explaining that consideration of evidence existing at the time an initial petition for a termination of parental rights is denied is not barred by the doctrine of res judicata so long as the subsequent termination-of-parental-rights action is also based on new evidence of changes, or a lack thereof, in circumstances
How later courts described this case
- explaining that consideration of evidence existing at the time an initial petition for a termination of parental rights is denied is not barred by the doctrine of res judicata so long as the subsequent termination-of-parental-rights action is also based on new evidence of changes, or a lack thereof, in circumstances
- recognizing that the rights of a parent may be terminated when that parent fails or refuses to protect his or her children from threat of harm presented by the other unfit, abusive, or neglectful parent by allowing the other parent access to family home
- determining that the record did not contain evidence sufficient to support a finding that the father was unwilling to protect the children from the potential harm presented by another person
- finding that DHR presented insufficient evidence to justify its demand that common-law parents separate as a condition for father to retain his parental rights
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
THOMAS, Judge,
concurring specially.
Although I dissented in H.H. v. Baldwin County Department of Human Resources, 989 So.2d 1094, 1110 (Ala.Civ.App.2007), T.B. v. DeKalb County Department of Human Resources, 12 So.3d 90, 100 (Ala.Civ.App.2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting), and J.B. v. DeKalb County Department of Human Resources, 12 So.3d 100, 119 *391 (Ala.Civ.App.2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting), I concur in the reversal of the judgment terminating the parental rights of the mother and the father in the present case. The evidence does not support the conclusion that the father’s parental rights should be terminated. Because we reverse the judgment insofar as it terminates the father’s parental rights, I agree that the judgment, insofar as it terminates the parental rights of the mother, should also be reversed, because an appropriately tailored custody award to the father may well be a viable alternative to termination of the mother’s rights.