitted an affidavit stating

that the firm’s lawyers “handle pro bono cases on an indi-

vidual basis” and that the lawyers who had appeared in

Maples’ case had followed that practice, “attempt[ing] not

to use the firm name on correspondence or court papers.”

App. to Pet. for Cert. 257a. But Maples’ habeas petition is

the pleading that initiated the current litigation; and

Cite as: 565 U. S. ____ (2012) 5

SCALIA, J., dissenting

surely the allegations that it contained should be given

priority over representations made to prior courts.*

In any case, even if Maples had no attorney-client rela-

tionship with the Sullivan & Cromwell firm, Munanka

and Ingen-Housz were surely not the only Sullivan &

Cromwell lawyers who represented Maples on an individ-

ual basis. De Leeuw’s affidavit acknowledged that he had

“been involved in [Maples’] case since the summer of

2001,” ibid., roughly a year before Munanka and Ingen-

Housz left Sullivan & Cromwell, and it further stated that

after “Ms. Ingen-Housz and Mr. Munanka” learned of the

court’s initial order denying the State’s motion to dismiss

Maples’ postconviction petition in December 2001, “the

lawyers working on this case for Mr. Maples prepared

for the evidentiary hearing” Maples had requested, id., at

258a. Moreover, when Sullivan & Cromwell attorney

Felice Duffy filed a motion to appear pro hac vice before

the Alabama trial court in connection with the attempt to

extend the deadline, she stated that she had “worked on

[Maples’] case since October 14, 2002,” App. 231, months

before the procedural default took place.

According to the Court, see ante, at 17, De Leeuw’s

affidavit does not make clear how he was “involved” in

——————

* The Court says that the allegations in Maples’ own habeas petition

are not “persuasive evidence,” ante, at 17–18, n. 8, because Maples’

lawyers at Sullivan & Cromwell labored under a conflict of interest

when they prepared the document. This is a curious point, since the

effect of Maples’ statement was to implicate Sullivan & Cromwell as a

firm in missing the filing deadline. The conflict would have induced the

Sullivan & Cromwell lawyers to exonerate the firm. To be sure, as the

case later developed (at this stage abandonment had not yet been

conceived as the litigating strategy), it would have been in Maples’

interest to say he had no lawyers. But the issue the petition’s state-

ment raises is not whether Maples was cleverly represented; it is

whether the statement was true. And if Sullivan & Cromwell’s in-

volvement in preparing the petition has any bearing upon that, it only

reinforces the truth.

6 MAPLES v. THOMAS

SCALIA, J., dissenting

Maples’ case or whether lawyers other than Munanka and

Ingen-Housz were among those who prepared for the

anticipated evidentiary hearing; and Duffy’s motion does

not make clear what her “wor[k]” entailed. But there is

little doubt that Munanka and Ingen-Housz were not the

only attorneys who engaged in the preparations; and that

De Leeuw was “involved” and Duffy “worked” as lawyers

for Maples (what other role could they have taken on?).

De Leeuw’s distinction between “Ms. Ingen-Housz and Mr.

Munanka” and “the lawyers working on his case for Mr.

Maples” would have been senseless if the latter category

did not extend beyond the two named attorneys.

In sum, there is every indication that when the trial

court entered its order dismissing Maples’ postconviction

petition in May 2003, Maples continued to be represented

by a team of attorneys in Sullivan & Cromwell’s New York

office. The Court nonetheless insists that the actions of

these attorneys are irrelevant because they had not been

admitted to practice law in Alabama, had not entered

appearances in the Alabama trial court, and had not

sought to substitute for Munanka and Ingen-Housz. See

ante, at 18–19. The Court does not, however, explain why

these facts establish that the attorneys were not Maples’

agents for the purpose of attending to those aspects of the

case that did not require court appearance—which would

certainly include keeping track of orders issued and filing

deadlines. The Court’s quotation from the Restatement of

Agency, ante, at 18, that the “failure to acquire a qualifica-

tion by the agent without which it is illegal to do an au-

thorized act . . . terminates the agent’s authority to act,” 1

Restatement 2d, §111, at 290, omits the crucial condition

contained at the end of the section: “if thereafter he [the

agent] should infer that the principal, if he knew the facts,

would not consent to the further exercise of the authority.”

There was no basis whatever for these attorneys to infer

that Maples no longer wanted them to represent him,

Cite as: 565 U. S. ____ (2012) 7

SCALIA, J., dissenting

simply because they had not yet qualified before the Ala-

bama court. Though it would have been “illegal” for these

attorneys to file a notice of appeal without being author-

ized to practice in Alabama, nothing prevented them from

first seeking to secure admission to practice, as Munanka

and Ingen-Housz initially had done, and then filing a

notice of appeal.

It would create a huge gap in our Coleman jurispru-

dence to disregard all attorney errors committed before

admission to the relevant court; and an even greater gap

to disregard (as the Court suggests) all errors committed

before the attorney enters an appearance. Moreover, even

if these attorneys cannot be regarded as Maples’ agents for

purposes of conducting the Alabama litigation, they were

at least his agents for purposes of advising him of the

impending deadline. His unawareness was the fault of

counsel who were his agents, and must be charged to him.

What happened here is simply “[a]ttorney ignorance or

inadvertence” of the sort that does not furnish cause to

excuse a procedural default. Coleman, 501 U. S., at 753.

But even leaving aside the question of Maples’ “unad-

mitted” attorneys at Sullivan & Cromwell, Maples had a

fully admitted attorney, who had entered an appearance,

in the person of local counsel, John Butler. There is no

support for the Court’s conclusion that Butler “did not

even begin to represent Maples.” Ante, at 19. True, the

affidavit Butler filed with the Alabama trial court in the

proceeding seeking extension of the deadline stated that

he had “no substantive involvement” with the case, and

that he had “agreed to serve as local counsel only.” App. to

Pet. for Cert. 255a. But a disclaimer of “substantive in-

volvement” in a case, whether or not it violates a lawyer’s

ethical obligations, see ante, at 19, is not equivalent to a

denial of any agency role at all. A local attorney’s “non-

substantive” involvement would surely include, at a min-

imum, keeping track of local court orders and advising

8 MAPLES v. THOMAS

SCALIA, J., dissenting

“substantive” counsel of impending deadlines. Nor did

Butler’s explanation for his failure to act when he received

a copy of the trial court’s order sound in abandonment.

Butler did not say, for instance, that he ignored the order

because he did not consider Maples to be his client. In-

stead, based on “past practice” and the content of the

order, Butler “assumed” that Maples’ lawyers at Sullivan

& Cromwell would receive a copy. App. to Pet. for Cert.

256a.

The Court gets this badly wrong when it states that

“Butler’s failure even to place a phone call to the New

York firm” demonstrates Butler’s “disclaimer of any genu-

inely representative role.” Ante, at 19. By equating the

very attorney error that contributed to Maples’ procedural

default with the absence of an agency relationship, the

Court ensures that today’s opinion will serve as a template

for future habeas petitioners seeking to evade Coleman’s

holding that ineffectiveness of postconviction counsel will

not furnish cause to excuse a procedural default. See 501

U. S., at 752–754. The trick will be to allege, not that

counsel was ineffective, but rather that counsel’s ineffec-

tiveness demonstrates that he was not a genuinely repre-

sentative agent. No precedent should be so easily circum-

vented by word games, but the damage is particularly

acute when the affected precedent is so firmly “grounded

in concerns of comity and federalism.” Id., at 730.

The Court’s last-gasp attempt to justify its conclusion

that Butler was not Maples’ agent is to point out that a

prosecutor sent a letter to Maples directly, informing him

of the defaulted appeal. See ante, at 20. The Court rea-

sons that the prosecutor must have thought that Maples

had been abandoned by his lawyers, since to communicate

with a represented party would have been a violation of

ethical standards. Ibid. But even if this supposition is

correct, it is hard to understand what it proves. What

matters, after all, is not whether the prosecutor thought

Cite as: 565 U. S. ____ (2012) 9

SCALIA, J., dissenting

Maples had been abandoned, but whether Maples really

was abandoned. And as it turns out, Butler’s conduct

after learning about the default further belies any such

contention. Almost immediately, Butler began to cooper-

ate with Maples’ lawyers at Sullivan & Cromwell, filing

papers as “Counsel for Mr. Maples” or “Local Counsel for

Petitioner Cory Maples” in multiple courts in an attempt

to rectify the mistake. See App. 229, 230, 236, 238. Had

Butler reassumed his representational duties after having

abandoned them? Hardly. There is no proper basis for a

conclusion of abandonment interruptus.

II

Maples argues in the alternative that his default should

be excused because his right to due process was violated

when the trial-court clerk failed to take action after Mu-

nanka’s and Ingen-Housz’s copies of the court’s dismissal

order were returned undeliverable. According to Maples,

our decision in Jones v. Flowers, 547 U. S. 220 (2006),

establishes that the clerk had a duty to do more.

We held in Jones that, when a mailed notice of a tax

sale is returned unclaimed, a State must take additional

reasonable steps to attempt to provide notice to the prop-

erty owner before selling his property. See id., at 234. It

is questionable whether that holding has any relevance to

the circumstances here, which involved not the institution

of proceedings against an unwitting litigant, but rather

the issuance of an order in a pending case that was insti-

tuted by Maples himself. Indeed, I think it doubtful

whether due process entitles a litigant to any notice of a

court’s order in a pending case. The Federal Rules cer-

tainly reject the notion that notice is an absolute require-

ment. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 77(d)(2) provides

that “[l]ack of notice of the entry [of an order or judgment]

does not affect the time for appeal or relieve—or authorize

the court to relieve—a party for failing to appeal within

10 MAPLES v. THOMAS

SCALIA, J., dissenting

the time allowed, except as allowed by Federal Rule of

Appellate Procedure (4)(a).” And although Federal Rule

of Appellate Rule 4(a)(6) in turn provides that the time for

filing an appeal can be reopened when a litigant did not

receive notice, it establishes 180 days after the judgment

or order is entered as the outer limit by which a motion to

reopen must be filed. See Fed. Rule App. Proc. 4(a)(6)(B).

There is no need to grapple with this question, however,

because Butler received a copy of the trial court’s order.

“Under our system of representative litigation, ‘each party

. . . is considered to have notice of all facts, notice of which

can be charged upon [his] attorney.’ ” Irwin v. Department

of Veterans Affairs, 498 U. S. 89, 92 (1990) (quoting Link

v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U. S. 626, 634 (1962)). The notice to

Butler was therefore constitutionally sufficient.

* * *

One suspects that today’s decision is motivated in large

part by an understandable sense of frustration with the

State’s refusal to waive Maples’ procedural default in

the interest of fairness. Indeed, that frustration may well

explain the Court’s lengthy indictment of Alabama’s gen-

eral procedures for providing representation to capital

defendants, ante, at 2–4, a portion of the Court’s opinion

that is so disconnected from the rest of its analysis as to be

otherwise inexplicable.

But if the interest of fairness justifies our excusing

Maples’ procedural default here, it does so whenever a

defendant’s procedural default is caused by his attorney.

That is simply not the law—and cannot be, if the states

are to have an orderly system of criminal litigation con-

ducted by counsel. Our precedents allow a State to stand

on its rights and enforce a habeas petitioner’s procedural

default even when counsel is to blame. Because a faithful

application of those precedents leads to the conclusion that

Maples has not demonstrated cause to excuse his proce-

Cite as: 565 U. S. ____ (2012) 11

SCALIA, J., dissenting

dural default; and because the reasoning by which the

Court justifies the opposite conclusion invites future evis-

ceration of the principle that defendants are responsible

for the mistakes of their attorneys; I respectfully dissent.