rejecting the compelling-reason requirement and explaining that “our caselaw more accurately holds that siblings may be separated if the trial court concludes, based on sufficient evidence in the record, that the separation will serve the best interests of the children at issue”
How later courts described this case
- rejecting the compelling-reason requirement and explaining that “our caselaw more accurately holds that siblings may be separated if the trial court concludes, based on sufficient evidence in the record, that the separation will serve the best interests of the children at issue”
- reversing a judgment insofar as it required a parent to pay half of the child's expenses for extracurricular activities because, among other reasons, "[t]he final judgment … failed to include the language necessary to support an award under Rule 32(C)(4)[, Ala. R. Jud. Admin.]"
- citing, among other authority, Alverson, 28 So. 3d at 790 (Moore, J., concurring in part and concurring in the result in part)
- reversing a judgment insofar as it required a parent to pay half of child’s expenses for extracurricular activities because, among other reasons, “[t]he final judgment ... failed to include the language necessary to support an award under Rule 32(C)(4)”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
PITTMAN, Judge,
concurring in part, concurring in the result in part, and dissenting in part.
I concur in Parts II and III of the main opinion. I concur in the result as to Part I. As to Part IV, which overrules Campbell v. Campbell, 41 So.3d 775, 786 (Ala.Civ.App.2009), I believe, in contrast to the view of the per curiam opinion, that Campbell is consistent with appellate-review principles applicable to trial-court attorney-fee awards in domestic-relations cases. See, e.g., Walding v. Walding, 983 So.2d 1128, 1132 (Ala.Civ.App.2007) (affirming trial court’s judgment directing husband to pay one-half of wife’s undetermined attorney fees). Because I would prefer not to place this court in the position of micromanaging a settled area of trial-court discretion, see generally Ex parte James, 764 So.2d 557, 560 (Ala.1999), I dissent from Part IV of the main opinion.