"See Art. I, § 14, Ala. Const. 1901; Ala. Code 1975, §§ 16-25-2(b) and 36-27-2(b) (recognizing that the boards of control of the [Teachers' Retirement System] and the [Employees' Retirement System] are instrumentalities of the State, that the [Teachers' Retirement System] and the [Employees' Retirement System] are funded by the State, and that their officers and employees are immune from suit in their official capacities to the same extent as the State, its agencies, and its officers and employees)."
How later courts described this case
- "See Art. I, § 14, Ala. Const. 1901; Ala. Code 1975, §§ 16-25-2(b) and 36-27-2(b) (recognizing that the boards of control of the [Teachers' Retirement System] and the [Employees' Retirement System] are instrumentalities of the State, that the [Teachers' Retirement System] and the [Employees' Retirement System] are funded by the State, and that their officers and employees are immune from suit in their official capacities to the same extent as the State, its agencies, and its officers and employees)."
- "[A]ny action against a State official that seeks only to recover monetary damages against the official 'in [his or her] individual capacity' is, of course, not an action against that person in his or her official capacity and would of necessity fail to qualify as 'an action against the State' for purposes of § 14."
- "See Art. I, § 14, Ala. Const. 1901; Ala. Code 1975, §§ 16-25-2(b) and 36-27-2(b
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
MOORE, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
I agree with Justice Shaw that it is premature at this point in the case to supplant the considered judgment of the trial court. “[A] Rule 12(b)(6)[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] dismissal is proper only when it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle the plaintiff to relief.” Nance v. Matthews, 622 So.2d 297, 299 (Ala.1993).
The trial court took into account the concerns expressed in the main opinion when it stated that among the issues before it were the following:
“whether and how the Court might substitute its judgment for the judgment of the Boards of Control, since investment policymaking is a function allotted by the legislature to the Boards of Control; [and] whether the Court can take the responsibility for investment policymak-ing from the Boards of Control when Plaintiffs have the political remedy of electing new and different members to the Boards of Control....” .
I would defer to the trial court to adjudge these issues in the first instance upon a full summary-judgment record.