Michael Nall v. BNSF Railway Company

Case: 17-20113 Document: 00514836721 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/15/2019

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

No. 17-20113

February 15, 2019

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

FLORA NALL, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Michael Nall,

substituted in place and stead of Michael Nall, deceased,

Plaintiff – Appellant,

v.

BNSF RAILWAY COMPANY,

Defendant – Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas—Houston

No. 4:14-CV-2819

Before ELROD, COSTA, and HO, Circuit Judges.

JENNIFER WALKER ELROD, Circuit Judge:

The panel opinion, special concurrence, and dissent previously issued in

this case are withdrawn, and the following opinions are substituted in their

place.

Michael Nall sued his employer, BNSF Railway Company, for disability

discrimination and retaliation after he was diagnosed with Parkinson’s disease

and later placed on medical leave by BNSF. Because there is a fact issue as to

whether BNSF discriminated against Nall, we REVERSE the grant of

summary judgment to BNSF on Nall’s disability discrimination claim and

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No. 17-20113

REMAND for further proceedings. Because Nall fails to identify a material

fact issue regarding his retaliation claim, we AFFIRM the district court’s

judgment on this claim.

I.

Nall started working as a trainman with BNSF in 1973. In 2010, he was

diagnosed with Parkinson’s disease. At this time, BNSF provided Nall and his

doctor with a medical status form listing the job duties of a trainman, including

items such as operating track switches, applying and releasing hand brakes,

monitoring track conditions, inspecting train cars and equipment, relaying

various types of signals, and controlling train speed. After Nall’s neurologist

cleared him to continue working, BNSF’s doctor revised the form to instead

contain a list of switchman duties different from the trainman duties on the

previous form. The new list added items such as “mak[ing] quick hand and leg

movements,” “rid[ing] on moving cars while holding onto a ladder,” and

“maintaining good balance and steadiness of stance/gait.”

Nall continued to work with BNSF for the next year and a half without

incident. Then, in 2012, BNSF gave Nall a letter stating that a co-worker had

voiced concern about Nall’s ability to safely perform his job duties. Nall was

placed on medical leave and required to obtain a release from the BNSF

medical department to return to work.

To begin the evaluation process, BNSF requested a copy of the results of

a physical examination from Nall’s neurologist that would show the doctor’s

awareness of BNSF’s concerns and the results of any diagnostic tests

performed. Nall complied. He submitted to BNSF a report from his

neurologist recommending further evaluations by a neuropsychologist and a

physical therapist. BNSF requested that Nall complete these evaluations.

Nall again complied. The neuropsychologist reported that he did not see any

evidence of brain damage after evaluating Nall and placed Nall’s skill level at

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the low end of the average range. The occupational therapist concluded that

Nall was able to meet the demands of his position at BNSF; suggested that

Nall be cautious with balance situations; and added that Nall was able to

perform balance tasks safely.

BNSF found some of the statements in these reports “concerning” and

kept Nall on leave. BNSF emphasized that its rail yard employees “need[ ] to

be able to make quick decisions and take quick actions in order to work safely”

and that “[b]alance is essential to working safely as a

brakeman/switchman/conductor.” In addition, BNSF provided Nall with five

pages of photographs depicting some of his job duties and asked for his

neurologist to review them and return a statement to BNSF regarding Nall’s

ability to complete the depicted tasks.

Dr. Joseph Jankovic, a neurologist and the director of the Parkinson’s

Disease Center and Movement Disorders Clinic at the Baylor College of

Medicine, reviewed the photographs. He concluded that Nall was able to

perform the job duties shown in the photographs safely and was “in very good

condition with balance and concentration in order.” BNSF next requested that

Nall perform a field test. During the test, Nall successfully completed all of

the requested tasks, including taking instructions via radio, climbing on and

off equipment, and walking on uneven surfaces. The physical therapist who

conducted the test wrote a report in which he noted that Nall had decreased

balance when reaching, a resting tremor, and slow and jerky movement

patterns. Although not mentioned in the report, two BNSF employees later

testified in depositions that, during the test, Nall engaged in conduct that

violated two of BNSF’s “eight deadly decisions”—BNSF’s most serious safety

rules. BNSF informed Nall that, based on the results of the field test, he could

not return to work.

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A few months later, Nall filed a discrimination charge with the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). He also sent a new medical

status form to BNSF showing that he could safely return to work. BNSF

responded that Nall was unable to return to work because of his field test

results. Nall sent another medical status form to BNSF, from another doctor,

clearing him to return to work, and a new BNSF doctor, Dr. Laura Gillis,

responded by classifying him as “permanently medically disqualified.” The

EEOC concluded its investigation and sent a letter to BNSF stating that it did

not agree with BNSF that Nall was a potential harm to himself or others or

that he was incapable of doing his job. Indeed, the EEOC investigator

concluded that there was a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act

(ADA).

Nall and his wife filed the instant lawsuit. During the litigation process,

Nall kept trying to return to work. BNSF conducted a second field test and

found that Nall was still unable to perform his job duties safely. Several

months later, Nall submitted records to BNSF showing that his

neuropsychological testing results were “essentially the same as they were in

2012.” BNSF’s decision remained the same.

Against BNSF, Nall alleged disability discrimination and retaliation

under the ADA and Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA). 1

BNSF maintains that it did not discriminate against Nall because Nall was

unsafe to return to work throughout the relevant time period. The district

court held that Nall presented no direct evidence of discrimination, was not

1 Nall also alleged age discrimination and brought a retaliation claim under the Age

Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). However, on appeal, Nall states that he “no

longer wishes to pursue his age discrimination claims.” Thus, he has waived any arguments

under the ADEA. See United States v. Conn, 657 F.3d 280, 286 (5th Cir. 2011) (“‘[W]aiver is

the intentional relinquishment of a known right,’ and ‘waived errors are entirely

unreviewable.’” (quoting United States v. Arviso-Mata, 442 F.3d 382, 384 (5th Cir. 2006))).

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qualified for his position as a trainman, failed to present evidence of pretext,

and was precluded from succeeding on his claims because BNSF is entitled to

a “direct threat” defense. Nall timely appealed.

II.

We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment, viewing

all facts and evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.

Cannon v. Jacobs Field Servs. N. Am., Inc., 813 F.3d 586, 590 (5th Cir. 2016).

“Summary judgment is only appropriate if the movant has shown that there is

no genuine issue as to any material fact such that the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Id.

“An issue of material fact is genuine if a reasonable jury could return a

verdict for the nonmovant. In reviewing the evidence, we must draw all

reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and avoid credibility

determinations and weighing of the evidence. In so doing, we must disregard

all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to

believe.” Sandstad v. CB Ricard Ellis, Inc., 309 F.3d 893, 896 (5th Cir. 2002)

(citations omitted).

III.

“In employment discrimination cases, a plaintiff may present his case by

direct or circumstantial evidence, or both.” 2 Id. If the plaintiff produces direct

evidence that discriminatory animus played a role in the employer’s adverse

employment decision, the burden of persuasion shifts to the defendant who

must prove that it would have taken the same action despite any

discriminatory animus. Id. If the plaintiff only produces circumstantial

2 “Because TCHRA ‘parallels the language of the ADA,’ Texas courts follow ADA law

in evaluating TCHRA discrimination claims.” Williams v. Tarrant Cty. Coll. Dist., 717 F.

App’x 440, 444–45 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Pegram v. Honeywell, Inc., 361 F.3d 272, 285–87

(5th Cir. 2004)). Except where we have noted otherwise, the following ADA analysis therefore

applies equally to Nall’s claims under the TCHRA. See id.

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evidence of discrimination, the well-known burden-shifting analysis set forth

in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973), guides our

inquiry. Id. The district court held that Nall neither presented direct evidence

of discrimination nor satisfied the circumstantial-evidence requirements of

McDonnell Douglas. We address both determinations.

A.

On appeal, Nall presents several comments by BNSF employees as direct

evidence of discrimination. First, right after the initial field test, Dana Dickey,

the BNSF field medical manager, allegedly told Nall that Nall was “never

coming back to work” and that “they were just sending [him] paper

work . . . to—you know, be nice.” Second, Dr. Gillis and BNSF’s manager of

clinical services, Carol Wilks, allegedly told Nall’s wife that “people with

Parkinson’s don’t get better.” Third, Dickey e-mailed Dr. Gillis regarding

Nall’s condition and whether BNSF should offer him a second field test and

said that they “have to have it all documented.” In response, Dr. Gillis noted

that there was a low likelihood that Nall’s situation would improve but that

they have to ask the questions. Fourth, despite Nall’s submission of several

medical status forms indicating his ability to work safely, Dr. Gillis and Dickey

repeatedly referenced only the first field test.

The first two statements above—that BNSF was just sending Nall

paperwork to “be nice” and that “people with Parkinson’s don’t get better”—

were the only comments presented as direct evidence of discrimination to the

district court. As a result, these are the only statements we consider. See

United States v. Mix, 791 F.3d 603, 611–12 (5th Cir. 2015) (holding that

arguments not raised below are forfeited). We agree with the district court

that these two statements are insufficient to constitute direct evidence.

If an inference is required for evidence to be probative as to an employer’s

discriminatory animus, the evidence is circumstantial, not direct. Sandstad,

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309 F.3d at 897–98. Here, the evidence that Nall provides requires an

inference to be probative as to any discriminatory animus. First, to find that

Dickey’s comments, said after the field test, are evidence of animus requires

the inference that Nall was “never coming back to work” because of Nall’s

disorder rather than his performance on the field test. Second, Dr. Gillis’s and

Wilks’s statements about people with Parkinson’s disease could simply be an

observation about the disorder. To be evidence of animus, the comment

requires an inference that the irreversible nature of Parkinson’s disease was

the reason why Nall would not be returning to work. These comments do not

constitute direct evidence; they are circumstantial evidence which we may

consider only under McDonnell Douglas. Having so concluded, we move on to

the McDonnell Douglas framework. 3

B.

Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, Nall must first make out a

prima facie case of discrimination by showing that: (1) he has a disability or

was regarded as disabled; (2) he was qualified for the job; and (3) he was subject

to an adverse employment decision because of his disability. Williams v. J.B.

Hunt Transp., Inc., 826 F.3d 806, 811 (5th Cir. 2016). If he does, the burden

shifts to BNSF to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the

adverse employment action. Id. If BNSF satisfies its burden, the burden shifts

back to Nall “to produce evidence from which a jury could conclude that

[BNSF’s] articulated reason is pretextual.” Cannon, 813 F.3d at 590.

3 Judge Costa’s observation in his concurrence that the McDonnell Douglas framework

can be inefficient and cumbersome is astute. However, as Judge Costa notes, Nall’s attempt

to prove his case by direct evidence relied only on comments by his supervisors. Beyond these

comments, which we have concluded are not direct evidence, Nall attempted to prove his case

using circumstantial evidence. Thus, because Nall presented only circumstantial evidence

on summary judgment, it does not appear that we have the liberty to analyze this case in the

streamlined manner that Judge Costa describes.

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1. Prima facie case

Here, the district court concluded that Nall satisfied the first and third

elements of a prima facie case of discrimination but failed to show the second

element—that Nall was qualified for the job of a trainman. That element is

the focus of this appeal.

“To be a qualified employee, [Nall] must be able to show that he could

either (1) ‘perform the essential functions of the job in spite of his disability,’

or (2) that ‘a reasonable accommodation of his disability would have enabled

him to perform the essential functions of his job.’” Id. at 592 (quoting EEOC

v. LHC Grp., Inc., 773 F.3d 688, 697 (5th Cir. 2014)); see 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).

Nall argues that he could perform the essential functions of his job. “A function

is ‘essential’ if it bears ‘more than a marginal relationship’ to the employee’s

job.” Cannon, 813 F.3d at 592 (quoting Chandler v. City of Dall., 2 F.3d 1385,

1393 (5th Cir. 1993), holding modified on other grounds as discussed in Kapche

v. City of San Antonio, 304 F.3d 493 (5th Cir. 2002)). “[C]onsideration shall be

given to the employer’s judgment as to what functions of a job are essential,

and if an employer has prepared a written description before advertising or

interviewing applicants for the job, this description shall be considered

evidence of the essential functions of the job.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).

In this case, the parties agree that the question of whether Nall was a

qualified employee is directly related to the question of whether BNSF is

entitled to a “direct threat” defense. 4 An employer is entitled to a direct threat

defense if an employee poses a “significant risk to the health or safety of others

that cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation.” EEOC v. E.I. Du

4 While the “direct threat” defense controls our analysis of Nall’s ADA claims, the

TCHRA does not contain analogous statutory language, we have not found any Texas case

law discussing the issue, and the parties did not brief it. Accordingly, the district court will

need to address this issue on remand.

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Pont de Nemours & Co., 480 F.3d 724, 731 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting 42 U.S.C.

§ 12111(3)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b). Whether an employer has properly

determined that a person poses a direct threat depends on “the objective

reasonableness of [the employer’s] actions.” Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624,

650 (1998) (“[C]ourts should assess the objective reasonableness of the views

of health care professionals without deferring to their individual

judgments[.]”). “The direct threat defense must be ‘based on a reasonable

medical judgment that relies on the most current medical knowledge and/or

the best available objective evidence,’ and upon an expressly ‘individualized

assessment of the individual’s present ability to safely perform the essential

functions of the job[.]’” Chevron USA, Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 86 (2002)

(quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r)); see also E.I. Du Pont, 480 F.3d at 731 (“The

employer must make an ‘individualized assessment of the individual’s present

ability to safely perform the essential function of the job.’” (citations omitted)).

Nall’s arguments focus on the standard articulated in Echazabal: he

contends that BNSF did not consider the best available objective evidence or

conduct a meaningful individualized assessment because it, inter alia,

disqualified him “with no medical basis/analysis,” “kept making him jump

through hoops,” and “search[ed] for reasons to prevent [him] from returning to

work.” Thus, the question here is whether a genuine issue of material fact

exists as to whether BNSF’s direct threat determination was properly made

under that standard. 5

5 We do not reach the question of which party bears the burden of proof regarding the

direct threat defense. BNSF argues that because the direct threat defense is related to the

second element of Nall’s prima facie case, Nall should have the burden to prove that he could

safely do his job. In Rizzo v. Children’s World Learning Ctrs., Inc., 213 F.3d 209 (5th Cir.

2000) (en banc), we declined to reach the question of which party bears the burden of

establishing that an individual’s disability poses a direct health or safety threat to the

disabled employee or others. Id. at 213 & n.4. We do so again here. Even assuming arguendo

that the burden is Nall’s, at this stage, he has satisfied it.

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Nall states in his complaint that he worked as a trainman, performing

the duties of a conductor, switchman, and brakeman. According to BNSF, the

duties of a conductor include maneuvering on, off, and around railcars, riding

on railcars with four points of contact, hand signaling, connecting and

disconnecting hoses and railcars, and “throwing” switches. Moreover, the

duties of a switchman include substantially similar tasks, along with the

ability “to make quick hand and leg movements” and “maintain[ ] good balance

and steadiness of stance/gait.”

In support of his argument that BNSF did not engage in a proper direct

threat analysis, Nall points to a BNSF medical status form provided to Nall

and his doctor before the list of switchman duties that includes a more limited

set of trainman duties and does not mention quick movements or balance. The

medical status form lists the following: operating track switches and derails,

using hand brakes, monitoring track conditions and traffic, inspecting railcars

and equipment, communicating signals affecting the movement of trains, and

controlling the speed and clearance distance of railcars. After Nall’s

neurologist recommended a release to full duty for Nall based on this medical

status form back in 2010, shortly after Nall had been diagnosed, a BNSF doctor

provided Nall’s doctor with a new list that she said “addresses the duties for

which Parkinson’s symptoms may be of issue.” In addition, Nall cites to the

testimony of BNSF’s terminal manager for the yard where Nall worked. The

manager testified that it is not essential to work quickly as a conductor,

switchman, or brakeman.

A reasonable jury could conclude that BNSF did not consider the “best

available objective evidence” or meaningfully engage in an “individualized

assessment” of whether Nall could perform the essential duties of a trainman

safely—and that, as a result, BNSF’s direct threat determination was not

objectively reasonable. First is the issue of identifying those essential duties.

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The district court acknowledged that the job descriptions provided to the court,

specifically the original medical status form and the more specific list of

switchman duties, contain differences. But the court concluded that these

differences do not affect the question of whether Nall was qualified because

“the record demonstrated that BNSF repeatedly stated that it deemed

performing job tasks safely as essential to Nall’s position” and this was also

reflected in the original medical status form job description. The question

remains, however, what the job tasks were that Nall could allegedly not

perform safely.

For our analysis, we take guidance from the ADA’s definition of a

“qualified individual” and consider the list of trainman duties BNSF originally

provided to Nall on the medical status form that they gave to his doctor. See

42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (stating that a written job description shall be considered

if it was prepared “before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job”).

This list did not include any reference to quick movements, balance, or

steadiness. Moreover, BNSF’s terminal manager testified that it was not

essential to work quickly as a conductor, switchman, or brakeman. Cf. Holly

v. Clairson Indus., L.L.C., 492 F.3d 1247, 1257 (11th Cir. 2007) (“[W]hen

considering the employer’s judgment regarding what is an essential function,

we have previously considered not only the company’s ‘official position,’ but

also testimony from the plaintiff’s supervisor.”). Taking the evidence in the

light most favorable to Nall, the trainman duties listed on the medical status

form are the ones we consider. Next, we address the question of whether

BNSF’s determination that Nall could not safely perform these tasks was

objectively reasonable.

As the Supreme Court and this court have made clear, an employer’s

direct threat determination must result from an “individualized assessment”

of the particular employee based on the “best available objective evidence,” not

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a categorical conclusion that an employee with a particular disability cannot

safely perform a job. See Echazabal, 536 U.S. at 86; Kapche, 304 F.3d at 499

(“[T]he City’s failure to assess [the employee’s] abilities on an individual

basis . . . stat[ed] a claim of a present and continuing violation of the ADA.”).

Thus, the question on appeal is not whether it was reasonable for BNSF to

conclude that an employee with Parkinson’s could pose a direct threat; the

question is whether BNSF reasonably concluded that Nall posed a direct

threat via an individualized assessment that relied on the best available

objective evidence and was not, as Nall alleges, manipulated midstream to

achieve BNSF’s desired result of disqualifying him. More precisely, the

question is whether there is any evidence in the record that creates a genuine

issue of material fact as to whether BNSF meaningfully assessed Nall’s ability

to perform his job safely and reasonably concluded that he posed a direct

threat. 6

On this question, taking into consideration the reports by Nall’s

doctors—all of whom concluded that Nall could safely perform the tasks of a

trainman listed on the medical status form that BNSF originally provided to

Nall—the fact that Nall successfully completed each of the tasks presented to

him during his first field test, and the comments made by BNSF employees

that Nall was “never coming back to work” and that “people with Parkinson’s

don’t get better,” there is a genuine dispute. See E.I. Du Pont, 480 F.3d at 728,

6 The dissent from our original opinion, as well as the petition for rehearing en banc

and two amicus curiae submissions in support of it, expressed concern that the panel majority

had imposed a new requirement for assertion of the direct-threat defense, to-wit: that in

addition to showing that the employment decision was objectively reasonable, the employer

must also establish that the process itself that was utilized in reaching that decision,

considered separately, was objectively reasonable. Without commenting further on the

efficacy of such an approach or on whether the panel majority actually adopted it, we

emphasize that nothing in this substitute opinion should be understood as employing that

reasoning.

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731 (holding that judgment as a matter of law on direct threat defense was

inappropriate where employee presented evidence she could safely perform

essential job function but employer relied on disputed field test); Riel v. Elec.

Data Sys. Corp., 99 F.3d 678, 680–81, 683 (5th Cir. 1996) (reversing summary

judgment where employer terminated employee for inability to perform

essential function not included on lists of essential functions provided to

employee and his doctor, and employee introduced evidence that the function

was not essential).

The district court held that BNSF was entitled to disregard Dr.

Jankovic’s medical releases because they “were based on a limited set of

observations and ‘incomplete set of facts.’” Hickman v. Exxon Mobile, 2012 WL

9100358, at *9 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 27, 2012). Even if it is true that BNSF could

choose to credit the opinions of its own doctors over Nall’s, the evidence

identified by Nall puts into question the objective reasonableness of those

opinions.

The district court supported its decision with citations to our

unpublished opinion in Hickman v. Exxon Mobil, 540 F. App’x 277 (5th Cir.

2013). In that case, the plaintiff, Hickman, argued that her employer, Exxon,

failed to conduct an adequate individualized assessment of her abilities to

perform her job in support of a direct threat defense because it discounted the

opinion of her doctor. See Hickman, 2012 WL 9100358, at *9. The district

court disagreed. Id. It characterized that doctor’s decision as a “last-minute

work release” and noted that two of Hickman’s previous neurologists had

placed work restrictions on her; that she had worked with two neurologists

before she found one who would release her to return to work with only a

driving restriction; and that the doctor who released her orally agreed with

Exxon’s doctor that his concerns regarding Hickman returning to work were

legitimate. Id. In a short, unpublished opinion that did not discuss the

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differing views of these doctors, we affirmed. See Hickman, 540 F. App’x at

277. This is a completely different case. And, in any event, we are not bound

by Hickman.

Here, Nall provided medical reports from numerous doctors concluding

that he could perform his job duties safely. This includes a report from a

neurologist who said that Nall’s “station and gait were not too abnormal”; a

report from an occupational therapist who found that Nall “appeared to be able

to meet the demands for various positions working for BNSF” and that he could

perform balance tasks safely; a memo from Baylor College of Medicine

neurologist Dr. Jankovic that he had reviewed BNSF’s photographs of Nall’s

job duties and concluded that he was able to perform his job duties safely; a

medical status form completed by Dr. Jankovic stating that Nall was able to

return to work without any restrictions; and a medical status form completed

by a different doctor stating that Nall was able to return to work without any

restrictions. 7

In addition, and importantly, Nall successfully completed each of the

tasks required of him during his first field test. BNSF nonetheless did not

reinstate Nall because he committed “[s]everal safety exceptions” during the

evaluation, including making the “deadly decision” of going between moving

7 With respect to timing, Nall argues on appeal that BNSF took adverse actions in:

(1) April 2012, when BNSF placed him on medical leave; (2) September 2012, when BNSF

informed Nall that he could not return to work; (3) December 2012 through January 2013,

when BNSF again said Nall could not return to work; and (4) June through July 2013, when

BNSF permanently medically disqualified him. At the district court, however, Nall argued

that he was subjected to an adverse employment decision only on the last two of these four

dates: December 2012 and June 2013, when Nall submitted information that he was able to

return to work without restriction and BNSF still denied his requests. All of the doctor

evaluations listed above were provided to BNSF before December 2012, with the exception of

the second medical status form, which was sent to BNSF on December 20, 2012. Moreover,

because he did not present argument regarding the first two actions to the district court, Nall

has forfeited the argument that he was also subject to adverse actions in April and September

2012. See Mix, 791 F.3d at 611.

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cars, failing to give proper hand signals, and demonstrating unsafe behavior

while dismounting equipment. Later, BNSF also claimed that Nall made a

second “deadly decision”—“fouling” the track, which involves walking on a

part of the track that puts you at risk of being hit. Nall, however, disputes

each of these allegations. With respect to the “deadly decisions,” Nall testified

that the cars were not moving when he started walking between them, and

that he was asked to do something during the test that required him to “foul”

the track. He also testified that he used a radio during the evaluation, not

hand signals, and did not agree that he dismounted the railcar in a way that

was unsafe.

Finally, Nall provided evidence that BNSF employees made comments

that cast doubt on the propriety of BNSF’s evaluation process, and, as a result,

the credibility of its decision to disqualify him. Nall testified in his deposition

that BNSF’s field medical manager told him he was “never coming back to

work” and that the company was only asking Nall for updated medical

paperwork to “be nice.” In addition, two BNSF employees—a doctor and the

manager of clinical services—allegedly told Nall’s wife that “people with

Parkinson’s don’t get better.”

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Nall, as we must,

there is a genuine dispute as to the objective reasonableness of BNSF’s

actions. 8 See, e.g., Justice v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 527 F.3d 1080, 1091–92

(10th Cir. 2008) (holding that a triable issue of material fact existed as to

whether the employee actually posed a direct threat to workplace safety where

there was a question on whether a physical therapist’s opinion could be

8 We emphasize that a correct conclusion is not required to satisfy the objective

reasonableness standard. What is required, however, is that BNSF consider the best

available objective evidence, not categorically assume that Parkinson’s will disqualify an

employee, and not change the disqualification criteria in the middle of the evaluation to

dictate that outcome.

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considered objective, evidence indicating that the employee’s restrictions may

not have limited his ability to perform safely in his environment, and evidence

that his employer’s application of various medical judgments to the workplace

was unreasonable); Echazabal v. Chevron USA, Inc., 336 F.3d 1023, 1030 (9th

Cir. 2003) (holding that medical opinion letters from the employee’s doctors,

together with the employee’s own declaration, raised a material fact issue as

to the objective reasonableness of the employer’s opinion); Lowe v. Ala. Power

Co., 244 F.3d 1305, 1309 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that questions of fact

remained as to what the essential functions of the employee’s position are, and

whether, assuming the disputed function was included, the employee was

qualified to perform such work).

The evidence that Nall presented—that BNSF employees (1) disregarded

Nall’s medical release forms; (2) relied on safety violations they later identified

in Nall’s field test despite his successful completion of the assigned tasks;

(3) changed the trainman job description to incorporate tasks that an

individual with Parkinson’s may have difficulty performing; and (4) made

comments indicating a belief that Parkinson’s categorically disqualified an

individual from working as a trainman—calls into question the credibility of

BNSF’s decision to disqualify him. Taken together, this evidence creates a

material fact issue on the question of whether BNSF considered the best

available objective evidence and meaningfully engaged in an individualized

assessment of Nall. Specifically, it raises a fact dispute as to whether BNSF

requested particular objective evidence of Nall’s ability to perform his job, only

to intentionally disregard that evidence when it indicated that Nall was

qualified and instead request new evidence on which to base its direct threat

determination.

As discussed more fully in our pretext analysis below, it is well-accepted

in employment law—and the law more generally—that inconsistent

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explanations and changing requirements undermine a party’s credibility. See

Cleveland v. Home Shopping Network, Inc., 369 F.3d 1189, 1193–94 (11th Cir.

2004) (holding that “shifting reasons allow the jury to question [the employer’s]

credibility” and once his “credibility is damaged, the jury could infer that he

did not fire [the employee] because of the [proffered reason], but rather because

of her disability”); Appelbaum v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 340 F.3d

573, 579 (7th Cir. 2003) (“One can reasonably infer pretext from an employer’s

shifting or inconsistent explanations for the challenged employment

decision.”); cf. United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 177 (1975) (“A basic rule of

evidence provides that prior inconsistent statements may be used to impeach

the credibility of a witness.”). And when an employer’s credibility is

undermined, it casts doubt on the reasonableness of that employer’s decisions.

Thus, although there is no requirement under the ADA for the employer to

follow certain procedures in making a “direct threat” assessment, the language

in Echazabal and the related EEOC regulation establishes that intentional

disregard for the best available objective evidence, in whatever form it takes,

undermines an employer’s credibility and renders its direct threat conclusion

objectively unreasonable. See Echazabal, 536 U.S. at 86 (“The direct threat

defense must be ‘based on a reasonable medical judgment that relies on . . . the

best available objective evidence[.]’”); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r). In this instance,

BNSF’s intentional disregard for the best available objective evidence took the

form of moving the goalposts during Nall’s evaluation in order to produce

BNSF’s desired outcome of disqualifying him. As a result, for summary-

judgment purposes, Nall has established his prima facie case, and we move to

the next steps of the McDonnell Douglas analysis—asking whether BNSF has

articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for placing Nall on medical

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leave and, if so, whether Nall has shown that the articulated reason is

pretextual. 9

2. Legitimate, non-discriminatory reason and pretext

“At summary judgment, evidence demonstrating that the employer’s

explanation is false or unworthy of credence, taken together with the plaintiff’s

prima facie case, is likely to support an inference of discrimination even

without further evidence of defendant’s true motive.” Diggs v. Burlington N.

& Santa Fe Ry. Co., 742 F. App’x 1, 4 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting LHC Grp., 773

F.3d at 702). The district court held that the safety concerns emphasized by

BNSF constituted a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for BNSF to place

Nall on medical leave. As we have discussed, however, viewing the evidence

in the light most favorable to Nall, BNSF’s safety concerns were not tied to

Nall’s ability to perform the tasks required of his job. He could perform those

tasks. Instead, BNSF’s concerns were tied to his physical impairment—his

Parkinson’s symptoms.

Notably, the job requirements that were added by BNSF to those of a

trainman reflect abilities directly impacted by Parkinson’s disease, such as the

9 The district court also concluded that BNSF was entitled to a “business necessity”

defense. The “direct threat” defense and the “business necessity” defense “require different

types of proof.” EEOC v. Exxon Corp., 203 F.3d 871, 875 (5th Cir. 2000). “Direct threat

focuses on the individual employee, examining the specific risk posed by the employee’s

disability. In contrast, business necessity addresses whether the qualification standard can

be justified as an across-the-board requirement.” Id. (citation omitted). The district court

seemed to consider the qualification standard here to be a requirement that Nall could do his

job safely. Thus, its analysis regarding the defense mirrored its direct threat analysis.

Similarly, BNSF summarily states that the district court’s separate rejection of Nall’s attack

on BNSF’s business necessity defense was correct “[f]or the same reasons” given in support

of its direct threat defense. Accepting the relevant qualification as the ability to do his job

safely, we conclude that Nall has also established a fact issue regarding BNSF’s entitlement

to the business necessity defense under the ADA.

As with the direct threat defense, however, the district court did not address the

applicability of the business necessity defense under the TCHRA, and the parties did not

brief it. The district court will need to consider this on remand.

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ability “to make quick hand and leg movements” and “maintain[ ] good balance

and steadiness of stance/gait.” This casts doubt on the legitimacy of BNSF’s

concerns. See Caldwell v. KHOU-TV, 850 F.3d 237, 242 (5th Cir. 2017) (“An

employer’s inconsistent explanations for an employment decision ‘cast doubt’

on the truthfulness of those explanations.”); see also Rizzo v. Children’s World

Learning Ctrs., Inc., 213 F.3d 209, 221 (5th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (Jones, J., and

Smith, J., dissenting) (“[W]e may have special cause for suspicion when an

employer justifies discrimination not on the relatively concrete and more

readily measurable basis of ability to perform a particular essential job

function safely, but because of a proffered generalized concern about health

and safety.”).

Additional evidence that suggests that BNSF’s explanation is false or

unworthy of credence includes the reports by Nall’s doctors, who concluded

that Nall could safely return to work, the “never coming back to work” and

Parkinson’s-related statements made by BNSF employees, and the fact that

BNSF continued to move the goalposts—to make requests of Nall, even as he

completed the previous ones. Cf. Diggs, 742 F. App’x at 5 (holding that there

was no fact issue regarding pretext when an employee failed to timely submit

information requested by his employer, BNSF, and there was “no evidence that

the company would create new information demands after [the employee]

complied with previous ones”).

As a result, even assuming that BNSF’s alleged safety concerns were

legitimate and non-discriminatory, the totality of the circumstances creates a

material fact issue as to whether BNSF’s proffered reasons for refusing to

reinstate Nall were merely pretextual—that is, that the real reason for BNSF’s

adverse employment action was Nall’s disability. Accordingly, on Nall’s

disability discrimination claims, we reverse the district court’s judgment. Of

course, this holding does not mean that Nall will prevail at trial or that safety

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was not the real reason for BNSF’s decision. It means only that Nall produced

enough evidence to survive summary judgment.

IV.

“To show an unlawful retaliation, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie

case of (1) engagement in an activity protected by the ADA, (2) an adverse

employment action, and (3) a causal connection between the protected act and

the adverse action. Once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the

defendant must come forward with a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for

the adverse employment action. If such a reason is advanced, the plaintiff

must adduce sufficient evidence that the proffered reason is a pretext for

retaliation. Ultimately, the employee must show that ‘but for’ the protected

activity, the adverse employment action would not have occurred.” Seaman v.

CSPH, Inc., 179 F.3d 297, 301 (5th Cir. 1999) (footnotes omitted); see also Feist

v. La. Dep’t of Justice, Office of the Att’y Gen., 730 F.3d 450, 454 (5th Cir. 2013).

Here, Nall claims that the “causal link” element of his prima facie case

is the only element in dispute. “A ‘causal link’ is established when the evidence

demonstrates that ‘the employer’s decision to terminate was based in part on

knowledge of the employee’s protected activity.’” Medina v. Ramsey Steel Co.,

238 F.3d 674, 684 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Sherrod v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 132

F.3d 1112, 1122 (5th Cir. 1998)).

Nall satisfies the first element of his retaliation claim by pointing to his

decision to file a complaint with the EEOC in December 2012. For the second

element, Nall notes that “BNSF consistently refused to reinstate him after that

date, including only three weeks later on January 8, 2013.” As to the third

element, Nall argues that Dr. Gillis and Dickey were aware of Nall’s EEOC

complaint because they admit that they provided information to the EEOC

through another BNSF employee. Nall argues that there is a fact issue on this

element because of how burdensome BNSF made the process for Nall to be

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considered “qualified” and misrepresentations BNSF made to the EEOC,

including the fact that BNSF said it had not received additional information

from Nall during a certain time period when it had.

Nall does not provide evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact

on the “causal link” element of his retaliation claim. Although Nall sets forth

some evidence to show that Dr. Gillis and Dickey, individuals involved in the

decision-making process regarding Nall, eventually learned that Nall had filed

a claim with the EEOC, he does not cite to any evidence that demonstrates

that the subsequent decisions to keep him on leave were at all based on this

knowledge. Without evidence of a causal link between the filing of his EEOC

claim and his continued placement on medical leave, Nall is unable to establish

a prima facie case of an unlawful retaliation and his retaliation claims

necessarily fail.

V.

For the above reasons, we REVERSE the grant of summary judgment as

to Nall’s disability discrimination claims and AFFIRM the judgment as to the

remaining claims. This case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent

with this opinion.

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GREGG COSTA, Circuit Judge, specially concurring:

The question that divides the panel—whether the railroad had good

reason to believe Nall posed a safety risk—should be the only issue in this case.

There is no doubt the railroad fired Nall because of those alleged safety

concerns and that those concerns resulted from Nall’s Parkinson’s. So that

disability is the reason Nall was fired. See Cannon v. Jacob Field Servs. N.

America, Inc., 813 F.3d 586, 594 (5th Cir. 2016) (finding causation “easily

resolve[d]” when a company revoked a job offer because of concerns that the

applicant’s shoulder injury would prevent him from climbing a ladder).

We might be uncomfortable with so readily calling the railroad’s action

“discrimination.” Today that word is usually equated with something

invidious. 1 That is for understandable, indeed laudable, reasons given our

history of pernicious, pervasive, and persistent prejudice against members of

certain groups. But the reality is that employers lawfully discriminate all the

time in making hiring and promotion decisions. Employers discriminate based

on employees’ education, work experience, intelligence, and work ethic to name

a few common examples. So the question often is not whether discrimination

is occurring, but whether it is the type of discrimination that society, through

its laws, has condemned.

1 That instinct led an employer to recently argue in the Sixth Circuit that an ADA

plaintiff had to show animus. E.E.O.C. v. Dolgencorp, LLC, 899 F.3d 428, 436 (6th Cir. 2018).

In rejecting that challenge to a verdict, Judge Sutton explained that:

the Act speaks in terms of causation, not animus. An employer violates the Act

whenever it discharges an employee ‘on the basis of disability’ (a necessary

requirement for liability), not only when it harbors ill will (a sufficient way of

establishing liability). Imagine a company that fired a visually impaired employee to

save itself the minimal expense of buying special software for her. Without more, that

would constitute termination ‘on the basis of disability,’ even if all of the evidence

showed that cost-savings, not animus towards the blind, motivated the company.

Id. at 436 (internal citations omitted).

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The Americans with Disabilities Act was a long overdue recognition that

discrimination against the disabled belongs in the unlawful category. That

discrimination is unjust to the disabled and deprives the economy of

individuals who usually can fully and effectively perform their jobs. But

Congress decided that not all disability discrimination should be unlawful.

Because some disabilities may prevent some people from performing some jobs

safely, the ADA provides a defense if the disabled employee will pose a safety

threat to himself or others. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6), 12113(b); see also 42

U.S.C. § 12111(8) (defining a “qualified individual” under the ADA as a person

“who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential

functions of the employment position”). This “direct threat” defense draws a

line not between discrimination and its absence, but between unlawful and

lawful discrimination.

For cases like this one that turn on whether the disability renders the

employee a safety risk (or the sometimes related statutory question whether

the employee is unable to perform the essential functions of the job), there thus

should not be a dispute about discriminatory intent. An employer cannot have

it both ways by arguing that the termination was justified because the

disability was dangerous while also maintaining that the safety-threatening

disability was not the reason for the firing. When a concern about the

disability’s negative impact on workplace safety is the reason for the adverse

action, the “causation” element of an ADA discrimination claim should be

straightforward. See Cannon, 813 F.3d at 594; Rizzo v. Children’s World

Learning Centers, Inc., 84 F.3d 758, 762 (5th Cir. 1996); E.E.O.C. v.

Dolgencorp, LLC, 899 F.3d 428, 435 (6th Cir. 2018); McMillan v. City of New

York, 711 F.3d 120, 129 (2d Cir. 2013).

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Yet courts and employment lawyers are conditioned to thinking of

causation as the difficult element to prove in discrimination cases; it often is

the contested one in Title VII disparate treatment cases alleging race or sex

discrimination. And when causation is disputed, courts and lawyers

reflexively apply the burden shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp.

v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

McDonnell Douglas is the “kudzu” of employment law. Cf. Zadeh v.

Robinson, 902 F.3d 483, 498 (5th Cir. 2018) (Willett, J., concurring) (describing

the “kudzu-like creep” of qualified immunity law). More than 57,000 court

opinions have cited it. That’s more than 3 cases a day (including weekends and

holidays!) since the opinion was issued 45 years ago. Although courts keep

trying to trim back its invasion of those parts of employment law where it does

not belong—pleading standards, 2 jury instructions, 3 or appellate review of jury

verdicts, 4 for example—its dominance continues. 5 As the judge-created

doctrine has been widely criticized for its inefficiency and unfairness even in

the space it is supposed to occupy 6—a tool for evaluating the sufficiency of

circumstantial evidence—we should not expand it beyond those bounds. 7

2 Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002) (reversing a district court’s

requirement that plaintiffs plead facts sufficient to raise an inference of discrimination under

McDonnell Douglas).

3 Walther v. Lone Star Gas Co., 952 F.2d 119, 127 (5th Cir. 1992) (explaining that a

jury should not be instructed using the McDonnell Douglas standard).

4 Stover v. Hattiesburg Pub. Sch. Dist., 549 F.3d 985, 993 (5th Cir. 2008) (noting that

in an appeal from a jury verdict, the appellate court’s focus is on whether the record supports

the jury’s finding of discrimination, “not on the plaintiff’s prima facie case or the McDonnell

Douglas framework”).

5 See generally Sandra F. Sperino, MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: THE MOST IMPORTANT

CASE IN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW (2018).

6 See Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 862–63 (7th Cir. 2012) (Wood, J., concurring);

Brady v. Office of Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 493–94 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J.);

D. Brock Hornby, Over Ruled, 21 GREEN BAG 2d 17, 22–26 (2017) (collecting extensive

judicial and academic criticism of McDonnell Douglas); Sperino, supra note 6, at 317–27.

7 McDonnell Douglas created the three-part framework to evaluate the evidence for a

bench trial, see Hornby, 21 GREEN BAG 2d. at 22–23 (citing 411 U.S. at 802), as the original

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I fear that is what is happening with the use of McDonnell Douglas to

prove discrimination in Nall’s case. To be sure, Nall also tried to prove

discrimination with direct evidence. But in doing so, he relied on the comments

of certain supervisors, which itself requires recourse to another complicated

multipart test. See Brown v. CSC Logic, Inc., 82 F.3d 651, 655 (5th Cir. 1996).

There is a simpler and more convincing direct evidence route. To use a

modern phrase, the firing “is what it is”: the railroad has all along

acknowledged that it fired Nall because of concerns about his Parkinson’s.

That’s discrimination on the basis of a disability. See Rizzo, 84 F.3d at 762

(explaining that the court did not need to “engage in the McDonnell Douglas

presumptions in order to infer discrimination” because the employer did “not

deny that [the employee] was removed from driving duties because of her

hearing impairment”); cf. Dolgencorp, LLC, 899 F.3d at 435 (explaining that

an employer’s neutral justification does not come into play when there is direct

evidence of disability discrimination). So, like many ADA cases, the hard issue

in this one is not whether there was discrimination but whether that

discrimination was justified.

Title VII did not grant a jury right (the 1991 Civil Rights Act added one, see 42 U.S.C.

§ 1981a(c)). See generally Beesley v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 717 F. Supp. 781, 782 (N.D. Ala.

1989) (explaining that after Title VII’s passage, judges in the South denied jury requests for

fear that juries would ignore the Civil Rights Act’s mandate); Vincenza G. Aversano, et al.,

Jury Trial Right Under Title VII: The Need for Judicial Reinterpretation, 6 CARDOZO L. REV.

613, 632–37 (1985) (suggesting that the drafters of Title VII omitted a jury right for fear that

juries in the South would not give black plaintiffs a fair hearing). The Supreme Court has

since endorsed its use in evaluating circumstantial evidence at the summary judgment stage

to decide whether a case gets to the jury. See, e.g., Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S.

Ct. 1338, 1355 (2015). At the same time, it has repeatedly admonished that the test was

“‘never intended to be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic.’” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512 (2002)

(quoting Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978)); St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v.

Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519, (1993) (quoting same); U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. Of Governors v. Aikens,

460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983) (quoting same).

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This case should be an example of why McDonnell Douglas is not the be-

all and end-all of proving discrimination. There are other ways, including that

the discrimination is obvious.

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JAMES C. HO, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

I applaud the panel majority for withdrawing its earlier opinion in this

matter (912 F.3d 263), for the reasons stated in footnote 6 of its revised opinion.

Although I would still affirm the district court for the case-specific evidentiary

reasons specified in my original dissent (but which are not independently

worthy of en banc review) (see id. at 279–83), the panel majority has now wisely

obviated the need for en banc rehearing in this case, by removing the process-

based theory of liability that animated its earlier opinion. There is no basis for

such a legal theory under the ADA, for reasons that need not be repeated

here—but are well articulated in the petition for en banc rehearing and the

persuasive amicus briefs filed by the Association of American Railroads, the

Center for Workplace Compliance, and the National Federation of Independent

Business (see also id. at 283–84).

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