holding that legislation concerning construction and financing of a baseball stadium which applies only to counties of a certain size was not special legislation, even where only one county had a population of that size— possibility existed that another county could reach the given population in the future
How later courts described this case
- holding that legislation concerning construction and financing of a baseball stadium which applies only to counties of a certain size was not special legislation, even where only one county had a population of that size— possibility existed that another county could reach the given population in the future
- considering propriety of mandating the Secretary of State to process referendum petition long after 90-day time limit of Const, art. II, § 1(d) to gather signatures had expired
- “In reviewing legislative declarations of emergency we are to give substantial deference to the Legislature.”
- addressing the constitutionality of the Stadium Act which authorizes various measures for the construction of a major league baseball stadium in King County
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Guy, J.
(concurring and dissenting) — While I agree that the Stadium Act is otherwise constitutional, I cannot agree that it qualifies as "emergency” legislation. By declaring the raising of taxes to build a sports stadium an emergency, the Act effectively prevents the people of this state from conducting a referendum on the new law. This is contrary to our state constitution which assures the right of referendum to the citizens of our state unless legislation is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety. Wash. Const, art. II, § 1 (amend. 72). While baseball is close to the heart of many of us, and I understand that a major league baseball team in our state brings economic and social benefits, I cannot agree that raising money for the building of a new stadium is an "emergency.”
This Court should, and will, give the Legislature’s decía *821 ration of an emergency every favorable presumption. However, in giving deference, we must do so with this Court’s constitutional duty in mind. We have a duty to test the emergency clause against the backdrop of the constitutional right of referendum. We are not free to rubber-stamp an emergency clause when there are no facts recited in the legislation, or apparent from the subject of the legislation, or judicially known to the Court, which would support the existence of an emergency.
I will defer to the judgment of the Legislature whenever an "emergency” situation, such as an immediately effective consequence, is explained in the preamble of an act or in the emergency clause itself, or is apparent from the nature of the act. The Stadium Act before us provides no facts on which to base deference to the legislative decision. The emergency clause contains only standard, generic language, and there is no other indication in the legislation as to why the Legislature decided to declare the Act to be an emergency. Nothing in the legislation supports an inference that through application of common sense or judicial knowledge we could conclude that funding a new sports stadium is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety.
I therefore respectfully dissent on the issue concerning Wash. Const, art. II, § 1 (amend. 72). I would find the Act otherwise constitutional but would allow the people of this State their normal right of referendum and would direct the Secretary of State to accept the petition.