Opinion

United States v. Rahimi

  • 602 U.S. 680
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Filed
Jun 21, 2024
Status
Published
On the bench
John G. Roberts
Cited by
93 cases
Authority
More cited than 94.4%

holding that § 922(g)(8)(C)(i) satisfied the “how” component of Bruen because, like the surety laws, its temporary burdens were targeted at only those persons who had been judicially determined to present a threat to the safety of others

How later courts described this case

  • holding that § 922(g)(8)(C)(i) satisfied the “how” component of Bruen because, like the surety laws, its temporary burdens were targeted at only those persons who had been judicially determined to present a threat to the safety of others
  • holding that, in evaluating laws regulating firearm ownership and possession, we are to consider whether the “regulation is consistent with the principles that underpin our regulatory tradition”
  • noting that Heller did not “establish[] a categorical rule that the Constitution prohibits regulations that forbid firearm possession in the home[,]” but rather “stated that many such prohibitions, like those on the possession of firearms by ‘felons and the mentally ill,’ are ‘presumptively lawful’”
  • noting that history and tradition supported “laws banning the possession of guns by categories of persons thought by a legislature to present a special danger of misuse . . . only once a court has found that the defendant ‘represents a credible threat to the physical safety’ of another.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

PRELIMINARY PRINT

Volume 602 U. S. Part 1

Pages 680–778

OFFICIAL REPORTS

OF

THE SUPREME COURT

June 21, 2024

Page Proof Pending Publication

REBECCA A. WOMELDORF

reporter of decisions

NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before

the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter

of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543,

pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.

680 OCTOBER TERM, 2023

Syllabus

UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for

the fth circuit

No. 22–915. Argued November 7, 2023—Decided June 21, 2024

Respondent Zackey Rahimi was indicted under 18 U. S. C. § 922(g)(8), a

federal statute that prohibits individuals subject to a domestic violence

restraining order from possessing a frearm. A prosecution under Sec-

tion 922(g)(8) may proceed only if the restraining order meets certain

statutory criteria. In particular, the order must either contain a fnd-

ing that the defendant “represents a credible threat to the physical

safety” of his intimate partner or his or his partner's child, § 922(g)

(8)(C)(i), or “by its terms explicitly prohibit[ ] the use,” attempted use,

or threatened use of “physical force” against those individuals, § 922(g)

(8)(C)(ii). Rahimi concedes here that the restraining order against him

satisfies the statutory criteria, but argues that on its face Section

922(g)(8) violates the Second Amendment. The District Court denied

Rahimi's motion to dismiss the indictment on Second Amendment

Page Proof Pending Publication

grounds. While Rahimi's case was on appeal, the Supreme Court

decided New York State Rife & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen, 597

U. S. 1. In light of Bruen, the Fifth Circuit reversed, concluding

that the Government had not shown that Section 922(g)(8) “fts within

our Nation's historical tradition of frearm regulation.” 61 F. 4th

443, 460.

Held: When an individual has been found by a court to pose a credible

threat to the physical safety of another, that individual may be tempo-

rarily disarmed consistent with the Second Amendment. Pp. 690–702.

(a) Since the founding, the Nation's frearm laws have included regu-

lations to stop individuals who threaten physical harm to others from

misusing frearms. As applied to the facts here, Section 922(g)(8) fts

within this tradition.

The right to keep and bear arms is among the “fundamental rights

necessary to our system of ordered liberty.” McDonald v. Chicago,

561 U. S. 742, 778. That right, however, “is not unlimited,” District

of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570, 626. The reach of the Second

Amendment is not limited only to those arms that were in existence

at the founding. Id., at 582. Rather, it “extends, prima facie, to

all instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were

not [yet] in existence.” Ibid. By that same logic, the Second Amend-

ment permits more than just regulations identical to those existing in

1791.

Cite as: 602 U. S. 680 (2024) 681

Syllabus

Under our precedent, the appropriate analysis involves considering

whether the challenged regulation is consistent with the principles that

underpin the Nation's regulatory tradition. Bruen, 597 U. S., at 26–31.

When frearm regulation is challenged under the Second Amendment,

the Government must show that the restriction “is consistent with

the Nation's historical tradition of frearm regulation.” Id., at 24. A

court must ascertain whether the new law is “relevantly similar” to

laws that our tradition is understood to permit, “apply[ing] faithfully

the balance struck by the founding generation to modern circum-

stances.” Id., at 29, and n. 7. Why and how the regulation burdens

the right are central to this inquiry. As Bruen explained, a challenged

regulation that does not precisely match its historical precursors “still

may be analogous enough to pass constitutional muster.” Id., at 30.

Pp. 690–692.

(b) Section 922(g)(8) survives Rahimi's challenge. Pp. 693–702.

(1) Rahimi's facial challenge to Section 922(g)(8) requires him to

“establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would

be valid.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U. S. 739, 745. Here, Section

922(g)(8) is constitutional as applied to the facts of Rahimi's own case.

Rahimi has been found by a court to pose a credible threat to the physi-

cal safety of others, see § 922(g)(8)(C)(i), and the Government offers

Page Proof Pending Publication

ample evidence that the Second Amendment permits such individuals

to be disarmed. P. 693.

(2) The Court reviewed the history of American gun laws exten-

sively in Heller and Bruen. At common law people were barred from

misusing weapons to harm or menace others. Such conduct was often

addressed through ordinary criminal laws and civil actions, such as pro-

hibitions on fghting or private suits against individuals who threatened

others. By the 1700s and early 1800s, though, two distinct legal re-

gimes had developed that specifcally addressed frearms violence: the

surety laws and the “going armed” laws. Surety laws were a form of

“preventive justice,” 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of

England 251 (10th ed. 1787), which authorized magistrates to require

individuals suspected of future misbehavior to post a bond. If an indi-

vidual failed to post a bond, he would be jailed. If the individual did

post a bond and then broke the peace, the bond would be forfeit.

Surety laws could be invoked to prevent all forms of violence, including

spousal abuse, and also targeted the misuse of frearms. These laws

often offered the accused signifcant procedural protections.

The “going armed” laws—a particular subset of the ancient common-

law prohibition on affrays, or fghting in public—provided a mechanism

for punishing those who had menaced others with frearms. Under

these laws, individuals were prohibited from “riding or going armed,

with dangerous or unusual weapons, [to] terrify[ ] the good people of the

682 UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI

Syllabus

land.” Id., at 149. Those who did so faced forfeiture of their arms and

imprisonment. Prohibitions on going armed were incorporated into

American jurisprudence through the common law, and some States ex-

pressly codifed them. Pp. 693–698.

(3) Together, the surety and going armed laws confrm what com-

mon sense suggests: When an individual poses a clear threat of physical

violence to another, the threatening individual may be disarmed. Sec-

tion 922(g)(8) is not identical to these founding era regimes, but it does

not need to be. Like the surety and going armed laws, Section

922(g)(8)(C)(i) applies to individuals found by a court to threaten the

physical safety of another. This prohibition is “relevantly similar” to

those founding era regimes in both why and how it burdens the Second

Amendment right. 597 U. S., at 29. Section 922(g)(8) restricts gun use

to check demonstrated threats of physical violence, just as the surety

and going armed laws do. Unlike the regulation struck down in Bruen,

Section 922(g)(8) does not broadly restrict arms use by the public

generally.

The burden that Section 922(g)(8) imposes on the right to bear arms

also fts within the Nation's regulatory tradition. While the Court does

not suggest that the Second Amendment prohibits the enactment of

laws banning the possession of guns by categories of persons thought

Page Proof Pending Publication

by a legislature to present a special danger of misuse, see Heller, 554

U. S., at 626, Section 922(g)(8) applies only once a court has found that

the defendant “represents a credible threat to the physical safety” of

another, § 922(g)(8)(C)(i), which notably matches the similar judicial de-

terminations required in the surety and going armed laws. Moreover,

like surety bonds of limited duration, Section 922(g)(8) only prohibits

frearm possession so long as the defendant “is” subject to a restraining

order. Finally, the penalty—another relevant aspect of the burden—

also fts within the regulatory tradition. The going armed laws pro-

vided for imprisonment, and if imprisonment was permissible to respond

to the use of guns to threaten the physical safety of others, then the

lesser restriction of temporary disarmament that Section 922(g)(8) im-

poses is also permissible.

The Court's decisions in Heller and Bruen do not help Rahimi. While

Section 922(g)(8) bars individuals subject to restraining orders from pos-

sessing guns in the home, Heller never established a categorical rule

that the Constitution prohibits regulations that forbid frearm posses-

sion in the home. Indeed, Heller stated that many such prohibitions,

like those on the possession of frearms by “felons and the mentally ill,”

are “presumptively lawful.” 554 U. S., at 626, 627, n. 26. And

the Court's conclusion in Bruen that regulations like the surety laws

are not a proper historical analogue for a broad gun licensing regime

Cite as: 602 U. S. 680 (2024) 683

Syllabus

does not mean that they cannot be an appropriate analogue for a narrow

one. Pp. 698–700.

(4) The Fifth Circuit erred in reading Bruen to require a “historical

twin” rather than a “historical analogue.” 597 U. S., at 30. The panel

also misapplied the Court's precedents when evaluating Rahimi's facial

challenge. Rather than consider the circumstances in which Section

922(g)(8) was most likely to be constitutional, the panel instead focused

on hypothetical scenarios where the provision might raise constitutional

concerns. Pp. 700–701.

(5) Finally, the Court rejects the Government's contention that

Rahimi may be disarmed simply because he is not “responsible.” The

Court used this term in Heller and Bruen to describe the class of citi-

zens who undoubtedly enjoy the Second Amendment right. Those deci-

sions, however, did not defne the term and said nothing about the status

of citizens who were not “responsible.” Pp. 701–702.

61 F. 4th 443, reversed and remanded.

Roberts, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Alito,

Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson, JJ.,

joined. Sotomayor, J., fled a concurring opinion, in which Kagan, J.,

joined, post, p. 702. Gorsuch, J., post, p. 708, Kavanaugh, J., post, p. 714,

Page Proof Pending Publication

Barrett, J., post, p. 737, and Jackson, J., post, p. 740, fled concurring

opinions. Thomas, J., fled a dissenting opinion, post, p. 747.

Solici tor General Prelogar argued the cause for the

United States. With her on the briefs were Acting Assist-

ant Attorney General Argentieri, Deputy Solicitor General

Fletcher, Vivek Suri, and William A. Glaser.

J. Matthew Wright argued the cause for respondent.

With him on the brief were Jason D. Hawkins, Kevin Joel

Page, Rachel Taft, T. W. Brown, and Brandon E. Beck.*

*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the State of Illi-

nois et al. by Kwame Raoul, Attorney General of Illinois, Jane Elinor Notz,

Solicitor General, Alex Hemmer, Deputy Solicitor General, and Mitchell

J. Ness, Assistant Attorney General, by Brian L. Schwalb, Attorney Gen-

eral of the District of Columbia, Caroline S. Van Zile, Solicitor General,

Ashwin P. Phatak, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, and Alexan-

dra Lichtenstein, Assistant Attorney General, and by the Attorneys Gen-

eral and other offcials for their respective jurisdictions as follows: Kris

Mayes of Arizona, Rob Bonta of California, Philip J. Weiser of Colorado,

William Tong of Connecticut, Patrick J. Griffn, Chief State's Attorney

684 UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI

Opinion of the Court

Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the

Court.

A federal statute prohibits an individual subject to a do-

mestic violence restraining order from possessing a frearm

of Connecticut, Kathleen Jennings of Delaware, Anne E. Lopez of Hawaii,

Aaron M. Frey of Maine, Anthony G. Brown of Maryland, Andrea Joy

Campbell of Massachusetts, Dana Nessel of Michigan, Keith Ellison of

Minnesota, Aaron D. Ford of Nevada, Matthew J. Platkin of New Jersey,

Raúl Torrez of New Mexico, Letitia James of New York, Joshua H. Stein

of North Carolina, Edward E. Manibusan of the Northern Mariana Is-

lands, Ellen F. Rosenblum of Oregon, Michelle A. Henry of Pennsylvania,

Peter F. Neronha of Rhode Island, Charity R. Clark of Vermont, Robert

W. Ferguson of Washington, and Joshua L. Kaul of Wisconsin; for Califor-

nia Governor Gavin Newsom by James R. Sigel, David B. Sapp, and Brian

P. Goldman; for the City of New York et al. by Sylvia O. Hinds-Radix,

Richard Dearing, Claude S. Platton, Elina Druker, and Diana P. Cortes;

for AEquitas by Mary-Christine Sungaila; for the American Civil Liber-

ties Union Foundation by David D. Cole, Sandra S. Park, Ria Tabacco

Mar, Jennesa Calvo-Friedman, and Louise Melling; for the American

Page Proof Pending Publication

Medical Association et al. by Michael J. Dell and Marjorie E. Sheldon; for

Americans Against Gun Violence by Carly O. Alameda and Hilary C.

Krase; for the California Legislative Women's Caucus by Robin B. Jo-

hansen and Karen Getman; for the Center for Reproductive Rights by

Diana Kasdan and Michelle K. Moriarty; for the Citizens Crime Commis-

sion of New York City by Harry Sandick; for the DC Coalition Against

Domestic Violence et al. by Jason Stiehl, Lyndsay A. Gorton, and Micaela

Deming; for the Domestic Violence Legal Empowerment and Appeals

Project et al. by Michael Kim Krouse and Rosalyn Richter; for Educators

With Expertise in Domestic Violence Protective Orders et al. by Aaron

R. Marcu; for Everytown for Gun Safety by Alan Schoenfeld, Eric A.

Tirschwell, Janet Carter, and William J. Taylor, Jr.; for Former State

Chief Justices et al. by Adam M. Katz, Adam S. Gershenson, Kathleen R.

Hartnett, and Julie M. Veroff; for the Giffords Law Center To Prevent

Gun Violence by Scott A. Edelman, Lee R. Crain, Mark J. Cherry, Esther

Sanchez-Gomez, and Leigh Rome; for Global Action on Gun Violence et al.

by Jonathan K. Baum, Christopher A. Cole, and Jonathan Lowy; for Gun

Violence and Domestic Violence Prevention Groups et al. by Michael R.

Dreeben and Douglas N. Letter; for the Houston Area Women's Center by

Constance H. Pfeiffer; for Legal Aid Chicago et al. by Stephen R. McAllis-

ter; for the March For Our Lives Action Fund by Jonathan L. Diesenhaus;

for the National Indigenous Women's Resource Center et al. by Mary

Cite as: 602 U. S. 680 (2024) 685

Opinion of the Court

if that order includes a fnding that he “represents a credible

threat to the physical safety of [an] intimate partner,” or a

child of the partner or individual. 18 U. S. C. § 922(g)(8).

Respondent Zackey Rahimi is subject to such an order. The

Kathryn Nagle; for the National League of Cities et al. by Lawrence Ro-

senthal; for the New York County Lawyers Association by Benjamin G.

Shatz, Jacqueline C. Wolff, and Samantha J. Katze; for Prosecutor and

Law Enforcement Associations et al. by Carolyn F. Corwin and Christo-

pher M. Kimmel; for Prosecutors Against Gun Violence by Eric Del Pozo

and Joette Katz; for Public-Health Researchers et al. by Nicole A. Sahar-

sky; for Religious Leaders et al. by Emilie B. Cooper; for Second Amend-

ment Law Scholars by Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Rachel G. Miller-Ziegler,

and Justin P. Raphael; for the Texas Advocacy Project et al. by C. Andrew

Weber and Brenda L. Clayton; for the Tarrant County Criminal District

Attorney et al. by Fredericka Sargent, Steven W. Conder, Karen L. Row-

den, and Gary Young; for the United States Conference of Catholic Bish-

ops by Mark C. Fleming; for Sen. Richard Blumenthal et al. by H. Christo-

pher Boehning; for Mary Anne Franks by Douglas M. Poland and Erin

K. Deeley; for Sen. Amy Klobuchar et al. by Michelle S. Kallen and

Page Proof Pending Publication

Joshua P. Riley; and for 97Percent by Constance Van Kley and Rylee

Sommers-Flanagan.

Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the Alameda

County Public Defenders et al. by Joshi Valentine; for the Bronx Defend-

ers Union et al. by Aimee Carlisle and David M. Porter; for the California

Rife & Pistol Association, Inc., et al. by C. D. Michel, Anna M. Barvir,

and Tiffany D. Cheuvront; for the Cato Institute et al. by Clark M. Neily

III, Anastasia P. Boden, and Thomas A. Berry; for the Center for Human

Liberty by David H. Thompson, Peter A. Patterson, and John D. Ohlen-

dorf; for the Center for Prosecutor Integrity by James E. Preston; for the

Crime Prevention Research Center by Steven W. Dulan; for the Firearms

Policy Coalition by Bradley A. Benbrook and Stephen M. Duvernay; for

the Foundation for Moral Law by John A. Eidsmoe and Roy S. Moore; for

the FPC Action Foundation by Joseph G. S. Greenlee and Cody J. Wisniew-

ski; for Gun Owners of America, Inc., et al. by Robert J. Olson, William J.

Olson, Jeremiah L. Morgan, and John I. Harris III; for Law Enforcement

Groups et al. by Dan M. Peterson; for the National African American Gun

Association, Inc., by Stephen P. Halbrook; for the National Association for

Gun Rights by Barry K. Arrington; for the National Rife Association of

America, Inc., by Erin M. Erhardt and Michael T. Jean; for the Phyllis

Schlafy Eagles et al. by Andew L. Schlafy; for Professors of Second

Amendment Law et al. by David B. Kopel and Konstadinos T. Moros; for

686 UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI

Opinion of the Court

question is whether this provision may be enforced against

him consistent with the Second Amendment.

I

A

In December 2019, Rahimi met his girlfriend, C. M., for

lunch in a parking lot. C. M. is also the mother of Rahimi's

young child, A. R. During the meal, Rahimi and C. M.

began arguing, and Rahimi became enraged. Brief for

United States 2. C. M. attempted to leave, but Rahimi

grabbed her by the wrist, dragged her back to his car, and

shoved her in, causing her to strike her head against the

dashboard. When he realized that a bystander was watch-

ing the altercation, Rahimi paused to retrieve a gun from

under the passenger seat. C. M. took advantage of the op-

portunity to escape. Rahimi fred as she fed, although it is

unclear whether he was aiming at C. M. or the witness.

Page Proof Pending Publication

Rahimi later called C. M. and warned that he would shoot

her if she reported the incident. Ibid.

Undeterred by this threat, C. M. went to court to seek a

restraining order. In the affdavit accompanying her appli-

cation, C. M. recounted the parking lot incident as well as

other assaults. She also detailed how Rahimi's conduct had

endangered A. R. Although Rahimi had an opportunity to

contest C. M.'s testimony, he did not do so. On February 5,

2020, a state court in Tarrant County, Texas, issued a re-

the Second Amendment Foundation by Edward Andrew Paltzik; for Wil-

liam English, Ph.D., et al. by Craig L. Uhrich and Serge Krimnus; and for

Angus Kirk McClellan, Ph.D., by Charles R. Flores.

Briefs of amici curiae were fled for the National Association of Federal

Defenders by Vincent J. Brunkow, Sarah Gannett, Judith Mizner, and

Timothy Shepherd; for Professors of History et al. by Mark D. Selwyn

and Todd C. Zubler; for Patrick J. Charles by Hugh E. McKay, L. Bradfeld

Hughes, and Shane Pennington; and for Nicholas J. Johnson by John

P. Krill, Jr.

Cite as: 602 U. S. 680 (2024) 687

Opinion of the Court

straining order against him. The order, entered with the

consent of both parties, included a fnding that Rahimi had

committed “family violence.” App. 2. It also found that

this violence was “likely to occur again” and that Rahimi

posed “a credible threat” to the “physical safety” of C. M.

or A. R. Id., at 2–3. Based on these fndings, the order

prohibited Rahimi from threatening C. M. or her family for

two years or contacting C. M. during that period except to

discuss A. R. Id., at 3–7. It also suspended Rahimi's gun

license for two years. Id., at 5–6. If Rahimi was impris-

oned or confned when the order was set to expire, the order

would instead terminate either one or two years after his

release date, depending on the length of his imprisonment.

Id., at 6–7.

In May, however, Rahimi violated the order by approach-

ing C. M.'s home at night. He also began contacting her

through several social media accounts.

Page Proof Pending Publication

In November, Rahimi threatened a different woman with

a gun, resulting in a charge for aggravated assault with a

deadly weapon. And while Rahimi was under arrest for

that assault, the Texas police identifed him as the suspect

in a spate of at least fve additional shootings.

The frst, which occurred in December 2020, arose from

Rahimi's dealing in illegal drugs. After one of his custom-

ers “started talking trash,” Rahimi drove to the man's home

and shot into it. Brief for United States 3. While driving

the next day, Rahimi collided with another car, exited his

vehicle, and proceeded to shoot at the other car. Three days

later, he fred his gun in the air while driving through a resi-

dential neighborhood. A few weeks after that, Rahimi was

speeding on a highway near Arlington, Texas, when a truck

fashed its lights at him. Rahimi hit the brakes and cut

across traffc to chase the truck. Once off the highway, he

fred several times toward the truck and a nearby car before

feeing. Two weeks after that, Rahimi and a friend were

688 UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI

Opinion of the Court

dining at a roadside burger restaurant. When the restau-

rant declined his friend's credit card, Rahimi pulled a gun

and shot into the air.

The police obtained a warrant to search Rahimi's resi-

dence. There they discovered a pistol, a rife, ammunition—

and a copy of the restraining order.

B

Rahimi was indicted on one count of possessing a frearm

while subject to a domestic violence restraining order, in

violation of 18 U. S. C. § 922(g)(8). At the time, such a viola-

tion was punishable by up to 10 years' imprisonment (since

amended to 15 years). § 924(a)(2); see Bipartisan Safer Com-

munities Act, Pub. L. 117–159, § 12004(c)(2), 136 Stat. 1329,

18 U. S. C. § 924(a)(8). A prosecution under Section 922(g)(8)

may proceed only if three criteria are met. First, the de-

fendant must have received actual notice and an opportunity

Page Proof Pending Publication

to be heard before the order was entered. § 922(g)(8)(A).

Second, the order must prohibit the defendant from either

“harassing, stalking, or threatening” his “intimate partner”

or his or his partner's child, or “engaging in other conduct

that would place [the] partner in reasonable fear of bodily

injury” to the partner or child. § 922(g)(8)(B). A defend-

ant's “intimate partner[s]” include his spouse or any former

spouse, the parent of his child, and anyone with whom he

cohabitates or has cohabitated. § 921(a)(32). Third, under

Section 922(g)(8)(C), the order must either contain a fnding

that the defendant “represents a credible threat to the physi-

cal safety” of his intimate partner or his or his partner's

child, § 922(g)(8)(C)(i), or “by its terms explicitly prohibit[ ]

the use,” attempted use, or threatened use of “physical force”

against those individuals, § 922(g)(8)(C)(ii).

Rahimi's restraining order met all three criteria. First,

Rahimi had received notice and an opportunity to be heard

before the order was entered. App. 2. Second, the order

Cite as: 602 U. S. 680 (2024) 689

Opinion of the Court

prohibited him from communicating with or threatening

C. M. Id., at 3–4. Third, the order met the requirements

of Section 922(g)(8)(C)(i), because it included a fnding that

Rahimi represented “a credible threat to the physical safety”

of C. M. or her family. Id., at 2–3. The order also “explic-

itly prohibit[ed]” Rahimi from “the use, attempted use, or

threatened use of physical force” against C. M., satisfying the

independent basis for liability in Section 922(g)(8)(C)(ii).

Id., at 3.

Rahimi moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that Sec-

tion 922(g)(8) violated on its face the Second Amendment

right to keep and bear arms. No. 4:21–cr–00083 (ND Tex.,

May 7, 2021), ECF Doc. 17. Concluding that Circuit prece-

dent foreclosed Rahimi's Second Amendment challenge, the

District Court denied his motion. Rahimi then pleaded

guilty. On appeal, he again raised his Second Amendment

challenge. The appeal was denied, and Rahimi petitioned

Page Proof Pending Publication

for rehearing en banc.

While Rahimi's petition was pending, this Court decided

New York State Rife & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U. S.

1 (2022). In Bruen, we explained that when a frearm regu-

lation is challenged under the Second Amendment, the Gov-

ernment must show that the restriction “is consistent with

the Nation's historical tradition of frearm regulation.” Id.,

at 24.

In light of Bruen, the panel withdrew the prior opinion

and ordered additional briefng. A new panel then heard

oral argument and reversed. 61 F. 4th 443, 448 (CA5 2023).

Surveying the evidence that the Government had identifed,

the panel concluded that Section 922(g)(8) does not ft within

our tradition of frearm regulation. Id., at 460–461. Judge

Ho wrote separately to express his view that the panel's

ruling did not confict with the interest in protecting peo-

ple from violent individuals. Id., at 461–462 (concurring

opinion).

690 UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI

Opinion of the Court

We granted certiorari. 600 U. S. ––– (2023)

II

When a restraining order contains a fnding that an indi-

vidual poses a credible threat to the physical safety of an

intimate partner, that individual may—consistent with the

Second Amendment—be banned from possessing frearms

while the order is in effect. Since the founding, our Nation's

frearm laws have included provisions preventing individuals

who threaten physical harm to others from misusing fre-

arms. As applied to the facts of this case, Section 922(g)(8)

fts comfortably within this tradition.

A

We have held that the right to keep and bear arms is

among the “fundamental rights necessary to our system of

ordered liberty.” McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U. S. 742, 778

Page Proof Pending Publication

(2010). Derived from English practice and codifed in the

Second Amendment, the right secures for Americans a

means of self-defense. Bruen, 597 U. S., at 17. The spark

that ignited the American Revolution was struck at Lexing-

ton and Concord, when the British governor dispatched sol-

diers to seize the local farmers' arms and powder stores. In

the aftermath of the Civil War, Congress's desire to enable

the newly freed slaves to defend themselves against former

Confederates helped inspire the passage of the Fourteenth

Amendment, which secured the right to bear arms against

interference by the States. McDonald, 561 U. S., at 771–

776. As a leading and early proponent of emancipation ob-

served, “Disarm a community and you rob them of the means

of defending life. Take away their weapons of defense and

you take away the inalienable right of defending liberty.”

Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 2d Sess., 1967 (1868) (statement of

Rep. Stevens).

“Like most rights,” though, “the right secured by the Sec-

ond Amendment is not unlimited.” District of Columbia v.

Cite as: 602 U. S. 680 (2024) 691

Opinion of the Court

Heller, 554 U. S. 570, 626 (2008). In Heller, this Court held

that the right applied to ordinary citizens within the home.

Even as we did so, however, we recognized that the right

was never thought to sweep indiscriminately. “From Black-

stone through the 19th-century cases, commentators and

courts routinely explained that the right was not a right to

keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner what-

soever and for whatever purpose.” Ibid. At the founding,

the bearing of arms was subject to regulations ranging from

rules about frearm storage to restrictions on gun use by

drunken New Year's Eve revelers. Act of Mar. 1, 1783, 1783

Mass. Acts and Laws ch.13, pp. 218–219; 5 Colonial Laws of

New York ch. 1501, pp. 244–246 (1894). Some jurisdictions

banned the carrying of “dangerous and unusual weapons.”

554 U. S., at 627 (citing 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on

the Laws of England 148–149 (1769)). Others forbade carry-

ing concealed frearms. 554 U. S., at 626.

Page Proof Pending Publication

In Heller, our inquiry into the scope of the right began

with “constitutional text and history.” Bruen, 597 U. S., at

22. In Bruen, we directed courts to examine our “historical

tradition of frearm regulation” to help delineate the con-

tours of the right. Id., at 17. We explained that if a chal-

lenged regulation fts within that tradition, it is lawful under

the Second Amendment. We also clarifed that when the

Government regulates arms-bearing conduct, as when the

Government regulates other constitutional rights, it bears

the burden to “justify its regulation.” Id., at 24.

Nevertheless, some courts have misunderstood the meth-

odology of our recent Second Amendment cases. These

precedents were not meant to suggest a law trapped in

amber. As we explained in Heller, for example, the reach

of the Second Amendment is not limited only to those arms

that were in existence at the founding. 554 U. S., at 582.

Rather, it “extends, prima facie, to all instruments that con-

stitute bearable arms, even those that were not [yet] in exist-

ence.” Ibid. By that same logic, the Second Amendment

692 UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI

Opinion of the Court

permits more than just those regulations identical to ones

that could be found in 1791. Holding otherwise would be

as mistaken as applying the protections of the right only to

muskets and sabers.

As we explained in Bruen, the appropriate analysis in-

volves considering whether the challenged regulation is con-

sistent with the principles that underpin our regulatory

tradition. 597 U. S., at 26–31. A court must ascertain

whether the new law is “relevantly similar” to laws that our

tradition is understood to permit, “apply[ing] faithfully the

balance struck by the founding generation to modern circum-

stances.” Id., at 29, and n. 7. Discerning and developing

the law in this way is “a commonplace task for any lawyer

or judge.” Id., at 28.

Why and how the regulation burdens the right are central

to this inquiry. Id., at 29. For example, if laws at the

founding regulated frearm use to address particular prob-

lems, that will be a strong indicator that contemporary laws

Page Proof Pending Publication

imposing similar restrictions for similar reasons fall within

a permissible category of regulations. Even when a law

regulates arms-bearing for a permissible reason, though, it

may not be compatible with the right if it does so to an ex-

tent beyond what was done at the founding. And when a

challenged regulation does not precisely match its historical

precursors, “it still may be analogous enough to pass consti-

tutional muster.” Id., at 30. The law must comport with

the principles underlying the Second Amendment, but it

need not be a “dead ringer” or a “historical twin.” Ibid.

(emphasis deleted).1

1

We also recognized in Bruen the “ongoing scholarly debate on whether

courts should primarily rely on the prevailing understanding of an individ-

ual right when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratifed in 1868 when de-

fning its scope (as well as the scope of the right against the Federal Gov-

ernment).” 597 U. S., at 37. We explained that under the circumstances,

resolving the dispute was unnecessary to decide the case. Id., at 37–38.

The same is true here.

Cite as: 602 U. S. 680 (2024) 693

Opinion of the Court

B

Bearing these principles in mind, we conclude that Section

922(g)(8) survives Rahimi's challenge.

1

Rahimi challenges Section 922(g)(8) on its face. This is

the “most diffcult challenge to mount successfully,” because

it requires a defendant to “establish that no set of circum-

stances exists under which the Act would be valid.” United

States v. Salerno, 481 U. S. 739, 745 (1987). That means that

to prevail, the Government need only demonstrate that Sec-

tion 922(g)(8) is constitutional in some of its applications.

And here the provision is constitutional as applied to the

facts of Rahimi's own case.

Recall that Section 922(g)(8) provides two independent

bases for liability. Section 922(g)(8)(C)(i) bars an individual

from possessing a frearm if his restraining order includes a

Page Proof Pending Publication

fnding that he poses “a credible threat to the physical

safety” of a protected person. Separately, Section 922(g)(8)

(C)(ii) bars an individual from possessing a frearm if his re-

straining order “prohibits the use, attempted use, or threat-

ened use of physical force.” Our analysis starts and stops

with Section 922(g)(8)(C)(i) because the Government offers

ample evidence that the Second Amendment permits the dis-

armament of individuals who pose a credible threat to the

physical safety of others. We need not decide whether regu-

lation under Section 922(g)(8)(C)(ii) is also permissible.

2

This Court reviewed the history of American gun laws ex-

tensively in Heller and Bruen. From the earliest days of

the common law, frearm regulations have included provi-

sions barring people from misusing weapons to harm or men-

ace others. The act of “go[ing] armed to terrify the King's

subjects” was recognized at common law as a “great offence.”

Sir John Knight's Case, 3 Mod. 117, 118, 87 Eng. Rep. 75,

694 UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI

Opinion of the Court

76 (K. B. 1686). Parliament began codifying prohibitions

against such conduct as early as the 1200s and 1300s, most

notably in the Statute of Northampton of 1328. Bruen, 597

U. S., at 40. In the aftermath of the Reformation and the

English Civil War, Parliament passed further restrictions.

The Militia Act of 1662, for example, authorized the King's

agents to “seize all Armes in the custody or possession of

any person . . . judge[d] dangerous to the Peace of the King-

dome.” 14 Car. 2 c. 3, § 13 (1662); J. Greenlee, The Historical

Justifcation for Prohibiting Dangerous Persons From Pos-

sessing Arms, 20 Wyo. L. Rev. 249, 259 (2020).

The Glorious Revolution cut back on the power of the

Crown to disarm its subjects unilaterally. King James II

had “caus[ed] several good Subjects being Protestants, to be

disarmed, at the same Time when Papists were . . . armed.”

1 Wm. & Mary c. 2, § 6, in 3 Eng. Stat. at Large 440 (1689).

By way of rebuke, Parliament adopted the English Bill of

Page Proof Pending Publication

Rights, which guaranteed “that the Subjects which are Prot-

estants, may have Arms for their Defence suitable to their

Conditions, and as allowed by Law.” § 7, id., at 441. But

as the document itself memorialized, the principle that arms-

bearing was constrained “by Law” remained. Ibid.

Through these centuries, English law had disarmed not

only brigands and highwaymen but also political opponents

and disfavored religious groups. By the time of the found-

ing, however, state constitutions and the Second Amendment

had largely eliminated governmental authority to disarm po-

litical opponents on this side of the Atlantic. See Heller,

554 U. S., at 594–595, 600–603. But regulations targeting

individuals who physically threatened others persisted.

Such conduct was often addressed through ordinary criminal

laws and civil actions, such as prohibitions on fghting or pri-

vate suits against individuals who threatened others. See 4

W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 145–

146, 149–150 (10th ed. 1787) (Blackstone); 3 id., at 120. By

the 1700s and early 1800s, however, two distinct legal re-

Cite as: 602 U. S. 680 (2024) 695

Opinion of the Court

gimes had developed that specifcally addressed frearms

violence.

The frst were the surety laws. A form of “preventive

justice,” these laws derived from the ancient practice of

frankpledges. 4 id., at 251–253. Reputedly dating to the

time of Canute, the frankpledge system involved compelling

adult men to organize themselves into ten-man “tithing[s].”

A. Lefroy, Anglo-Saxon Period of English Law, Part II, 26

Yale L. J. 388, 391 (1917). The members of each tithing then

“mutually pledge[d] for each other's good behaviour.” 4

Blackstone 252. Should any of the ten break the law, the

remaining nine would be responsible for producing him in

court, or else face punishment in his stead. D. Levinson,

Collective Sanctions, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 345, 358 (2003).

Eventually, the communal frankpledge system evolved into

the individualized surety regime. Under the surety laws, a

magistrate could “oblig[e] those persons, [of] whom there is

Page Proof Pending Publication

a probable ground to suspect of future misbehaviour, to stip-

ulate with and to give full assurance . . . that such offence

. . . shall not happen[,] by fnding pledges or securities.” 4

Blackstone 251. In other words, the law authorized magis-

trates to require individuals suspected of future misbehavior

to post a bond. Ibid. If an individual failed to post a bond,

he would be jailed. See, e. g., Mass. Rev. Stat., ch. 134, § 6

(1836). If the individual did post a bond and then broke the

peace, the bond would be forfeit. 4 Blackstone 253.

Well entrenched in the common law, the surety laws could

be invoked to prevent all forms of violence, including spousal

abuse. As Blackstone explained, “[w]ives [could] demand

[sureties] against their husbands; or husbands, if necessary,

against their wives.” Id., at 254. These often took the

form of a surety of the peace, meaning that the defendant

pledged to “keep the peace.” Id., at 252–253; see R. Bloch,

The American Revolution, Wife Beating, and the Emergent

Value of Privacy, 5 Early American Studies 223, 232–233,

234–235 (2007) (Bloch) (discussing peace bonds). Wives also

696 UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI

Opinion of the Court

demanded sureties for good behavior, whereby a husband

pledged to “demean and behave himself well.” 4 Blackstone

253; see Bloch 232–233, 234–235, and n. 34.

While communities sometimes resorted to public shaming

or vigilante justice to chastise abusers, sureties provided the

public with a more measured solution. B. McConville, The

Rise of Rough Music, in Riot and Revelry in Early America

90–100 (W. Pencak, M. Dennis, & S. Newman eds. 2002). In

one widely reported incident, Susannah Wyllys Strong, the

wife of a Connecticut judge, appeared before Tapping Reeve

in 1790 to make a complaint against her husband. K. Ryan,

“The Spirit of Contradiction”: Wife Abuse in New England,

1780–1820, 13 Early American Studies 586, 602 (2015).

Newspapers carried the story in Connecticut, Massachusetts,

and New York. Ibid. Reeve ultimately ordered the man

to post a bond of £1,000. Id., at 603.

Importantly for this case, the surety laws also targeted

Page Proof Pending Publication

the misuse of frearms. In 1795, for example, Massachusetts

enacted a law authorizing justices of the peace to “arrest” all

who “go armed offensively [and] require of the offender to

fnd sureties for his keeping the peace.” 1795 Mass. Acts ch.

2, in Acts and Resolves of Massachusetts, 1794–1795, ch. 26,

pp. 66–67 (1896). Later, Massachusetts amended its surety

laws to be even more specifc, authorizing the imposition of

bonds from individuals “[who went] armed with a dirk, dag-

ger, sword, pistol, or other offensive and dangerous weapon.”

Mass. Rev. Stat., ch. 134, § 16; see ibid. (marginal note) (ref-

erencing the earlier statute). At least nine other jurisdic-

tions did the same. See Bruen, 597 U. S., at 56, and n. 23.

These laws often offered the accused signifcant procedural

protections. Before the accused could be compelled to post

a bond for “go[ing] armed,” a complaint had to be made to a

judge or justice of the peace by “any person having reason-

able cause to fear” that the accused would do him harm or

breach the peace. Mass. Rev. Stat., ch. 134, §§ 1, 16. The

magistrate would take evidence, and—if he determined that

Cite as: 602 U. S. 680 (2024) 697

Opinion of the Court

cause existed for the charge—summon the accused, who

could respond to the allegations. §§ 3–4. Bonds could not

be required for more than six months at a time, and an indi-

vidual could obtain an exception if he needed his arms for

self-defense or some other legitimate reason. § 16.

While the surety laws provided a mechanism for prevent-

ing violence before it occurred, a second regime provided a

mechanism for punishing those who had menaced others with

frearms. These were the “going armed” laws, a particular

subset of the ancient common-law prohibition on affrays.

Derived from the French word “affraier,” meaning “to ter-

rify,” 4 Blackstone 145, the affray laws traced their origin to

the Statute of Northampton, 2 Edw. 3 c. 3 (1328). Although

the prototypical affray involved fghting in public, commenta-

tors understood affrays to encompass the offense of “arm-

[ing]” oneself “to the Terror of the People,” T. Barlow, The

Justice of the Peace: A Treatise 11 (1745). Moreover, the

Page Proof Pending Publication

prohibitions—on fghting and going armed—were often codi-

fed in the same statutes. E. g., 2 Edw. 3 c. 3; Acts and

Laws of His Majesty's Province of New-Hampshire in New-

England 2 (1761).

Whether classifed as an affray law or a distinct prohibi-

tion, the going armed laws prohibited “riding or going

armed, with dangerous or unusual weapons, [to] terrify[ ] the

good people of the land.” 4 Blackstone 149 (emphasis de-

leted). Such conduct disrupted the “public order” and “le[d]

almost necessarily to actual violence.” State v. Huntly, 25

N. C. 418, 421–422 (1843) (per curiam). Therefore, the law

punished these acts with “forfeiture of the arms . . . and

imprisonment.” 4 Blackstone 149.

In some instances, prohibitions on going armed and affrays

were incorporated into American jurisprudence through the

common law. See, e. g., Huntly, 25 N. C., at 421–422; O'Neill

v. State, 16 Ala. 65, 67 (1849); Hickman v. State, 193

Md. App. 238, 253–255, 996 A. 2d 974, 983 (2010) (recognizing

that common-law prohibition on fghting in public remains

698 UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI

Opinion of the Court

even now chargeable in Maryland). Moreover, at least four

States—Massachusetts, New Hampshire, North Carolina, and

Virginia—expressly codifed prohibitions on going armed.

1786 Va. Acts ch. 21; 2 Laws of the Commonwealth of Massa-

chusetts from Nov. 28, 1780 to Feb. 28, 1807, pp. 652–653

(1807); Acts and Laws of His Majesty's Province of New-

Hampshire in New-England 2 (1761); Collection of All the

Public Acts of Assembly, of the Province of North-Carolina:

Now in Force and Use 131 (1751) (1741 statute).

3

Taken together, the surety and going armed laws confrm

what common sense suggests: When an individual poses a

clear threat of physical violence to another, the threatening

individual may be disarmed. Section 922(g)(8) is by no

means identical to these founding era regimes, but it does

not need to be. See Bruen, 597 U. S., at 30. Its prohibition

Page Proof Pending Publication

on the possession of frearms by those found by a court to

present a threat to others fts neatly within the tradition the

surety and going armed laws represent.

Like the surety and going armed laws, Section 922(g)

(8)(C)(i) applies to individuals found to threaten the physical

safety of another. This provision is “relevantly similar” to

those founding era regimes in both why and how it burdens

the Second Amendment right. Id., at 29. Section 922(g)(8)

restricts gun use to mitigate demonstrated threats of physi-

cal violence, just as the surety and going armed laws do.

Unlike the regulation struck down in Bruen, Section

922(g)(8) does not broadly restrict arms use by the public

generally.

The burden Section 922(g)(8) imposes on the right to bear

arms also fts within our regulatory tradition. While we do

not suggest that the Second Amendment prohibits the enact-

ment of laws banning the possession of guns by categories of

persons thought by a legislature to present a special danger

of misuse, see Heller, 554 U. S., at 626, we note that Section

Cite as: 602 U. S. 680 (2024) 699

Opinion of the Court

922(g)(8) applies only once a court has found that the defend-

ant “represents a credible threat to the physical safety” of

another. § 922(g)(8)(C)(i). That matches the surety and

going armed laws, which involved judicial determinations of

whether a particular defendant likely would threaten or had

threatened another with a weapon.

Moreover, like surety bonds of limited duration, Section

922(g)(8)'s restriction was temporary as applied to Rahimi.

Section 922(g)(8) only prohibits frearm possession so long

as the defendant “is” subject to a restraining order.

§ 922(g)(8). In Rahimi's case that is one to two years after

his release from prison, according to Tex. Fam. Code Ann.

§ 85.025(c) (West 2019). App. 6–7.

Finally, the penalty—another relevant aspect of the bur-

den—also fts within the regulatory tradition. The going

armed laws provided for imprisonment, 4 Blackstone 149,

and if imprisonment was permissible to respond to the use

Page Proof Pending Publication

of guns to threaten the physical safety of others, then the

lesser restriction of temporary disarmament that Section

922(g)(8) imposes is also permissible.

Rahimi argues Heller requires us to affrm, because Sec-

tion 922(g)(8) bars individuals subject to restraining orders

from possessing guns in the home, and in Heller we invali-

dated an “absolute prohibition of handguns . . . in the home.”

554 U. S., at 636; Brief for Respondent 32. But Heller never

established a categorical rule that the Constitution prohibits

regulations that forbid frearm possession in the home. In

fact, our opinion stated that many such prohibitions, like

those on the possession of frearms by “felons and the

mentally ill,” are “presumptively lawful.” 554 U. S., at 626,

627, n. 26.

Our analysis of the surety laws in Bruen also does not help

Rahimi. In Bruen, we explained that the surety laws were

not a proper historical analogue for New York's gun licensing

regime. 597 U. S., at 55–60. What distinguished the re-

gimes, we observed, was that the surety laws “presumed

700 UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI

Opinion of the Court

that individuals had a right to . . . carry,” whereas New

York's law effectively presumed that no citizen had such a

right, absent a special need. Id., at 56 (emphasis deleted).

Section 922(g)(8)(C)(i) does not make the same faulty pre-

sumption. To the contrary, it presumes, like the surety laws

before it, that the Second Amendment right may only be

burdened once a defendant has been found to pose a credible

threat to the physical safety of others. See ibid.

While we also noted that the surety laws applied different

penalties than New York's special-need regime, we did so

only to emphasize just how severely the State treated the

rights of its citizens. Id., at 57. But as we have explained,

our Nation's tradition of frearm regulation distinguishes cit-

izens who have been found to pose a credible threat to the

physical safety of others from those who have not. The con-

clusion that focused regulations like the surety laws are not a

historical analogue for a broad prohibitory regime like New

York's does not mean that they cannot be an appropriate

Page Proof Pending Publication

analogue for a narrow one.

4

In short, we have no trouble concluding that Section

922(g)(8) survives Rahimi's facial challenge. Our tradition

of frearm regulation allows the Government to disarm in-

dividuals who present a credible threat to the physical safety

of others. Section 922(g)(8) can be applied lawfully to

Rahimi.

The dissent reaches a contrary conclusion, primarily on the

ground that the historical analogues for Section 922(g)(8) are

not suffciently similar to place that provision in our histori-

cal tradition. The dissent does, however, acknowledge that

Section 922(g)(8) is within that tradition when it comes to

the “why” of the appropriate inquiry. The objection is to

the “how.” See post, at 767 (opinion of Thomas, J.). For the

reasons we have set forth, however, we conclude that Section

922(g)(8) satisfes that part of the inquiry as well. See

Cite as: 602 U. S. 680 (2024) 701

Opinion of the Court

supra, at 692, 698–700. As we said in Bruen, a “historical

twin” is not required. 597 U. S., at 30.

For its part, the Fifth Circuit made two errors. First,

like the dissent, it read Bruen to require a “historical twin”

rather than a “historical analogue.” Ibid. Second, it did

not correctly apply our precedents governing facial chal-

lenges. 61 F. 4th, at 453. As we have said in other con-

texts, “[w]hen legislation and the Constitution brush up

against each other, [a court's] task is to seek harmony, not to

manufacture confict.” United States v. Hansen, 599 U. S.

762, 781 (2023). Rather than consider the circumstances in

which Section 922(g)(8) was most likely to be constitutional,

the panel instead focused on hypothetical scenarios where

Section 922(g)(8) might raise constitutional concerns. See

61 F. 4th, at 459; id., at 465–467 (Ho, J., concurring). That

error left the panel slaying a straw man.2

5

Page Proof

Finally, in Pending

holding that Publication

Section 922(g)(8) is constitutional

as applied to Rahimi, we reject the Government's contention

that Rahimi may be disarmed simply because he is not “re-

sponsible.” Brief for United States 6; see Tr. of Oral Arg.

8–11. “Responsible” is a vague term. It is unclear what

such a rule would entail. Nor does such a line derive from

our case law. In Heller and Bruen, we used the term “re-

sponsible” to describe the class of ordinary citizens who un-

2

Many of the potential faults that the Fifth Circuit identifes in Section

922(g)(8) appear to sound in due process rather than the Second Amend-

ment. E. g., 61 F. 4th, at 459; id., at 465–467 (Ho, J., concurring). As we

have explained, unless these hypothetical faults occur in every case, they

do not justify invalidating Section 922(g)(8) on its face. See United States

v. Salerno, 481 U. S. 739, 745 (1987) (a facial challenge fails if the law is

constitutional in at least some of its applications). In any event, we need

not address any due process concern here because this challenge was not

litigated as a due process challenge and there is no such claim before us.

See this Court's Rule 14.1(a).

702 UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI

Sotomayor, J., concurring

doubtedly enjoy the Second Amendment right. See, e. g.,

Heller, 554 U. S., at 635; Bruen, 597 U. S., at 70. But those

decisions did not defne the term and said nothing about the

status of citizens who were not “responsible.” The question

was simply not presented.

* * *

In Heller, McDonald, and Bruen, this Court did not “un-

dertake an exhaustive historical analysis . . . of the full scope

of the Second Amendment.” Bruen, 597 U. S., at 31. Nor

do we do so today. Rather, we conclude only this: An indi-

vidual found by a court to pose a credible threat to the physi-

cal safety of another may be temporarily disarmed consistent

with the Second Amendment.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

Page Proof Pending Publication It is so ordered.

Justice Sotomayor, with whom Justice Kagan joins,

concurring.

Today, the Court applies its decision in New York State

Rife & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U. S. 1 (2022), for the

frst time. Although I continue to believe that Bruen was

wrongly decided, see id., at 83–133 (Breyer, J., joined by So-

tomayor and Kagan, JJ., dissenting), I join the Court's opin-

ion applying that precedent to uphold 18 U. S. C. § 922(g)(8).

The Court today emphasizes that a challenged regulation

“must comport with the principles underlying the Second

Amendment,” but need not have a precise historical match.

Ante, at 692. I agree. I write separately to highlight why

the Court's interpretation of Bruen, and not the dissent's, is

the right one. In short, the Court's interpretation permits

a historical inquiry calibrated to reveal something useful and

transferable to the present day, while the dissent would

make the historical inquiry so exacting as to be useless, a

Cite as: 602 U. S. 680 (2024) 703

Sotomayor, J., concurring

too-sensitive alarm that sounds whenever a regulation did

not exist in an essentially identical form at the founding.

I

Even under Bruen, this is an easy case. Section 922(g)(8)

prohibits an individual subject to a domestic violence re-

straining order from possessing a frearm, so long as certain

criteria are met. See ante, at 688. Section 922(g)(8) is

wholly consistent with the Nation's history and tradition of

frearm regulation.

The Court correctly concludes that “the Second Amend-

ment permits the disarmament of individuals who pose a

credible threat to the physical safety of others.” Ante, at

693. That conclusion fnds historical support in both the

surety laws, which “provided a mechanism for preventing

violence before it occurred” by requiring an individual who

posed a credible threat of violence to another to post a

Page Proof Pending Publication

surety, and the “going armed” laws, which “provided a mech-

anism for punishing those who had menaced others with

frearms” through forfeiture of the arms or imprisonment.

Ante, at 697. “Taken together, the surety and going armed

laws confrm what common sense suggests: When an individ-

ual poses a clear threat of physical violence to another, the

threatening individual may be disarmed.” Ante, at 698.

Section 922(g)(8)'s prohibition on gun possession for individ-

uals subject to domestic violence restraining orders is part

of that “tradition of frearm regulation allow[ing] the Gov-

ernment to disarm individuals who present a credible threat

to the physical safety of others,” ante, at 700, as are the

similar restrictions that have been adopted by 48 States and

Territories, see Brief for United States 34–35, and nn. 22–23

(collecting statutes).

The Court's opinion also clarifes an important method-

ological point that bears repeating: Rather than asking

whether a present-day gun regulation has a precise his-

torical analogue, courts applying Bruen should “conside[r]

704 UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI

Sotomayor, J., concurring

whether the challenged regulation is consistent with the

principles that underpin our regulatory tradition.” Ante,

at 692 (emphasis added); see also ibid. (“The law must com-

port with the principles underlying the Second Amendment,

but it need not be a `dead ringer' or a `historical

twin' ” (quoting Bruen, 597 U. S., at 30)). Here, for example,

the Government has not identified a founding-era or

Reconstruction-era law that specifcally disarmed domestic

abusers, see, e. g., Tr. of Oral Arg. 40 (conceding as much),

but it did not need to do so. Although § 922(g)(8) “is by no

means identical” to the surety or going armed laws, ante, at

698, it “restricts gun use to mitigate demonstrated threats

of physical violence, just as the surety and going armed laws

d[id],” ibid. That shared principle is suffcient.

II

The dissent reaches a different conclusion by applying the

Page Proof Pending Publication

strictest possible interpretation of Bruen. It picks off the

Government's historical sources one by one, viewing any

basis for distinction as fatal. See, e. g., post, at 764 (opinion

of Thomas, J.) (“Although surety laws shared a common jus-

tifcation with § 922(g)(8), surety laws imposed a materially

different burden”); post, at 771 (explaining that “[a]ffray laws

are wide of the mark” because they “expressly carve out the

very conduct § 922(g)(8) was designed to prevent (interper-

sonal violence in the home)”). The dissent urges a close look

“at the historical law's justifcation as articulated during the

relevant time period,” post, at 774, and a “careful parsing of

regulatory burdens” to ensure that courts do not “stray too

far from [history] by eliding material differences between

historical and modern laws,” post, at 761. The dissent criti-

cizes this Court for adopting a more “piecemeal approach”

that distills principles from a variety of historical evidence

rather than insisting on a precise historical analogue. Post,

at 767.

Cite as: 602 U. S. 680 (2024) 705

Sotomayor, J., concurring

If the dissent's interpretation of Bruen were the law, then

Bruen really would be the “one-way ratchet” that I and the

other dissenters in that case feared, “disqualify[ing] virtually

any `representative historical analogue' and mak[ing] it

nearly impossible to sustain common-sense regulations nec-

essary to our Nation's safety and security.” 597 U. S., at 112

(Breyer, J., dissenting). Thankfully, the Court rejects that

rigid approach to the historical inquiry. As the Court puts

it today, Bruen was “not meant to suggest a law trapped in

amber.” Ante, at 691.

This case lays bare the perils of the dissent's approach.

Because the dissent concludes that “§ 922(g)(8) addresses a

societal problem—the risk of interpersonal violence—`that

has persisted since the 18th century,' ” post, at 752–753, it in-

sists that the means of addressing that problem cannot be

“ `materially different' ” from the means that existed in the

18th century, post, at 753. That is so, it seems, even when the

Page Proof Pending Publication

weapons in question have evolved dramatically. See R. Roth,

Why Guns Are and Are Not the Problem, in A Right To Bear

Arms?: The Contested Role of History in Contemporary De-

bates on the Second Amendment 117 (J. Tucker, B. Hacker, &

M. Vining eds. 2019) (explaining that guns in the 18th cen-

tury took a long time to load, typically fred only one shot,

and often misfred). According to the dissent, the solution

cannot be “materially different” even when societal percep-

tion of the problem has changed, and even if it is now clear

to everyone that the historical means of addressing the prob-

lem had been wholly inadequate. Given the fact that the

law at the founding was more likely to protect husbands who

abused their spouses than offer some measure of accountabil-

ity, see, e. g., R. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as

Prerogative and Privacy, 105 Yale L. J. 2117, 2154–2170

(1996), it is no surprise that that generation did not have an

equivalent to § 922(g)(8). Under the dissent's approach, the

legislatures of today would be limited not by a distant gener-

706 UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI

Sotomayor, J., concurring

ation's determination that such a law was unconstitutional,

but by a distant generation's failure to consider that such a

law might be necessary. History has a role to play in Second

Amendment analysis, but a rigid adherence to history (par-

ticularly history predating the inclusion of women and people

of color as full members of the polity) impoverishes constitu-

tional interpretation and hamstrings our democracy.

III

The Court today clarifes Bruen's historical inquiry and

rejects the dissent's exacting historical test. I welcome that

development. That being said, I remain troubled by

Bruen's myopic focus on history and tradition, which fails to

give full consideration to the real and present stakes of the

problems facing our society today. In my view, the Second

Amendment allows legislators “to take account of the serious

problems posed by gun violence,” Bruen, 597 U. S., at 91

(Breyer, J., dissenting), not merely by asking what their

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predecessors at the time of the founding or Reconstruction

thought, but by listening to their constituents and crafting

new and appropriately tailored solutions. Under the means-

end scrutiny that this Court rejected in Bruen but “regu-

larly use[s] . . . in cases involving other constitutional provi-

sions,” id., at 106, the constitutionality of § 922(g)(8) is even

more readily apparent.*

To start, the Government has a compelling interest in

keeping frearms out of the hands of domestic abusers. A

woman who lives in a house with a domestic abuser is fve

*By “means-end scrutiny,” I refer to the mode of analysis that would

permit courts “to consider the State's interest in preventing gun violence,

the effectiveness of the contested law in achieving that interest, the

degree to which the law burdens the Second Amendment right, and, if

appropriate, any less restrictive alternatives.” Bruen, 597 U. S., at 131

(Breyer, J., dissenting). Prior to Bruen, the Courts of Appeals would

apply a level of means-end scrutiny “ `proportionate to the severity of the

burden that the law imposes on the right': strict scrutiny if the burden is

severe, and intermediate scrutiny if it is not.” Id., at 103.

Cite as: 602 U. S. 680 (2024) 707

Sotomayor, J., concurring

times more likely to be murdered if the abuser has access to

a gun. See A. Kivisto & M. Porter, Firearm Use Increases

Risk of Multiple Victims in Domestic Homicides, 48 J. Am.

Acad. Psychiatry & L. 26 (2020). With over 70 people shot

and killed by an intimate partner each month in the United

States, the seriousness of the problem can hardly be over-

stated. See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,

WISQARS Nat. Violent Death Reporting System, Violent

Deaths Report 2020, https://wisqars.cdc.gov/nvdrs (showing

that 863 people were killed with a frearm by a spouse or

other intimate partner in 2020). Because domestic violence

is rarely confned to the intimate partner that receives the

protective order, the Government's interest extends even

further. In roughly a quarter of cases where an abuser

killed an intimate partner, the abuser also killed someone

else, such as a child, family member, or roommate. See S.

Smith, K. Fowler, & P. Niolon, Intimate Partner Homicide

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and Corollary Victims in 16 States: National Violent Death

Reporting System, 2003–2009, 104 Am. J. Pub. Health 461,

463–464 (2014). Moreover, one study found that domestic

disputes were the most dangerous type of call for responding

offcers, causing more offcer deaths with a frearm than any

other type of call. See N. Breul & M. Keith, Deadly Calls

and Fatal Encounters: Analysis of U. S. Law Enforcement

Line of Duty Deaths When Offcers Responded to Dis-

patched Calls for Service and Conducted Enforcement, 2010–

2014, p. 15 (2016).

While the Second Amendment does not yield automatically

to the Government's compelling interest, § 922(g)(8) is tai-

lored to the vital objective of keeping guns out of the

hands of domestic abusers. See ante, at 688, 699. Section

922(g)(8) should easily pass constitutional muster under any

level of scrutiny.

Although I continue to think that the means-end approach

to Second Amendment analysis is the right one, neither

party asks the Court to reconsider Bruen at this time, and

708 UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI

Gorsuch, J., concurring

that question would of course involve other considerations

than whether Bruen was rightly decided. Whether consid-

ered under Bruen or under means-end scrutiny, § 922(g)(8)

clears the constitutional bar. I join in full the Court's opin-

ion, which offers a more helpful model than the dissent for

lower courts struggling to apply Bruen.

Justice Gorsuch, concurring.

Mr. Rahimi pursues the “most diffcult challenge to mount

successfully”: a facial challenge. United States v. Salerno,

481 U. S. 739, 745 (1987). He contends that 18 U. S. C.

§ 922(g)(8) violates the Second Amendment “in all its applica-

tions.” Bucklew v. Precythe, 587 U. S. 119, 138 (2019). To

prevail, he must show “no set of circumstances” exists in

which that law can be applied without violating the Second

Amendment. Salerno, 481 U. S., at 745. I agree with the

Court that he has failed to make that showing. Ante, at 693.

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That is not because the Constitution has little to say about

the matter. The Second Amendment protects the “right of

the people to keep and bear Arms.” “ `[T]ext and history' ”

dictate the contours of that right. Ante, at 691 (quoting

New York State Rife & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U. S.

1, 22 (2022)). As this Court has recognized, too, the Amend-

ment's text “ `guarantee[s] the individual right to possess and

carry weapons in case of confrontation.' ” Id., at 32 (quoting

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570, 592 (2008)).

And where that “text covers an individual's conduct,” a law

regulating that conduct may be upheld only if it is “consist-

ent with this Nation's historical tradition of frearms regula-

tion.” 597 U. S., at 17; see ante, at 691.

In this case, no one questions that the law Mr. Rahimi

challenges addresses individual conduct covered by the text

of the Second Amendment. So, in this facial challenge, the

question becomes whether that law, in at least some of its

applications, is consistent with historic frearm regulations.

To prevail, the government need not show that the current

Cite as: 602 U. S. 680 (2024) 709

Gorsuch, J., concurring

law is a “ `dead ringer' ” for some historical analogue. Ante,

at 692 (quoting Bruen, 597 U. S., at 30). But the government

must establish that, in at least some of its applications, the

challenged law “impose[s] a comparable burden on the right of

armed self-defense” to that imposed by a historically recog-

nized regulation. Id., at 29; see ante, at 692. And it must

show that the burden imposed by the current law “is compara-

bly justifed.” Bruen, 597 U. S., at 29; see ante, at 692.

Why do we require those showings? Through them, we

seek to honor the fact that the Second Amendment “codifed

a pre-existing right” belonging to the American people, one

that carries the same “scope” today that it was “understood

to have when the people adopted” it. Heller, 554 U. S., at

592, 634–635. When the people ratifed the Second Amend-

ment, they surely understood an arms-bearing citizenry

posed some risks. But just as surely they believed that the

right protected by the Second Amendment was itself vital to

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the preservation of life and liberty. See, e. g., 1 Blackstone's

Commentaries, Editor's App. 300 (St. George Tucker ed.

1803) (observing that the Second Amendment may represent

the “palladium of liberty,” for “[t]he right of self defence is

the frst law of nature,” and “in most governments[,] it has

been the study of rulers to confne this right within the nar-

rowest limits”); 3 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution

of the United States § 1890, p. 746 (1833) (“The right of the

citizens to keep and bear arms has justly been considered, as

the palladium of the liberties of a republic”).

We have no authority to question that judgment. As

judges charged with respecting the people's directions in

the Constitution—directions that are “trapped in amber,”

see ante, at 691—our only lawful role is to apply them in the

cases that come before us. Developments in the world may

change, facts on the ground may evolve, and new laws may

invite new challenges, but the Constitution the people

adopted remains our enduring guide. Bruen, 597 U. S., at

27–28; see, e. g., United States v. Jones, 565 U. S. 400, 404–

710 UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI

Gorsuch, J., concurring

405 (2012); Caetano v. Massachusetts, 577 U. S. 411, 411–412

(2016) (per curiam). If changes are to be made to the Con-

stitution's directions, they must be made by the American

people. Nor is there anything remotely unusual about any

of this. Routinely, litigants and courts alike must consult

history when seeking to discern the meaning and scope of a

constitutional provision. See post, at 719–729 (Kavanaugh,

J., concurring) (offering examples). And when doing so, liti-

gants and courts “must exercise care.” See post, at 739, n.

(Barrett, J., concurring).

Consider just one example. We have recognized that the

Sixth Amendment enshrines another pre-existing right:

the right of a defendant to confront his accusers at trial.

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U. S. 36, 54 (2004). Just as

here, we have recognized that, in placing this right in the

Constitution, the people set its scope, “admitting only those

exceptions established at the time of the founding.” Ibid.

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And, just as here, when parties ask us to sustain some mod-

ern exception to the confrontation right, we require them to

point to a close historic analogue to justify it. See Giles v.

California, 554 U. S. 353, 358–361 (2008). Just as here, too,

we have expressly rejected arguments that courts should

proceed differently, such as by trying to glean from historic

exceptions overarching “policies,” “ `purposes,' ” or “values”

to guide them in future cases. See id., at 374–375 (opinion

of Scalia, J.). We have rejected those paths because the

Constitution enshrines the people's choice to achieve certain

policies, purposes, and values “through very specifc means”:

the right of confrontation as originally understood at the

time of the founding. Id., at 375. As we have put it, a court

may not “extrapolate” from the Constitution's text and his-

tory “the values behind [that right], and then . . . enforce its

guarantees only to the extent they serve (in the courts'

views) those underlying values.” Ibid. Proceeding that

way, we have warned, risks handing judges a license to turn

“the guarantee of confrontation” into “no guarantee at all.”

Cite as: 602 U. S. 680 (2024) 711

Gorsuch, J., concurring

Ibid. As there, so too here: Courts must proceed with

care in making comparisons to historic frearms regulations,

or else they risk gaming away an individual right the people

expressly preserved for themselves in the Constitution's

text.

Proceeding with this well in mind today, the Court rightly

holds that Mr. Rahimi's facial challenge to § 922(g)(8) cannot

succeed. It cannot because, through surety laws and re-

strictions on “going armed,” the people in this country have

understood from the start that the government may disarm

an individual temporarily after a “judicial determinatio[n]”

that he “likely would threaten or ha[s] threatened another

with a weapon.” Ante, at 699. And, at least in some cases,

the statute before us works in the same way and does so for

the same reasons: It permits a court to disarm a person only

if, after notice and hearing, it fnds that he “represents a

credible threat to the physical safety” of others. §§ 922(g)

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(8)(A), (g)(8)(C)(i). A court, too, may disarm an individual

only for so long as its order is in effect. § 922(g)(8). In

short, in at least some applications, the challenged law does

not diminish any aspect of the right the Second Amendment

was originally understood to protect. See Bruen, 597 U. S.,

at 24.

I appreciate that one of our colleagues sees things differ-

ently. Post, at 751 (Thomas, J., dissenting). But if reason-

able minds can disagree whether § 922(g)(8) is analogous to

past practices originally understood to fall outside the Sec-

ond Amendment's scope, we at least agree that is the only

proper question a court may ask. Post, at 750. Discerning

what the original meaning of the Constitution requires in

this or that case may sometimes be diffcult. Asking that

question, however, at least keeps judges in their proper

lane, seeking to honor the supreme law the people have or-

dained rather than substituting our will for theirs. And

whatever indeterminacy may be associated with seeking to

honor the Constitution's original meaning in modern dis-

712 UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI

Gorsuch, J., concurring

putes, that path offers surer footing than any other this

Court has attempted from time to time. Come to this Court

with arguments from text and history, and we are bound to

reason through them as best we can. (As we have today.)

Allow judges to reign unbounded by those materials, or

permit them to extrapolate their own broad new principles

from those sources, and no one can have any idea how they

might rule. (Except the judges themselves.) Faithful ad-

herence to the Constitution's original meaning may be an

imperfect guide, but I can think of no more perfect one for

us to follow.

Just consider how lower courts approached the Second

Amendment before our decision in Bruen. They reviewed

frearm regulations under a two-step test that quickly “de-

volved” into an interest-balancing inquiry, where courts

would weigh a law's burden on the right against the benefts

the law offered. See Rogers v. Grewal, 590 U. S. 996, 999–

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1000, and n. 1 (2020) (Thomas, J., joined by Kavanaugh, J.,

dissenting from denial of certiorari); see also, e. g., Peruta v.

County of San Diego, 742 F. 3d 1144, 1167–1168, 1176–1177

(CA9 2014); Drake v. Filko, 724 F. 3d 426, 457 (CA3 2013)

(Hardiman, J., dissenting). Some judges expressed concern

that the prevailing two-step test had become “just window

dressing for judicial policymaking.” Duncan v. Bonta, 19 F.

4th 1087, 1148 (CA9 2021) (en banc) (Bumatay, J., dissenting).

To them, the inquiry worked as a “black box regime” that

gave a judge broad license to support policies he “[f]avored”

and discard those he disliked. Ibid. How did the govern-

ment fare under that regime? In one circuit, it had an “un-

defeated, 50–0 record.” Id., at 1167, n. 8 (VanDyke, J., dis-

senting). In Bruen, we rejected that approach for one

guided by constitutional text and history. 597 U. S., at 19.

Perhaps judges' jobs would be easier if they could simply

strike the policy balance they prefer. And a principle that

the government always wins surely would be simple for

judges to implement. But either approach would let judges

Cite as: 602 U. S. 680 (2024) 713

Gorsuch, J., concurring

stray far from the Constitution's promise. See Heller, 554

U. S., at 634.

One more point: Our resolution of Mr. Rahimi's facial chal-

lenge to § 922(g)(8) necessarily leaves open the question

whether the statute might be unconstitutional as applied in

“particular circumstances.” Salerno, 481 U. S., at 751. So,

for example, we do not decide today whether the government

may disarm a person without a judicial fnding that he poses

a “credible threat” to another's physical safety. § 922(g)(8)

(C)(i); see ante, at 693. We do not resolve whether the gov-

ernment may disarm an individual permanently. See ante,

at 699 (stressing that, “like surety bonds of limited duration,

Section 922(g)(8)'s restriction was temporary as applied to

[Mr.] Rahimi”). We do not determine whether § 922(g)(8)

may be constitutionally enforced against a person who uses

a frearm in self-defense. Notably, the surety laws that in-

form today's decision allowed even an individual found to

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pose a threat to another to “obtain an exception if he needed

his arms for self-defense.” Ante, at 697; see also post, at 769

(Thomas, J., dissenting). Nor do we purport to approve in

advance other laws denying frearms on a categorical basis

to any group of persons a legislature happens to deem, as

the government puts it, “not `responsible.' ” Ante, at 701

(quoting Brief for United States 6); see Tr. of Oral Arg. 31–

32; see also post, at 773 (opinion of Thomas, J.) (“Not a single

Member of the Court adopts the Government's theory”).

We do not resolve any of those questions (and perhaps oth-

ers like them) because we cannot. Article III of the Con-

stitution vests in this Court the power to decide only the

“ `actual cas[e]' ” before us, “ `not abstractions.' ” Public

Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75, 89 (1947). And the case

before us does not pose the question whether the challenged

statute is always lawfully applied, or whether other statutes

might be permissible, but only whether this one has any law-

ful scope. Nor should future litigants and courts read any

more into our decision than that. As this Court has long

714 UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI

Kavanaugh, J., concurring

recognized, what we say in our opinions must “be taken in

connection with the case in which those expressions are

used,” Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 399 (1821), and may

not be “stretch[ed] . . . beyond their context,” Brown v. Dav-

enport, 596 U. S. 118, 141 (2022).

Among all the opinions issued in this case, its central mes-

sages should not be lost. The Court reinforces the focus on

text, history, and tradition, following exactly the path we

described in Bruen. Ante, at 690–692. And after carefully

consulting those materials, the Court “conclude[s] only this”:

“An individual found by a court to pose a credible threat to

the physical safety of another may be temporarily disarmed

consistent with the Second Amendment.” Ante, at 702 (em-

phasis added). With these observations, I am pleased to

concur.

Justice Kavanaugh, concurring.

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The Framers of the Constitution and Bill of Rights wisely

sought the best of both worlds: democratic self-government

and the protection of individual rights against excesses of

that form of government. In justiciable cases, this Court

determines whether a democratically enacted law or other

government action infringes on individual rights guaranteed

by the Constitution. When performing that Article III

duty, the Court does not implement its own policy judgments

about, for example, free speech or gun regulation. Rather,

the Court interprets and applies the Constitution by examin-

ing text, pre-ratifcation and post-ratifcation history, and

precedent. The Court's opinion today does just that, and I

join it in full.

The concurring opinions, and the briefs of the parties and

amici in this case, raise important questions about judicial

reliance on text, history, and precedent, particularly in Sec-

ond Amendment cases. I add this concurring opinion to re-

view the proper roles of text, history, and precedent in

constitutional interpretation.

Cite as: 602 U. S. 680 (2024) 715

Kavanaugh, J., concurring

I

The American people established an enduring American

Constitution. The frst and most important rule in constitu-

tional interpretation is to heed the text—that is, the actual

words of the Constitution—and to interpret that text accord-

ing to its ordinary meaning as originally understood. The

text of the Constitution is the “Law of the Land.” Art. VI.

As a general matter, the text of the Constitution says what

it means and means what it says. And unless and until it is

amended, that text controls.

In many important provisions, the Constitution is a docu-

ment of majestic specifcity with “strikingly clean prose.”

A. Amar, America's Constitution xi (2005). Two Houses

of Congress. A House elected every two years. Senators

serve 6-year terms. Two Senators per State. A State's

equal suffrage in the Senate may not be changed without the

State's consent. A two-thirds House vote to expel a Mem-

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ber of the House. The same for the Senate. Appropria-

tions are made by law. Bicameralism and presentment.

The Presidential veto. The Presidential pardon. The Pres-

ident serves a 4-year term. A maximum of two elected

terms for a President. The salary of a sitting President may

not be increased or decreased. A vote of a majority of the

House and two-thirds of the Senate to remove a President.

The President nominates and the Senate confrms principal

executive offcers. One Supreme Court. Tenure and salary

protection for Supreme Court and other federal judges.

Two-thirds of each House of Congress together with three-

fourths of the States may amend the Constitution. Con-

gress meets at noon on January 3rd unless otherwise

specifed by Congress. The District of Columbia votes in

Presidential elections. The list goes on.

Those and many other constitutional provisions are rela-

tively clear. And when the “framers of the Constitution em-

ployed words in their natural sense; and where they are plain

and clear, resort to collateral aids to interpretation is unnec-

716 UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI

Kavanaugh, J., concurring

essary and cannot be indulged in to narrow or enlarge the

text.” McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U. S. 1, 27 (1892).

Of course, some provisions of the Constitution are broadly

worded or vague—to put it in Madison's words, “more or less

obscure and equivocal.” The Federalist No. 37, p. 229 (C.

Rossiter ed. 1961). As Chief Justice Rehnquist explained,

the Constitution is in some parts “obviously not a specifcally

worded document but one couched in general phraseology.”

W. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 Texas

L. Rev. 693, 697 (1976).

That is especially true with respect to the broadly worded

or vague individual-rights provisions. (I will use the terms

“broadly worded” and “vague” interchangeably in this opin-

ion.) For example, the First Amendment provides that

“Congress shall make no law” “abridging the freedom of

speech.” And the Second Amendment, at issue here, guar-

antees that “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms”

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“shall not be infringed.”

Read literally, those Amendments might seem to grant ab-

solute protection, meaning that the government could never

regulate speech or guns in any way. But American law has

long recognized, as a matter of original understanding and

original meaning, that constitutional rights generally come

with exceptions.

With respect to the First Amendment, for example, this

Court's “jurisprudence over the past 216”—now 233—“years

has rejected an absolutist interpretation.” Federal Elec-

tion Comm'n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U. S. 449,

482 (2007) (opinion of Roberts, C. J.); see R. Bork, Neutral

Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind.

L. J. 1, 21–22 (1971). From 1791 to the present, “the First

Amendment has permitted restrictions upon the content of

speech in a few limited areas”—including obscenity, defama-

tion, fraud, and incitement. United States v. Stevens, 559

U. S. 460, 468 (2010) (quotation marks omitted). So too with

respect to the Second Amendment: “Like most rights, the

Cite as: 602 U. S. 680 (2024) 717

Kavanaugh, J., concurring

right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited”;

it is “not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever

in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.” Dis-

trict of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570, 626 (2008).

II

A recurring and diffcult issue for judges, therefore, is how

to interpret vague constitutional text. That issue often

arises (as here) in the context of determining exceptions to

textually guaranteed individual rights. To what extent

does the Constitution allow the government to regulate

speech or guns, for example? 1

In many cases, judicial precedent informs or controls the

answer (more on that later). But absent precedent, there

are really only two potential answers to the question of how

to determine exceptions to broadly worded constitutional

rights: history or policy.

Generally speaking, the historical approach examines the

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laws, practices, and understandings from before and after

ratifcation that may help the interpreter discern the mean-

ing of the constitutional text and the principles embodied in

that text. The policy approach rests on the philosophical or

policy dispositions of the individual judge.

History, not policy, is the proper guide.

For more than 200 years, this Court has relied on history

when construing vague constitutional text in all manner of

constitutional disputes. For good reason. History can sup-

1

There are two ways to frame this point—either (i) determining the

exceptions to a constitutional right or (ii) determining the affrmative

scope or contours of that constitutional right. Either way, the analysis is

the same—does the constitutional provision, as originally understood, per-

mit the challenged law? This opinion uses the term “exceptions,” which

underscores that the constitutional baseline is protection of the textually

enumerated right. See Federal Election Comm'n v. Wisconsin Right to

Life, Inc., 551 U. S. 449, 482 (2007) (opinion of Roberts, C. J.) (stating

in a First Amendment case that “it is worth recalling the language we

are applying”).

718 UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI

Kavanaugh, J., concurring

ply evidence of the original meaning of vague text. History

is far less subjective than policy. And reliance on history is

more consistent with the properly neutral judicial role than

an approach where judges subtly (or not so subtly) impose

their own policy views on the American people.

Judges are like umpires, as The Chief Justice has aptly

explained. And in a constitutional system that counts on an

independent Judiciary, judges must act like umpires. To be

an umpire, the judge “must stick close to the text and the

history, and their fair implications,” because there “is no

principled way” for a neutral judge “to prefer any claimed

human value to any other.” R. Bork, Neutral Principles and

Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind. L. J. 1, 8 (1971).

History establishes a “criterion that is conceptually quite

separate from the preferences of the judge himself.” A.

Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 849,

864 (1989). When properly applied, history helps ensure

that judges do not simply create constitutional meaning “out

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of whole cloth.” A. Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of

Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175, 1183 (1989).2

Absent precedent, therefore, history guides the interpre-

tation of vague constitutional text. Of course, this Court

has been deciding constitutional cases for about 230 years,

so relevant precedent often exists. As the Court's opinions

2

The historical approach applies when the text is vague. But the text

of the Constitution always controls. So history contrary to clear text is

not to be followed. See, e. g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919, 945–959

(1983); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486, 546–547 (1969); Brown v.

Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483, 490–495, and n. 5 (1954); cf. Sedi-

tion Act of 1798, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596. In some cases, there may be debate

about whether the relevant text is suffciently clear to override contrary

historical practices. See, e. g., NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U. S. 513, 613

(2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (“What the majority needs to

sustain its judgment is an ambiguous text and a clear historical practice.

What it has is a clear text and an at-best-ambiguous historical practice”).

The basic principle remains: Text controls over contrary historical

practices.

Cite as: 602 U. S. 680 (2024) 719

Kavanaugh, J., concurring

over time amply demonstrate, precedent matters a great

deal in constitutional interpretation.

I now turn to explaining how courts apply pre-ratifcation

history, post-ratifcation history, and precedent when analyz-

ing vague constitutional text.

A

Pre-ratifcation history. When interpreting vague con-

stitutional text, the Court typically scrutinizes the stated in-

tentions and understandings of the Framers and Ratifers

of the Constitution (or, as relevant, the Amendments). The

Court also looks to the understandings of the American peo-

ple from the pertinent ratifcation era. Those intentions and

understandings do not necessarily determine meaning, but

they may be strong evidence of meaning. See generally,

e. g., The Federalist (C. Rossiter ed. 1961); Records of the

Federal Convention of 1787 (M. Farrand ed. 1911); Debates

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on the Federal Constitution (J. Elliot ed. 1836).

Especially for the original Constitution and the Bill of

Rights, the Court also examines the pre-ratifcation history

in the American Colonies, including pre-ratifcation laws and

practices. And the Court pays particular attention to the

historical laws and practices in the United States from

Independence in 1776 until ratifcation in 1788 or 1791. Pre-

ratifcation American history can shed light on constitutional

meaning in various ways.

For example, some provisions of the Constitution use lan-

guage that appeared in the Articles of Confederation or state

constitutional provisions. And when the language that ap-

peared in the Articles of Confederation or in state constitu-

tions is the same as or similar to the language in the U. S.

Constitution, the history of how people understood the lan-

guage in the Articles or state constitutions can inform inter-

pretation of that language in the U. S. Constitution. See,

e. g., Moore v. Harper, 600 U. S. 1, 33 (2023) (the “Framers

did not write the Elections Clause on a blank slate—they

720 UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI

Kavanaugh, J., concurring

instead borrowed from the Articles of Confederation” as evi-

denced by their use of “closely parallel” language); District

of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570, 600–601 (2008) (“Our

interpretation is confrmed by analogous arms-bearing rights

in state constitutions that preceded and immediately fol-

lowed adoption of the Second Amendment”); United States

Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U. S. 452, 460, and

n. 10 (1978) (“The history of interstate agreements under

the Articles of Confederation suggests the same distinction

between `treaties, alliances, and confederations' on the one

hand, and `agreements and compacts' on the other,” as the

distinction made in the Constitution's Treaty and Compact

Clauses).

Similarly, other pre-ratifcation national or state laws and

practices may sometimes help an interpreter discern the

meaning of particular constitutional provisions. Those pre-

ratifcation American laws and practices formed part of the

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foundation on which the Framers constructed the Constitu-

tion and Bill of Rights. Indeed, the Constitution did not

displace but largely co-exists with state constitutions and

state laws, except to the extent they confict with federal

law. See Art. VI.

On the other hand, some pre-ratifcation history can be

probative of what the Constitution does not mean. The

Framers drafted and approved many provisions of the Con-

stitution precisely to depart from rather than adhere to cer-

tain pre-ratifcation laws, practices, or understandings.

For example, the “defects” of the Articles of Confederation

inspired some of the key decisions made by the Framers in

Philadelphia and by the First Congress in drafting the Bill

of Rights. The Federalist No. 37, at 224 (J. Madison); see,

e. g., id., at 226 (“the existing Confederation is founded on

principles which are fallacious; that we must consequently

change this frst foundation, and with it the superstructure

resting upon it”); PennEast Pipeline Co. v. New Jersey, 594

U. S. 482, 508 (2021) (“When the Framers met in Philadelphia

Cite as: 602 U. S. 680 (2024) 721

Kavanaugh, J., concurring

in the summer of 1787, they sought to create a cohesive na-

tional sovereign in response to the failings of the Articles of

Confederation”); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U. S. 692,

716–717 (2004) (“The Continental Congress was hamstrung

by its inability to `cause infractions of treaties, or of the law

of nations to be punished,' ” and the “Framers responded by

vesting the Supreme Court with original jurisdiction over

`all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public ministers and

Consuls,' and the First Congress followed through” (citation

omitted)); U. S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U. S. 779,

803 (1995) (“After the Constitutional Convention convened,

the Framers were presented with, and eventually adopted

a variation of, a plan not merely to amend the Articles of

Confederation but to create an entirely new National Gov-

ernment with a National Executive, National Judiciary, and

a National Legislature” (quotation marks omitted)).

The pre-ratifcation history of America's many objections

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to British laws and the system of oppressive British rule

over the Colonies—identifed most prominently in the Decla-

ration of Independence—can likewise inform interpretation

of some of the crucial provisions of the original Constitution

and Bill of Rights. Compare Declaration of Independence

¶11 (under British rule, the King “made Judges dependent

on his Will alone, for the tenure of their offces, and the

amount and payment of their salaries”) with U. S. Const.,

Art. III, § 1 (“The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior

Courts, shall hold their Offces during good Behaviour, and

shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compen-

sation, which shall not be diminished during their Continu-

ance in Offce”); see, e. g., The Federalist No. 37, at 226 (“The

most that the convention could do” “was to avoid the errors

suggested by the past experience of other countries, as well

as of our own”); 1 Annals of Cong. 436 (1789) (J. Madison)

(“The freedom of the press and rights of conscience, those

choicest privileges of the people, are unguarded in the Brit-

ish Constitution”).

722 UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI

Kavanaugh, J., concurring

This Court has recognized, for example, that no “purpose

in ratifying the Bill of Rights was clearer than that of secur-

ing for the people of the United States much greater freedom

of religion, expression, assembly, and petition than the peo-

ple of Great Britain had ever enjoyed.” Bridges v. Califor-

nia, 314 U. S. 252, 265 (1941). Ratifed as it was “while

the memory of many oppressive English restrictions on the

enumerated liberties was still fresh,” the Bill of Rights “can-

not reasonably be taken as approving prevalent English

practices.” Ibid.; see, e. g., Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lu-

theran Church and School v. EEOC, 565 U. S. 171, 183 (2012)

(“Familiar with life under the established Church of Eng-

land, the founding generation sought to foreclose the possi-

bility of a national church” through the First Amendment's

Establishment Clause); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 60

(1932) (right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment re-

fected America's rejection of the English common law rule

that a “person charged with treason or felony was denied the

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aid of counsel”).3

3

To be sure, as the Court's cases reveal, pre-ratifcation English law and

practices may supply background for some constitutional provisions. But

the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights, did not purport to take Eng-

lish law or history wholesale and silently download it into the U. S. Consti-

tution. See, e. g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U. S. 957, 975 (1991) (opinion

of Scalia, J.) (“Unless one accepts the notion of a blind incorporation, how-

ever, the ultimate question is not what `cruell and unusuall punishments'

meant in the [English] Declaration of Rights, but what its meaning was to

the Americans who adopted the Eighth Amendment”). Therefore, re-

fexively resorting to English law or history without careful analysis can

sometimes be problematic because America had fought a war—and would

soon fght another in 1812—to free itself from British law and practices

and rid itself of tyrannical British rule. See The Federalist No. 45, p. 289

(C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (J. Madison) (“Was, then, the American Revolution

effected, was the American Confederacy formed, was the precious blood

of thousands spilt, and the hard-earned substance of millions lavished, not

that the people of America should enjoy peace, liberty, and safety,” but

that they should continue to be subject to the “impious doctrine in the old

world, that the people were made for kings, not kings for the people”?).

Cite as: 602 U. S. 680 (2024) 723

Kavanaugh, J., concurring

The Equal Protection Clause provides another example.

Ratifed in 1868, that Clause sought to reject the Nation's

history of racial discrimination, not to backdoor incorporate

racially discriminatory and oppressive historical practices

and laws into the Constitution. See generally Flowers v.

Mississippi, 588 U. S. 284 (2019); Batson v. Kentucky, 476

U. S. 79 (1986); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1 (1967); Brown

v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954).

In short, pre-ratifcation American history—that is, pre-

ratifcation laws, practices, and understandings—can inform

interpretation of vague constitutional provisions in the origi-

nal Constitution and Bill of Rights. The same principle of

looking to relevant pre-ratifcation history applies when in-

terpreting broadly worded language in the later amend-

ments, including the Fourteenth Amendment ratifed in 1868.

But in using pre-ratifcation history, courts must exercise

care to rely only on the history that the Constitution actually

incorporated and not on the history that the Constitution

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left behind.

B

Post-ratifcation history. As the Framers made clear,

and as this Court has stated time and again for more than

two centuries, post-ratifcation history—sometimes referred

to as tradition—can also be important for interpreting vague

constitutional text and determining exceptions to individual

constitutional rights. When the text is vague and the pre-

ratifcation history is elusive or inconclusive, post-ratifcation

history becomes especially important. Indeed, absent prec-

edent, there can be little else to guide a judge deciding a

constitutional case in that situation, unless the judge simply

defaults to his or her own policy preferences.

After ratifcation, the National Government and the state

governments began interpreting and applying the Constitu-

tion's text. They have continued to do so ever since. As

the national and state governments over time have enacted

laws and implemented practices to promote the general wel-

724 UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI

Kavanaugh, J., concurring

fare, those laws and practices have often refected and rein-

forced common understandings of the Constitution's authori-

zations and limitations.

Post-ratifcation interpretations and applications by gov-

ernment actors—at least when reasonably consistent and

longstanding—can be probative of the meaning of vague con-

stitutional text. The collective understanding of Americans

who, over time, have interpreted and applied the broadly

worded constitutional text can provide good guidance for a

judge who is trying to interpret that same text decades

or centuries later. See, e. g., Republican Party of Minn. v.

White, 536 U. S. 765, 785 (2002) (a “universal and long-

established tradition of prohibiting certain conduct creates

a strong presumption that the prohibition is constitutional”

(quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Midwest Oil Co.,

236 U. S. 459, 472–473 (1915) (“offcers, law-makers and citi-

zens naturally adjust themselves to any long-continued ac-

tion” of the government “on the presumption that” unconsti-

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tutional “acts would not have been allowed to be so often

repeated as to crystallize into a regular practice”); McPher-

son v. Blacker, 146 U. S. 1, 27 (1892) (when constitutional

text is vague, “contemporaneous and subsequent practical

construction are entitled to the greatest weight”).4

4

Post-ratifcation history is sometimes also referred to as tradition, liq-

uidation, or historical gloss. Those concepts are probably not identical in

all respects. In any event, in applying those concepts in constitutional

interpretation, some important questions can arise, such as: (i) the level

of generality at which to defne a historical practice; (ii) how widespread

a historical practice must have been; (iii) how long ago it must have

started; and (iv) how long it must have endured.

Although this Court's constitutional precedents routinely rely on post-

ratifcation history, those precedents do not supply a one-size-fts-all an-

swer to those various methodological questions. See, e. g., Noel Canning,

573 U. S., at 522–556; Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S.

579, 610–611 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).

And I will not attempt to answer all of those questions here. Re-

spected scholars are continuing to undertake careful analysis. See gener-

ally J. Alicea, Practice-Based Constitutional Theories, 133 Yale L. J. 568

Cite as: 602 U. S. 680 (2024) 725

Kavanaugh, J., concurring

Importantly, the Framers themselves intended that post-

ratifcation history would shed light on the meaning of vague

constitutional text. They understood that some constitu-

tional text may be “more or less obscure and equivocal” such

that questions “daily occur in the course of practice.” The

Federalist No. 37, at 228–229. Madison explained that the

meaning of vague text would be “liquidated and ascertained

by a series of particular discussions and adjudications.” Id.,

at 229. In other words, Madison articulated the Framers'

expectation and intent that post-ratifcation history would be

a proper and important tool to help constitutional interpret-

ers determine the meaning of vague constitutional text.

From early on, this Court followed Madison's lead. In

1819, in one of its most important decisions ever, the Court

addressed the scope of Article I's Necessary and Proper

Clause. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819).

Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Marshall invoked post-

ratifcation history to conclude that Congress's authority to

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establish a national bank could “scarcely be considered as

an open question.” Id., at 401. The constitutionality of the

national bank had “been recognised by many successive leg-

islatures,” and an “exposition of the constitution, deliberately

established by legislative acts, on the faith of which an im-

mense property has been advanced, ought not to be lightly

disregarded.” Ibid. Marshall added: The “respective pow-

ers of those who are equally the representatives of the peo-

ple, are to be adjusted; if not put at rest by the practice of

(2023); R. Barnett & L. Solum, Originalism After Dobbs, Bruen, and Ken-

nedy: The Role of History and Tradition, 118 Nw. U. L. Rev. 433 (2023); M.

DeGirolami, Traditionalism Rising, 24 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 9 (2023);

S. Girgis, Living Traditionalism, 98 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 1477 (2023); W. Baude,

Constitutional Liquidation, 71 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (2019); C. Bradley, Doing

Gloss, 84 U. Chi. L. Rev. 59 (2017); C. Bradley & T. Morrison, Historical

Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 411 (2012); A. Amar,

America's Constitution (2005); C. Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive

Conventions, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 519 (2003); M. McConnell, Tradition and

Constitutionalism Before the Constitution, 1998 U. Ill. L. Rev. 173.

726 UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI

Kavanaugh, J., concurring

the government, ought to receive a considerable impression

from that practice.” Ibid.

In relying on post-ratifcation history as a proper tool to

discern constitutional meaning, Madison and Marshall make

for a formidable duo. Moving from distant American his-

tory to more recent times, one can add Justice Scalia.

Throughout his consequential 30-year tenure on this Court,

Justice Scalia repeatedly emphasized that constitutional in-

terpretation must take account of text, pre-ratifcation his-

tory, and post-ratifcation history—the last of which he often

referred to as “tradition.” In his words, when judges in-

terpret vague or broadly worded constitutional text, the

“traditions of our people” are “paramount.” McDonald v.

Chicago, 561 U. S. 742, 792 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring).

Constitutional interpretation should refect “the principles

adhered to, over time, by the American people, rather than

those favored by the personal (and necessarily shifting) phil-

osophical dispositions of a majority of this Court.” Rutan

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v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U. S. 62, 96 (1990) (Scalia,

J., dissenting).

The U. S. Reports are well stocked with Scalia opinions

looking to post-ratifcation history and tradition.5 In Heller,

5

Justice Scalia's opinions “made extensive use of post-ratifcation his-

tory,” and “his assessment of post-ratifcation history” in those opinions

extended “far beyond the time of enactment.” M. Ramsey, Beyond the

Text: Justice Scalia's Originalism in Practice, 92 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1945,

1957, 1960 (2017). Justice Scalia did not necessarily “use[ ] tradition as an

independent source of interpretive authority; rather, he had a very broad

view of what traditions might be indicative of original meaning.” Id., at

1962, n. 79; see, e. g., NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U. S. 513, 584–593, 602–

615 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment); District of Columbia v.

Heller, 554 U. S. 570, 605–619, 626–628 (2008); McCreary County v. Ameri-

can Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U. S. 844, 886–900 (2005) (Scalia, J.,

dissenting); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U. S. 507, 558–563 (2004) (Scalia, J.,

dissenting); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U. S. 36, 47–50 (2004); Mitchell v.

United States, 526 U. S. 314, 334–336, and n. 1 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting);

Department of Commerce v. United States House of Representatives, 525

U. S. 316, 347–349 (1999) (Scalia, J., concurring in part); Clinton v. City of

Cite as: 602 U. S. 680 (2024) 727

Kavanaugh, J., concurring

Justice Scalia wrote for the Court that “a critical tool of con-

stitutional interpretation” is “the examination of a variety of

legal and other sources to determine the public understand-

ing of a legal text in the period after its enactment or ratif-

cation.” 554 U. S., at 605 (emphasis in original); see also

ibid. (“We now address how the Second Amendment was in-

terpreted from immediately after its ratifcation through the

end of the 19th century”).

Heller echoed years of earlier Scalia opinions. To take

one: “Where the meaning of a constitutional text (such as

`the freedom of speech') is unclear, the widespread and long-

accepted practices of the American people are the best indi-

cation of what fundamental beliefs it was intended to en-

shrine.” McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U. S. 334,

378 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Or another: A “venerable

and accepted tradition is not to be laid on the examining

table and scrutinized for its conformity to some abstract

principle” of “adjudication devised by this Court. To the

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contrary, such traditions are themselves the stuff out of

which the Court's principles are to be formed. They are, in

these uncertain areas, the very points of reference by which

the legitimacy or illegitimacy of other practices is to be fg-

ured out.” Rutan, 497 U. S., at 95–96 (Scalia, J., dissenting)

(emphasis in original).

New York, 524 U. S. 417, 465–469 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and

dissenting in part); Printz v. United States, 521 U. S. 898, 905–918 (1997);

United States v. Gaudin, 515 U. S. 506, 515–519 (1995); McIntyre v. Ohio

Elections Comm'n, 514 U. S. 334, 375–378, and nn. 1–2 (1995) (Scalia, J.,

dissenting); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U. S. 211, 223–225 (1995);

Board of Ed. of Kiryas Joel Village School Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U. S. 687,

732, 744 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Herrera v. Collins, 506 U. S. 390,

427–428 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring); Richmond v. Lewis, 506 U. S. 40, 54

(1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U. S. 957, 979–

985 (1991) (opinion of Scalia, J.); Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497

U. S. 62, 95–97 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting); McKoy v. North Carolina,

494 U. S. 433, 466, 471 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Holland v. Illinois,

493 U. S. 474, 481–482, and n. 1 (1990).

728 UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI

Kavanaugh, J., concurring

As leading actors and theorists in the earliest and latest

chapters of the American constitutional story, Madison, Mar-

shall, and Scalia made clear that courts should look to

post-ratifcation history as well as pre-ratifcation history to

interpret vague constitutional text.

For more than two centuries—from the early 1800s to this

case—this Court has done just that. The Court has repeat-

edly employed post-ratifcation history to determine the

meaning of vague constitutional text. Reliance on post-

ratifcation history “has shaped scores of Court cases span-

ning all domains of constitutional law, every era of the

nation's history, and Justices of every stripe.” S. Girgis,

Living Traditionalism, 98 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 1477, 1480 (2023);

see, e. g., Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. Com-

munity Financial Services Assn. of America, Ltd., 601 U. S.

416, 441–445 (2024) (Kagan, J., concurring); Trump v. Ander-

son, 601 U. S. 100, 113–115 (2024) (per curiam); Moore v.

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Harper, 600 U. S. 1, 22, 32–34 (2023); Kennedy v. Bremerton

School Dist., 597 U. S. 507, 535–536, 540–541, and n. 6 (2022);

New York State Rife & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U. S.

1, 35–37, 50–70 (2022); City of Austin v. Reagan Nat. Adver-

tising of Austin, LLC, 596 U. S. 61, 75 (2022); Houston Com-

munity College System v. Wilson, 595 U. S. 468, 474–477

(2022); PennEast Pipeline Co. v. New Jersey, 594 U. S. 482,

494–497, 508 (2021); TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U. S.

413, 424–425, 432–434 (2021); Torres v. Madrid, 592 U. S. 306,

314 (2021); Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 591 U. S. 848, 858–

862 (2020); Chiafalo v. Washington, 591 U. S. 578, 592–597

(2020); American Legion v. American Humanist Assn., 588

U. S. 29, 58–66 (2019); Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U. S. 1, 15–

17, 23–28 (2015); Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U. S. 565,

575–579 (2014); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570,

605–619, 626–628 (2008); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U. S.

36, 47–50 (2004); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U. S. 466, 481–

483, and n. 10 (2000); Medina v. California, 505 U. S. 437,

445–448 (1992); Holland v. Illinois, 493 U. S. 474, 481–482,

Cite as: 602 U. S. 680 (2024) 729

Kavanaugh, J., concurring

and n. 1 (1990); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783, 786–792

(1983); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U. S. 654, 678–682

(1981); Walz v. Tax Comm'n of City of New York, 397 U. S.

664, 676–680 (1970); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486, 522,

541–547 (1969); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,

343 U. S. 579, 610–613 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring);

United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304,

321–329 (1936); The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U. S. 655, 688–691

(1929); Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 155–158 (1926);

United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U. S. 459, 469–475

(1915); Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 683–692

(1892); Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement

Co., 18 How. 272, 279–280 (1856); McCulloch v. Maryland, 4

Wheat. 316, 400–401 (1819).6

C

Precedent. With a Constitution and a Supreme Court

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that are both more than two centuries old, this Court and

other courts are rarely interpreting a constitutional provi-

sion for the frst time. Rather, a substantial body of Su-

preme Court precedent already exists for many provisions

of the Constitution.

Precedent is fundamental to day-to-day constitutional de-

cisionmaking in this Court and every American court. The

“judicial Power” established in Article III incorporates the

6

The Court has similarly relied on history when deciding cases involv-

ing textually unenumerated rights under the Due Process Clause or the

Privileges or Immunities Clause. In those contexts, the baseline is

180-degrees different: The text supplies no express protection of any as-

serted substantive right. The Court has recognized exceptions to that

textual baseline, but in doing so has regularly observed that the Four-

teenth Amendment “specially protects those fundamental rights and liber-

ties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradi-

tion.” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U. S. 702, 720–721 (1997) (quotation

marks omitted); see, e. g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 534–

535 (1925) (“liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and

education of children under their control”).

730 UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI

Kavanaugh, J., concurring

principle of stare decisis, both vertical and horizontal. As

Hamilton stated, to “avoid an arbitrary discretion in the

courts, it is indispensable that they should be bound down

by strict rules and precedents” that will “unavoidably swell

to a very considerable bulk” and “serve to defne and point

out their duty in every particular case that comes before

them.” The Federalist No. 78, at 471 (A. Hamilton).

Courts must respect precedent, while at the same time

recognizing that precedent on occasion may appropriately be

overturned. See, e. g., Brown, 347 U. S. 483; West Coast

Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379 (1937); see also Ramos

v. Louisiana, 590 U. S. 83, 115–132 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J.,

concurring in part). In light of the signifcant amount of

Supreme Court precedent that has built up over time, this

Court and other courts often decide constitutional cases by

reference to those extensive bodies of precedent.

Even then, however, text and history still matter a great

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deal. When determining how broadly or narrowly to read a

precedent; when determining whether to extend, limit, or

narrow a precedent; or in relatively infrequent cases, when

determining whether to overrule a precedent, a court often

will consider how the precedent squares with the Constitu-

tion's text and history. Therefore, the text, as well as pre-

ratifcation and post-ratifcation history, may appropriately

function as a gravitational pull on the Court's interpretation

of precedent. See Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Com-

pany Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F. 3d 667, 698 (CADC

2008) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“We should resolve ques-

tions about the scope of those precedents in light of and

in the direction of the constitutional text and constitutional

history”).

But the frst stop in this Court's constitutional decision-

making is the Court's precedents—the accumulated wisdom

of jurists from Marshall and Story to Harlan and Taft; from

Hughes and Black to Jackson and White; from Rehnquist and

O'Connor to Kennedy and Scalia; and so on.

Cite as: 602 U. S. 680 (2024) 731

Kavanaugh, J., concurring

III

Some say that courts should determine exceptions to

broadly worded individual rights, including the Second

Amendment, by looking to policy. Uphold a law if it is a

good idea; strike it down if it is not. True, the proponents

of a policy-based approach to interpretation of broadly

worded or vague constitutional text usually do not say so

explicitly (although some do). Rather, they support a bal-

ancing approach variously known as means-end scrutiny,

heightened scrutiny, tiers of scrutiny, rational basis with

bite, or strict or intermediate or intermediate-plus or rigor-

ous or skeptical scrutiny. Whatever the label of the day,

that balancing approach is policy by another name. It re-

quires judges to weigh the benefts against the burdens of a

law and to uphold the law as constitutional if, in the judge's

view, the law is suffciently reasonable or important. See

M. Barnes & E. Chemerinsky, The Once and Future Equal

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Protection Doctrine?, 43 Conn. L. Rev. 1059, 1080 (2011)

(“The levels of scrutiny are essentially balancing tests”).

To begin, as I have explained, that kind of balancing ap-

proach to constitutional interpretation departs from what

Framers such as Madison stated, what jurists such as Mar-

shall and Scalia did, what judges as umpires should strive to

do, and what this Court has actually done across the consti-

tutional landscape for the last two centuries.

The balancing tests (heightened scrutiny and the like) are

a relatively modern judicial innovation in constitutional deci-

sionmaking. The “tiers of scrutiny have no basis in the text

or original meaning of the Constitution.” J. Alicea & J.

Ohlendorf, Against the Tiers of Constitutional Scrutiny,

National Affairs 72, 73 (2019). And before the late 1950s,

“what we would now call strict judicial scrutiny did not

exist.” R. Fallon, The Nature of Constitutional Rights: The

Invention and Logic of Strict Judicial Scrutiny 30 (2019).

The Court “appears to have adopted” heightened-scrutiny

tests “by accident” in the 1950s and 1960s in a series of Com-

732 UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI

Kavanaugh, J., concurring

munist speech cases, “rather than as the result of a consid-

ered judgment.” Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of

N. Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U. S. 105, 125 (1991) (Ken-

nedy, J., concurring in judgment). The Court has employed

balancing only in discrete areas of constitutional law—and

even in those cases, history still tends to play a far larger

role than overt judicial policymaking.7

To be clear, I am not suggesting that the Court overrule

cases where the Court has applied those heightened-scrutiny

tests. But I am challenging the notion that those tests are

the ordinary approach to constitutional interpretation. And

I am arguing against extending those tests to new areas,

including the Second Amendment.

One major problem with using a balancing approach to de-

termine exceptions to constitutional rights is that it requires

highly subjective judicial evaluations of how important a law

is—at least unless the balancing test itself incorporates his-

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tory, in which case judges might as well just continue to rely

on history directly.

The subjective balancing approach forces judges to act

more like legislators who decide what the law should be,

rather than judges who “say what the law is.” Marbury

v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803). That is because the

7

The Court has articulated a heightened-scrutiny test in some pockets

of free-speech jurisprudence. But even when invoking heightened scru-

tiny in that context, the Court still often relies directly on history. See,

e. g., City of Austin v. Reagan Nat. Advertising of Austin, LLC, 596 U. S.

61, 75 (2022) (a city's regulation of solely off-premises billboards was

within “the Nation's history of regulating off-premises signs” as “federal,

state, and local jurisdictions have repeatedly relied upon on-/off-premises

distinctions” “for the last 50-plus years”); Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local

Educators' Assn., 460 U. S. 37, 45–46 (1983) (“In places which by long

tradition” “have been devoted to assembly and debate, the rights of the

State to limit expressive activity are sharply circumscribed”). The Court

has also used heightened scrutiny in certain equal protection cases. As

discussed above, the Equal Protection Clause rejected the history of ra-

cially discriminatory laws and practices.

Cite as: 602 U. S. 680 (2024) 733

Kavanaugh, J., concurring

balancing approach requires judges to weigh the benefts of

a law against its burdens—a value-laden and political task

that is usually reserved for the political branches. And that

power in essence vests judges with “a roving commission to

second-guess” legislators and administrative offcers “con-

cerning what is best for the country.” W. Rehnquist, The

Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 Texas L. Rev. 693, 698

(1976). Stated otherwise, when a court “does not have a

solid textual anchor or an established social norm from which

to derive the general rule, its pronouncement appears un-

comfortably like legislation.” A. Scalia, The Rule of Law as

a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175, 1185 (1989).

Moreover, the balancing approach is ill-defned. Some

judges will apply heightened scrutiny with a presumption in

favor of deference to the legislature. Other judges will

apply heightened scrutiny with a presumption in favor of the

individual right in question. Because it is unmoored, the

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balancing approach presents the real “danger” that “judges

will mistake their own predilections for the law.” A. Scalia,

Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 849, 863

(1989). Under the balancing approach, to use Justice Sca-

lia's characteristically vivid description, if “We The Court

conclude that They The People's answers to a problem” are

unwise, “we are free to intervene,” but if we “think the

States may be on to something, we can loosen the leash.”

McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U. S. 742, 803 (2010) (concurring

opinion) (quotation marks omitted).

The balancing approach can be antithetical to the principle

that judges must act like umpires. It turns judges into

players. Justice Black once protested that the Court should

not balance away bedrock free speech protections for the

perceived policy needs of the moment. He argued that “the

balancing approach” “disregards all of the unique features of

our Constitution” by giving “the Court, along with Congress,

a greater power, that of overriding the plain commands of

the Bill of Rights on a fnding of weighty public interest.”

734 UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI

Kavanaugh, J., concurring

H. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 865, 878–879

(1960). Like Justice Black, the Court in Heller cautioned

that a “constitutional guarantee subject to future judges' as-

sessments of its usefulness is no constitutional guarantee at

all.” 554 U. S. 570, 634 (2008).

Some respond that history can be diffcult to decipher. It

is true that using history to interpret vague text can require

“nuanced judgments,” McDonald, 561 U. S., at 803–804

(Scalia, J., concurring), and is “sometimes inconclusive,”

Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev., at

864. But at a minimum, history tends to narrow the range

of possible meanings that may be ascribed to vague constitu-

tional language. A history-based methodology supplies di-

rection and imposes a neutral and democratically infused

constraint on judicial decisionmaking.

The historical approach is not perfect. But “the question

to be decided is not whether the historically focused method

is a perfect means of restraining aristocratic judicial

Page Proof Pending Publication

Constitution-writing; but whether it is the best means avail-

able in an imperfect world.” McDonald, 561 U. S., at 804

(Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis in original). And the his-

torical approach is superior to judicial policymaking. The

historical approach “depends upon a body of evidence suscep-

tible of reasoned analysis rather than a variety of vague

ethico-political First Principles whose combined conclusion

can be found to point in any direction the judges favor.”

Ibid. Moreover, the historical approach “intrudes less upon

the democratic process because the rights it acknowledges

are those established by a constitutional history formed by

democratic decisions; and the rights it fails to acknowledge

are left to be democratically adopted or rejected by the peo-

ple.” Id., at 805.

IV

This Court's Second Amendment jurisprudence has care-

fully followed and reinforced the Court's longstanding ap-

Cite as: 602 U. S. 680 (2024) 735

Kavanaugh, J., concurring

proach to constitutional interpretation—relying on text, pre-

ratifcation and post-ratifcation history, and precedent.

In Heller, the Court began with the baseline point that the

Second Amendment textually guarantees an individual right.

The Court then explained that the Second Amendment right

is, of course, “not a right to keep and carry any weapon what-

soever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose”

and is subject to “important” limitations. 554 U. S. 570,

626–627 (2008).

Although Heller declined to “undertake an exhaustive his-

torical analysis,” it recognized a few categories of traditional

exceptions to the right. Id., at 626. For example, Heller

indicated that: (i) “prohibitions on carrying concealed weap-

ons were lawful”; (ii) the Second Amendment attaches only

to weapons “in common use” because “that limitation is

fairly supported by the historical tradition of prohibiting the

carrying of dangerous and unusual weapons”; and (iii) “long-

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standing prohibitions on the possession of frearms by felons

and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of fre-

arms in sensitive places such as schools and government

buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifcations on

the commercial sale of arms” are presumptively constitu-

tional. Id., at 626–627 (quotation marks omitted).

In McDonald, the Court held that the Second Amendment

was incorporated against the States. In so holding, the

Court reiterated the presumed constitutionality of the “long-

standing regulatory measures” identifed in Heller. 561

U. S. 742, 786 (2010) (plurality opinion).

Then, in Bruen, the Court repeated that the “Nation's his-

torical tradition of frearm regulation” guides the constitu-

tional analysis of gun regulations and exceptions to the right

to bear arms. 597 U. S. 1, 17 (2022); see id., at 79–81 (Kava-

naugh, J., concurring).

This Court's approach in those three recent Second

Amendment cases—and in the Court's opinion today—is en-

736 UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI

Kavanaugh, J., concurring

tirely consistent with the Court's longstanding reliance on

history and precedent to determine the meaning of vague

constitutional text. Heller rested on “constitutional text

and history,” ante, at 691 (quotation marks omitted), and laid

the foundation for McDonald and then Bruen.

In today's case, the Court carefully builds on Heller, Mc-

Donald, and Bruen. The Court applies the historical test

that those precedents have set forth—namely, “whether the

new law is relevantly similar to laws that our tradition is

understood to permit.” Ante, at 692 (quotation marks omit-

ted). The Court examines “our historical tradition of fre-

arm regulation,” ante, at 691 (quotation marks omitted), and

correctly holds that America's “tradition of frearm regula-

tion allows the Government to disarm individuals who pres-

ent a credible threat to the physical safety of others,” ante,

at 700. The law before us “fts neatly within the tradition

the surety and going armed laws represent.” Ante, at 698.

As the Court's decision today notes, Second Amendment

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jurisprudence is still in the relatively early innings, unlike

the First, Fourth, and Sixth Amendments, for example.

That is because the Court did not have occasion to recognize

the Second Amendment's individual right until recently.

See generally Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F. 3d 1244,

1269–1296 (CADC 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). Decid-

ing constitutional cases in a still-developing area of this

Court's jurisprudence can sometimes be diffcult. But that

is not a permission slip for a judge to let constitutional analy-

sis morph into policy preferences under the guise of a balanc-

ing test that churns out the judge's own policy beliefs.

* * *

As exemplifed by Heller, McDonald, Bruen, and the

Court's opinion today, constitutional interpretation properly

takes account of text, pre-ratifcation and post-ratifcation

history, and precedent. Those are the tools of the trade for

an American judge interpreting the American Constitution.

Cite as: 602 U. S. 680 (2024) 737

Barrett, J., concurring

Of course, diffcult subsidiary questions can arise about how

to apply those tools, both generally and in particular cases.

And in some cases, text, history, and precedent may point in

somewhat different directions. In law as in life, nothing is

perfect. But in Second Amendment cases as in other con-

stitutional cases, text, history, and precedent must remain

paramount.

Justice Barrett, concurring.

Despite its unqualifed text, the Second Amendment is not

absolute. It codifed a pre-existing right, and pre-existing

limits on that right are part and parcel of it. District of

Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570, 595, 627 (2008). Those

limits defne the scope of “the right to keep and bear arms”

as it was originally understood; to identify them, courts must

examine our “historical tradition of frearm regulation.”

New York State Rife & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U. S.

Page Proof Pending Publication

1, 17, 19 (2022). That evidence marks where the right stops

and the State's authority to regulate begins. A regulation

is constitutional only if the government affrmatively proves

that it is “consistent with the Second Amendment's text and

historical understanding.” Id., at 26.

Because the Court has taken an originalist approach to the

Second Amendment, it is worth pausing to identify the basic

premises of originalism. The theory is built on two core

principles: that the meaning of constitutional text is fxed at

the time of its ratifcation and that the “discoverable histori-

cal meaning . . . has legal signifcance and is authoritative in

most circumstances.” K. Whittington, Originalism: A Criti-

cal Introduction, 82 Ford. L. Rev. 375, 378 (2013) (Whitting-

ton). Ratifcation is a democratic act that renders constitu-

tional text part of our fundamental law, see Arts. V, VII,

and that text “remains law until lawfully altered,” S. Sachs,

Originalism: Standard and Procedure, 135 Harv. L. Rev. 777,

782 (2022). So for an originalist, the history that matters

most is the history surrounding the ratifcation of the text;

738 UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI

Barrett, J., concurring

that backdrop illuminates the meaning of the enacted law.

History (or tradition) that long postdates ratifcation does

not serve that function. To be sure, postenactment history

can be an important tool. For example, it can “reinforce our

understanding of the Constitution's original meaning”; “liq-

uidate ambiguous constitutional provisions”; provide persua-

sive evidence of the original meaning; and, if stare decisis

applies, control the outcome. See Vidal v. Elster, 602 U. S.

286, 323 (2024) (Barrett, J., concurring in part). But gen-

erally speaking, the use of postenactment history requires

some justifcation other than originalism simpliciter.

In Bruen, the Court took history beyond the founding era,

considering gun regulations that spanned the 19th century.

597 U. S., at 50–70. I expressed reservations about the

scope of that inquiry but concluded that the timing question

did not matter to Bruen's holding. Id., at 81–83 (concurring

opinion). It bears emphasis, however, that my questions

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were about the time period relevant to discerning the Second

Amendment's original meaning—for instance, what is the

post-1791 cutoff for discerning how the Second Amendment

was originally understood? Id., at 82 (“How long after rati-

fcation may subsequent practice illuminate original public

meaning?”). My doubts were not about whether “tradi-

tion,” standing alone, is dispositive. Id., at 83 (“[T]oday's

decision should not be understood to endorse freewheeling

reliance on historical practice from the mid-to-late 19th cen-

tury to establish the original meaning of the Bill of Rights”).

As I have explained elsewhere, evidence of “tradition” un-

moored from original meaning is not binding law. Vidal,

602 U. S., at 323–324 (Barrett, J., concurring in part). And

scattered cases or regulations pulled from history may have

little bearing on the meaning of the text. Samia v. United

States, 599 U. S. 635, 656–657 (2023) (Barrett, J., concurring

in part and concurring in judgment).

“Original history”—i. e., the generally dispositive kind—

plays two roles in the Second Amendment context. It eluci-

Cite as: 602 U. S. 680 (2024) 739

Barrett, J., concurring

dates how contemporaries understood the text—for example,

the meaning of the phrase “bear Arms.” See Heller, 554

U. S., at 582–592. It also plays the more complicated role of

determining the scope of the pre-existing right that the peo-

ple enshrined in our fundamental law.* In Rahimi's case,

the Court uses history in this latter way. Call this “original

contours” history: It looks at historical gun regulations to

identify the contours of the right.

Courts have struggled with this use of history in the wake

of Bruen. One diffculty is a level of generality problem:

Must the government produce a founding-era relative of

the challenged regulation—if not a twin, a cousin? Or do

founding-era gun regulations yield concrete principles that

mark the borders of the right?

Many courts, including the Fifth Circuit, have understood

Bruen to require the former, narrower approach. But

Bruen emphasized that “analogical reasoning” is not a “regu-

latory straightjacket.” 597 U. S., at 30. To be consistent

Page Proof Pending Publication

with historical limits, a challenged regulation need not be

an updated model of a historical counterpart. Besides, im-

posing a test that demands overly specifc analogues has se-

rious problems. To name two: It forces 21st-century regula-

tions to follow late-18th-century policy choices, giving us “a

law trapped in amber.” Ante, at 691. And it assumes that

founding-era legislatures maximally exercised their power to

*To my mind, this use of history walks a fne line between original

meaning (which controls) and expectations about how the text would apply

(which do not). See Whittington 383 (“Specifc expectations about the

consequences of a legal rule are distinct from the meaning of the rule

itself ”). Contemporary government actors might have been “wrong

about the consequences of their own constitutional rule,” or they “might

not have fully and faithfully implemented the adopted constitutional rule

themselves.” Id., at 384. Thus, while early applications of a constitu-

tional rule can help illuminate its original scope, an interpreter must exer-

cise care in considering them. Id., at 385–386. In the Second Amend-

ment context, particular gun regulations—even if from the ratifcation

era—do not themselves have the status of constitutional law.

740 UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI

Jackson, J., concurring

regulate, thereby adopting a “use it or lose it” view of legis-

lative authority. Such assumptions are fawed, and original-

ism does not require them.

“Analogical reasoning” under Bruen demands a wider

lens: Historical regulations reveal a principle, not a mold.

See, e. g., 597 U. S., at 28–29 (explaining that the Amendment

does not apply only to the catalogue of arms that existed in

the 18th century, but rather to all weapons satisfying the

“general defnition” of “bearable arms” (emphasis added));

id., at 30–31 (discussing the “ `sensitive places' ” principle

that limits the right to public carry); cf. Vidal, 602 U. S., at

323–324 (Barrett, J., concurring in part); Whittington 386

(“The insight to be gleaned is not the authoritative status of

the expected application, but the apparent rule at play given

that such an application is expected to follow from it”). To

be sure, a court must be careful not to read a principle at

such a high level of generality that it waters down the right.

Pulling principle from precedent, whether case law or his-

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tory, is a standard feature of legal reasoning, and reasonable

minds sometimes disagree about how broad or narrow the

controlling principle should be.

Here, though, the Court settles on just the right level of

generality: “Since the founding, our Nation's frearm laws

have included provisions preventing individuals who

threaten physical harm to others from misusing frearms.”

Ante, at 690; see also Kanter v. Barr, 919 F. 3d 437, 451, 464–

465 (CA7 2019) (Barrett, J., dissenting) (“History is consist-

ent with common sense: it demonstrates that legislatures

have the power to prohibit dangerous people from possessing

guns”). Section 922(g)(8)(C)(i) fts well within that princi-

ple; therefore, Rahimi's facial challenge fails. Harder level-

of-generality problems can await another day.

Justice Jackson, concurring.

This case tests our Second Amendment jurisprudence as

shaped in particular by New York State Rife & Pistol Assn.,

Cite as: 602 U. S. 680 (2024) 741

Jackson, J., concurring

Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U. S. 1 (2022). I disagree with the meth-

odology of that decision; I would have joined the dissent had

I been a Member of the Court at that time. See generally

id., at 83–133 (Breyer, J., dissenting). But Bruen is now

binding law. Today's decision fairly applies that precedent,

so I join the opinion in full.

I write separately because we now have two years' worth

of post-Bruen cases under our belts, and the experiences of

courts applying its history-and-tradition test should bear on

our assessment of the workability of that legal standard.

This case highlights the apparent diffculty faced by judges

on the ground. Make no mistake: Today's effort to clear up

“misunderst[andings],” ante, at 691, is a tacit admission that

lower courts are struggling. In my view, the blame may lie

with us, not with them.

I

The Court today expounds on the history-and-tradition in-

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quiry that Bruen requires. Ante, at 691–692. We empha-

size that the Second Amendment is “not . . . a law trapped

in amber.” Ante, at 691. It “permits more than just those

regulations identical to ones that could be found in 1791”;

indeed, “a challenged regulation [that] does not precisely

match its historical precursors . . . `still may be analogous

enough to pass constitutional muster.' ” Ante, at 692 (quot-

ing Bruen, 597 U. S., at 30). Gun regulations need only

“comport with the principles underlying the Second Amend-

ment.” Ante, at 692. These clarifying efforts are welcome,

given the many questions Bruen left unanswered.

When this Court adopts a new legal standard, as we did

in Bruen, we do not do so in a vacuum. The tests we estab-

lish bind lower court judges, who then apply those legal

standards to the cases before them. In my view, as this

Court thinks of, and speaks about, history's relevance to

the interpretation of constitutional provisions, we should be

mindful that our common-law tradition of promoting clarity

and consistency in the application of our precedent also has

742 UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI

Jackson, J., concurring

a lengthy pedigree. So when courts signal they are having

trouble with one of our standards, we should pay attention.

Cf. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,

469 U. S. 528, 538–539 (1985).

The message that lower courts are sending now in Second

Amendment cases could not be clearer. They say there is

little method to Bruen's madness.1 It isn't just that Bruen's

1

See, e. g., Barris v. Stroud Twp., ––– Pa. –––, –––, 310 A. 3d 175, 190

(2024) (“[M]ore guidance in this challenging and ever-shifting area of the

law is welcome”); State v. Wilson, 154 Haw. 8, 21, 543 P. 3d 440, 453 (2024)

(“[B]y turning the test into history and nothing else, [Bruen] dismantles

workable methods to interpret frearms laws”); United States v. Dubois,

94 F. 4th 1284, 1293 (CA11 2024) (“We require clearer instruction from the

Supreme Court before we may reconsider the constitutionality of [18

U. S. C. § ]922(g)(1)”); United States v. Daniels, 77 F. 4th 337, 358 (CA5

2023) (Higginson, J., concurring) (“[C]ourts, operating in good faith, are

struggling at every stage of the Bruen inquiry. Those struggles encom-

pass numerous, often dispositive, diffcult questions”); Atkinson v. Gar-

land, 70 F. 4th 1018, 1024 (CA7 2023) (“[T]he historical analysis required

Page Proof Pending Publication

by Bruen will be diffcult and no doubt yield some measure of indetermi-

nancy”); id., at 1036 (Wood, J., dissenting) (“As other courts have begun to

apply Bruen, [the] need for further research and further guidance has

become clear”); Gonyo v. D. S., 210 N. Y. S. 3d 612, 615, 2024 N. Y. Slip Op.

24018 (Jan. 19, 2024) (“Interpretations and applications of Bruen by lower

courts have been widely divergent and thus, very diffcult to apply as

precedent”); United States v. Sing-Ledezma, 706 F. Supp. 3d 650, 655

(WD Tex. 2023) (“[T]he Court pauses to join the choir of lower courts

urging the Supreme Court to resolve the many unanswered questions

left in Bruen's wake”); United States v. Bartucci, 658 F. Supp. 3d 794, 800

(ED Cal. 2023) (“[T]he unique test the Supreme Court announced in Bruen

does not provide lower courts with clear guidance as to how analogous

modern laws must be to founding-era gun laws. In the short time post-

Bruen, this has caused disarray among the lower courts”); United States

v. Bullock, 679 F. Supp. 3d 501, 534 (SD Miss. 2023) (raising methodological

questions “in hopes that future judges and justices can answer them with

enough detail to enable trial courts to perform their duties”); Fraser

v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, 672 F. Supp.

3d 118, 137, n. 20 (ED Va. 2023) (“The Court is staffed by lawyers who

are neither trained nor experienced in making the nuanced historical anal-

yses called for by Bruen. . . . The analytical construct specifed by Bruen

is thus a diffcult one for non-historians”); United States v. Jackson,

661 F. Supp. 3d 392, 406 (Md. 2023) (noting “ the challenges cre-

Cite as: 602 U. S. 680 (2024) 743

Jackson, J., concurring

history-and-tradition test is burdensome (though that is no

small thing to courts with heavier caseloads and fewer re-

sources than we have). The more worrisome concern is that

lower courts appear to be diverging in both approach and

outcome as they struggle to conduct the inquiry Bruen re-

quires of them. Scholars report that lower courts applying

Bruen's approach have been unable to produce “consistent,

principled results,” Brief for Second Amendment Law Schol-

ars as Amici Curiae 4, and, in fact, they “have come to con-

ficting conclusions on virtually every consequential Second

Amendment issue to come before them,” id., at 4–5; see also

id., at 5–6 (collecting examples). Given this, it appears in-

disputable that, after Bruen, “confusion plagu[es] the lower

courts.” Id., at 6.

II

This discord is striking when compared to the relative har-

mony that had developed prior to Bruen. To be sure, our

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decision in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570

(2008), which frst recognized an individual right to keep and

bear arms for self-defense, see id., at 628, was disruptive in

its own way. After all, before Heller, “[t]he meaning of the

Second Amendment ha[d] been considered settled by courts

and legislatures for over two centuries,” and “judges and

legislators . . . properly believed . . . that the Second Amend-

ment did not reach possession of frearms for purely pri-

vate activities.” Id., at 676, n. 38 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

Nonetheless, after Heller, lower courts took up the necessary

work of reviewing burdens on this newly unearthed right.

By the time this Court decided Bruen, every court of appeals

evaluating whether a frearm regulation was consistent with

the Second Amendment did so using a two-step framework

ated by Bruen's assignment”); United States v. Love, 647 F. Supp. 3d 664,

670 (ND Ind. 2022) (“By . . . announcing an inconsistent and amorphous

standard, the Supreme Court has created mountains of work for district

courts that must now deal with Bruen-related arguments in nearly every

criminal case in which a frearm is found”).

744 UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI

Jackson, J., concurring

that incorporated means-end scrutiny. See Bruen, 597 U. S.,

at 103 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

Rejecting that “two-step approach” as having “one step

too many,” id., at 19, the Bruen majority subbed in another

two-step evaluation. Courts must, frst, determine whether

“the Second Amendment's plain text covers an individual's

conduct.” Id., at 24. If it does, “[t]he government must

then justify its regulation by demonstrating that it is consist-

ent with the Nation's historical tradition of frearm regula-

tion.” Ibid.

No one seems to question that “[h]istory has a role to play

in Second Amendment analysis.” Ante, at 706 (Sotomayor,

J., concurring). But, per Bruen, courts evaluating a Second

Amendment challenge must consider history to the exclusion

of all else. This means legislators must locate and pro-

duce—and courts must sift through—troves of centuries-old

documentation looking for supportive historical evidence.2

This very case provides a prime example of the pitfalls of

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Bruen's approach. Having been told that a key marker of a

constitutional gun regulation is “a well-established and rep-

resentative historical analogue,” Bruen, 597 U. S., at 30 (em-

phasis deleted), Rahimi argued below that “there is little or

no historical evidence suggesting disarmament for those who

committed domestic violence; and there is certainly no tradi-

tion of disarming people subject to a no-contact order related

to domestic violence.” Supp. Brief for Appellant in No. 21–

11001 (CA5), p. 22 (emphasis deleted). The Government

then proffered what it maintained were suffcient historical

analogues to 18 U. S. C. § 922(g)(8), including surety and

going armed laws. Supp. Brief for Appellee in No. 21–11001

2

It is not clear what qualifes policymakers or their lawyers (who do

not ordinarily have the specialized education, knowledge, or training of

professional historians) to engage in this kind of assessment. And dutiful

legislators are not the only stakeholders who are far outside their depth:

Bruen also conscripts parties and judges into service as amateur histori-

ans, casting about for similar historical circumstances.

Cite as: 602 U. S. 680 (2024) 745

Jackson, J., concurring

(CA5), pp. 33, n. 2, 37–41. But the Fifth Circuit concluded

that the federal statute was unconstitutional because the

Government's analogues were not “ `relevantly similar.' ” 61

F. 4th 443, 460–461 (2023).

Neither the parties nor the Fifth Circuit had the beneft

of today's decision, in which we hold that the Government

had in fact offered “ample evidence that the Second Amend-

ment permits the disarmament of individuals who pose a

credible threat to the physical safety of others.” Ante, at

693. But even setting aside whether the historical examples

the Government found were suffciently analogous, just can-

vassing the universe of historical records and gauging the

suffciency of such evidence is an exceedingly diffcult task.3

Consistent analyses and outcomes are likely to remain elu-

sive because whether Bruen's test is satisfed in a particu-

lar case seems to depend on the suitability of whatever his-

torical sources the parties can manage to cobble together, as

well as the level of generality at which a court evaluates

Page Proof Pending Publication

those sources—neither of which we have as yet adequately

clarifed.

And the unresolved questions hardly end there. Who is

protected by the Second Amendment, from a historical per-

spective? To what conduct does the Second Amendment's

plain text apply? To what historical era (or eras) should

3

The mad scramble for historical records that Bruen requires also sug-

gests that only those solutions that States implemented in the distant past

comport with the Constitution. That premise is questionable because,

given the breadth of some of the Constitution's provisions, it is likely that

the Founders understood that new solutions would be needed over time,

even for traditional problems, and that the principles they were adopting

would allow for such fexibility. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554

U. S. 570, 722 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (expressing doubt that the

Framers “intended future generations to ignore [modern-day] matters”).

It stifes both helpful innovation and democratic engagement to read the

Constitution to prevent advancement in this way. In any event, what

we see now is that Bruen's history-and-tradition test is not only limiting

legislative solutions, it also appears to be creating chaos.

746 UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI

Jackson, J., concurring

courts look to divine a historical tradition of gun regulation?

How many analogues add up to a tradition? Must there

be evidence that those analogues were enforced or subject

to judicial scrutiny? How much support can nonstatutory

sources lend? I could go on—as others have. See, e. g.,

United States v. Daniels, 77 F. 4th 337, 358–360 (CA5 2023)

(Higginson, J., concurring) (providing a similarly nonexhaus-

tive list). But I won't.

III

Maybe time will resolve these and other key questions.

Maybe appellate courts, including ours, will fnd a way to

“[b]rin[g] discipline to the increasingly erratic and unprin-

cipled body of law that is emerging after Bruen.” J.

Blocher & E. Ruben, Originalism-by-Analogy and Second

Amendment Adjudication, 133 Yale L. J. 99, 174 (2023). In-

deed, “[m]any constitutional standards involve undoubted

gray areas,” and “it normally might be fair to venture the

Page Proof Pending Publication

assumption that case-by-case development [will] lead to a

workable standard.” Garcia, 469 U. S., at 540 (internal quo-

tation marks and alteration omitted). By underscoring that

gun regulations need only “comport with the principles un-

derlying the Second Amendment,” ante, at 692 (emphasis

added), today's opinion inches that ball forward.

But it is becoming increasingly obvious that there are

miles to go.4 Meanwhile, the Rule of Law suffers. That

ideal—key to our democracy—thrives on legal standards

that foster stability, facilitate consistency, and promote pre-

4

Extremely pertinent inquiries relevant to consistent application of

Bruen's standard await resolution. For example, in Bruen we acknowl-

edged the existence of “an ongoing scholarly debate on whether courts

should primarily rely on the prevailing understanding of an individual

right when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratifed in 1868 when defning

its scope (as well as the scope of the right against the Federal Govern-

ment).” 597 U. S., at 37. We saw no need to address the issue in Bruen.

Id., at 38. We similarly decline to resolve that dispute today. Ante, at

692, n. 1.

Cite as: 602 U. S. 680 (2024) 747

Thomas, J., dissenting

dictability. So far, Bruen's history-focused test ticks none

of those boxes.

* * *

I concur in today's decision applying Bruen. But, in my

view, the Court should also be mindful of how its legal

standards are actually playing out in real life. We must

remember that legislatures, seeking to implement meaning-

ful reform for their constituents while simultaneously re-

specting the Second Amendment, are hobbled without a

clear, workable test for assessing the constitutionality of

their proposals. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 54–57; cf. Bruen, 597

U. S., at 90–91 (Breyer, J., dissenting). And courts, which

are currently at sea when it comes to evaluating frearms

legislation, need a solid anchor for grounding their constitu-

tional pronouncements. The public, too, deserves clarity

when this Court interprets our Constitution.

Justice Thomas, dissenting.

Page Proof Pending Publication

After New York State Rife & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen,

597 U. S. 1 (2022), this Court's directive was clear: A frearm

regulation that falls within the Second Amendment's plain

text is unconstitutional unless it is consistent with the Na-

tion's historical tradition of frearm regulation. Not a single

historical regulation justifes the statute at issue, 18 U. S. C.

§ 922(g)(8). Therefore, I respectfully dissent.

I

Section 922(g)(8) makes it unlawful for an individual who

is subject to a civil restraining order to possess frearms or

ammunition. To trigger § 922(g)(8)'s prohibition, a restrain-

ing order must bear three characteristics. First, the order

issues after a hearing where the accused “received actual

notice” and had “an opportunity to participate.” § 922(g)

(8)(A). Second, the order restrains the accused from engag-

ing in threatening behavior against an intimate partner or

child. § 922(g)(8)(B). Third, the order has either “a fnding

748 UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI

Thomas, J., dissenting

that [the accused] represents a credible threat to the physi-

cal safety of [an] intimate partner or child,” or an “explici[t]

prohibit[ion]” on “the use, attempted use, or threatened use

of physical force against [an] intimate partner or child.”

§ 922(g)(8)(C). If those three characteristics are present,

§ 922(g)(8) automatically bans the individual subject to the

order from possessing “any firearm or ammunition. ”

§ 922(g).

Just as important as § 922(g)(8)'s express terms is what it

leaves unsaid. Section 922(g)(8) does not require a fnding

that a person has ever committed a crime of domestic vio-

lence. It is not triggered by a criminal conviction or a per-

son's criminal history, unlike other § 922(g) subsections. See

§§ 922(g)(1), (9). And, § 922(g)(8) does not distinguish con-

tested orders from joint orders—for example, when parties

voluntarily enter a no-contact agreement or when both par-

ties seek a restraining order.

Page Proof Pending Publication

In addition, § 922(g)(8) strips an individual of his ability to

possess frearms and ammunition without any due process.1

Rather, the ban is an automatic, uncontestable consequence

of certain orders. See § 922(g) (“It shall be unlawful for any

[qualifying] person [to] possess in or affecting commerce, any

frearm or ammunition”). There is no hearing or opportu-

nity to be heard on the statute's applicability, and a court

need not decide whether a person should be disarmed under

§ 922(g)(8). The only process § 922(g)(8) requires is that pro-

vided (or not) for the underlying restraining order.

Despite § 922(g)(8)'s broad scope and lack of process, it car-

ries strong penalties. Any violation of § 922(g)(8) is a felony

punishable by up to 15 years' imprisonment. § 924(a)(8); see

also ante, at 688. And, a conviction for violating § 922(g)(8)

itself triggers a permanent, life-long prohibition on possess-

ing frearms and ammunition. See § 922(g)(1).

1

Rahimi does not ask the Court to consider, and I do not address,

whether § 922(g)(8) satisfes the Due Process Clause.

Cite as: 602 U. S. 680 (2024) 749

Thomas, J., dissenting

In 2020, Zackey Rahimi and his ex-girlfriend, C. M., en-

tered into a qualifying civil restraining order. App. 1.

C. M. had requested the order and asserted that Rahimi

assaulted her. See id., at 2. Because the order found

that Rahimi presented a credible threat and prohibited him

from using physical force against C. M., the order automati-

cally triggered § 922(g)(8)'s frearms ban. A year later, off-

cers discovered frearms in Rahimi's home. Rahimi pleaded

guilty to violating § 922(g)(8).

Before his guilty plea, Rahimi challenged his conviction

under the Second Amendment. He pointed to District of

Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570 (2008), which held that the

Second Amendment protects an individual right to keep and

bear frearms. Section 922(g)(8), Rahimi argued, violates

that right by penalizing frearms possession. The District

Court rejected Rahimi's claim. At that time, the Courts of

Appeals, including the Fifth Circuit, applied a form of

Page Proof Pending Publication

means-end scrutiny to Second Amendment claims. See,

e. g., United States v. McGinnis, 956 F. 3d 747, 753–754

(2020). Applying Circuit precedent, the Fifth Circuit af-

frmed the District Court. 2022 WL 2070392 (2022).

Roughly two weeks later, this Court issued its opinion in

New York State Rife & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen. The

Court rejected the means-end-scrutiny approach and laid out

the appropriate framework for assessing whether a fre-

arm regulation is con

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