Opinion

Rickey I. Kanter v. William P. Barr

  • 919 F.3d 437
Court
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Filed
Mar 15, 2019
Status
Published
On the bench
Flaum, Ripple, Barrett
Nature of suit
civil
Cited by
218 cases
Authority
More cited than 7.2%

Abrogated by New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022)

explaining that disarmament of Catholics was done “‘with the intent of preventing social upheavals’ and ‘rebellion’” but “[t]hose ‘willing to swear undivided allegiance to the sovereign’ were permitted to keep their arms” and that enslaved persons and Native Americans were disarmed out of fear that they would use guns to revolt or rebel

How later courts described this case

  • explaining that disarmament of Catholics was done “‘with the intent of preventing social upheavals’ and ‘rebellion’” but “[t]hose ‘willing to swear undivided allegiance to the sovereign’ were permitted to keep their arms” and that enslaved persons and Native Americans were disarmed out of fear that they would use guns to revolt or rebel
  • concluding before Bruen that Congress cannot dispossess felons based solely on status, and that “a very strong public-interest justification and a close means-end fit” is required before a felon may be subject to a dispossession statute based on dangerousness
  • explaining that disarmament laws prevented slaves and Native Americans from possessing firearms “as a matter of course” because those groups “were thought to pose more immediate threats to public safety and stability”
  • stating that the phrase “or real danger of public injury from individuals” suggests that only individuals who have committed “the subset of crimes suggesting a proclivity for violence” could be disarmed

Written by the judges who cited it.

Later courts went against this

  • Abrogated by New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022)

    919 F.3d 437, 462 (7th Cir. 2019) (Barrett, J., concur- ring) (“The obvious point that the dead enjoy no rights does not tell us what the founding-era generation would have understood about the rights of felons who lived, discharged their sentences, and returned to society.”), abrogated on other grounds by New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1
    Supreme Court of the United StatesJun 23, 202213 citing opinionsRead it
  • Abrogated by United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024)

    919 F.3d 437, 459 (7th Cir. 2019) (Barrett, J., dissenting), abrogated by Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022). 46 United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 738-39
    Supreme Court of the United StatesJun 21, 2024medium confidenceRead it

The opinion

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

____________________

No. 18-1478

RICKEY I. KANTER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General

of the United States, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 16-cv-1121 — William C. Griesbach, Chief Judge.

____________________

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 7, 2018 — DECIDED MARCH 15, 2019

____________________

Before FLAUM, RIPPLE, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.

FLAUM, Circuit Judge. Rickey I. Kanter pleaded guilty to

one count of mail fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1341. Due to his fel-

ony conviction, he is prohibited from possessing a firearm un-

der both federal and Wisconsin law. At issue in this case is

whether the felon dispossession statutes—18 U.S.C.

§ 922(g)(1) and Wis. Stat. § 941.29(1m)—violate the Second

Amendment as applied to Kanter. Even if Kanter could bring

2 No. 18-1478

an as-applied challenge, the government has met its burden

of establishing that the felon dispossession statutes are sub-

stantially related to an important government interest. We

therefore affirm the district court.

I. Background

A. Federal and Wisconsin Felon Dispossession Statutes

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits firearm possession by persons

convicted of “a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term

exceeding one year.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). State misdemean-

ors are included under the statute if they are punishable by

more than two years in prison. 1 Id. § 921(a)(20)(B). However,

the statute excludes anyone convicted of “any Federal or State

offenses pertaining to antitrust violations, unfair trade prac-

tices, restraints of trade, or other similar offenses relating to

the regulation of business practices.” Id. § 921(a)(20)(A).

Moreover, “[a]ny conviction which has been expunged, or set

aside or for which a person has been pardoned or has had civil

rights restored” is not a conviction for purposes of the statute.

Id. § 921(a)(20).

Although the firearms prohibition generally applies for

life, the statute includes a “safety valve” that permits individ-

uals to apply to the Attorney General for restoration of their

firearms rights. Logan v. United States, 552 U.S. 23, 28 n.1

1Accordingly, calling the statute a “felon” dispossession statute is

somewhat of a “misnomer.” Carly Lagrotteria, Note, Heller's Collateral

Damage: As-Applied Challenges to the Felon-in-Possession Prohibition, 86 Ford-

ham L. Rev. 1963, 1970 (2018).

No. 18-1478 3

(2007). Specifically, the Attorney General 2 may remove the

prohibition on a case-by-case basis if an applicant sufficiently

establishes “that the circumstances regarding the disability,

and the applicant’s record and reputation, are such that the

applicant will not be likely to act in a manner dangerous to

public safety and that the granting of the relief would not be

contrary to the public interest.” 18 U.S.C. § 925(c).

Since 1992, however, “Congress has repeatedly barred

the Attorney General from using appropriated funds ‘to in-

vestigate or act upon [relief] applications,’” rendering the pro-

vision “inoperative.” Logan, 552 U.S. at 28 n.1 (quoting United

States v. Bean, 537 U.S. 71, 74–75 (2002)). The Committee on

Appropriations eliminated funding because the restoration

procedure under § 925(c) was “a very difficult task” that re-

quired ATF officials to “spend many hours investigating a

particular applicant for relief.” H.R. Rep. No. 102-618, at 14

(1992). Even then, there was “no way to know with any cer-

tainty whether the applicant [was] still a danger to public

safety.” Id. Accordingly, ATF officials were effectively “re-

quired to guess whether a convicted felon … [could] be en-

trusted with a firearm.” Id. Moreover, they were “forced to

make these decisions knowing that a mistake could have dev-

astating consequences for innocent citizens.” Id. Ultimately,

the Committee determined that “the $3.75 million and the 40

man-years annually spent investigating and acting upon

these applications for relief would be better utilized by ATF

in fighting violent crime.” Id. The Committee addressed the

funding issue again in 1995, adding that “too many of these

2 The Attorney General delegated its authority under § 925(c) to the

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (“ATF”). 28 C.F.R.

§ 0.130(a)(1).

4 No. 18-1478

felons whose gun ownership rights were restored went on to

commit violent crimes with firearms.” H.R. Rep. No. 104-183,

at 15 (1995).

In 1981, Wisconsin adopted its own felon dispossession

law. See Wis. Stat. § 941.29(1m). Section 941.29(1m) prohibits

an individual from possessing a firearm if he has “been con-

victed of a felony in” Wisconsin or “a crime elsewhere that

would be a felony” in Wisconsin. Id. § 941.29(1m)(a)–(b).

B. Factual Background

Kanter lives in Mequon, Wisconsin. He was previously the

owner, operator, and CEO of Rikco International, LLC. Rikco

International, which did business as “Dr. Comfort,” manufac-

tured therapeutic shoes and inserts for individuals with dia-

betes and severe foot disease. The company marketed the

shoes and inserts to podiatrists, who in turn sold them to in-

dividual consumers. Most of the shoes and inserts were billed

to, and paid for by, Medicare. Medicare only paid for inserts

that met certain thickness and hardness standards.

In April 2004, Kanter submitted his inserts to Medicare to

determine whether they met those requirements. Medicare

rejected Kanter’s inserts because they were too thin. Kanter

then submitted revised samples, which Medicare approved.

However, Kanter continued to sell the noncompliant inserts

while representing that they were Medicare-approved. All

told, Medicare paid Kanter’s company $375,000 for the non-

compliant inserts.

On May 24, 2011, Kanter pleaded guilty to one count of

mail fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1341 based on a shipment of the

noncompliant inserts to a podiatrist in Florida. Section 1341

carries a maximum penalty of twenty years in prison and a

No. 18-1478 5

$250,000 fine. Kanter was sentenced to one year and one day

in prison and two years of supervised release. He was also

ordered to pay a criminal penalty of $50,000, and he reim-

bursed Medicare over $27 million in a related civil settlement.

Kanter has since served his time and paid his criminal pen-

alty, and he has not been charged with any additional crimi-

nal activity. However, because of his felony conviction, he is

permanently prohibited from owning a firearm under federal

and Wisconsin law.

C. Procedural Background

Kanter brought suit in the Eastern District of Wisconsin,

arguing that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and Wis. Stat. § 941.29(1m)

are unconstitutional under the Second Amendment as ap-

plied to him. The United States moved to dismiss his claim

under Rule 12(b)(6), and Wisconsin moved for judgment on

the pleadings under Rule 12(c). In response, Kanter moved for

summary judgment, arguing that his status as a nonviolent

offender with no other criminal record meant that both stat-

utes were unconstitutional as applied to him.

The district court granted defendants’ motions and denied

Kanter’s motion. In so doing, the district court held that, even

assuming felons are entitled to Second Amendment protec-

tion, the application of the federal and Wisconsin felon dis-

possession laws to Kanter is substantially related to the gov-

ernment’s important interest in preventing gun violence. The

court reasoned that Congress and the Wisconsin legislature

are entitled to categorically disqualify all felons—even nonvi-

olent felons like Kanter—because both have found that such

individuals are more likely to abuse firearms. The court also

noted that this “bright line categorical approach … allows for

6 No. 18-1478

uniform application and ease of administration.” The district

court entered judgment on January 2, 2018, and this appeal

followed.

II. Discussion

We review de novo a district court’s ruling on a motion to

dismiss for failure to state a claim and a motion for judgment

on the pleadings. Landmark Am. Ins. Co. v. Hilger, 838 F.3d 821,

824 (7th Cir. 2016). In doing so, “we accept all well-pleaded

facts as true and draw reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs’

favor.” Roberts v. City of Chicago, 817 F.3d 561, 564 (7th Cir.

2016). To avoid dismissal, “the complaint must ‘state a claim

to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

A. Legal Standard 3

The Second Amendment states: “A well regulated Militia,

being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the

people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S.

Const. amend. II. In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme

Court identified the “core” of the Second Amendment as “the

right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in de-

fense of hearth and home.” 554 U.S. 570, 634–35. Accordingly,

the Court concluded that Washington D.C.’s ban on handgun

possession in the home violated the Second Amendment. Id.

at 635.

However, the Court also made clear that “the right se-

cured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited.” Id. at 626.

3 Because “the federal and state prohibitions are equivalent in effect”

as to Kanter, our Second Amendment analysis of the two statutes is the

same. Baer v. Lynch, 636 F. App’x 695, 698–99 (7th Cir. 2016).

No. 18-1478 7

Although the Court did not “undertake an exhaustive histor-

ical analysis ... of the full scope of the Second Amendment,” it

said that “nothing in [its] opinion should be taken to cast

doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of fire-

arms by felons and the mentally ill.” Id. It described such pro-

hibitions as “presumptively lawful regulatory measures.” Id.

at 627 n.26. Two years later, in McDonald v. City of Chicago, the

Court “repeat[ed] [its] assurances” that felon dispossession

laws remain valid. 561 U.S. 742, 786 (2010) (plurality opinion).

After Heller, we developed a two-step test for Second

Amendment challenges. “The threshold question is whether

the regulated activity falls within the scope of the Second

Amendment.” Ezell v. City of Chicago, 846 F.3d 888, 892 (7th

Cir. 2017) (“Ezell II”). “This is a textual and historical inquiry;

if the government can establish that the challenged law regu-

lates activity falling outside the scope of the right as originally

understood, then ‘the regulated activity is categorically un-

protected, and the law is not subject to further Second

Amendment review.’” Id. (quoting Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651

F.3d 684, 703 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Ezell I”)).

However, “if the historical evidence is inconclusive or sug-

gests that the regulated activity is not categorically unpro-

tected[,] then there must be a second inquiry into the strength

of the government’s justification for restricting or regulating

the exercise of Second Amendment rights.” Id. (quoting Ezell

I, 651 F.3d at 703). At step two, we evaluate “the regulatory

means the government has chosen and the public-benefits

end it seeks to achieve.” Id. (quoting Ezell I, 651 F.3d at 703).

The rigor of the review is dependent on “how close the law

comes to the core of the Second Amendment right and the se-

verity of the law’s burden on the right.” Id. (quoting Ezell I,

8 No. 18-1478

651 F.3d at 703). “Severe burdens” on this core right “require

a very strong public-interest justification and a close means-

end fit; lesser burdens, and burdens on activity lying closer to

the margins of the right, are more easily justified.” Id. The

government has the burden “of justifying its law under a

heightened standard of scrutiny; rational-basis review does

not apply.” Id. We have consistently described step two as

“akin to intermediate scrutiny” and have required the gov-

ernment to show that the challenged statute is substantially

related to an important governmental objective. United States

v. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d 664, 672 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing

cases).

B. As-Applied Second Amendment Challenges

Relying on the “presumptively lawful” language in Heller

and McDonald, every federal court of appeals to address the

issue has held that § 922(g)(1) does not violate the Second

Amendment on its face. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 406 F.

App’x 52, 53–54 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. Bogle, 717 F.3d

281, 281–82 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam); United States v. Moore,

666 F.3d 313, 318–19 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. Barton, 633

F.3d 168, 172 (3d Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds by

Binderup v. Att’y Gen., 836 F.3d 336 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc);

Schrader v. Holder, 704 F.3d 980, 989–91 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert.

denied, 571 U.S. 989 (2013); United States v. Joos, 638 F.3d 581,

586 (8th Cir. 2011); United States v. Khami, 362 F. App’x 501,

508 (6th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 560 U.S. 934 (2010); United

States v. Battle, 347 F. App’x 478, 480 (11th Cir. 2009) (per cu-

riam); United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1047 (10th Cir.

2009), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 970 (2010); United States v. Smith,

329 F. App’x 109, 110–11 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Ander-

son, 559 F.3d 348, 352 (5th Cir. 2009).

No. 18-1478 9

However, courts of appeals are split as to whether as-ap-

plied Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(1) are viable.

On the one hand, the Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh

Circuits have suggested that § 922(g)(1) is always constitu-

tional as applied to felons as a class, regardless of their indi-

vidual circumstances or the nature of their offenses. See Stim-

mel v. Sessions, 879 F.3d 198, 210 (6th Cir. 2018) (“[W]e have

upheld § 922(g)(1), which disarms even non-violent felons.”

(citing United States v. Carey, 602 F.3d 738, 741 (6th Cir. 2010),

cert. denied, 562 U.S. 895 (2010))); United States v. Scroggins, 599

F.3d 433, 451 (5th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 867 (2010)

(rejecting as-applied Second Amendment challenge and hold-

ing that felon dispossession laws are constitutional even if the

offense was nonviolent in nature); United States v. Rozier, 598

F.3d 768, 771 (11th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 560 U.S. 958 (2010)

(concluding that “statutes disqualifying felons from pos-

sessing a firearm under any and all circumstances do not of-

fend the Second Amendment,” and holding that § 922(g)(1) is

“a constitutional avenue to restrict the Second Amendment

right of certain classes of people,” including convicted felons);

United States v. Vongxay, 594 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 2010),

cert. denied, 562 U.S. 921 (2010) (rejecting nonviolent felon’s as-

applied Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(1) because

“felons are categorically different from the individuals who

have a fundamental right to bear arms”); In re U.S., 578 F.3d

1195, 1200 (10th Cir. 2009) (“We have already rejected the no-

tion that Heller mandates an individualized inquiry concern-

ing felons pursuant to § 922(g)(1).” (citing McCane, 573 F.3d at

1047)).

The First Circuit has not foreclosed as-applied challenges,

but it has expressed some skepticism about them. In United

States v. Torres-Rosario, the court rejected the defendant’s as-

10 No. 18-1478

applied challenge because he had two prior convictions for

“serious drug offenses.” 658 F.3d 110, 113 (1st Cir. 2011), cert.

denied, 565 U.S. 1271 (2012). However, the court noted that the

Supreme Court “may be open to claims that some felonies do

not indicate potential violence and cannot be the basis for ap-

plying a categorical ban,” and “might even be open to highly

fact-specific objections.” Id. Yet the First Circuit cautioned that

“such an approach, applied to countless variations in individ-

ual circumstances, would obviously present serious problems

of administration, consistency and fair warning.” Id.

On the other hand, we, along with the Fourth, Eighth, and

D.C. Circuits, have left room for as-applied challenges to the

statute. See United States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685, 693 (7th Cir.

2010), cert. denied, 563 U.S. 1092 (2010) (“[W]e recognize that

§ 922(g)(1) may be subject to an overbreadth challenge at

some point because of its disqualification of all felons, includ-

ing those who are non-violent.”); Medina v. Whitaker, 913 F.3d

152, 160 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (“We need not decide today if it is

ever possible for a convicted felon to show that he may still

count as a ‘law-abiding, responsible citizen’” entitled to Sec-

ond Amendment protections.); United States v. Woolsey, 759

F.3d 905, 909 (8th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he Eighth Circuit has left

open the possibility that a person could bring a successful as-

applied challenge to § 922(g)(1)” but rejected defendant’s as-

applied challenge because he had multiple violent felony con-

victions.); United States v. Pruess, 703 F.3d 242, 247 (4th Cir.

2012) (holding that § 922(g)(1) could constitutionally be ap-

plied to nonviolent felons, but acknowledging that “there in

theory might be an as-applied Second Amendment challenge

to [§] 922(g)(1) that could succeed” (citations and internal

quotation marks omitted)).

No. 18-1478 11

Neither we, nor the Fourth, Eighth, or D.C. Circuits, how-

ever, have ever actually upheld such a challenge in practice.

In fact, we have repeatedly rejected as-applied Second

Amendment challenges to § 922(g). See Baer v. Lynch, 636 F.

App’x 695, 698 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding that § 922(g)(1) could

constitutionally be applied to individual convicted of felony

robbery); United States v. Shields, 789 F.3d 733, 750–51 (7th Cir.

2015) (concluding that § 922(g)(1) was constitutional as ap-

plied to individual who had been convicted of three violent

felonies); Williams, 616 F.3d at 693–94 (holding that § 922(g)(1)

was constitutional as applied to individual convicted of fel-

ony robbery who “beat[] the victim so badly that the victim

required sixty-five stitches”); United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d

638, 642, 644 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (rejecting as-applied Sec-

ond Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(9) brought by domes-

tic violence misdemeanant because violence was “an element

of the offense” and data suggested high rates of recidivism).

Indeed, only one federal court of appeals has upheld an

as-applied Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g). In a

fractured en banc decision, a narrow majority of the Third Cir-

cuit (eight out of fifteen judges) held that § 922(g)(1) was un-

constitutional as applied to two individuals convicted of a

misdemeanor for corrupting a minor and a misdemeanor for

unlawfully carrying a handgun without a license, respec-

tively. Binderup, 836 F.3d at 340, 356. Because it is the only suc-

cessful as-applied Second Amendment challenge in a court of

appeals to date—and because Kanter relies heavily upon it—

it is worth examining the case at some length.

Seven members of the Third Circuit reasoned that the his-

torical justification for disarming felons was “tied to the con-

cept of a virtuous citizenry,” and that “persons who have

12 No. 18-1478

committed serious crimes forfeit the right to possess firearms

much the way they forfeit other civil liberties.” Id. at 348–49

(plurality opinion) (citations and internal quotation marks

omitted). Applying the civic virtue rationale, three of those

judges concluded that the challengers’ offenses “were not se-

rious enough to strip them of their Second Amendment

rights.” Id. at 351. They explained that, although the two of-

fenses were punishable by more than a year in prison, and

thus met the definition of a felony in § 922(g), the state legis-

latures had enacted them as misdemeanors, and “a state leg-

islature’s classification of an offense as a misdemeanor is a

powerful expression of its belief that the offense is not serious

enough to be disqualifying.” Id. Those judges also considered

that neither of the offenses at issue involved violence and that

each of the challengers received “a minor sentence,” and they

pointed to the lack of a “cross-jurisdictional consensus re-

garding the seriousness of the [c]hallengers’ crimes,” remark-

ing that in some states the challengers’ conduct was not even

illegal. Id. at 352. At step two, those three judges concluded

that § 922(g)(1) did not survive intermediate scrutiny because

the government relied on “off-point statistical studies” that

involved incarcerated felons, not misdemeanants who had

served no jail time. Id. at 354.

By contrast, the other five judges who upheld the as-ap-

plied challenge believed that the exclusion of felons from the

scope of the Second Amendment’s protections was not rooted

in notions of civic virtue, but rather “the time-honored prin-

ciple that the right to keep and bear arms does not extend to

those likely to commit violent offenses.” Id. at 367 (Hardiman,

J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgments). Ap-

plying dangerousness as the touchstone, those judges con-

cluded that persons like the challengers who were convicted

No. 18-1478 13

of nonviolent offenses fall within the scope of the Second

Amendment’s protection. Id. at 375–76. Moreover, those five

judges believed that § 922(g) was “categorically unconstitu-

tional” when applied to “non-dangerous persons convicted of

offenses unassociated with violence,” such that any subse-

quent means-end scrutiny or judicial interest balancing was

“inappropriate.” Id. at 358, 378.

The seven dissenting judges concluded that as-applied

challenges to § 922(g)(1) are never permissible. Id. at 401

(Fuentes, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and dis-

senting from the judgments). In doing so, they stressed that

the majority’s decision to uphold such a challenge was un-

precedented. See id. at 380–81 (“The plaintiffs ask us to do

something that no federal appellate court has done before.…

No federal appellate court has yet upheld a challenge, facial

or as-applied, to the felon-in-possession statute.”). They criti-

cized the majority’s approach because it “saddle[s] district

court judges with a seemingly unending obligation to review

as-applied challenges” and “fail[s] to provide us with any

workable standards that would make such a regime adminis-

tratively feasible or doctrinally coherent.” Id. at 380. Accord-

ing to the dissent, the challengers’ claim failed at step one be-

cause “Heller itself tells us that felons are disqualified from

exercising their Second Amendment rights,” and “there is no

principled basis … for distinguishing felons from misde-

meanants who commit crimes punishable by more than two

years in prison.” Id. at 388. In any event, the dissenting judges

concluded that § 922(g)(1) survives intermediate scrutiny be-

cause the government’s studies established a link between

past criminal conduct and the government’s important inter-

est in preventing future gun violence. See id. at 400–01. With

14 No. 18-1478

respect to plaintiffs’ contention that the studies were not tai-

lored to their specific characteristics, the dissenting judges ex-

plained that “[t]he question is not whether someone exactly

like the plaintiffs poses a threat to public safety,” but rather

“whether the fit between the challenged regulation and the

asserted objective [is] reasonable, not perfect.” Id. at 400 (al-

teration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted). 4

With this background in mind, we now apply our two-

step test to this case.

C. Step One: The Historical Evidence is Inconclusive as

to Whether Felons Were Categorically Excluded From

the Second Amendment’s Scope

The first question is whether nonviolent felons as a class

historically enjoyed Second Amendment rights. Heller did not

answer this question. True, “some of Heller’s language does

link Second Amendment rights with the notion[] of ‘law-abid-

ing citizens.’” Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d at 669; see also Heller,

554 U.S. at 634–35 (observing that the “core” of the Second

Amendment right is “the right of law-abiding, responsible cit-

izens to use arms in defense of hearth and home” (emphasis

added)). The Heller Court also cautioned that nothing in its

decision “should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding pro-

hibitions on the possession of firearms by felons,” which it re-

ferred to as “presumptively lawful.” 554 U.S. at 626–27 & n.26.

Moreover, the Court mentioned that certain individuals may

4Both parties appealed to the Supreme Court, but the Supreme Court

denied the petitions for writ of certiorari. See Sessions v. Binderup, 137 S. Ct.

2323 (2017) (noting Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor would grant the pe-

tition); Binderup v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 2323 (2017) (same).

No. 18-1478 15

be “disqualified from the exercise of Second Amendment

rights.” Id. at 635. However, the Court never actually ad-

dressed the historical pedigree of felon dispossession laws.

Accordingly, we have refused to read too much into the

Court’s “precautionary language.” Skoien, 614 F.3d at 640; see

also Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d at 669 (“We are reluctant to place

more weight on these passing references than the Court itself

did.”). 5

Nor has the Seventh Circuit decided whether felons were

historically outside the scope of the Second Amendment’s

protection. See Baer, 636 F. App’x at 698. Although the litigants

in Williams raised that question, we declined to address it and

proceeded directly to the intermediate scrutiny analysis. 616

F.3d at 692. In so doing, we noted that “[t]he academic writing

on the subject of whether felons were excluded from firearm

possession at the time of the founding is ‘inconclusive at best,’

and we refrain[ed] … from making a determination based on

contradictory views.” Id. (quoting Skoien, 614 F.3d at 650

(Sykes, J., dissenting)).

To be sure, although we have not expressly decided this

issue before, we have suggested that felons were not histori-

cally understood to have Second Amendment rights. For ex-

ample, in Skoien, which involved domestic violence misde-

meanants, we explained that some “categorical limits” on fire-

arm possession were “part of the original meaning” of the

Second Amendment. 614 F.3d at 640. Similarly, in United

5 But see Berron v. Ill. Concealed Carry Licensing Review Bd., 825 F.3d 843,

847 (7th Cir. 2016) (“When holding in [Heller] that the Second Amendment

establishes personal rights, the Court observed that only law-abiding per-

sons enjoy these rights, even at home.”).

16 No. 18-1478

States v. Yancey, we opined that “most scholars of the Second

Amendment agree that the right to bear arms was tied to the

concept of a virtuous citizenry and that, accordingly, the gov-

ernment could disarm ‘unvirtuous citizens,’” including fel-

ons. 621 F.3d 681, 684–85 (7th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (quoting

Vongxay, 594 F.3d at 1118). 6

If, as we suggested in Yancey and as most scholars have

concluded, the founders conceived of the right to bear arms

as belonging only to virtuous citizens, even nonviolent felons

like Kanter would fall outside the scope of the Second

6 Indeed, numerous legal historians have endorsed this view. See, e.g.,

Saul Cornell, “Don't Know Much About History” The Current Crisis in Second

Amendment Scholarship, 29 N. Ky. L. Rev. 657, 679 (2002) (“Perhaps the

most accurate way to describe the dominant understanding of the right to

bear arms in the Founding era is as a civic right [that] … was limited to

those members of the polity who were deemed capable of exercising it in

a virtuous manner.”); Robert Dowlut, The Right to Arms: Does the Constitu-

tion or the Predilection of Judges Reign?, 36 Okla. L. Rev. 65, 96 (1983) (“Co-

lonial and English societies of the eighteenth century … excluded … felons

[from possessing firearms].”); Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and

the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 204, 266

(1983) (“Felons simply did not fall within the benefits of the common law

right to possess arms.”); Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the

Second Amendment, 62 Tenn. L. Rev. 461, 480 (1995) (“One implication of

this emphasis on the virtuous citizen is that the right to arms does not

preclude laws disarming the unvirtuous (i.e. criminals) ….” (citation omit-

ted)). Moreover, according to Thomas M. Cooley’s 1868 Treatise on Con-

stitutional Limitations, which the Heller court described as a “massively

popular” treatise written by “[t]he most famous” late-nineteenth-century

legal scholar, 554 U.S. at 616, certain classes of people were “almost uni-

versally excluded” from exercising certain civic rights, including “the id-

iot, the lunatic, and the felon, on obvious grounds.” Thomas M. Cooley, A

Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations Which Rest Upon the Legislative

Power of the States of the American Union 29 (1st ed. 1868).

No. 18-1478 17

Amendment. Indeed, several courts of appeals have con-

cluded that nonviolent felons are outside the scope of the Sec-

ond Amendment. For example, in Hamilton v. Pallozzi, the

Fourth Circuit rejected a nonviolent felon’s as-applied Second

Amendment challenge to a state felon dispossession statute,

holding that “conviction of a felony necessarily removes one

from the class of ‘law-abiding, responsible citizens’ for pur-

poses of the Second Amendment.” 848 F.3d 614, 626 (4th Cir.

2017). Explaining that the defendant could not rebut the pre-

sumption that he fell outside the category of “‘law-abiding,

responsible citizens,’” the court focused on his felony convic-

tion for fraud and theft crimes: “Theft, fraud, and forgery are

not merely errors in filling out a form or some regulatory mis-

demeanor offense; these are significant offenses reflecting dis-

respect for the law.” Id. at 627 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 635);

see also Medina, 913 F.3d at 160 (“Whether a certain crime re-

moves one from the category of ‘law-abiding and responsi-

ble,’ in some cases, may be a close question,” such as “a mis-

demeanor arising from a fistfight …. Those who commit felo-

nies however, cannot profit from our recognition of such bor-

derline cases.”); United States v. Hughley, 691 F. App’x 278, 279

(8th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (“Restricting gun possession by

felons—even nonviolent ones—differs meaningfully from re-

stricting citizens who have not been convicted of serious of-

fenses from having guns in their home for self-defense.”);

Vongxay, 594 F.3d at 1115–16 (“declin[ing] to make a distinc-

tion between violent and non-violent felons” because “felons

are categorically different from the individuals who have a

fundamental right to bear arms”); Rozier, 598 F.3d at 771 & n.5

(stating that a nonviolent felon’s “Second Amendment right

to bear arms is not weighed in the same manner as that of a

law-abiding citizen” and analogizing felon-dispossession

18 No. 18-1478

statutes to felon disenfranchisement laws); United States v.

Everist, 368 F.3d 517, 519 (5th Cir. 2004) (“Irrespective of

whether his offense was violent in nature, a felon has shown

manifest disregard for the rights of others. He may not justly

complain of the limitation on his liberty when his possession

of firearms would otherwise threaten the security of his fel-

low citizens.”). 7

On the other hand, as Judge Sykes observed in her dissent

in Skoien, there is scholarly “disagree[ment] about the extent

to which felons … were considered excluded from the right to

bear arms during the founding era,” and “[t]he historical evi-

dence is inconclusive at best.” Skoien, 614 F.3d at 650 (Sykes,

J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted). 8 If the founders were really

7 Although Everist was issued before the Heller decision, the Fifth Cir-

cuit already recognized an individual right to bear arms pre-Heller and

reaffirmed the validity of the Everist decision after Heller. See Scroggins, 599

F.3d at 451.

8 For support for Judge Sykes’s observation regarding the conflicting

scholarship on the historical conception of the Second Amendment, see,

e.g., Carlton F.W. Larson, Four Exceptions in Search of A Theory: District of

Columbia v. Heller and Judicial Ipse Dixit, 60 Hastings L.J. 1371, 1374 (2009)

(“[S]o far as I can determine, no colonial or state law in eighteenth-century

America formally restricted the ability of felons to own firearms.”); C.

Kevin Marshall, Why Can’t Martha Stewart Have a Gun?, 32 Harv. J.L. &

Pub. Pol’y 695, 698 (2009) (“[A]ctual ‘longstanding’ precedent in America

and pre-Founding England suggests that a firearms disability can be con-

sistent with the Second Amendment to the extent that … its basis credibly

indicates a present danger that one will misuse arms against others and

the disability redresses that danger.”); Adam Winkler, Heller’s Catch-22,

56 UCLA L. Rev. 1551, 1563 (2009) (“The Founding generation had no

laws … denying the right to people convicted of crimes.”).

No. 18-1478 19

just concerned about dangerousness, not a lack of virtue, non-

violent felons like Kanter arguably fall within the scope of the

Second Amendment’s protections.

Ultimately, we need not resolve this difficult issue regard-

ing the historical scope of the Second Amendment to dispose

of this case. Instead, we proceed to the means-end scrutiny of

the government’s objectives. 9

D. Step Two: The Felon Dispossession Statutes Survive

Intermediate Scrutiny

Categorical prohibitions on the possession of firearms by

felons are “presumptively lawful,” even in disqualifying non-

violent felons like Kanter. See Skoien, 614 F.3d at 640 (“[S]uch

a recent extension of [§ 922(g)(1)’s] disqualification to non-vi-

olent felons (embezzlers and tax evaders, for example) is pre-

sumptively constitutional, as Heller said in note 26.”). But be-

cause “Heller referred to felon disarmament bans only as ‘pre-

sumptively lawful,’” we require the government to “prov[e]

9 In fact, we usually defer the threshold historical scope inquiry and

proceed directly to means-end scrutiny. See, e.g., Horsley v. Trame, 808 F.3d

1126, 1131 (7th Cir. 2015) (declining to decide whether eighteen- to twenty-

year-olds are within the scope of the Second Amendment); Yancey, 621

F.3d at 684–85. One notable exception to our generally restrained ap-

proach in this area is United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d 664 (7th Cir.

2015). There, the majority held that undocumented immigrants were his-

torically within the scope of the Second Amendment but ultimately con-

cluded that the statute at issue nevertheless survived intermediate scru-

tiny. Id. at 669–73. The concurrence advocated for a “prudential approach”

since we did not need to decide the threshold question to resolve the case,

and proposed “reserv[ing] resolution of this challenging constitutional

question for a case that compels addressing it.” Id. at 673–74 (Flaum, J.,

concurring in the judgment). We think that prudential approach is appro-

priate here.

20 No. 18-1478

“the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) … using the intermediate

scrutiny framework.” Williams, 616 F.3d at 692.

To survive intermediate scrutiny at step two, the govern-

ment must show that the felon dispossession statute is sub-

stantially related to an important governmental objective.

Consistent with how we apply intermediate scrutiny in the

First Amendment context, the “fit” between the challenged

regulation and the asserted governmental objective need only

“be reasonable, not perfect.” United States v. Marzzarella, 614

F.3d 85, 98 (3d Cir. 2010); cf. FTC v. Trudeau, 662 F.3d 947, 953

(7th Cir. 2011). 10

The government has met its burden in this case. First, Kan-

ter concedes that the government’s objective in passing

§ 922(g)(1) was an important one. The government identifies

its interest as preventing gun violence by keeping firearms

away from persons, such as those convicted of serious crimes,

who might be expected to misuse them. This formulation of

the government’s interest is consistent with our precedent in

this area. See Yancey, 621 F.3d at 683 (“Congress enacted the

exclusions in § 922(g) to keep guns out of the hands of pre-

10 Our means-end review is arguably less rigorous in this case because

the weight of the historical evidence summarized above suggests that

felon dispossession laws do not restrict the “core right of armed defense,”

but rather burden “activity lying closer to the margins of the right.” Ezell

II, 846 F.3d at 892. Indeed, we have said that “the state can prevail with

less evidence when, as in Skoien, guns are forbidden to a class of persons

who present a higher than average risk of misusing a gun.” Moore, 702

F.3d at 940. We have even gone so far as to say that “empirical evidence of

a public safety concern can be dispensed with altogether when the ban is

limited to obviously dangerous persons such as felons and the mentally

ill.” Id.

No. 18-1478 21

sumptively risky people.”); Williams, 616 F.3d at 693 (describ-

ing the government’s objective as “keep[ing] firearms out of

the hands of violent felons, who the government believes are

often those most likely to misuse firearms”); Skoien, 614 F.3d

at 642 (describing the government’s interest as “preventing

armed mayhem”). And we have previously held that this in-

terest is “without doubt an important one.” Yancey, 621 F.3d

at 684; see also Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d at 673 (“[T]he govern-

ment has a[] strong interest in preventing people who already

have disrespected the law (including … felons …) from pos-

sessing guns.”).

Second, the government has shown that prohibiting even

nonviolent felons like Kanter from possessing firearms is sub-

stantially related to its interest in preventing gun violence. Be-

fore turning to the government’s statistical evidence estab-

lishing such a link, it is important to note that we do not write

on a blank slate. In Yancey, we explained that “most felons are

nonviolent, but someone with a felony conviction on his rec-

ord is more likely than a nonfelon to engage in illegal and vi-

olent gun use.” 621 F.3d at 685. In fact, the D.C. Circuit has

concluded that “nonviolent offenders not only have a higher

recidivism rate than the general population, but certain

groups—such as property offenders—have an even higher re-

cidivism rate than violent offenders, and a large percentage of

the crimes nonviolent recidivists later commit are violent.”

Kaemmerling v. Lappin, 553 F.3d 669, 683 (D.C. Cir. 2008); see

Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 26 (2003) (citing P. Langan &

D. Levin, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Spe-

cial Report: Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 1994, at 1 (June

2002)).

22 No. 18-1478

In addition to these judicial statements, the government

points to several studies that have found a connection be-

tween nonviolent offenders like Kanter and a risk of future

violent crime. For example, one study of 210,886 nonviolent

offenders found that about one in five were rearrested for a

violent crime within three years of his or her release. See U.S.

Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics Profile of Nonviolent

Offenders Exiting State Prisons 2, 4 (2004). A separate study

found that 28.5 percent of nonviolent property offenders—a

category that includes fraud convictions—were rearrested for

a violent offense within five years of their release. See Mat-

thew R. Durose, et al., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Justice

Statistics, Recidivism of Prisoner Released in 30 States in 2005:

Patterns from 2005 to 2010, at 9 (2014). Yet another study found

that “even handgun purchasers with only 1 prior misdemeanor

conviction and no convictions for offenses involving firearms

or violence were nearly 5 times as likely as those with no prior

criminal history to be charged with new offenses involving

firearms or violence.” Garen J. Wintemute, et al., Prior Misde-

meanor Convictions as a Risk Factor for Later Violent and Firearm-

Related Criminal Activity Among Authorized Purchasers of Hand-

guns, 280 J. Am. Med. Ass’n 2083, 2083 (1998) (emphasis

added). 11

11 Even the study that Kanter relies upon found that approximately 40

percent of individuals convicted of mail fraud had at least one additional

arrest afterward. David Weisburd & Elin Waring, White-Collar Crime and

Criminal Careers 12, 29 (2004). The same study found that 24.5 percent of

all repeat white-collar offenders had at least one violent arrest on their

record. Id. at 45. In other words, “white-collar offenders often have multi-

ple contacts with the criminal justice system” and “are unlikely to evi-

dence a high degree of specialization.” Id. at 49.

No. 18-1478 23

Kanter’s only response to the government’s statistical

studies is that they are not tailored enough to his “individual

circumstances.” Specifically, Kanter asks the Court “to con-

sider the fact that [he] is a first-time, non-violent offender with

no history of violence, firearm misuses, or subsequent convic-

tions.” Kanter also points out that he is “employed, married,

and does not use illicit drugs, all of which correspond with

lower rates of recidivism.” In short, Kanter argues that to

meet its burden the government must show “a substantial re-

lationship between denying Mr. Kanter a firearm and further-

ing the government’s objective of preventing firearm misuse

and armed violence.”

Kanter is mistaken. In Skoien we held that “Congress is not

limited to case-by-case exclusions of persons who have been

shown to be untrustworthy with weapons, nor need these

limits be established by evidence presented in court. Heller

did not suggest that disqualifications would be effective only

if the statute’s benefits are first established by admissible evi-

dence.” 614 F.3d at 641. Of course, not all nonviolent felons

will later commit a violent crime with a firearm. In that sense,

the statute is “somewhat over-inclusive.” United States v.

Chapman, 666 F.3d 220, 231 (4th Cir. 2012). However, that

“does not undermine [the statute’s] constitutionality … be-

cause it merely suggests that the fit is not a perfect one; a rea-

sonable fit is all that is required under intermediate scrutiny.”

Id.; see also Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 97–98 (analogizing to inter-

mediate scrutiny in First Amendment context).

Here, unlike the challengers in Binderup, who were con-

victed of “non-serious” state misdemeanors and served no

prison time, Kanter was convicted of a serious federal felony

for conduct broadly understood to be criminal, and he did not

24 No. 18-1478

face a minor sentence. 836 F.3d at 353 & n.6. Instead, Kanter is

more akin to the challenger in Hamilton, whose fraud and

theft convictions were “black-letter mala in se felonies reflect-

ing grave misjudgment and maladjustment.” 848 F.3d at 627.

Kanter’s crime—defrauding the federal government out of

hundreds of thousands of dollars—“reflect[s] significant dis-

respect for the law.” Id. at 627 n.14; see also Medina, 913 F.3d at

160 (rejecting as-applied challenge where plaintiff was con-

victed of “felony fraud—a serious crime, malum in se, that is

punishable in every state”). Thus, Kanter’s serious felony con-

viction prevents him from challenging the constitutionality of

§ 922(g)(1) as applied to him. 12

We are further assured in our decision because the highly-

individualized approach Kanter proposes raises serious insti-

tutional and administrative concerns. See Torres-Rosario, 658

F.3d at 113 (“[S]uch an approach, applied to countless varia-

tions in individual circumstances, would obviously present

serious problems of administration, consistency and fair

warning.”); see also Medina, 913 F.3d at 159–60 (rejecting argu-

ment that “non-dangerous felons have a right to bear arms”

12 We decline to revisit our comment in Williams “that § 922(g)(1) may

be subject to an overbreadth challenge at some point because of its dis-

qualification of all felons, including those who are non-violent.” 616 F.3d

at 693. That statement was dictum, and we need not determine whether

§ 922(g)(1) may ever be subject to an as-applied challenge to reach our de-

cision in this case. There may be a case in the future that requires address-

ing whether any individual may successfully bring an as-applied chal-

lenge to the statute, but Kanter’s is not that case. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma,

413 U.S. 601, 610 (1973) (“[A] person to whom a statute may constitution-

ally be applied will not be heard to challenge that statute on the ground

that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others, in other

situations not before the Court.”).

No. 18-1478 25

because “[u]sing an amorphous ‘dangerousness’ standard to

delineate the scope of the Second Amendment would require

the government to make case-by-case predictive judgments

before barring the possession of weapons”). As mentioned

above, Congress previously allowed the ATF to restore a

felon’s gun rights under § 925(c) if the agency determined that

“the applicant will not be likely to act in a manner dangerous

to public safety and that the granting of the relief would not

be contrary to the public interest.” 18 U.S.C. § 925(c). How-

ever, Congress abandoned that approach after finding that

the dangerousness inquiry was a “very difficult” and time-in-

tensive task, H.R. Rep. No. 102-618, at 14 (1992), and that “too

many of these felons whose gun ownership rights were re-

stored went on to commit violent crimes with firearms.” H.R.

Rep. No. 104-183, at 15 (1995). Congress’s failed attempt to

delegate this investigative task to a law enforcement agency

“should have a profound impact on our tailoring analysis.”

Binderup, 836 F.3d at 403 (Fuentes, J., concurring in part, dis-

senting in part, and dissenting from the judgment).

At bottom, the fact-specific inquiry Kanter asks this Court

to undertake is “a function best performed by the Executive,

which, unlike courts, is institutionally equipped for conduct-

ing a neutral, wide-ranging investigation.” Bean, 537 U.S. at

77; see also Pontarelli v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 285 F.3d 216,

231 (3d Cir. 2002) (“Unlike ATF, courts possess neither the re-

sources to conduct the requisite investigations nor the exper-

tise to predict accurately which felons may carry guns with-

out threatening the public’s safety.”). Moreover, “[i]n the con-

text of firearm regulation, the legislature is far better

equipped than the judiciary to make sensitive public policy

judgments (within constitutional limits) concerning the dan-

gers in carrying firearms and the manner to combat those

26 No. 18-1478

risks.” Schrader, 704 F.3d at 990 (citation and internal quota-

tion marks omitted).

In sum, the government has established that the felon dis-

possession statutes are substantially related to the important

governmental objective of keeping firearms away those con-

victed of serious crimes. Because Kanter was convicted of a

serious federal felony for conduct broadly understood to be

criminal, his challenge to the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) is

without merit.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the

district court.

No. 18-1478 27

BARRETT, Circuit Judge, dissenting. History is consistent

with common sense: it demonstrates that legislatures have the

power to prohibit dangerous people from possessing guns.

But that power extends only to people who are dangerous.

Founding-era legislatures did not strip felons of the right to

bear arms simply because of their status as felons. Nor have

the parties introduced any evidence that founding-era

legislatures imposed virtue-based restrictions on the right;

such restrictions applied to civic rights like voting and jury

service, not to individual rights like the right to possess a gun.

In 1791—and for well more than a century afterward—

legislatures disqualified categories of people from the right to

bear arms only when they judged that doing so was necessary

to protect the public safety.

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and Wisconsin Statute § 941.29(1m)

would stand on solid footing if their categorical bans were

tailored to serve the governments’ undeniably compelling

interest in protecting the public from gun violence. But their

dispossession of all felons—both violent and nonviolent—is

unconstitutional as applied to Kanter, who was convicted of

mail fraud for falsely representing that his company’s

therapeutic shoe inserts were Medicare-approved and billing

Medicare accordingly. Neither Wisconsin nor the United

States has introduced data sufficient to show that disarming

all nonviolent felons substantially advances its interest in

keeping the public safe. Nor have they otherwise

demonstrated that Kanter himself shows a proclivity for

violence. Absent evidence that he either belongs to a

dangerous category or bears individual markers of risk,

28 No. 18-1478

permanently disqualifying Kanter from possessing a gun

violates the Second Amendment. 1

I.

At the outset, it is worth clarifying a conceptual point.

There are competing ways of approaching the

constitutionality of gun dispossession laws. Some maintain

that there are certain groups of people—for example, violent

felons—who fall entirely outside the Second Amendment’s

scope. See, e.g., Binderup v. Attorney Gen. U.S., 836 F.3d 336, 357

(3d Cir. 2016) (en banc) (Hardiman, J., concurring in part and

concurring in the judgments) (“[T]he Founders understood

that not everyone possessed Second Amendment rights.

These appeals require us to decide who count among ‘the

people’ entitled to keep and bear arms.”). Others maintain

that all people have the right to keep and bear arms but that

history and tradition support Congress’s power to strip

certain groups of that right. See Eugene Volokh, Implementing

the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self-Defense: An Analytical

Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443, 1497–

98 (2009) (describing these competing views). These

approaches will typically yield the same result; one uses

history and tradition to identify the scope of the right, and the

other uses that same body of evidence to identify the scope of

the legislature’s power to take it away.

1Because the federal and state statutes operate to the same effect as

applied to Kanter, my analysis applies equally to both. For simplicity’s

sake, I often refer only to the federal statute. In addition, I sometimes refer

to the statutes as imposing a “felon ban” or “felon dispossession” with the

understanding that § 922(g)(1) also encompasses state misdemeanors

punishable by more than two years in prison. See 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20)(B).

No. 18-1478 29

In my view, the latter is the better way to approach the

problem. It is one thing to say that certain weapons or

activities fall outside the scope of the right. See District of

Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 627 (2008) (explaining that

“the sorts of weapons protected were those ‘in common use

at the time’” (citation omitted)); Ezell v. City of Chicago, 846

F.3d 888, 892 (7th Cir. 2017) (Ezell II) (“[I]f … the challenged

law regulates activity falling outside the scope of the right as

originally understood, then ‘the regulated activity is

categorically unprotected, and the law is not subject to further

Second Amendment review.’” (citation omitted)); Ezell v. City

of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 702 (7th Cir. 2011) (Ezell I) (drawing

an analogy between categories of speech, like obscenity, that

fall outside the First Amendment and activities that fall

outside the Second Amendment). It is another thing to say

that certain people fall outside the Amendment’s scope. Arms

and activities would always be in or out. But a person could

be in one day and out the next: the moment he was convicted

of a violent crime or suffered the onset of mental illness, his

rights would be stripped as a self-executing consequence of

his new status. No state action would be required.

To be sure, under this theory such a person could possess

a gun as a matter of legislative grace. But he would lack

standing to assert constitutional claims that other citizens

could assert. For example, imagine that a legislature

disqualifies those convicted of crimes of domestic violence

from possessing a gun for a period of ten years following

release from prison. See United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638,

642 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (holding constitutional 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(g)(9), which forbids those convicted of crimes of

domestic violence to possess a gun). After fifteen years pass,

a domestic violence misdemeanant challenges a handgun ban

30 No. 18-1478

identical to the one that the Court held unconstitutional in

Heller. Despite the legislative judgment that such a person

could safely possess a gun after ten years, a court would still

have to determine whether the person had standing to assert

a Second Amendment claim. If the justification for the initial

deprivation is that the person falls outside the protection of

the Second Amendment, it doesn’t matter if the statutory

disqualification expires. If domestic violence misdemeanants

are out, they’re out. 2

That is an unusual way of thinking about rights. In other

contexts that involve the loss of a right, the deprivation occurs

because of state action, and state action determines the scope

of the loss (subject, of course, to any applicable constitutional

constraints). Felon voting rights are a good example: a state

can disenfranchise felons, but if it refrains from doing so, their

voting rights remain constitutionally protected. 3 So too with

2 Or at least that would be true absent the unlikely event that the

Second Amendment, as originally understood, imposed a very specific

restriction on the length of time that such a misdemeanant was excluded

from the right.

3 Felon disenfranchisement laws have a long history, and the

Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of the right to vote expressly

acknowledges the authority of state legislatures to enact such laws. U.S.

CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (providing that a state’s representation in the

House will be reduced if the right to vote “is denied … or in any way

abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime”). The

Second Amendment contains no similar acknowledgement. Legislative

power to strip the right from certain people or groups was nonetheless a

historically accepted feature of the pre-existing right that the Second

Amendment protects. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 592 (“[T]he Second

Amendment … codified a pre-existing right.”); id. at 595 (“Of course the

right was not unlimited ….”); Skoien, 614 F.3d at 640 (“That some

categorical limits are proper is part of the original meaning, leaving to the

No. 18-1478 31

the right to keep and bear arms: a state can disarm certain

people (for example, those convicted of crimes of domestic

violence), but if it refrains from doing so, their rights remain

constitutionally protected. In other words, a person convicted

of a qualifying crime does not automatically lose his right to

keep and bear arms but instead becomes eligible to lose it.

In addition to being analytically awkward, the “scope of

the right” approach is at odds with Heller itself. There, the

Court interpreted the word “people” as referring to “all

Americans.” 554 U.S. at 580–81; see also id. at 580 (asserting

that “the people” “refers to a class of persons who are part of

a national community or who have otherwise developed

sufficient connection with this country to be considered part

of that community” (citation omitted)). Neither felons nor the

mentally ill are categorically excluded from our national

community. That does not mean that the government cannot

prevent them from possessing guns. Instead, it means that the

question is whether the government has the power to disable

the exercise of a right that they otherwise possess, rather than

whether they possess the right at all.

Thus, I treat Kanter as falling within the scope of the

Second Amendment and ask whether Congress and

Wisconsin can nonetheless prevent him from possessing a

gun.

people’s elected representatives the filling in of details.”). Thus, such a

regulation does not “infringe” the right to bear arms because the right was

always qualified by the government’s power to prevent the dangerous

from exercising it.

32 No. 18-1478

II.

Heller did not “undertake an exhaustive historical

analysis … of the full scope of the Second Amendment,” but

it did offer a list of “presumptively lawful regulatory

measures,” including “longstanding prohibitions on the

possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill.” See

Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27 & n.26. Like the majority, I am

“reluctant to place more weight on these passing references

than the Court itself did.” See Maj. Op. at 15 (quoting United

States v. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d 664, 669 (7th Cir. 2015)). The

constitutionality of felon dispossession was not before the

Court in Heller, and because it explicitly deferred analysis of

this issue, the scope of its assertion is unclear. For example,

does “presumptively lawful” mean that such regulations are

presumed lawful unless a historical study shows otherwise?

Does it mean that as-applied challenges are available? Does

the Court’s reference to “felons” suggest that the legislature

cannot disqualify misdemeanants from possessing guns?

Does the word “longstanding” mean that prohibitions of

recent vintage are suspect? As we observed in Skoien, judicial

opinions are not statutes, and we don’t dissect them word-by-

word as if they were. 614 F.3d at 640. Thus, I agree with the

majority that Heller’s dictum does not settle the question

before us.

It does, however, give us a place to start. Heller’s reference

endorses the proposition that the legislature can impose some

categorical bans on the possession of firearms. See id. (“That

some categorical limits are proper is part of the original

meaning.”). Our task is to determine whether all felons—

violent and nonviolent alike—comprise one such category.

No. 18-1478 33

Wisconsin and the United States advance three basic

historical arguments in support of this categorical exclusion.

First, they say that there is some evidence suggesting that

founding-era legislatures deprived felons of the right. Second,

they argue that because the states put felons to death at the

time of the founding, no one would have questioned their

authority to take felons’ guns too. And third, they insist that

founding-era legislatures permitted only virtuous citizens to

have guns, and felons are not virtuous citizens.

As I explain below, none of these rationales supports the

proposition that the legislature can permanently deprive

felons of the right to possess arms simply because of their

status as felons. The historical evidence does, however,

support a different proposition: that the legislature may

disarm those who have demonstrated a proclivity for violence

or whose possession of guns would otherwise threaten the

public safety. This is a category simultaneously broader and

narrower than “felons”—it includes dangerous people who

have not been convicted of felonies but not felons lacking

indicia of dangerousness.

A.

The best historical support for a legislative power to

permanently dispossess all felons would be founding-era

laws explicitly imposing—or explicitly authorizing the

legislature to impose—such a ban. But at least thus far,

scholars have not been able to identify any such laws. The

only evidence coming remotely close lies in proposals made

in the New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania

ratifying conventions. In recommending that protection for

the right to arms be added to the Constitution, each of these

proposals included limiting language arguably tied to

34 No. 18-1478

criminality. See, e.g., Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and

the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV.

204, 222, 266 (1983); Steven P. Halbrook, The Right of the People

or the Power of the State: Bearing Arms, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 131,

147, 185 (1991); see also C. Kevin Marshall, Why Can’t Martha

Stewart Have a Gun?, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 695, 712 (2009)

(“For relevant authority before World War I for disabling

felons from keeping firearms, then, one is reduced to three

proposals emerging from the ratification of the

Constitution.”).

A majority of the New Hampshire convention

recommended that a bill of rights include the following

protection: “Congress shall never disarm any citizen, unless

such as are or have been in actual rebellion.” See 1 JONATHAN

ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON

THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 326 (2d ed. 1891)

(emphasis added). In the Massachusetts convention, Samuel

Adams proposed to protect the right to arms with the

following language: “And that the said Constitution be never

construed to authorize Congress to … prevent the people of

the United States, who are peaceable citizens, from keeping their

own arms.” See 2 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A

DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 675, 681 (1971) (emphasis added).

Finally, the influential Pennsylvania Minority suggested an

addition stating: “That the people have a right to bear arms

for the defense of themselves and their own State or the

United States, or for the purpose of killing game; and no law

shall be passed for disarming the people or any of them unless

for crimes committed, or real danger of public injury from

individuals ….” 2 SCHWARTZ, supra, at 662, 665 (emphasis

added). On the basis of these three proposals some conclude

that “[a]ll the ratifying convention proposals which most

No. 18-1478 35

explicitly detailed the recommended right-to-arms

amendment excluded criminals and the violent.” See, e.g.,

Kates, 82 MICH. L. REV. at 266.

Several things bear emphasis here. First, none of the

relevant limiting language made its way into the Second

Amendment. Second, only New Hampshire’s proposal—the

least restrictive of the three—even carried a majority of its

convention. See 2 SCHWARTZ, supra, at 628, 675, 758. Third,

proposals from other states that advocated a constitutional

right to arms did not contain similar language of limitation or

exclusion. See Kates, 82 MICH. L. REV. at 222 (citing 1 ELLIOT,

supra, at 328, 335). And finally, similar limitations or

exclusions do not appear in any of the four parallel state

constitutional provisions enacted before ratification of the

Second Amendment. See Eugene Volokh, State Constitutional

Rights to Keep and Bear Arms, 11 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 191, 208

(2006) (North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Vermont,

Massachusetts). All that said, these proposals may “indicate

some common if imprecise understanding at the Founding

regarding the boundaries of a right to keep and bear arms.”

Marshall, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y at 713. And at a

minimum, the fact that they are routinely invoked in support

of blanket felon disarmament makes it necessary to consider

them.

I’ll begin with the New Hampshire proposal, which did

not embrace the disarmament of all felons, but rather of those

citizens who “are or have been in actual rebellion.” 1 ELLIOT,

supra, at 326 (emphasis added). This limitation targeted a

narrow group because “rebellion” was a very specific crime.

See Rebellion, 2 NEW UNIVERSAL ETYMOLOGICAL ENGLISH

DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1756) (explaining that the term is “now

36 No. 18-1478

used for a traiterous taking up arms, or a tumultuous

opposing the authority of the king, etc. or supreme power in

a nation”). There are obvious reasons why the government

would take guns away from those bent on overthrowing it,

and, as I discuss later, stripping rebels of their gun rights

followed well-established practice in both England and the

colonies. Thus, while this proposal reflects support for

disarming rebels, it does not say anything about disarming

those who have committed other crimes, much less

nonviolent ones.

Samuel Adams’s proposed language to the Massachusetts

convention, which would have limited the right to “peaceable

citizens,” see 2 SCHWARTZ, supra, at 681, sweeps more

broadly—but not so broadly that it encompasses all criminals,

or even all felons. At the time, “peaceable” was defined as

“[f]ree from war; free from tumult”; “[q]uiet; undisturbed”;

“[n]ot violent; not bloody”; “[n]ot quarrelsome; not

turbulent.” 1 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH

LANGUAGE (5th ed. 1773). Those who “breach[ed] the peace”

caused “[a] violation of the public peace, as by a riot, affray,

or any tumult which is contrary to law, and destructive to the

public tranquility.” See Breach, NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN

DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828); see also Atwater

v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 327 & n.2 (2001) (noting some

“variations in the common-law usage of the term ‘breach of

the peace’” but assuming that the definition “entail[ed] at

least a threat of violence”); id. (quoting MICHAEL DALTON, THE

COUNTRY JUSTICE 9 (1727) (“The Breach of th[e] Peace seemeth

to be any injurious Force or Violence moved against the

Person of another, his Goods, Lands, or other Possessions,

whether by threatening words, or by furious Gesture, or Force

of the Body, or any other Force used in terrorem.”)); Pearce v.

No. 18-1478 37

Atwood, 13 Mass. 324, 332 (1816) (“Breaches of the peace

comprise not only cases of actual violence to the person of

another, but any unlawful acts, tending to produce an actual

breach of the peace; whether the peace of the public, or an

individual, be in fact disturbed or not.”). Not all crimes are

violent; nor, for that matter, is every non-peaceable person a

criminal. In short, the phrase “peaceable citizens” was not a

synonym for “non-felons” or even “non-criminals.”

That leaves the strongest support for a blanket felon

exclusion: the Pennsylvania Minority’s suggested guarantee

of the right to arms “unless for crimes committed, or real

danger of public injury from individuals.” 2 SCHWARTZ, supra,

at 665. This proposal can be read in two ways. The first, which

would support a broad exclusion, is to interpret it as

capturing two groups: (1) those who have committed any

crime—felony or misdemeanor, violent or nonviolent—and

(2) those who have not committed a crime but nonetheless

pose a danger to public safety. The second, which would

support a more targeted exclusion, is to interpret it as

capturing one group: those who pose a danger to public

safety, whether or not they have committed a crime. On this

reading, the catchall phrase limiting the rights of individuals

who pose a “real danger of public injury” would be an effort

to capture non-criminals whose possession of guns would

pose the same kind of danger as possession by those who have

committed crimes. And unless the founding generation

understood all crimes—even nonviolent misdemeanors—to

be markers for that risk, the relevant “crimes committed”

would be the subset of crimes suggesting a proclivity for

violence. (As far as I can find, no one even today reads this

provision to support the disarmament of literally all

criminals, even nonviolent misdemeanants.) If “crimes

38 No. 18-1478

committed” refers only to a subset of crimes, that subset must

be defined; using “real danger of public injury” to draw the

line is both internally coherent and consistent with founding-

era practice.

Whatever else may be said about the particulars of each of

these three proposals, they are most helpful taken together as

evidence of the scope of founding-era understandings

regarding categorical exclusions from the enjoyment of the

right to keep and bear arms. The concern common to all three

is not about felons in particular or even criminals in general;

it is about threatened violence and the risk of public injury.

See Binderup, 836 F.3d at 368 (Hardiman, J., concurring in part

and concurring in the judgments). This is the same concern

that animated English and early American restrictions on

arms possession.

In England, officers of the Crown had the power to disarm

anyone they judged to be “dangerous to the Peace of the

Kingdom.” Militia Act of 1662, 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 3, § 13 (1662).

Relatedly, English common law “punish[ed] people who

[went] armed to terrify the King’s subjects” with

imprisonment and forfeiture of their “armour.” 4 Sir John

4 This common-law offense was adapted from the 1328 Statute of

Northampton, which decreed that a person may not “go nor ride armed

by night nor by day in fairs, markets, … nor in no part elsewhere, upon

pain to forfeit their armour to the King, and their bodies to prison at the

King’s pleasure.” Statute of Northampton, 2 Edw. 3, c. 3 (1328). By the

middle of the seventeenth century, the statute was “almost gone in

desuetudinem,” because the law recognized “a general connivance to

gentlemen to ride armed for their security.” Rex v. Knight, 90 Eng. Rep.

330, 330 (K.B. 1686). But it was still enforced against those who violated

the terms of the statute “malo animo,” id.—that is, those who carried arms

No. 18-1478 39

Knight’s Case, 87 Eng. Rep. 75, 76 (K.B. 1686). And—perhaps

unsurprisingly because they were presumptively thought to

pose a similar threat or terror—Parliament also disarmed

Catholics. See JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS

18–19, 122 (1994) (explaining that Protestants feared revolt,

massacre, and counter-revolution from Catholics); see also

ADAM WINKLER, GUNFIGHT 115 (2011) (explaining that

Parliament disarmed Catholics because the Protestant

majority found them “untrustworthy”); Marshall, 32 HARV.

J.L. & PUB. POL’Y at 723 (“In short, the stated principle

supporting the disability was cause to fear that a person,

although technically an English subject, was because of his

beliefs effectively a resident enemy alien liable to violence

against the king.”). 5

Similar laws and restrictions appeared in the American

colonies, adapted to the fears and threats of that time and

place. See ALEXANDER DECONDE, GUN VIOLENCE IN AMERICA

22 (2001) (“Although the colonial demand for such

discriminatory controls sprang from circumstances different

from those in England, as in applying them against Indians

and blacks, colonists usually followed home-country

practices of excluding other distrusted people from

with intent “to terrorize their neighbors,” see JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, TO

KEEP AND BEAR ARMS at 104 (1994).

5 To be sure, the American experience does not map on exactly to the

English one. For one thing, the right protected by the Second Amendment

was decidedly broader than the one protected in the English Bill of Rights.

See MALCOLM, supra, at 162. Still, the American version was derived from

its English predecessor, see id. at 150, 164, which makes English practice

instructive. That is especially true when the patterns from English practice

repeat themselves in American law.

40 No. 18-1478

ownership.”). In some places, Catholics were still disarmed,

but “on the basis of allegiance, not on the basis of faith.” See

Robert H. Churchill, Gun Regulation, the Police Power, and the

Right to Keep Arms in Early America: The Legal Context of the

Second Amendment, 25 LAW & HIST. REV. 139, 157 (2007) (citing

Virginia’s 1756 “disarmament of all those refusing the test of

allegiance”) 6; see also DECONDE, supra, at 22–23 (associating

Catholics with the “distrusted inhabitants” from whom the

colonies seized guns “with the intent of preventing social

upheavals” and “rebellion”). Those “willing to swear

undivided allegiance to the sovereign” were permitted to

keep their arms. See Churchill, 25 LAW & HIST. REV. at 157.

After all, confiscation of guns from those who refused to

swear an oath of allegiance was meant to “deal with the

potential threat coming from armed citizens who remained

loyal to” another sovereign. See Saul Cornell & Nathan

DeDino, A Well Regulated Right: The Early American Origins of

Gun Control, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 487, 506 (2004); see also NRA

v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, 700 F.3d

185, 200 (5th Cir. 2012) (“American legislators had

determined that permitting [those who refused to swear an

oath of allegiance] to keep and bear arms posed a potential

danger.”). But that particular threat dissipated when a person

pledged his allegiance to the United States or to a particular

state.

6First, the allegiance required was to the Crown, and later, it was to

the sovereign and independent states. See id. at 159 & n.49 (quoting 4

JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 201–05 (1906)

(calling for the disarmament of those “who are notoriously disaffected to

the cause of America, or who have not associated, and shall refuse to

associate, to defend, by arms, these United Colonies”)).

No. 18-1478 41

Slaves and Native Americans, on the other hand, were

thought to pose more immediate threats to public safety and

stability and were disarmed as a matter of course. See

MALCOLM, supra, at 140–41; WINKLER, supra, at 115–16 (noting

“forcible disarmament” out of “fear that these groups would

use guns to revolt” or otherwise threaten the “public safety”);

DECONDE, supra, at 21–22 (noting “anxiety that slaves would

rebel”). And this practice of keeping guns out of the hands of

“distrusted” groups continued after the Revolution. For

example, many states even constitutionalized the

disarmament of slaves and Native Americans. See Volokh, 11

TEX. REV. L. & POL. at 208–09. 7

In sum, founding-era legislatures categorically disarmed

groups whom they judged to be a threat to the public safety.

But neither the convention proposals nor historical practice

supports a legislative power to categorically disarm felons

because of their status as felons.

B.

A common response to the dearth of felon-disarmament

laws in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is to say that

such laws would have been unnecessary given the severity

with which felons were punished. Because felons were

routinely executed or stripped of all rights, the argument

goes, explicit provisions depriving them of firearms would

have been redundant. See, e.g., Brief of Defendant-Appellee

Brad D. Schimel at 9 (“[I]n eighteenth-century America,

felonies were punishable by death, so no early American

7 It should go without saying that such race-based exclusions would

be unconstitutional today.

42 No. 18-1478

lawmaker would have questioned the propriety of a proposal

to disarm serious offenders.”); Medina v. Whitaker, 913 F.3d

152, 158 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (“[I]t is difficult to conclude that the

public, in 1791, would have understood someone facing death

and estate forfeiture to be within the scope of those entitled to

possess arms.”). One scholar puts it this way:

The constitutionality of [bans on felon

possession] cannot seriously be questioned …

[because f]elons simply did not fall within the

benefits of the common law right to possess

arms. That law punished felons with automatic

forfeiture of all goods, usually accompanied by

death. We may presume that persons confined

in gaols awaiting trial on criminal charges were

also debarred from the possession of arms.

Kates, 82 MICH. L. REV. at 266. On this view, the criminal law

provides a historical justification for felon disarmament even

if laws regulating gun safety do not.

The premise of this argument—that the states

permanently extinguished the rights of felons, either by death

or operation of law, in the eighteenth and nineteenth

centuries—is shaky. While it accurately describes the

punishment of felons at English common law, the American

picture is far more complex. It is true that at common law, the

“idea of felony” was intertwined with the punishments of

death and civil death. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES

ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 98 (1769) (“The idea of felony is

indeed so generally connected with that of capital

punishment, that we find it hard to separate them ….”); Avery

v. Everett, 18 N.E. 148, 150 (N.Y. 1888) (“By the ancient

common law … [t]here were three principle incidents

No. 18-1478 43

consequent upon an attainder for treason or felony, forfeiture,

corruption of blood, and an extinction of civil rights, more or

less complete, which was denominated civil death.”). Civil

death was a state in which a person “though living, was

considered dead”—a status “very similar to natural death in

that all civil rights were extinguished.” See Harry David

Saunders, Note, Civil Death—A New Look at an Ancient

Doctrine, 11 WM. & MARY L. REV. 988, 988–89 (1970). As

originally conceived, civil death signified “a transitional

status in the period between a capital sentence and its

execution.” Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking

Punishment in the Era of Mass Incarceration, 160 U. PA. L. REV.

1789, 1797 (2012). It “was intended to merely settle the estate

of an executed or banished felon.” Saunders, 11 WM. & MARY

L. REV. at 990.

During the period leading up to the founding, the

connection between felonies and capital punishment started

to fray. Once a short, specified list of offenses, felonies in

England grew to “no less than an hundred and sixty,” which

is likely what forced Blackstone to define them in terms of

their most common characteristic: capital punishment. See 4

BLACKSTONE, supra, at 18, 97–98. But as the number of

designated felonies continued to grow, so did the variations

on punishment, especially in the American colonies.

Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, capital

punishment in the colonies was used “sparingly,” and

property crimes including variations on theft, burglary, and

robbery “were, on the whole, not capital.” LAWRENCE M.

FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 42

(1993). By the time the Constitution was ratified, James

Wilson observed that while the term “felony” was once “very

strongly connected with capital punishment,” that was no

44 No. 18-1478

longer true. JOHN D. BESSLER, CRUEL & UNUSUAL 52–53 (2012)

(quoting 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 348 (James DeWitt

Andrews ed., 1896)); see also 6 NATHAN DANE, DIGEST OF

AMERICAN LAW 715 (1823) (“[W]e have many felonies, not one

punished with forfeiture of estate, and but a very few with

death.”). Of course, many crimes remained eligible for the

death penalty, and the extent to which that was true varied by

state. Death, however, no longer inevitably followed a felony

conviction.

Because it was no longer defined with reference to a list of

specific crimes or even a specific punishment, the definition

of “felony” was difficult to pin down at the time of the

founding. See Will Tress, Unintended Collateral Consequences:

Defining Felony in the Early American Republic, 57 CLEV. ST. L.

REV. 461, 465 (2009) (emphasizing the “ambiguity in the

meaning of felony” at the founding). According to James

Madison, “felony” was “a term of loose signification even in

the common law of England,” but more so in the States where

“[t]he meaning of the term … [was] not precisely the same in

any two of the States; and varie[d] in each with every revision

of its criminal laws.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 228 (J. R. Pole

ed., 2005); see also DANE, supra, at 715 (“[T]he word felony, in

the process of many centuries, has derived so many meanings

from so many parts of the common law, and so many statutes

in England, and has got to be used in such a vast number of

different senses, that it is now impossible to know precisely

in what sense we are to understand this word.”).

The shift in punishment for felonies necessitated a shift in

the meaning of civil death, which had been previously

connected to a capital sentence. And so civil death came to be

understood “as an incident of life conviction.” See Saunders,

No. 18-1478 45

11 WM. & MARY L. REV. at 990; see also Troup v. Wood, 4 Johns.

Ch. 228, 248 (N.Y. Ch. 1820) (a person convicted of felony and

sentenced to imprisonment in the state prison for life is

“civiliter mortuus”). But applying the ancient concept of civil

death in this context proved difficult. Because

“[i]mprisonment for life was a punishment unknown to the

common law,” courts quickly realized that common-law civil

death did not automatically apply. See Platner v. Sherwood, 6

Johns. Ch. 118, 122 (N.Y. Ch. 1822) (¶ 2 argument of Butler

and Henry, counsel for the plaintiff); id. at 128 (Opinion of the

Chancellor). Thus, courts soon decided that civil death

applied only when statutes explicitly attached it to life

sentences, and statutes did not universally do so. Id. at 129

(holding that a person convicted of a felony and sentenced to

life imprisonment was not “deemed and taken to be civilly

dead, to all intents and purposes in the law” until an act of the

legislature made it so) 8; see also Frazer v. Fulcher, 17 Ohio 260,

8 The same court had two years earlier suggested that where a statute

changed punishment from death to a life sentence, the statute may be read

as an affirmance of the common law punishment of civil death. See Platner,

6 Johns. Ch. at 127–28 (citing Troup, 4 Johns. Ch. 228)). But in Platner, the

court explicitly rejected its earlier assumption and replaced it with a well-

reasoned, widely-adopted, and enduring view that civil death existed

only if authorized by statute. Id. at 128 (“The same point arose,

incidentally, in respect to this same conviction, in the case of Troup v.

Wood, and I was there induced to think, upon the authority of Lord Coke,

that every person attainted of felony was accounted, in law, civiliter

mortuus. It was not a necessary or very material point in that case, and I

did not pursue the subject to the extent I should have done, if it had been

then, as it is now, the direct and material point in issue. I have, likewise,

since, had the benefit of a full and able discussion, and of a diligent and

accurate research, particularly on the part of the plaintiff, respecting this

very unusual question of law.” (citation omitted)).

46 No. 18-1478

262 (1848) (“But it is said that, by the rules of the common law,

there is such a thing as a civil death as well as a natural death.

We know that in England there are cases in which a man,

although in full life, is said to be civilly dead, but I have not

learned, until this case was brought before us, that there was

but one kind of death known to our laws.”); Cannon v.

Windsor, 1 Houst. 143, 144 (Del. 1855) (“But here there is no

such general forfeiture of property, or the right to maintain an

action, on a conviction for treason or felony, and the maxim

or principle of civilter mortuus cannot therefore apply in this

State, even when he is a party plaintiff.”); Chin, 160 U. PA. L.

REV. at 1796 (“In England, civil death was a common law

punishment, but in the United States, it existed only if

authorized by statute. It was far from universal….”). And

even when it applied to life sentences, the doctrine of civil

death had to be at least partially reconceived because it had

begun as a time-limited doctrine justified by the anticipation

of natural death—it was “not a condition applicable

potentially for decades.” See Chin, 160 U. PA. L. REV. at 1797.

As courts hammered out the incongruities between civil

death and continued life over the next century, they settled

uncomfortably on an American version of civil death that

required explicit statutory authorization and deprived a felon

of many, but not all, rights. 9 See, e.g., Avery, 18 N.E. at 154–55

9 Courts were consistent and explicit about the difficulty of trying to

apply the doctrine of civil death outside the context of the death penalty.

See, e.g., Shapiro v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U.S., 45 N.Y.S.2d 717 (N.Y.

Sup. Ct. 1943) (“Palpable anomaly inevitably results from attempting to

attribute civil death, not only to persons about to be executed, but, also, to

persons who may remain physically alive for many years and also may be

paroled of pardoned.”); Byers v. Sun Sav. Bank, 139 P. 948, 949 (Okla. 1914)

(“[Civil death] had its origin in the fogs and fictions of feudal

No. 18-1478 47

(suggesting that a life convict maintained a right to defend an

action brought against him and certain property rights,

including the ability to transfer property by will or deed).

Of particular relevance to Kanter’s case, courts also

struggled to determine how—if at all—the old concept of civil

death applied to felons serving sentences for a term of years.

Cases decided in the early nineteenth century, like Troup v.

Wood and Platner v. Sherwood, associated the loss of rights

under a theory of civil death only with capital and life

sentences. Later cases building on that reasoning held that the

rights of felons serving less than life were merely suspended

during the term of the sentence. See, e.g., In re Estate of Nerac,

35 Cal. 392, 396 (1868) (“If the convict be sentenced for life, he

becomes civiliter mortuus, or dead in law …. If, however, he be

sentenced for a term less than life, his civil rights are only

suspended during the term.”); Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va.

790, 796 (1871) (explaining that a convict is “civiliter mortuus,”

but only “[f]or the time being, during his term of service in

jurisprudence and doubtlessly has been brought forward into modern

statutes without fully realizing either the effect of its literal significance or

the extent of its infringement upon the spirit of our system of government.

At any rate, the full significance of such statutes have never been enforced

by our courts for the principal reason that they are out of harmony with

the spirit of our fundamental laws and with other provisions of statutes.”);

Avery, 18 N.E. at 155 (“Any one who takes the pains to explore the ancient

and in many respects obsolete learning connected with the doctrine of civil

death in consequence of crime, will find that he has to grope his way along

paths marked by uncertain, flickering, and sometimes misleading lights;

and he cannot feel sure that at some point in his course he has not missed

the true road.”). But here, defining the precise impact of “civil death” on

a felon sentenced to life is not as important as underscoring that the impact

was no longer complete destruction of rights and death to the law.

48 No. 18-1478

the penitentiary”); Bowles v. Habermann, 95 N.Y. 246, 247

(1884) (applying a statute, which provided that “a sentence of

imprisonment in a State prison for any term less than for

life … suspends, during the term of the sentence, all the civil

rights … of, or held by, the person sentenced.”).

The upshot of this history for present purposes is that the

consequences of a felony conviction were not as categorically

severe as the governments suggest. Capital punishment was

less pervasive than one might think. Outside the capital

context, civil death applied exclusively to life sentences and

only if authorized by statute—and even then, it was more

modest than the ancient version because the convict retained

some rights. Felons serving a term of years did not suffer civil

death; their rights were suspended but not destroyed. In sum,

a felony conviction and the loss of all rights did not

necessarily go hand-in-hand.

Because they did not go hand-in-hand, the argument that

the severity of punishment at the founding implicitly

sanctions the blanket stripping of rights from all felons,

including those serving a term of years, is misguided. Those

who ratified the Second Amendment would not have

assumed that a free man, previously convicted, lived in a

society without any rights and without the protection of law.

This is not to say that felons could not lose rights under

another theory. Indeed, state legislatures did explicitly

exclude felons from the enjoyment of particular rights. See

infra Section II.C. But history confirms that the basis for the

permanent and pervasive loss of all rights cannot be tied

generally to one’s status as a convicted felon or to the uniform

severity of punishment that befell the class.

No. 18-1478 49

Even if it could be, though, one might reasonably ask: “So

what?” We wouldn’t draw this inference from the severity of

founding-era punishment in other contexts—for example, we

wouldn’t say that the state can deprive felons of the right to

free speech because felons lost that right via execution at the

time of the founding. The obvious point that the dead enjoy

no rights does not tell us what the founding-era generation

would have understood about the rights of felons who lived,

discharged their sentences, and returned to society.

C.

While scholars have not identified eighteenth or

nineteenth century laws depriving felons of the right to bear

arms, history does show that felons could be disqualified

from exercising certain rights—like the rights to vote and

serve on juries—because these rights belonged only to

virtuous citizens. See THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 29 (1st ed. 1868) (explaining

that certain classes of people were “almost universally

excluded” from the franchise for “want of capacity or of moral

fitness”); Saul Cornell, “Don’t Know Much About History” The

Current Crisis in Second Amendment Scholarship, 29 N. KY. L.

REV. 657, 679 (2002) (identifying the “right to sit on juries” as

“limited to those members of the polity who were deemed

capable of exercising it in a virtuous manner”). Some

maintain that the right to bear arms is similarly limited by a

virtue requirement. See, e.g., Don. B. Kates Jr., The Second

Amendment: A Dialogue, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter

1986, at 143, 146 (“[T]he right to arms does not preclude laws

disarming the unvirtuous citizens (i.e., criminals) or those

who, like children or the mentally unbalanced, are deemed

incapable of virtue.”). On this view, the legislature can disarm

50 No. 18-1478

felons because of their poor character, without regard to

whether they are dangerous. See Medina, 913 F.3d at 159

(endorsing the view that the Second Amendment excludes

not only the dangerous, but also the “unvirtuous”) The

majority is sympathetic to this view. See Maj. Op. at 16.

The problem with this argument is that virtue exclusions

are associated with civic rights—individual rights that

“require[] citizens to act in a collective manner for distinctly

public purposes.” See Saul Cornell, A New Paradigm for the

Second Amendment, 22 LAW & HIST. REV. 161, 165 (2004). For

example, the right to vote is held by individuals, but they do

not exercise it solely for their own sake; rather, they cast votes

as part of the collective enterprise of self-governance.

Similarly, individuals do not serve on juries for their own

sake, but as part of the collective enterprise of administering

justice. Some scholars have characterized the right to keep

and bear arms as a civic right, because it was “one exercised

by citizens, not individuals …, who act together in a collective

manner, for a distinctly public purpose: participation in a well

regulated militia.” See Cornell & DeDino, 73 FORDHAM L. REV.

at 491 (“[T]he text [of the Second Amendment] fits a civic

rights model better than either the individual or collective

rights paradigms.”). Saul Cornell explains:

Perhaps the most accurate way to describe the

dominant understanding of the right to bear

arms in the Founding era is as a civic right. Such

a right was not something that all persons could

claim, but was limited to those members of the

polity who were deemed capable of exercising

it in a virtuous manner. Freedom of religion,

freedom of the press, trial by jury were

No. 18-1478 51

genuinely rights belonging to individuals and

were treated differently than were civic rights

such as militia service, or the right to sit on

juries.

Cornell, 29 N. KY. L. REV. at 679 (footnotes omitted). And as a

right that was exercised for the benefit of the community (like

voting and jury service), rather than for the benefit of the

individual (like free speech or free exercise), it belonged only

to virtuous citizens.

Heller, however, expressly rejects the argument that the

Second Amendment protects a purely civic right. Moore v.

Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 935 (7th Cir. 2012). It squarely holds

that “the Second Amendment confer[s] an individual right to

keep and bear arms,” Heller, 554 U.S. at 595 (emphasis added),

and it emphasizes that the Second Amendment is rooted in

the individual’s right to defend himself—not in his right to

serve in a well-regulated militia, id. at 582–86. The “civic

rights” approach runs headlong into both propositions. See

Binderup, 836 F.3d at 371 (Hardiman, J., concurring in part and

concurring in the judgments) (“[T]his virtuous-citizens-only

conception of the right to keep and bear arms is closely

associated with pre-Heller interpretations of the Second

Amendment by proponents of the ‘sophisticated collective

rights model’ who rejected the view that the Amendment

confers an individual right and instead characterized the right

as a ‘civic right ….’” (citation omitted)). The parties have

introduced no evidence that virtue exclusions ever applied to

individual, as opposed to civic, rights. 10 And if virtue

10 The governments gesture towards Heller as support for a virtue

exclusion, citing Heller’s assertion that the Second Amendment “surely

52 No. 18-1478

exclusions don’t apply to individual rights, they don’t apply

to the Second Amendment.

It bears emphasis that virtue exclusions from the exercise

of civic rights were explicit. If the right to bear arms was

similarly subject to a virtue exclusion, we would expect to see

provisions expressly depriving felons of that right too—but

we don’t. By 1820, ten states’ constitutions included

provisions excluding or authorizing the exclusion of those

who “had committed crimes, particularly felonies or so-called

infamous crimes” from the franchise. See ALEXANDER

KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE 62–63 & tbl. A.7 (Kentucky,

Vermont, Ohio, Louisiana, Indiana, Mississippi, Connecticut,

Illinois, Alabama, Missouri). By 1857, twenty-four state

constitutions included such provisions. Id. The same crimes

often “made a person ineligible to serve as a witness in a legal

proceeding,” id. at 62, and to serve on a jury. 11

elevates above all other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible

citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.” 554 U.S. at 635. That

statement implies that the legislature might have the power to more

heavily regulate those who are not law-abiding or responsible. But it does

not purport to analyze the scope of that power, nor does it endorse the

very specific concept of a virtue exclusion.

11See, e.g., Act of Feb. 28, 1803, ch. 92, § 1, in ACTS AND LAWS OF THE

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS 173 (Wright & Potter 1898) (jurors

must be “of good Moral Character” and qualified to vote; “and if any

person, whose name shall be put into either [jury] Box, shall be convicted

of any Scandalous crime, or be guilty of any gross immorality, his name

shall be withdrawn from the [jury] Box, by Selectmen of his town”); Act

of Feb. 2, 1811, ch. 158, § 2, in 4 LAWS OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE, at 445,

449 (Bradford & Porter 1816) (grand jurors must be “sober, substantial and

judicious freeholders, lawful men, of fair characters”); id. § 7 (petit jurors

must be “sober, discreet and judicious freeholders,… lawful men of fair

No. 18-1478 53

State constitutions protecting the right to bear arms do not

follow a similar pattern. Between 1790 and 1820, nine states

enacted their own right-to-arms provisions in their

constitutions. See Volokh, 11 TEX. REV. L. & POL. at 208–09

(four more had enacted such provisions prior to 1790). None

of those provisions made an exception for criminals. Id. And

notably, seven of those nine states explicitly excluded or

authorized the exclusion of certain criminals from the right to

vote. Compare id. (identifying Kentucky, Ohio, Indiana,

Mississippi, Connecticut, Alabama, and Missouri as seven of

the nine states with right-to-arms provisions in their

constitutions by 1820), with KEYSSAR, supra, at tbl. A.7 (the

same seven state constitutions specifically excluded certain

criminals from the right to vote). The same pattern held true

in 1857. Compare Volokh, 11 TEX. REV. L. & POL. at 209–10, with

KEYSSAR, supra, at tbl. A.7. There is no basis, then, for

assuming that a virtue requirement on the right to vote

applies equally to the right to keep and bear arms. See

Binderup, 836 F.3d at 372 (Hardiman, J., concurring in part and

concurring in the judgments) (“We have found no historical

evidence on the public meaning of the right to keep and bear

arms indicating that ‘virtuousness’ was a limitation on one’s

qualification for the right—contemporary insistence to the

contrary falls somewhere between guesswork and ipse

dixit.”). 12

characters”); Act of Dec. 17, 1796, § 52, in ACTS FOR THE COMMONWEALTH

OF KENTUCKY 134 (Stewart 1796) (jurors must “be of good demeanor”).

12 The fact that the first general prohibition on felon gun possession

was not enacted until 1961 further undercuts the argument that either

history or tradition supports a virtue-based restriction on the right. See An

Act to Strengthen the Federal Firearms Act, Pub. L. No. 87-342, 75 Stat. 757

54 No. 18-1478

In sum, the available evidence suggests that the right to

arms differs from rights that depend on civic virtue for

enjoyment. The Second Amendment confers an individual

right, intimately connected with the natural right of self-

defense, and not limited to civic participation (i.e., militia

service). By the very terms of the civic-rights argument, then,

the right to arms would have been “treated differently” than

rights like the right to vote or to sit on juries. See Cornell, 29

N. KY. L. REV. at 679 (“[R]ights belonging to individuals …

were treated differently than were civic rights such as militia

service, or the right to sit on juries.”). And that difference is

borne out by historical treatment: we see no explicit criminal,

or even more general virtue-based, exclusions from the right

to bear arms like we do in other contexts. Thus, although the

right protected by the Second Amendment is not unlimited,

see Heller, 554 U.S. at 595, its limits are not defined by a general

felon ban tied to a lack of virtue or good character.

III.

The history canvassed in Part II yields two conclusions

that are important for present purposes. History does not

support the proposition that felons lose their Second

Amendment rights solely because of their status as felons. But

it does support the proposition that the state can take the right

to bear arms away from a category of people that it deems

dangerous. Our precedent is consistent with this principle: we

have held that “Congress is not limited to case-by-case

exclusions of persons who have been shown to be

(1961) (amending the Federal Firearms Act by “deleting the words ‘crime

of violence’ … and inserting in lieu thereof the words ‘crime publishable

by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year’”).

No. 18-1478 55

untrustworthy with weapons, nor need these limits be

established by evidence presented in court.” Skoien, 614 F.3d

at 641. Instead, the legislature can make that judgment on a

class-wide basis. See id. at 640 (“That some categorical limits

are proper is part of the original meaning, leaving to the

people’s elected representatives the filling in of details.”).

And it may do so based on present-day judgments about

categories of people whose possession of guns would

endanger the public safety; as we said in Skoien, “exclusions

need not mirror limits that were on the books in 1791.” Id. at

641. Such restrictions are “lineal descendants” of historical

laws banning dangerous people from possessing guns. See

Transcript of Oral Argument at 77, Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (No.

07–290) (Chief Justice Roberts: “[W]e are talking about lineal

descendants of the arms but presumably there are lineal

descendants of the restrictions as well.”).

That said, “the government does not get a free pass simply

because Congress has established a ‘categorical ban.’” United

States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685, 692 (7th Cir. 2010). The

government could quickly swallow the right if it had broad

power to designate any group as dangerous and thereby

disqualify its members from having a gun. See Skoien, 614 F.3d

at 641 (“We do not mean that a categorical limit on the

possession of firearms can be justified under the rational-basis

test, which deems a law valid if any justification for it may be

imagined.”). The legislature must be able to justify its

designation, and the rigor with which we review this

justification “depends on ‘how close the law comes to the core

of the Second Amendment right and the severity of the law’s

burden on the right.’” Ezell II, 846 F.3d at 892 (citation

omitted). “Severe burdens on the core right of armed defense

56 No. 18-1478

require a very strong public-interest justification and a close

means-ends fit ….” Id.

The majority contends that the means-end review should

be “arguably less rigorous in this case because … felon

dispossession laws do not restrict the ‘core right of armed

defense,’ but rather burden ‘activity lying closer to the

margins of the right.’” Maj. Op. at 20 n.10 (quoting Ezell II, 846

F.3d at 892). I disagree. First, felon dispossession statutes

target the whole right, including its core: they restrict even

mere possession of a firearm in the home for the purpose of

self-defense. Cf. Heller, 554 U.S. at 630–35 (finding

unconstitutional a law that made it impossible for citizens to

use firearms for “the core lawful purpose of self-defense”); id.

at 628 (“[T]he inherent right of self-defense has been central

to the Second Amendment right.”). 13 And second, the burden

is severe: it is a permanent disqualification from the exercise of

a fundamental right. See Maj. Op. at 2–4; see also United States

v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1048–49 (10th Cir. 2009)

(Tymkovich, J., concurring) (“[T]he broad scope of

§ 922(g)(1)—which permanently disqualifies all felons from

possessing firearms—would conflict with the ‘core’ self-

13 The majority suggests that who exercises the right changes what the

core of the right is, see Maj. Op. at 20 n.10, but that is circular. Heller

distinguishes the two inquiries: First, it held that the District of Columbia’s

ban on handgun possession violated the Second Amendment (the what).

554 U.S. at 635. Then, it indicated the need to consider whether Heller

could be disqualified from exercising that right (the who). Id. (“Assuming

that Heller is not disqualified from the exercise of Second Amendment

rights, the District must permit him to register his handgun and must issue

him a license to carry it in the home.”). Heller’s qualification or lack

thereof did not change the content of the right itself; it affected whether

the legislature could take it away. The same is true of Kanter here.

No. 18-1478 57

defense right embodied in the Second Amendment.”). Thus,

“a very strong public-interest justification and a close means-

ends fit” is required before Kanter may be constitutionally

subject to the United States and Wisconsin dispossession

statutes. Ezell II, 846 F.3d at 892.

There is no question that the interest identified by the

governments and supported by history—keeping guns out of

the hands of those who are likely to misuse them—is very

strong. And we have held that several of the other categorical

bans within § 922(g) demonstrate the necessary fit between

this public-safety end and the government’s chosen means. In

Skoien, we upheld § 922(g)(9), which prohibits those convicted

of domestic violence misdemeanors from possessing

firearms, because “no one doubts that the goal of § 922(g)(9),

preventing armed mayhem, is an important governmental

objective” and “[b]oth logic and data establish a substantial

relation between § 922(g)(9) and this objective.” 614 F.3d at

642; see also id. at 644 (“[N]o matter how you slice these

numbers, people convicted of domestic violence remain

dangerous to their spouses and partners.”). In United States v.

Yancey, we sustained § 922(g)(3), which prohibits any person

“who is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled

substance” from possessing a gun, because “studies amply

demonstrate the connection between chronic drug abuse and

violent crime, and illuminate the nexus between Congress’s

attempt to keep firearms away from habitual drug abusers

and its goal of reducing violent crime.” 621 F.3d 681, 686 (7th

Cir. 2010). And in United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, we rejected

a challenge to § 922(g)(5), which prohibits aliens unlawfully

present in the United States from possessing firearms,

reasoning that keeping guns out of the hands of “persons who

are difficult to track and who have an interest in eluding law

58 No. 18-1478

enforcement” serves the public-safety objectives of § 922(g).

798 F.3d 664, 673 (7th Cir. 2015).

In contrast to these narrowly defined categorical bans,

§ 922(g)(1), which applies to all felons, is “wildly

overinclusive.” Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second

Amendment, 105 MICH. L. REV. 683, 721 (2007). Its application

is not limited to those who have committed violent crimes like

murder, assault, and rape. 14 It also encompasses those who

have committed any nonviolent felony or qualifying state-law

misdemeanor—and that is an immense and diverse category.

It includes everything from Kanter’s offense, mail fraud, to

selling pigs without a license in Massachusetts, redeeming

large quantities of out-of-state bottle deposits in Michigan,

and countless other state and federal offenses. See Mass. Gen.

14Section 922(g)(1)’s predecessor, the Federal Firearms Act of 1938,

did not permanently ban all felons from possessing firearms, but rather

those convicted of “crime[s] of violence,” defined then as “murder,

manslaughter, rape, mayhem, kidnapping, burglary, housebreaking,” and

certain forms of aggravated assault. See Marshall, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB.

POL’Y at 698–99 (citing Federal Firearms Act, ch. 850, § 1(6), 52 Stat. 1250,

1250 (1938)). Even today, many scholars cited as supporting a general

felon ban actually seem to assume or advocate something much closer to

a violent-felon ban. See, e.g., Don B. Kates & Clayton E. Cramer, Second

Amendment Limitations and Criminological Considerations, 60 HASTINGS L. J.

1339, 1362–63 (2009) (“At early common law, the term ‘felony’ applied

only to a few very serious, very dangerous offenses such as murder, rape,

arson, and robbery.… Insofar as federal or state statutes would seek to bar

arms possession by [felons who ‘pos[e] no physical danger to others’],

those laws would seem to be invalid on their face.”); Stephen P. Halbrook,

What the Framers Intended: A Linguistic Analysis of the Right to “Bear Arms”,

49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1986, at 151, 161 (“[V]iolent criminals,

children, and those of unsound mind may be deprived of firearms .…”

(emphasis added)).

No. 18-1478 59

Laws ch. 129, §§ 39, 43; Mich. Comp. Laws § 445.574a(1)(a),

(2)(d); see also, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 676 (violating the Federal Meat

Inspection Act in certain ways); 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (committing

perjury); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 266, § 30A (shoplifting goods

valued at $100). 15 These crimes, like many others captured by

§ 922(g), “rais[e] no particular suspicion that the convict is a

threat to public safety.” Winkler, 105 MICH. L. REV. at 721. Put

more colorfully, “It is hard to imagine how banning Martha

Stewart or Enron’s Andrew Fastow from possessing a gun

furthers public safety.” Id.

We have addressed the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1)

before. In United States v. Williams, a defendant with a prior

robbery conviction challenged the statute as applied to him.

616 F.3d at 691. We held that the provision is constitutional as

applied to violent felons, including the defendant in that case.

616 F.3d at 694 (“Because Williams was convicted of a violent

felony, his claim that § 922(g)(1) unconstitutionally infringes

on his right to possess a firearm is without merit.”). But our

decision came with an important qualification: we expressly

noted that “§ 922(g)(1) may be subject to an overbreadth

challenge at some point because of its disqualification of all

felons, including those who are non-violent.” Id. at 693. We

asserted that “[e]ven if the government may face a difficult

15 It’s worth noting that, in addition to the eclectic and wide-ranging

offenses already included in this category, there are very few limits on the

ability of Congress and state legislatures to expand the number of

qualifying nonviolent offenses. Cf. United States v. Phillips, 827 F.3d 1171,

1176 n.5 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Can Congress or the States define petty larceny

as a felony? Of course. Can a conviction for stealing a lollipop then serve

as a basis under § 922(g)(1) to a ban a person for the rest of his life from

ever possessing a firearm, consistent with the Second Amendment?”).

60 No. 18-1478

burden of proving § 922(g)(1)’s ‘strong showing’ in future

cases, it certainly satisfies its burden in this case, where [the

defendant] challenges § 922(g)(1) as it was applied to him.”

Id. As a violent felon, the defendant in Williams was in no

position to challenge § 922(g)(1) on the ground that its

application to nonviolent felons is unconstitutional. See

Skoien, 614 F.3d at 645 (“A person to whom a statute properly

applies can’t obtain relief based on arguments that a

differently situated person might present.”). As a nonviolent

felon, however, Kanter is in a position to make that argument.

The first step in analyzing Kanter’s as-applied challenge is

to consider whether banning all nonviolent felons is

substantially related to the governments’ interest in

preventing future gun violence. See Williams, 616 F.3d at 692–

93. Williams held that because the characteristic common to all

violent felons is a demonstrated propensity for violence, the

ban on possessing firearms is constitutional as applied to all

members of that class. Id. at 693–94. In contrast, and to state

the obvious, the characteristic common to all nonviolent

felons is that their criminal conduct was nonviolent. 16 Thus,

the reasoning that supports the categorical disarmament of

16 The majority suggests that nonviolent felonies are united by

another characteristic relevant to the constitutionality of disarmament:

that the commission of “mala in se felonies reflect[s] grave misjudgment

and maladjustment.” Maj. Op. at 24 (citation omitted). But that is just

another way of saying that nonviolent felons have demonstrated a lack of

virtue. Absent evidence that this lack of virtue is tied to a propensity for

risky behavior that threatens public safety, it does not justify stripping

them of their Second Amendment rights.

No. 18-1478 61

violent felons—that past violence is predictive of future

violence—simply does not apply.

The governments argue, though, that being convicted of a

nonviolent crime is also predictive of future violence. They try

to support that position with statistics showing that

nonviolent felons are likely to commit violent crimes in the

future. These statistics are entirely unhelpful, however,

because they lump all nonviolent felons together—and while

some nonviolent felons may be likely to misuse firearms, the

characteristics that make them risky cannot be generalized to

the whole class. For example, the characteristics of an

individual convicted of a drug-related offense tell us little if

anything about the tendency of an individual convicted of

perjury—or, for that matter, mail fraud—to commit gun

violence. The sheer diversity of crimes encompassed by these

statutes makes it virtually impossible for the governments to

show that banning all nonviolent felons from possessing guns

is closely tailored to the goal of protecting the public safety.

Thus, we must decide whether the statutes are

unconstitutional as applied to Kanter in particular. See

Williams, 616 F.3d at 692–93.

If Kanter’s conviction—mail fraud—is substantially

related to violent behavior, the governments can disarm him

without regard to any personal circumstances or

characteristics suggesting that he poses a low risk to public

safety. But their case for tying mail fraud to a risk of future

violence rests on a single study related to mail-fraud

recidivism. See DAVID WEISBURD ET AL., WHITE-COLLAR CRIME

AND CRIMINAL CAREERS (2004). This study suggests that

almost 40% of individuals convicted of mail fraud were later

rearrested. Id. at 29. It does not say, however, whether those

62 No. 18-1478

arrests were for violent or nonviolent offenses. Nor does it say

what percentage of those individuals were convicted. A

different portion of the same study suggests that 25% of all

white-collar repeat offenders (on the numbers provided, I’ll

assume that means roughly 10% of those with a mail-fraud

conviction, though we have been given no way to know) 17

have an arrest for a violent crime. Id at 45. But it does not

specify whether the violent arrest preceded or post-dated the

white-collar arrests, and the numbers drop dramatically for

those with only two total offenses, id., suggesting that a

pattern of criminality, rather than a particular mail-fraud

arrest, might be an indication of future dangerousness, see id.

at 46 (“[T]hose with fewer arrests seldom had violent crimes

in their criminal histories.”). This study falls well short of

establishing the “close means-ends fit” required before the

governments may totally and permanently strip offenders

like Kanter of the ability to exercise a fundamental right. 18

This does not mean that Wisconsin and the United States

cannot disarm Kanter. Even though the mail-fraud

conviction, standing alone, is not enough, they might still be

able to show that Kanter’s history or characteristics make him

17This assumes that the rate of violent arrest for mail fraudsters who

reoffend tracks that of all white-collar criminals who reoffend. The

governments’ study doesn’t speak to this question, underscoring the

inability of the data provided to support the governments’ arguments.

18

My analysis is limited to the total bans that Congress and the

Wisconsin legislature enacted. It might be that this study or other evidence

would support other, more limited intrusions on Kanter’s Second

Amendment right. But the constitutionality of a more limited measure (for

example, a temporary ban or one that limits the places in which Kanter

can have a gun) is not presented by this case.

No. 18-1478 63

likely to misuse firearms. And if banning Kanter, in

particular, from possessing a gun is substantially related to

the governments’ goal of “preventing armed mayhem,” then

the statutes could be constitutionally applied to him. Skoien,

614 F.3d at 642.

At this point, however, neither Wisconsin nor the United

States has presented any evidence that Kanter would be

dangerous if armed. Instead, as the majority notes, “Kanter is

a first-time, non-violent offender with no history of violence,

firearm misuses, or subsequent convictions,” and he is

“employed, married, and does not use illicit drugs, all of

which correspond with lower rates of recidivism.” Maj. Op.

at 23. Absent evidence that Kanter would pose a risk to the

public safety if he possessed a gun, the governments cannot

permanently deprive him of his right to keep and bear arms.

***

If the Second Amendment were subject to a virtue

limitation, there would be no need for the government to

produce—or for the court to assess—evidence that nonviolent

felons have a propensity for dangerous behavior. But Heller

forecloses the “civic right” argument on which a virtue

limitation depends. And while both Wisconsin and the United

States have an unquestionably strong interest in protecting

the public from gun violence, they have failed to show, by

either logic or data, cf. Skoien, 614 F.3d at 642, that disarming

Kanter substantially advances that interest. On this record,

holding that the ban is constitutional as applied to Kanter

does not “put[] the government through its paces,” see

Williams, 616 F.3d at 692, but instead treats the Second

Amendment as a “second-class right, subject to an entirely

different body of rules than the other Bill of Rights

64 No. 18-1478

guarantees,” McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 780

(2010) (plurality opinion). I therefore dissent.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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