stating that although testimony at trial indicated the appellant’s history of abuse led the appellant to fear rejection by her co-defendant, it did not indicate it led her to fear physical harm by the co-defendant, so there was therefore no threat of force which would implicate the duress defense
How later courts described this case
- stating that although testimony at trial indicated the appellant’s history of abuse led the appellant to fear rejection by her co-defendant, it did not indicate it led her to fear physical harm by the co-defendant, so there was therefore no threat of force which would implicate the duress defense
- observing that, in assessing whether the conflict of interest resulted in a deprivation of the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment, “the [United States Supreme] Court’s concern centers primarily on the potential for an attorney to alter his trial strategy due to extrinsic considerations stemming from other loyalties, thereby distorting counsel’s strategic or tactical decisions in a manner that would not occur if counsel’s sole loyalty were to the defendant” (citing Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 272, 101 S.Ct. 1097, 1103-04 (1981))
- noting that “under this Court’s *739 prevailing precedent, [] a [defense of diminished capacity] to first-degree murder is only available to defendants who admit that they killed the victim, but contest the degree of guilty based on an inability, at the time of the offense, to formulate a specific intent to kill due to a mental defect or voluntary intoxication.”
- noting “we have seen more than enough instances of deficient stewardship to raise very serious questions concerning the presumption[]” of effective capital defense representation
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice EAKIN,
concurring.
I join Chief Justice Castille’s Concurring Opinion, and its joinder of the Majority Opinion. If fee caps may create a “conflict of interest,” then, a fortiori, pro bono representation creates a conflict — if too little payment can do so, no payment at all would almost certainly do so. Of course, the truth is that countless attorneys handle countless legal matters for people with little or no compensation. This does not mean evidence “that counsel prioritized his own financial interests above the interests of his client and, as a result, rendered deficient stewardship prejudicing the defense” would not allow for a claim of ineffectiveness. Concurring Op., at 633-34 (Saylor, J., concurring). Such would be an admission of ineffectiveness, contrary to “prevailing professional norms,” and counsel’s reasoning for his ineffectiveness would be inconsequential to the determination. See id. at 617-18 (citing Bobby v. Van Hook, 558 U.S. 4 , 130 S.Ct. 13 , 175 L.Ed.2d 255 (2009)). However, it would not be based on a conflict of interest. The love of money may be the root of all evil and some ineffectiveness, but by itself, it does not create a legal conflict of interest.