holding that because the trial court admitted hearsay evidence for substantive purposes, the Court of Appeals erred when it reasoned the under ER 703 the hearsay evidence was admissible
How later courts described this case
- holding that because the trial court admitted hearsay evidence for substantive purposes, the Court of Appeals erred when it reasoned the under ER 703 the hearsay evidence was admissible
- deeming inadmissible report from computer system that aggregated details from police reports, including person’s demographic information, relationship with victim, weapon and force used
- counsel was not ineffective by 5 No. 74333-3-1/6 declining to request a jury instruction that then-current legal authority stated was unnecessary
- ‘The cumulative error doctrine applies where a combination of trial errors denies the accused a fair trial even where any one of the errors, taken individually, may not justify reversal.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Chambers, J.
¶82 (concurring) — I concur with the majority in result. I write separately because, in general, I believe allegations of uncharged crimes should not be admitted into evidence. Trial judges should start from the position that such evidence is inadmissible and require the proponent of the evidence to establish both a proper purpose for admission and that the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect. I fear that does not always happen. Specifically, when the State seeks to admit uncharged crimes to show that the perpetrator had a “signature,” that signature should be truly unique, and in doubtful cases, the evidence should be excluded. State v. Vy Thang, 145 Wn.2d 630, 642-43 , 41 P.3d 1159 (2002).
¶83 Experts should not act as funnels to allow lawyers to get into evidence through their expert opinion what is otherwise inadmissible. Some of the elements used by the expert here are too common to meaningfully form part of a “signature.” Prior bad acts are admissible only under the “signature” exception if the “shared features, when combined, are so unusual and distinctive as to be signature-like” and only if the probative value outweighs the prejudicial effect. Id. at 645. In my view, some of the elements cited by the expert are simply too common to qualify as a meaningful part of a signature. It is hardly uncommon for a rapist to intimidate his victim, undo his own clothing, penetrate his victim, and ejaculate during the commission of the crime. Were I in the trial court’s position, I would not have allowed the uncharged crimes that did not have highly unusual elements to be admitted through the auspices of expert testimony.
¶84 That said, I concur because many of the uncharged crimes did have the sort of unusual elements that characterize a signature. In many, though not all, of the uncharged crimes, the perpetrator put fingers into victims’ mouths, attempted to induce the victim to urinate or defecate upon him, and asked personal and offensive questions. The *517 overwhelming untainted evidence supports the jury’s verdict. I respectfully concur.
Wiggins, J., concurs with Chambers, J.