explaining Maud construed the statute “as not so vesting that power in such party, under the established presumption of validity,” and “[t]hus clearly in effect holding that it would have been invalid if given the construction contended for by respondent”
How later courts described this case
- explaining Maud construed the statute “as not so vesting that power in such party, under the established presumption of validity,” and “[t]hus clearly in effect holding that it would have been invalid if given the construction contended for by respondent”
- Maud construed the statute “as not so vesting that power in such party, under the established presumption of validity,” and “[t]hus clearly in effect holding that it would have been invalid if given the construction contended for by respondent”
- rejecting as irrelevant the plaintiff’s contention that qui tam actions had been permitted prior to the 1876 Constitution
- rejecting a similar argument because an action which “inures to the State . . . is maintainable only in the State’s name and by its authorized officials”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
On Appellee’s Motion for Rehearing.
In addition to the prayer in his original brief for an unqualified affirmance, Agey’s motion prays, in the alternative, that the judgment be affirmed only as to his half of the recovery, or that the cause be remanded with permission to replead and sue only for half of the penalties. We think the statute clearly creates a single, indivisible cause of action, which must be prosecuted in a single suit, instituted, by the State through its proper officials; and that Agey’s rights are limited to sharing in the recovery. We make this statement in order to make clear that we are overruling the alternative prayer of the motion upon its merits, and not upon a matter of practice.
The motion is overruled.
Overruled.