where the taxpayer conveyed to the county 8 percent of the total acreage of a planned subdivision development for use for such public purposes as parks, playgrounds, and schools in order to comply with a county regulation, albeit later found unconstitutional, that required such a land transfer prior to county officials approving a subdivision plan
How later courts described this case
- where the taxpayer conveyed to the county 8 percent of the total acreage of a planned subdivision development for use for such public purposes as parks, playgrounds, and schools in order to comply with a county regulation, albeit later found unconstitutional, that required such a land transfer prior to county officials approving a subdivision plan
- “[Taxpayers] received a direct benefit because of the transfer. It appears from the evidence that even if the partnership might have ultimately prevailed in its efforts to get approval of its plans without making the transfers, it certainly avoided considerable and perhaps protracted difficulty in this regard by making the transfers in question.”
- disallowing charitable contribution deduction where taxpayer conveyed property for school and recreational uses to obtain approval for subdivision
- transfer of land to school district in order to avoid difficulty in obtaining approval of development plans
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Fat, J., concurring: I agree with the majority that the transfers of property in question, because petitioners received a direct benefit therefor, do not qualify as charitable contributions under section 170(c). However, I believe that the only direct benefit received by petitioners from the transfers was the avoidance of “considerable and protracted difficulty” in obtaining the county’s approval of their development plans. 1 I disagree with the majority opinion to the extent to which it implies that the existence of school and recreational facilities on the transferred land also constitutes a direct benefit which alone would disqualify the transfers as charitable contributions. Such benefit seems to me to be of an incidental nature.
Or the county’s approval itself if the regulation requiring the transfers was constitutionally valid.