The opinion
Supreme Court of Louisiana
FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE NEWS RELEASE #077
FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
The Opinion handed down on the 19th day of December, 2016, is as follows:
BY HUGHES, J.:
2012-KA-0508 STATE OF LOUISIANA v. JEFFREY CLARK (Parish of West Feliciana)
For the reasons assigned herein, the defendant’s conviction and
death sentence are affirmed. In the event this judgment becomes
final on direct review when either: (1) the defendant fails to
petition timely the United States Supreme Court for certiorari;
or (2) that Court denies his petition for certiorari; and either
(a) the defendant, having filed for and been denied certiorari,
fails to petition the United States Supreme Court timely, under
its prevailing rules, for rehearing of denial of certiorari; or
(b) that Court denies his petition for rehearing, the trial judge
shall, upon receiving notice from this court under LSA-C.Cr.P.
art. 923 of finality of direct appeal, and before signing the
warrant of execution, as provided by LSA-R.S. 15:567(B),
immediately notify the Louisiana Public Defender Board and
provide the Board with reasonable time in which: (1) to enroll
counsel to represent the defendant in any state post-conviction
proceedings, if appropriate, pursuant to its authority under LSA-
R.S. 15:178; and (2) to litigate expeditiously the claims raised
in that original application, if filed, in the state courts.
CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.
CRICHTON, J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons.
12/19/16
SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
NO. 2012-KA-0508
STATE OF LOUISIANA
VERSUS
JEFFREY CLARK
ON APPEAL
FROM THE TWENTIETH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
FOR THE PARISH OF WEST FELICIANA
HUGHES, J.
The defendant, Jeffrey Clark, and a number of fellow inmates incarcerated at
the Louisiana State Penitentiary in Angola, Louisiana (“Angola”) conspired to
escape from prison. In furtherance of that plot, on the evening of December 28,
1999, they smuggled improvised weapons into the Angola Camp D education
building, where various scheduled meetings and classes were taking place; there,
they launched an attack on the prison guards present, hoping to obtain keys
necessary to gain access to a nearby vehicle and to exit a secure access sally port to
leave the prison and escape to Canada. The escape attempt was thwarted when
prison officials discovered the disturbance and quickly surrounded the education
building. Captain David N. Knapps, who had been taken hostage by the inmates,
was bludgeoned and stabbed to death. Each inmate involved was tried separately,
and the defendant was convicted of the first degree murder of Captain Knapps (in
violation of LSA-R.S. 14:30) and sentenced to death.
On appeal to this court, pursuant to LSA-Const. Art. V, Sec. 5(D)(2), 1 the
defendant relies on thirty-seven assignments of error, contending his conviction
and sentence should be reversed. After a thorough review of the law and evidence,
we find no merit in any of the assignments of error. Therefore, we affirm the
defendant’s conviction and sentence.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On March 15, 2004 a West Feliciana Parish grand jury indicted Angola
inmate Jeffrey Clark and fellow inmates David Mathis, David Brown, Barry Edge,
and Robert Carley 2 for the December 28, 1999 first degree murder of Capt. Knapps
(in violation of LSA-R.S. 14:30), which occurred in the officers’ restroom of the
Angola Camp D education building.
In July and August of 2004, respectively, the State notified the defendant
that it intended to seek the death penalty and would rely on eight aggravating
circumstances: 3 (1) the perpetration or attempted perpetration of the aggravated
kidnapping of Lieutenant Douglas Chaney and Sergeant Reddia Walker; (2) the
perpetration or attempted perpetration of an aggravated escape; (3) the victim was
a peace officer engaged in his lawful duties; (4) the offender has been previously
convicted of an unrelated murder; (5) the offender created a risk of death or great
bodily harm to more than one person; (6) the offender was imprisoned for the
commission of an unrelated forcible felony at the time of commission of the
offense; (7) the offense was committed in an especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel
1
Article V, Section 5(D) provides, in pertinent part: “[A] case shall be appealable to the
supreme court if . . . the defendant has been convicted of a capital offense and a penalty of death
actually has been imposed.”
2
These five defendants have come to be referred to as the “Angola 5.” A sixth inmate, Joel
Durham, was also involved but he was shot and killed on the night of the incident, during the
rescue of hostage Sergeant Reddia Walker. Mathis was also shot when he and Durham refused
to surrender. A seventh inmate, Robert Cooper, was involved in the escape attempt but was not
charged with the murder or any other crime, though he was the subject of a subsequent DOC
disciplinary action.
3
See LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 905.4(A)(1)-(4), (6), (7), and (9).
2
manner; and (8) the victim was a correctional officer who, in the normal course of
his employment was required to come in close contact with persons incarcerated in
a state prison facility, and the victim was engaged in his lawful duties at the time of
the offense.
On February 5, 2010 the State amended the indictment to charge the co-
defendants as principals. It also amended the list of aggravating circumstances on
which it intended to rely from eight to four.
Although the trial court addressed a majority of pretrial matters in a
consolidated manner, 4 each co-defendant’s trial was held separately. 5 The
defendant was the first to go to trial in July of 2010. The trial court declared a
mistrial because, during the guilt phase opening statements, the State referenced
the fact that the defendant was already serving a life sentence.6 The court of
appeal disagreed, but this court reversed and reinstated the trial court’s ruling.
State v. Clark, 10-1676 (La. 7/17/10), 39 So.3d 594.
On April 27, 2011, the day before jury selection was set to commence in the
defendant’s second trial, the defendant sought to represent himself in certain
aspects of his trial with the assistance of his appointed attorneys. After the trial
4
These pretrial motions were presided over, variously, by the Honorable George H. Ware, Jr.,
Judge, Division A; the Honorable Dennis J. Waldron, Judge Ad Hoc; and the Honorable Jerome
M. Winsberg, Judge Ad Hoc.
5
Mathis pled guilty and received a life sentence. Carley and Edge were found guilty as charged
and received life sentences, as neither of these defendants’ jury voted unanimously to impose the
death penalty. Brown’s jury found him guilty as charged and imposed the death penalty. The
trial court granted a motion for new trial as to Brown’s penalty phase, however, because it found
the State withheld Brady material, under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10
L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). The court of appeal reversed, and this court denied writs. State v. Brown,
15-2001 (La. 2/19/16), 184 So.3d 1265 (wherein this court concluded that the withheld
statements of an uninvolved inmate, inculpating Edge and Clark as the inmates who decided to
kill Capt. Knapps, based on the inmate’s conversations with Edge, did not constitute Brady
material as to Brown and provided no evidence regarding which inmates actually killed Capt.
Knapps), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S.Ct. 2489, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (2016). The defendant’s
jury did not hear this evidence.
6
The Honorable Dennis J. Waldron, Judge Ad Hoc, presided over the July 2010 trial.
3
court conducted extensive Faretta 7 colloquies with the defendant and his counsel,
the defendant ultimately gave the opening and closing statements and questioned
numerous fact witnesses during the guilt phase of his trial. 8 The record reflects
that the defendant’s appointed attorneys provided assistance with these tasks.
Under the defendant’s direction, as lead counsel, his appointed attorneys conducted
the penalty phase qualification and general voir dire and questioned all of the
expert witnesses during the guilt phase. The defendant waived his right to self-
representation during the penalty phase.
Jury selection commenced on April 28, 2011 and concluded May 6, 2011.9
Twelve jurors and four alternates were selected.
The State and the defendant gave opening statements on May 7, 2011. The
State described how it believed the crime occurred, summarized the evidence it
would present, explained how that evidence established the elements of the crime,
and discussed the conditions of employment and confinement at Angola. The State
conceded that the jury would “never . . . know which inmate wielded which
weapon inside that bathroom.” The defendant’s opening statement to the jury
stressed the State’s lack of evidence tying him to Capt. Knapps’ murder and lack of
evidence of his specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, as well as issues
related to crime scene contamination, the failure to properly collect evidence from
the crime scene, bias among the State’s witnesses, and correctional officer
misconduct by abusing inmates in securing control of the education building and
investigating the crime.
7
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975).
8
The Honorable Jerome M. Winsberg, Judge Ad Hoc, presided over the defendant’s second trial.
9
The jury venire was comprised of residents from St. Tammany Parish because the trial court
granted the co-defendants’ motion to change venue with respect to jury selection due to the
extensive ties between the residents of West Feliciana Parish and Angola.
4
During the guilt phase, the State presented the testimony of thirty-three lay
and expert witnesses, and the defense called twelve witnesses. Much of the
testimony focused on whether Angola’s tactical team used excessive force in
retaking control of the education building and whether correctional officers abused
inmates in the days that followed Capt. Knapps’ death. The jury also visited the
crime scene.
This case is unusually complex, given the number of inmates and
correctional officers involved in the events leading up to the foiled escape attempt,
the murder of Capt. Knapps, the various locations at which these events unfolded,
the extended time frame over which these events occurred, the co-defendants’
control of the crime scene and evidence prior to the correctional officers regaining
control, and the volume and variety of peripheral issues that have arisen over the
course of the succeeding two decades. A summary of the evidence heard by the
jury follows.
In October of 1999 inmate Joel Durham approached inmate Doyle Billiot
about joining a plan to escape Angola, which included inmates Carley, Edge,
Mathis, and Brown. Billiot learned the inmates planned to execute their escape
plan during evening call-outs in the Camp D education building on December 28,
1999, and the defendant had agreed to join the escape team. The addition of the
defendant to the plot coincided with circumstances that had led him to believe his
goal of becoming a trustee in January or February of 2000 was unlikely, which
upset him and had made him amenable to the escape plot. The defendant’s
position in an inmate social organization rendered it possible for him to list the
participating inmates on the “call-out sheet” for that night so they could access the
various rooms in the education building, thus furthering the escape plans.
According to the defendant’s initial statements to investigators, the inmates’
plan was to target correctional officers unlikely to fight back (such as those nearing
5
retirement, like Lieutenants Charles Cockerham and Douglas Chaney, or female
officers, like Sergeant Reddia Walker) or those allegedly involved in mistreating
inmates housed on Angola’s most restrictive confinement tier in Camp J (such as
Lieutenant David Ross). The inmates also needed to target a correctional officer
with the rank of captain in order to acquire the keys necessary to execute their
plan. After handcuffing the targeted officers and taking their keys, radios, and
parts of their uniforms, the inmates planned to exit the Camp D sally port, take a
car parked nearby, travel via a dirt road off Angola grounds, which some of the
involved inmates had identified while on a “blade” crew, and then proceed to
Tylertown, Mississippi, where they would obtain food, money, and an eighteen-
wheeler before heading to Canada. If escape proved impossible, they would seek
transfer to federal prison or die.
Apparently the inmates were inspired by an incident, earlier in the month, in
which federal Cuban detainees, housed in a St. Martinville, Louisiana facility, held
correctional officers hostage over the course of several days and successfully
negotiated their release via federal and state negotiators.10 Angola officials,
however, maintained, and trained for, a strict no-negotiation policy.
On December 28, 1999 Carley, Durham, Edge, Mathis, and the defendant
attended the AA/NA meeting call-out in “Classroom One” of the Camp D
education building.11 Brown was on call-out for an inmate-led legal class 12 in
10
The handling of the St. Martinville hostage situation raised serious concerns within the
Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections. Angola Warden Burl Cain had
predicted that inmates at some correctional facility would act soon after the St. Martinville
incident because the St. Martinville inmates had been successful.
11
Uninvolved inmates attending the AA/NA call-out included Jonah Menard, Brian Johns, John
Daniels, Donald Williamson, Joel Miller, and Henry Hadwin. Inmate Robert Cooper was also on
AA/NA call-out. Daniels, Johns, and Miller testified during the trial on the defendant’s behalf.
12
Inmate Alvin Loyd led the legal class, and inmates Eugene Jeanpierre, Gregory Rice, Vernon
Mitchell, Arthur Siedel, Gregory Wimberly, and Brown attended. Inmate Dennis Taylor later
joined some of the inmates on legal call-out. Loyd, Jeanpierre, and Taylor testified during the
State’s case in chief. The defendant called Wimberly to testify for the defense.
6
“Classroom Two.” Billiot stayed in his dorm, having decided not to participate in
the escape attempt. Several other uninvolved inmates were also present in the
education building attending the AA/NA meeting, legal call-out, and band practice
call-out. 13 In total, over twenty inmates were in the education building at some
point that evening.
Inmate Michael Robinson testified that he was working as an orderly that
night. His responsibilities included preparing the education building for the
evening call-outs and assisting correctional officers with distribution of snack trays
to diabetic inmates and of inmate property held in storage lockers in the “bundle”
rooms 14 of the Camp D education building. Early that evening, Robinson noticed
paper taped up over the glass window in the door to the education building. When
he went to remove the paper, he observed the defendant, Brown, Carley, Edge,
Mathis, and Durham in the hallway, and one of them told him not to worry about
the paper as he attempted to pull it down. According to Robinson, the defendant
and Brown also showed “great concern about where the captain, where the
lieutenant and everybody was at.”15
Sometime later, Robinson assisted Lt. Chaney with snack tray distribution.
Lt. Chaney entered the education building several times to access and return keys
to the nearby kitchen from one of the bundle rooms. When Lt. Chaney first
entered the education building at around 7:00 or 7:15 p.m., the defendant asked
13
Attendees of the band practice call-out included inmates Kenneth Edwards, Earl Lowe, Tyrone
Clofer, Mickey Lanerie, Michael Wardlaw, and Theodore Butler. Lowe, Clofer, and Wardlaw
were called to testify for the defense.
14
In general, “bundle” rooms functioned as storage areas at Angola. The dorm bundle room
contained bundles of inmate clothing and other personal items. The cell block bundle room
contained linens and other general supplies, as well as a desk and office supplies used by
correctional officers and overflow inmate items.
15
Robinson did not believe their excuse for needing to talk to Capt. Knapps (that Brown had a
headache), because the appropriate person regarding assistance with a minor medical concern
was a dorm sergeant.
7
him where Lt. Cockerham was, a question the defendant repeated about forty-five
minutes later.
As Lt. Chaney re-entered the education building, Robinson observed Capt.
Knapps enter the building, walk down the hallway past Brown, and toward the
defendant, who was standing near the officers’ restroom at the far end of the
hallway. 16 When Lt. Chaney took longer than usual to rejoin Robinson on the
walkway outside the education building, Robinson entered the building to check on
him and saw Lt. Chaney’s keys hanging in the lock of the dorm bundle room door,
which alerted Robinson to the fact that something was wrong.17 Robinson forced
his way into the dorm bundle room and saw Lt. Chaney pinned to the floor with
one inmate at his feet and another near his head.18 One of the inmates came after
Robinson, but Robinson escaped and ran toward the security booth on the
walkway, with several other fleeing inmates, to tell Sgt. Walker that inmates were
jumping Lt. Chaney and that she needed to hit her beeper. Ignoring the suggestion
to hit her beeper, which would have alerted other officers of a security problem,
Sgt. Walker immediately went to check on Capt. Knapps and Lt. Chaney. 19
16
Other inmates were also on the hallway. On cross-examination, Robinson admitted he did not
mention the defendant was at the end of the hallway near the officers’ restroom when Capt.
Knapps entered the education building, in his December 30, 1999 statement to investigators.
Robinson also confirmed that he did not see the defendant involved in the kidnapping of Lt.
Chaney and Sgt. Walker, and he never saw the defendant with a weapon. This appears to have
been one of the last times anyone not involved in the crime saw Capt. Knapps alive.
17
On cross-examination, Robinson stated he did not see the defendant in the hallway when he
went to check on Lt. Chaney.
18
Robinson identified Brown as the inmate at Lt. Chaney’s head and Durham as the inmate at his
feet. However, on cross-examination, Robinson admitted he had mistakenly identified Edge,
instead of Durham, as one of Lt. Chaney’s attackers in his December 30, 1999 statement to
investigators. Robinson also appears to have been mistaken about the second inmate attacker.
Lt. Chaney testified, in his December 1, 2004 deposition, that Mathis and Durham were the
inmates who initially attacked him. In a handwritten statement prepared on December 30, 1999,
Lt. Chaney described his initial attackers as “two white inmates” and stated the inmate who went
after Robinson was white. Brown is black and the rest of the co-defendants, including Durham,
are white.
19
Inmate Jeanpierre’s testimony corroborated Robinson’s account. Jeanpierre testified he and
inmates Rice, Mitchell, and Siedel fled the legal class call-out at the same time Robinson fled
from Lt. Chaney’s attackers. Jeanpierre had heard keys shaking in the hallway outside
Classroom Two and believed something was wrong, based on the reactions of Rice and Mitchell,
8
Lt. Chaney had managed to get to the education building doorway before the
inmates pulled him back into the building and another inmate pushed Sgt. Walker
inside. Carley began ordering inmates fleeing from the legal class to return to the
education building. As Robinson ran to get help, he saw Cooper burying a shank
in the ground near the walkway. Robinson called out to the next officer he saw, Lt.
Cockerham, saying, “we need help, we need help down here,” but Robinson was
ignored. Robinson then ran toward the dorms and jumped a fence, knowing that he
was risking getting shot as he did so, in order to let an officer at the Camp D sally
port know that corrections officers in the education building were being attacked. 20
Lt. Chaney testified that Mathis and Durham pushed him into the dorm
bundle room, grabbed him around the neck, hit him all over, and wrestled his keys,
radio, and scissors away from him. He was able to get away from Durham when
Mathis tried to grab Robinson, but was soon overpowered, slammed to the floor of
the hallway, handcuffed, had a sock stuffed into his mouth, a coat thrown partially
over his head, and his shoelaces tied together.21 Although he was dizzy and had
blurred vision from his head injuries, Lt. Chaney could see Carley had blood on his
pants and held a homemade weapon consisting of half a pair of scissors. Some of
the involved inmates then dragged Lt. Chaney into Classroom One, where he heard
Sgt. Walker crying behind him and Edge telling some of the uninvolved inmates
who had looked into the hallway. He observed one inmate trying to block the exit door and
heard yelling in one of the bundle rooms. At some point, Jeanpierre warned Lt. Ross and Sgt.
Smith not to go into the education building. Once back at his dorm in Camp D, Falcon 4,
Jeanpierre watched out through a window and observed the tactical team retake the building. He
did not witness any inmate beatings on the walkway or the in the portions of the hallway that he
could see.
20
Thereafter, Robinson was treated for injuries he sustained in jumping the fence at the medical
treatment center, and he was then placed into lockup while investigators sorted out the details of
what happened. At no point was Robinson beaten, and he did not observe any inmate being
beaten or even complaining about beatings that night. On cross-examination, Robinson admitted
that he later complained about being harassed by inmates and security personnel alike for telling
the truth about what he saw on December 28, 1999.
21
On cross-examination, Lt. Chaney acknowledged that the involved inmates asked him to calm
down several times and informed him that they did not want to hurt him.
9
that he was sorry they gotten caught up in the failed escape plan and that Capt.
Knapps was badly injured. Carley entered Classroom One with several sets of
keys, a radio, and a weapon, threatening to kill Lt. Chaney if he did not help
identify certain keys, before Carley escorted Sgt. Walker out of Classroom One.
At some point, Brown or Durham came in with a mallet and placed it in a chair
near Edge who appeared to be guarding Lt. Chaney and the uninvolved inmate
hostages. At no point did the defendant bring water and a blanket or protect and
comfort Lt. Chaney as he later claimed. 22 Just before the tactical team stormed the
building, Lt. Chaney heard Brown come into Classroom One, hollering that
everyone was going to be killed.
Sgt. Walker testified that on December 28, 1999 she was assigned to the
medium gate guard shack, as security for the walkway between the Camp D
education building and the sally port. She became aware of an issue at around 8:20
p.m., when she observed several inmates running out of the education building,
including Robinson. As she approached the ramp to the entrance of the education
building, the door opened, and she observed Lt. Chaney holding an inmate she did
not know in a headlock. Someone pushed her from behind into the building and
onto the floor of the hallway. Carley tied her shoelaces together, informing her she
was a hostage and the situation was “like St. Martinville” because the planned
escape had gone wrong. After Sgt. Walker realized her hands had not been tied,
she pressed her beeper, notifying security of the need for assistance in Camp D.
Carley attempted to intercept the call for assistance by stating into one of the
officers’ radio that the situation was under control; he then took Sgt. Walker’s
beeper from her and moved her to Classroom One, where Edge appeared to be
guarding several uninvolved inmates. Carley next brought in Lt. Chaney; the
22
Lt. Chaney testified that inmate Hadwin gave him water, held his hand, and tried to comfort
him.
10
defendant then entered the classroom. It did not appear to Sgt. Walker that Edge or
anyone else was limiting the defendant’s ability to go anywhere or do what he
wanted. While in Classroom One, the defendant informed Sgt. Walker that he was
not going to hurt her, but he wanted to talk to the Attorney General, stating his
belief that they were going to die. The defendant also requested Sgt. Walker, if she
got out alive, to call and tell his mother that he loved her, he was sorry, and he did
not want to be buried at Angola. The defendant then left Classroom One without
anyone attempting to stop him.
Inmate Hadwin tried to comfort and pray with Sgt. Walker before Carley
returned with a large ice pick-like shank in his bloody hands. Carley held the
shank to Sgt. Walker’s throat and forced her to leave Classroom One and go into
the cell block bundle room, where the defendant was looking through Angola’s
telephone directory and Brown was holding a telephone. They asked her how to
get an outside line, and she was responding that she did not know when the phone
rang. As Brown was speaking to the caller (who was obviously an Angola
official), the defendant told Brown to say, “We need to talk to an Attorney General
and then we need an outside line,” which Brown relayed to the caller. Carley,
Mathis, and Durham entered the cell block bundle room, and the inmates began
talking about dying. Then, a telephone number was broadcast across the radio
system. Brown dialed the number, and the defendant told him to repeat their
demand to speak to the Attorney General and for an outside line.23 When Carley
held the shank to Sgt. Walker’s throat again and told her to get on the phone to tell
Angola personnel she was okay, she complied. The defendant did nothing to
interfere with Carley’s threatening behavior, and he informed Sgt. Walker that they
23
Warden Cain testified that he spoke on the phone with one of the hostage-takers, who
demanded to be allowed to contact the FBI or the Justice Department. In response, Warden Cain
told the inmate that he was in charge and that the hostage-takers would not be talking to anyone
else.
11
could not let her go when she asked him to release her. Sgt. Walker also observed
that Mathis had a weapon made from scissors and Durham had a weapon made
from a metal door hinge arm.
Sgt. Walker further testified that when the phone rang again, Brown
answered. After hearing it was Warden Cain, the defendant stated they were all
going to die and expressed his desire to return to his dorm. All the involved
inmates indicated their unwillingness to serve time in Angola’s restrictive
confinement tier at Camp J, and Mathis and Durham made clear they would rather
die than be confined at Camp J. As the defendant told the others that they needed
to change their clothing and left the bundle room, Sgt. Walker noticed blood on the
defendant’s grey sweatshirt. 24 When the defendant returned wearing a different
grey sweatshirt, he wrote a note to his mother and placed it in Sgt. Walker’s
pocket. The defendant then left Sgt. Walker with Durham and Mathis. She
testified that the defendant did not make either inmate promise not to harm her
before he left, as he later claimed.
Sgt. Walker next heard Warden Cain enter the building and present an
amnesty (with no-consequences) note that the involved inmates could sign. She
heard Carley respond, “You-all aren’t going to let us go back to no dorms after you
see what we did.” Shortly thereafter, she heard Mathis and Durham reaffirm their
commitment to die rather than go to Camp J; then she heard shots and saw them on
the floor. Sgt. Walker was taken to the infirmary and, later that evening and on
December 30, 1999, she provided statements to investigators.
24
On cross-examination, Sergeant Walker admitted that she had not mentioned, in prior
testimony or statements, this exchange with the defendant or the fact that she observed blood on
the defendant’s grey sweatshirt before he replaced it with a cleaner sweatshirt. She stated that no
one had asked her about those specific aspects of the night, explaining that her initial two-and-a
half page handwritten statement was not complete and she had only answered the questions
asked in her prior testimony.
12
Former inmate Dennis Taylor testified 25 that he was with Lt. Cockerham and
another correctional officer when they observed inmates running on the walkway
and Sgt. Walker missing from her post. Taylor recalled his concern for his half-
brother, inmate Gregory Wimberly, who was inside, prompting Taylor to enter the
education building. He saw Durham and Carley and a discharged fire extinguisher
in the hallway. He also observed Lt. Chaney and Sgt. Walker on the floor in
Classroom One, with one black and one white inmate beating Lt. Chaney; he went
to the legal aid office to find out what was going on and decided to try to leave the
building. When he re-entered the hallway, he saw the defendant, Brown, Durham,
Mathis, and Carley. The exit door was locked, but Brown offered him the keys to
unlock it, which Taylor refused to touch. Brown and Mathis also had radios, and
Durham had another set of keys.
Taylor testified that the defendant, Durham, Mathis, and Carley had blood
on their clothing. Specifically, Taylor observed what appeared to be blood on the
defendant’s hooded sweatshirt, down the side of his pants, and on his hands.
Taylor also saw what he thought was a weapon in the defendant’s hand and spots
of blood in the hallway near the inmates’ restroom door. On cross-examination,
the defendant elicited testimony from Taylor about his reluctance to testify, a threat
regarding his incarceration if he failed to do so, and his 2005 brain surgery to
remove a tumor, which left him with memory damage. Taylor also admitted the
item he saw in the defendant’s hand could possibly have been a 2.5 x .5 inch
metallic cross that some inmates carry. 26
25
Taylor served twenty-eight years for armed robbery and while in Angola, he served as an
inmate counsel.
26
We note that there is no indication in the trial court record that anyone recovered a metal cross
from the defendant, any other inmate, or the crime scene. Further, although Taylor indicated that
he saw what appeared to be blood on the defendant’s “hooded” sweatshirt, the totality of the
evidence presented at trial indicated that, at some point after the victim’s blood was deposited on
the defendant’s denim jacket and sweatshirt, which had no hood, he changed into a different and
cleaner jacket and sweatshirt, which had a hood (though he continued to wear the same dark-
colored pants, which were saturated with blood). Thus, Taylor’s assertion that the defendant’s
13
Deputy Warden Vannoy testified that he was one of the first officers to
respond to the hostage situation that evening, and he initiated telephone contact
with the involved inmates before Warden Cain arrived. Warden Vannoy spoke
first with Carley, who he described as “very upset.” Warden Vannoy also stated
that Carley demanded to be allowed contact with the FBI and the U.S. Attorney in
Baton Rouge, and he threatened to kill the hostages if security approached the
education building. At the time, Carley informed Warden Vannoy that no one was
hurt and allowed him to speak with Sgt. Walker briefly. Warden Vannoy also
spoke with Durham and Brown, both of whom made similar demands and threats.
Warden Vannoy recalled that he was the first person to speak with Carley in
person, after some of the involved inmates, including the defendant, opened the
education building door and surrendered. On the walkway, Carley informed
Warden Vannoy that Capt. Knapps was in the officers’ restroom “seriously injured
and possibly dead.” Warden Vannoy yelled to Richard Stalder, then-Secretary of
the Department of Public Safety and Corrections, to check the restroom. Warden
Vannoy also testified that the defendant spoke to him on the walkway, after he
surrendered, stating, “All I ever wanted to be was a trustee.” After the building
was secure, Deputy Warden Vannoy’s supervisor, Deputy Warden Paul Perkins,
instructed him to pick up Capt. Knapps’ sister, Caroline Whitstine, from another
Angola building where she worked and to inform Capt. Knapps’ mother of her
son’s death.
Former Secretary Stalder testified about his participation in efforts to rescue
the hostages and retake the Camp D education building. When he arrived at
Angola, Warden Cain, as well as Deputy Wardens Vannoy, Perkins, and Jimmy
“hooded” sweatshirt appeared to have blood on it may not have been accurate; however, in light
of Taylor’s indication that his brain tumor and 2005 surgery left him with some memory
impairment and other evidence on the issue, the discrepancy in Taylor’s testimony is not
significant.
14
Johnson, were already staged at the education building door with tactical team
support surrounding the building. Secretary Stalder testified that the defendant
was the first inmate to leave the building, followed by Carley and Brown.27 While
Warden Cain stopped in the hallway next to the dorm bundle room with Sgt.
Walker, Mathis, and Durham inside, Secretary Stalder proceeded to Classroom
One with Deputy Wardens Perkins and Johnson to rescue Lt. Chaney. After
securing Lt. Chaney’s release, they went down the hallway and discovered Capt.
Knapps’ body in the officers’ restroom. Secretary Stalder signaled to Warden Cain
the urgent need to rescue Sgt. Walker. The tactical team deployed a flash grenade,
rescued Sgt. Walker from Mathis and Durham, and regained control of the
education building.
Deputy Warden Perkins’ testimony verified that of Secretary Stalder.
Warden Perkins further testified that he entered the restroom to “get a good look at
[Capt. Knapps],” who he said was “unrecognizable” due to his injuries, even
though he and Capt. Knapps had grown up together.28
Immediately after regaining control of the education building, corrections
officials considered all inmates in the building as suspects and, as they had been
trained, used the force necessary to regain control, searched the inmates for
additional weapons, and lined them up in a submissive position (i.e., on knees with
27
Other witnesses consistently testified that inmate Carley left the building first and informed
Warden Vannoy of Capt. Knapps’ condition and location, while Brown and the defendant exited
the education building after signing Warden Cain’s amnesty note.
28
Former Camp D Colonel Charles Stewart also testified about efforts to retake the education
building on December 28, 1999. Col. Stewart stated that he talked to an unknown inmate on the
telephone (believed to be the defendant, based on a subsequent statement by the defendant) and
entered the building when Carley, Brown, and the defendant opened the door. He recalled
Brown patted him down in front of Warden Cain and the rest of the initial response team
entering the building, while the defendant was agitated, pacing in circles and saying “You-all
going to kill me. They going to kill me. We have f’ed up, and you-all are going to kill me.” On
cross-examination, Col. Stewart acknowledged that he had not mentioned the defendant’s
alleged statements in any prior statement or testimony. In addition, Col. Stewart could not
identify the defendant in the courtroom initially, though he was able to identify the defendant’s
December 28, 1999 photograph and he did recognize the defendant when the defendant began to
cross-examine him.
15
wrists cuffed behind the back, legs crossed, and head against the hallway wall)
until investigators and crime lab technicians could photograph them, collect their
clothing and shoes, and take samples from their hands of suspected blood stains.
Warden Cain’s testimony corroborated the testimony of the other officials.
He also explained that his goal, prior to regaining access to the education building,
was to have the involved inmates open the education building door themselves to
avoid the additional time and increased risk to the hostages required to blow open a
door or wall and overcome whatever internal barricades the hostage-takers may
have erected. Warden Cain achieved this goal by agreeing to personally write and
deliver an amnesty note for the involved inmates to sign when they surrendered,
which were to be effective on the provision that no one had been hurt. 29 Carley
opened and ran out the door toward Warden Vannoy, while Warden Cain had
Brown and the defendant sign the amnesty note on the stack of large metal locker
boxes partially blocking the doorway before allowing them to leave.
As Warden Cain was trying to convince Mathis and Durham to give up and
release Sgt. Walker from the bundle room, Durham said, “You haven’t looked in
the bathroom yet.” When Secretary Stalder confirmed the inmates had killed Capt.
Knapps, Warden Cain decided to rescue Sgt. Walker with force. After setting off a
flash grenade, Colonel Joe Norwood and Captain Russell Bordelon, who
functioned as trained snipers on the tactical team, opened the bundle room door.
Col. Norwood testified that he observed, through the crack in the door hinge,
Durham standing over Sgt. Walker with a shiny weapon in his hand, and he shot
Durham twice in the chest through the crack; he also fired another couple of shots
29
The amnesty note stated, “No harm or charges or [disciplinary board] reports will be written
nor any official document of this event be recorded.” The signatures of Warden Cain, David
Brown, and the defendant appear on the amnesty note. Warden Cain testified that he personally
observed the defendant sign the amnesty note, though as pointed out during Warden Cain’s
cross-examination the defendant’s first name appears to have been written as “Jeffery,” rather
than the correct spelling of “Jeffrey.”
16
when Durham continued to move towards Sgt. Walker. Capt. Bordelon, who
testified at the suppression hearings but not at the defendant’s trial, stated that he
shot Mathis in the face as Mathis came toward the Angola personnel in the
doorway. Durham died, but Mathis survived.
Retired Colonel Darren Bordelon, who was a lieutenant colonel at the time
of the 1999 incident, testified that he was part of the Angola restraint team and
assisted in securing and clearing out the call-out rooms after the education building
was retaken. Col. Bordelon explained that the team’s training required security
personnel to consider all inmates as suspects and to use the force necessary to take
down an inmate who failed to comply with an order to get on the floor, before
being searched for weapons and restrained. Col. Bordelon testified that most of the
inmates complied, but a few did not and sustained injuries. Col. Bordelon also
testified that he came into contact with the defendant that evening near the
“medium gate,” outside of the education building at around 2:30 a.m.; he described
their conversation as follows:
I asked him, if I was to walk in the building that night, what would
have happened to me? And he said the same thing would have
happened to me. He said they would have took care of me like they
took care of Captain Knapps . . . . [H]e said they would take me down
the same way that they took down Captain Knapps.
Col. Bordelon also observed Capt. Knapps in the officers’ restroom while
medics were trying to save him, noting Capt. Knapps’ “condition was terrible” and
“[h]is face was almost unrecognizable” because “the top of his head looked like a
bowl because they beat him.”
Lieutenant Colonel Chad Oubre, who was a sergeant in 1999, testified that
he transported several inmates, including the defendant, from Camp D via transport
bus to new housing locations, following initial processing by crime lab technicians.
During the transport of the defendant to Camp J, Lt. Col. Oubre heard the
defendant spontaneously and repeatedly state that he planned to turn State’s
17
evidence. Lt. Col. Oubre also stated that he did not observe anyone beating the
defendant near the transport bus. On cross-examination, however, the defendant
was able to show that Lt. Col. Oubre’s testimony, in which he claimed he never
entered the education building that evening and did not see any inmates until they
got on the bus, was inconsistent with a prior statement given on August 3, 2005.
Pat Lane of the Louisiana State Police Crime Lab, a stipulated expert in
crime scene investigation and reconstruction and bloodstain pattern interpretation,
testified that he and co-worker Alejandro Vara arrived at the Camp D education
building at around midnight, spoke with investigators from the West Feliciana
Parish Sheriff’s Office (“WFPSO”), Angola, and the State Police and began
processing the crime scene. Mr. Lane explained that he and Mr. Vara walked
through the crime scene to assess what needed to be done, processed the inmates
individually, and collected additional evidence, including clothing and weapons
located throughout and around the education building.30 They also photographed
and videotaped various bloodstain types as well as bloody finger, palm, and shoe
prints found in the officers’ restroom, as well as photographed Capt. Knapps’ body
during the autopsy.
Inmate processing included photographing each inmate present in the
education building, having them remove their clothing and place it in individually
marked brown paper bags, examining their bodies for blood and collecting samples
where necessary, and providing them with prison jumpsuits so they could proceed
to speak with investigators. As to the defendant, Mr. Lane and Mr. Vara collected
30
Mr. Lane and Mr. Vara observed and/or recovered: a yellow plastic-headed mallet near a
cleaning bucket on the walkway outside the education building; bullet casings/impact markings,
the half pair of scissors, the door arm hinge, and locker boxes with broken tamper-indicating,
metallic tape from the dorm bundle room; the homemade shank with wooden handle and a
discarded blood-stained denim jacket in a garbage can from the cell block bundle room; another
yellow plastic-headed mallet, grey sweatshirt, white T-shirt, and black gloves from Classroom
One; and Capt. Knapps’ jacket from the hallway. State Police recovered and provided to Mr.
Lane three additional potential weapons (i.e., a U-shaped piece of metal, a chisel-type tool, and a
9-inch green-handled spatula).
18
two bags of clothing worn by the defendant at the time of processing,31 as well as
other clothing items found at the crime scene and later linked to the defendant;
they also swabbed his hands. Mr. Lane testified that the only fingerprints
recovered from the crime scene belonged to the victim. He made clear there was
no opportunity for Col. Bordelon or Lt. Ross to tamper with the defendant’s
collected clothing by placing Brown’s bloody sweatpants in one of the defendant’s
bags, as the defendant later claimed.
On cross-examination, Mr. Lane acknowledged that: the entire building was
the crime scene; inmates and security remained in and moved about the scene for
hours before processing commenced, including in the hallway where the attack on
Capt. Knapps likely started and in the officers’ restroom where he died; and
numerous items of evidence including weapons and clothing had been gathered
and provided to him without any indication of who collected it, when or where.
Mr. Lane also admitted at least one bag of inmate clothing (unrelated to the
defendant) had been mislabeled and clothing from all inmates was not collected at
the initial processing (including the clothing of Durham, Mathis, and Edge because
they were undergoing medical treatment). On redirect, Mr. Lane testified that none
of the alleged irregularities or oversights had any impact on the evidence linking
the defendant to the murder.
The testimony of Mr. Vara, Carolyn Booker, and George Schiro, who were
all stipulated as experts in forensic DNA analysis, corroborated the testimony of
Mr. Lane and further revealed the following:
• Clothing from involved and uninvolved inmates in the education building
that evening contained 692 bloodstains, and DNA testing was not performed
on each of those stains;
31
These items included a denim jacket, cut-off thermal underpants, white boxer shorts, grey
socks with red cuffs, white socks, white Reebok tennis shoes, jeans, grey sweat pants, and a grey
hooded zipper-front sweatshirt with pockets.
19
• With respect to the bloodstains on which Crime Lab technicians conducted
DNA testing, they found:
• Capt. Knapps’ blood on the shank and a denim jacket found in the
cell block bundle room; the white T-shirt and the mallet found in
Classroom One; and on the shoes, jeans, and sweatpants worn by
defendant at the time of processing;
• co-defendant Carley’s blood on the denim jacket collected from the
defendant at processing;
• the defendant’s blood on the socks and boxers collected from him at
processing;
• Capt. Knapps’ blood on Brown’s sock, white pants, and jeans,
Carley’s socks, long-john shirt, pants, and shoes, and Durham’s shoe
and jeans;
• the samples taken from bloodstains on the clothing of Edge and
Mathis matched only the wearer or another involved inmate, but not
the victim, although the copious amounts of blood from the wearer’s
injuries could have masked smaller amounts of the victim’s DNA;
and
• clothing worn by most of the uninvolved inmates at the time of
collection had bloodstains from various unknown sources on them,
and some of that clothing had bloodstains from known sources,
including items with the blood of an involved inmate on it (i.e., the
sweatshirt worn by inmate Brown at the time of processing had
Edge’s blood on it; a bloodstain from inmate Kenneth Edwards’
white hooded sweatshirt may have contained a blood mixture that
included Mathis’s blood), and some items had the victim’s blood on
them (i.e., the shirt worn by inmate Mickey Lanerie, the grey
sweatshirt worn by inmate Brian Johns, the dark grey sweatshirt and
shoes of inmate Taylor; and the sweatshirt worn by inmate John
Daniels).
• Swabs from the defendant’s hands contained a blood mixture consistent
with the DNA of Capt. Knapps and the defendant; 32 and
• The probability of the DNA found on the defendant’s jeans and sweatpants
and the grey sweatshirt linked to the defendant found in Classroom One
belonging to someone randomly selected other than Capt. Knapps was 1 in
17 trillion.
In addition, Alan Keel, another stipulated forensic DNA analysis expert,
whose private practice called for him to testify routinely in cases on behalf of both
the defense and the prosecution, conducted additional DNA testing on samples
32
On cross-examination, Ms. Booker admitted the mixture of blood on the defendant’s hands
could have gotten there when the defendant attempted to wash Capt. Knapps’ blood from the
first sweatshirt he wore, as claimed in his initial statement to investigators.
20
from several items of clothing to determine the habitual wearer of the items and
additional testing on weapons found at the crime scene. Mr. Keel testified that the
grey sweatshirt found in Classroom One had spatter stains of Capt. Knapps’ blood
on the front of it, a smear of Capt. Knapps’ blood on the inside of it, and a large
quantity of biological samples from areas known to be fertile with the habitual
wearer’s DNA (such as the collar, front waist hem, and outside front) that
contained the defendant’s DNA or low level mixtures containing higher levels of
the defendant’s DNA. 33 Mr. Keel further stated that the denim jacket found in the
cell block bundle room had the victim’s blood on the outside left front sleeve, the
defendant’s blood in a transfer stain on the inside, as well as Durham’s epithelial
cells on the front of it next to a rivet. 34 As to the tested weapons, sample levels
were too low to link the defendant to any weapon, although Mr. Keel confirmed
the victim’s blood was on the mallet and ice pick-like shank.
Dr. Alfredo Suarez conducted the autopsy of Capt. Knapps. Following a
stipulation as to his expertise in forensic pathology, he testified as follows
regarding Capt. Knapps’ injuries, before walking the jury through a limited number
of photographs of the injuries and linking those injuries to the recovered weapons:
This man sustained multiple and different injuries. The, the fatal
blows were in the head. He had several lacerations due to blunt
trauma that caused multiple fractures of the bones forming the skull,
the temporal, the left parietal, and the occipital. So there were at least
three blows to the head, heavy and with force, that one of the major
injuries was a depressed fracture. In other words, the bone was
inserted into the brain. And that’s a major blow to be able to fracture
a thick bone. And the bone ends up poking, if you will, into the brain.
In there that led to considerable hemorrhage inside the cranial cavity.
And that’s, that’s a fatal -- those were the fatal blows altogether.
In addition, there were puncture wounds. There were three
puncture wounds on the left lateral chest wall, one of which
33
Mr. Keel also testified that a stain on the inside of the back of the sweatshirt contained Edge’s
DNA.
34
In addition, the denim jacket had the names of four individuals written on it. None of them
appear to have been inmates present in the education building on the night of the attempted
escape and murder.
21
penetrated two inches into the spleen. The spleen is that organ that’s
on the left that’s very, very vascularized, so it bleeds quite a bit. And
that potentially could have been a fatal injury; however, the amount of
blood that I found in the abdomen, free in the belly, if you will, in the
abdomen, was not very abundant. It was only 50 ML. It’s like a pint
and a half maybe.
And the other two perforations didn’t injure any fatal structures,
no blood vessels and no organs.
There were defense wounds. There were defense wounds is
what we call the attempt from the victim to ward off the weapon. And
they sustain injuries to sometimes forearm, and, predominately in this
case, were the fingers. Those are so-called defense wounds.
There were other lacerations on the both shoulders, and the --
this man was hit pretty good in the perioral region, around the mouth.
Why? The, the maxillary teeth were loose and the prosthesis that he
had was out of mouth. And there were lacerations in both lips. So
that’s due to probably fist, punch him in the mouth. That’s basically
what he sustained.
* * *
. . . [T]here [were] superficial cuts, and there was a puncture
wound to the left neck that penetrated about two inches and produced
hemorrhage about the cervical esophagus. But that injury, although
with maybe a 5-degree angle, could have perforated both the carotid
artery and/or the internal jugular vein. But that particular wound
didn’t do that, so that’s not fatal.[35]
Dr. Suarez opined that, given the injuries and multiple weapons used, he suspected
more than one person was involved in the attack, and he noted that Capt. Knapps
likely sustained the puncture wounds to his torso after the fatal blows to his head.
The parties stipulated to the expertise of Colonel Timothy Scanlan of the
Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Office Crime Laboratory in the fields of crime scene
investigation, crime scene reconstruction, and bloodstain pattern analysis. Col.
Scanlan testified that he believed the inmates killed Capt. Knapps in the restroom,
rather than in the hallway or doorway, and he described the various types of
bloodstain patterns in the crime scene and on clothing and what they revealed to
him as a crime scene reconstructionist. Most notably, Col. Scanlan discussed the
implications of a takeaway print from the defendant’s notched left Reebok shoe in
the officer’s restroom, the blood spatter on the grey sweatshirt found in Classroom
35
On cross-examination, Dr. Suarez added some details, including that he believed the fatal blow
could have been any one of three heavy blows, two of which were delivered to the back of Capt.
Knapps’ head and one was to the front.
22
One linked to the defendant as the habitual wearer, and the blood spatter and
transfer patterns on the denim jacket found in the cell block bundle room also
linked to the defendant, which indicated the defendant was moving about the
restroom after Capt. Knapps sustained significant injury and was on top of the
victim or right next to him when Capt. Knapps sustained blows to previously
injured and bleeding areas of his body. Col. Scanlan testified that this evidence
was inconsistent with the defendant’s initial statements to investigators indicating
that Mathis, Carley, and Durham were the only ones with knowledge of what took
place in the officers’ restroom and that the defendant was unaware Capt. Knapps
was seriously hurt until after he was out of the education building on the walkway.
Col. Scanlan noted that, while the denim jacket and hooded, zippered, grey
sweatshirt with pockets, collected from the defendant during processing, did not
have the tell-tale spatter patterns, the defendant’s jeans had direct transfer blood
stains and blood spatter, indicative of dynamic bloodshed, and saturation stains
showing prolonged contact with active bleeding. The saturation was so significant
that the sweatpants worn under the defendant’s jeans had a secondary transfer
blood pattern in the corresponding location, and both the jeans and sweatpants
were soaked through with Capt. Knapps’ blood. Col. Scanlan also observed that
the small size of the blood spatter on clothing collected from or linked to the
defendant showed that the defendant was in “very close proximity” and “actively
involved.” While Col. Scanlan stated that he did not believe the initial attack took
place in the hallway, he acknowledged on cross-examination that the inmates’
control over the crime scene and reported efforts to clean the hallway may have
obscured that version of events, and he explained that his responsibility was to
reconstruct the crime scene with the physical evidence presented to him.
Major Randy Holden, formerly a WFPSO investigator, and State Trooper
Brad Cook conducted the initial interviews of Brown, Edge, and the defendant in
23
the early morning hours of December 29, 1999. Major Holden and Trooper Cook
testified that Major Holden advised the defendant of his rights and had the
defendant read and sign a waiver of rights form. Neither Major Holden nor
Trooper Cook inflicted, observed evidence of, or heard complaints about, abuse or
coercion of the defendant. 36 The defendant’s recorded statement commenced at
7:47 a.m., during which he informed officers that:
• On December 27, 1999, the defendant was informed of a pending unwanted
move in his housing location, which led him to believe his desire to become
a trustee in January or February 2000 was unlikely to happen, and he was
upset about this development (he said it “messed [him] up” when he realized
his chances to become a trustee appeared slim).
• Durham and Carley approached him about joining an escape plan about a
week before December 28, 1999, and they asked him to prepare a list of
inmates for the call-outs scheduled for that evening, which he did.
• The escape plan involved targeting correctional officers either close to
retirement or female (and therefore believed to be less likely to resist),37
tackling and handcuffing them, taking their uniforms, keys, and beepers, and
leaving them unharmed in one of the two bundle rooms in the education
building. From there, the inmates would exit the Camp D sally port, take
one of the cars parked near the sally port, drive off the property via a dirt
road, which had been observed by some of the involved inmates while
working a blade crew, proceed to Tylertown, Mississippi, to gather food,
money, and an eighteen-wheeler before heading to Canada.
• The defendant claimed he agreed to join the plan that evening and, despite
his claims of no intent or awareness of any intent to harm on anyone’s part,
he observed Edge with a mallet or hammer in his jacket and a shank up his
left sleeve, and the defendant knew 265-pound Brown was recruited to
handle the targeted officers physically.
• Planned targets Lieutenants Ross and Cockerham were not in the building,
and the involved inmates missed their initial chance to secure Lt. Chaney, so
when Capt. Knapps came in the education building to use the officers’
restroom, the inmates seized the opportunity. Specifically, the defendant
claimed Durham approached Capt. Knapps in the hallway, as Capt. Knapps
exited the restroom, and punched him, causing him to fall down near the
watercooler. The defendant stated that as Capt. Knapps struggled, Durham
36
In contrast, Major Holden and Trooper Cook observed that inmate Edge had some injuries
(i.e., bruising around an eye and a bloody nose) from the tactical team’s efforts to retake control
of the education building and inquired about them. Edge had apparently tried to blend in with
the uninvolved inmates and failed to comply with tactical team orders, thus sustaining injuries as
he was subdued; however, Edge received medical attention and thereafter confirmed his
willingness to proceed with the interview.
37
In a later statement, the defendant also admitted targeting at least one officer, Lt. Ross, who
had been previously involved in alleged mistreatment of one or more inmates on the Camp J tier,
which housed inmates under the most severe confinement restrictions. Lieutenants Cockerham
and Chaney fell into the close-to-retirement category of targeted officers, and Sergeant Walker is
female.
24
continued to hit him, and Edge approached with the mallet and hit Capt.
Knapps on the head several times.
• The defendant claimed that he and Brown approached to convince Capt.
Knapps to let them handcuff him when Capt. Knapps, then “bleeding bad”
from the head and his hands, grabbed the defendant around his legs. Brown
then dragged Capt. Knapps into the officers’ restroom by his pants cuffs.
• The defendant asserted that he saw Mathis, Carley, and Durham enter the
officers’ restroom as the defendant entered the inmates’ restroom, where the
defendant attempted to remove blood from his sweatshirt. He heard “kicking
noise” from the officers’ restroom next door.
• When the defendant’s attempts to rinse the blood off his sweatshirt proved
unsuccessful, he removed it and threw it in the waste basket in the inmates’
restroom, replacing it with a different sweatshirt from one of the bundle
rooms.
• By the time the defendant joined the other inmates, they had grabbed Lt.
Chaney and Sgt. Walker, and Edge was guarding them with a mallet in
Classroom One. Lt. Chaney appeared dazed as if he too had been beaten.
• The defendant claimed that he fetched water and blankets for the officers
and attempted to comfort Sgt. Walker by saying that no one would hurt her
and that he would protect her.
• The defendant stated that Carley and Mathis indicated security was aware of
the situation, so Carley, Mathis, and Durham started taping paper over the
small windows in the doors and discharging a fire extinguisher to create
confusion when security came inside. They also blocked one of the doors
into the education building with locker boxes from one of the bundle rooms.
• The defendant claimed that it was his idea to get on the telephone, demand
to speak with non-Angola authorities, and to surrender.
• The defendant described Sgt. Walker’s brief telephone conversation with
Warden Cain, his placing a note to his mother in Sgt. Walker’s pocket (in
which he apologized for his actions and asked not to be buried at Angola),
and his own telephone conversation with Col. Stewart before he, Brown, and
Carley surrendered to Warden Cain, as the tactical team commenced efforts
to rescue Lt. Chaney and Sgt. Walker and retake the building.
• The defendant claimed that he “had no idea” Capt. Knapps was “hurt . . . not
like that” in the officers’ restroom.
• At no point did the defendant claim that he was beaten or otherwise abused
by correctional officers before giving the statement.
Further, on December 29, 1999, Major Holden interviewed uninvolved
inmates Hadwin, Daniels, and Williamson, none of whom appeared injured or
complained of injuries. On December 30, 1999 Major Holden interviewed inmates
Rice, Jeanpierre, Mitchell, Billiot, Cooper, and Robinson, as well as Lt. Chaney
and Sgt. Walker. An arrest warrant was obtained by the State, on December 30,
1999, for the defendant, accusing him of the first degree murder of Capt. Knapps,
25
in violation of LSA-R.S. 14:30, and the aggravated kidnapping of Lt. Chaney and
Sgt. Walker, in violation of LSA-R.S. 14:44.
On January 3, 2000 the defendant gave a supplemental recorded statement to
Major Holden, WFPSO Chief Investigator Ivy Cutrer, Angola investigator Major
Warren Melancon, and Col. Donald Ray Davis, after signing another waiver of
rights form. The defendant confirmed, “I participated in an escape attempt that
resulted in Capt. Knapps’ death,” and “saw [Edge] hit Capt. Knapps in the head
with a yellow mallet or hammer out in the hallway . . . maybe four to six times . . .
maybe more.” The defendant reiterated his claim that Durham hit Capt. Knapps
first, and he added that Carley, Mathis, and Edge jumped on Capt. Knapps while
Capt. Knapps was down on the hallway floor. The defendant also attempted to
explain some of the physical evidence linking him to the murder. He stated that
when he and Brown approached, Capt. Knapps grabbed his legs and sweatshirt
before Brown pulled Capt. Knapps into the restroom. The defendant said he,
Brown, and Edge left, leaving Mathis, Carley, and Durham in the officers’
restroom with Capt. Knapps. The defendant claimed that he only saw Edge with a
mallet or hammer and Carley with the large ice pick-like shank. The defendant
also heard Capt. Knapps saying, “What are y’all doing,” and hollering, “Help me,
help me.” The defendant stated that he felt “partly responsible for” Capt. Knapps’
death, and he believed the law would hold him responsible because he did nothing
to stop it. The defendant also stated that he thought he would receive the death
penalty, and he planned to plead guilty for his family’s sake. The defendant made
no mention of any beating or abuse by investigators or correctional officers.
Nonetheless, on January 6, 2000, the defendant informed one of his
appointed attorneys, Burton Guidry, that correctional officers beat him on
numerous occasions with various types of riot batons and revealed extensive
bruising on his legs (on the upper front and sides of his thighs and on the lower
26
back of his thighs). Mr. Guidry photographed the injuries, and the photographs
were introduced into evidence. Stipulated expert witnesses in forensic pathology
and correctional investigations testified at trial that the defendant’s injuries were
not consistent with multiple beatings with riot batons in the early morning hours of
December 29, 1999, as claimed, and the injuries appeared to be self-inflicted.
Medical personnel from Angola also testified the defendant did not present injuries
from the alleged beatings to any staff members contemporaneously with the time
the defendant claimed his injuries were inflicted.
The jury also heard evidence of additional inculpatory statements made by
the defendant to authorities and other inmates. For example, on October 17, 2001,
the defendant wrote a thirteen-page letter to Deputy Warden Vannoy, seeking
assistance in negotiating a deal with the State in exchange for testimony and
identification of additional evidence located at the crime scene (even though the
defendant acknowledged in the letter that Warden Vannoy had no such authority
and the defendant’s appointed counsel remained on his case). In his letter to
Warden Vannoy, the defendant also claimed that his initial statements were “based
on half-truths” because he “feared for [his] life, due to the beatings and threats.”
The defendant asserted to Warden Vannoy that his other co-defendants all
“hung together” and “shared the same religious belief in Wicca,” which meant they
were not afraid of dying because of their belief in reincarnation. The inmates’ plan
in December, 1999 was to escape, be transferred to federal prison, or die. The
defendant admitted the other inmates “told [him] that they intended to kill Lt.
David Ross because he beat many inmates at Camp J, including their friend Jessie
Rogers.” When the inmates could not locate Lt. Ross, they killed Capt. Knapps
instead, reasoning they would then be taken seriously and somehow improve their
chances of transfer to federal prison by killing one guard but releasing the others.
When Warden Cain refused to negotiate, the inmates amended their plan, deciding
27
that if the only options were confinement at Camp J or death, they would kill the
officer hostages and die. Carley and Brown, however, surrendered. The defendant
claimed that he remained in the bundle room with Sgt. Walker to protect her, and
he left only after Durham promised not to injure her.
The defendant also wrote to Warden Vannoy that he had heard more details
related to Capt. Knapps’ death from rumors on the tier (i.e., that Carley had
instructed Edge to clean the blood from the hallway, while Carley, Brown, and
Durham went into the officers’ restroom and tried to beat Capt. Knapps into
disclosing Lt. Ross’s location; and that they later went back and stabbed Capt.
Knapps to death). The defendant offered to help authorities locate additional
evidence in the education building, including Carley’s bloody clothing and a
second knife-like weapon. The defendant also denied, in the letter, that he told
Col. Bordelon that “if [Col. Bordelon] would have come in the building that night
we would have taken him down like Knapps.” The defendant further claimed that
Col. Bordelon and Lt. Ross removed bloody sweatpants from a bag containing
Brown’s clothing and put them into a bag with the defendant’s clothing. The
defendant complained in the letter of multiple beatings, which coerced him to say
that he participated in the plan when he did not. The defendant also promised to
Warden Vannoy to testify at a civil trial (presumably the wrongful death case
brought by Durham’s heirs) that Durham was armed when security rescued Sgt.
Walker, and that Durham had demanded to be transferred to Hunt Correctional
Center and to be given a job as a trustee or as an inmate counsel.
The defendant added, in a postscript to the letter, a detailed description of
what most likely happened to Capt. Knapps in the officers’ restroom. Specifically,
the defendant stated that he knew Capt. Knapps crawled into the stall after Brown
dragged the captain into the officers’ restroom; and inmates Brown, Carley, and
Durham “beat [Capt. Knapps] until he passed out because he would not tell [them]
28
where Lt. Ross was.” 38 The defendant further detailed that Brown, Carley, and
Durham returned to the officers’ restroom, when the building was surrounded by
the Angola tactical team, to stab Capt. Knapps twice in the side and several times
in the head with the ice pick-like shank and in the chest with the half-scissors
blade. The defendant advised Deputy Warden Vannoy to confirm the accuracy of
this account from the autopsy report, and he claimed the other inmates informed
him of these details during their first weeks in Camp J.
In addition, inmate Christopher Shockley testified at the defendant’s trial
regarding the defendant’s jailhouse confession. Shockley and the defendant met in
2005, while serving time at Hunt Correctional Center. 39 In 2006 they discussed
Capt. Knapps’ death one morning. The defendant informed Shockley that Durham
had stabbed Capt. Knapps in the chest, and the defendant had hit Capt. Knapps in
the head with a mallet. Shockley also provided testimony about what he believed
were the defendant’s efforts to discredit his testimony about the jailhouse
confession. Although, on cross-examination, the defendant highlighted Shockley’s
numerous convictions and pending charges in this state and other jurisdictions,
Shockley maintained that the State had promised him nothing and his decision to
testify was motivated by the defendant’s attempts to “throw[] [him] under the bus.”
Inmate Alvin Loyd testified regarding the defendant’s efforts to obtain false
exculpatory testimony. Although Loyd was in the education building on the night
of the attempted escape and murder, he did not witness the attacks on Capt.
Knapps, Lt. Chaney, or Sgt. Walker because he was either in Classroom Two
38
Physical evidence and Col. Scanlan’s analysis thereof, which show latent fingerprints of Capt.
Knapps from the wall inside the stall and bloody fingerprint swipes of Capt. Knapps in the same
location, indicating someone dragged Capt. Knapps out of the stall into the open area of the
restroom, support this account.
39
Deputy Warden Vannoy had the defendant returned to Angola and housed on a restricted
confinement tier after learning the defendant had somehow been transferred to Hunt and
convinced Hunt personnel to place him on a working cell block.
29
teaching the legal class or in the law library across the hall from the officers’
restroom. Loyd was, however, aware of a commotion in the hallway because he
heard inmates running around, observed a smear of blood on the wall of the
hallway near the officers’ restroom when he went to the law library to place inmate
legal documents in a cabinet. Loyd also saw Robinson wrestle away from an
inmate who attacked him, as Loyd tried to leave the building. Loyd stated that he
returned to the law library to wait for security after Carley blocked his exit.
Nonetheless, in July 2010, just before the commencement of the defendant’s first
trial for Capt. Knapps’ murder, the defendant sent Loyd a fourteen-page,
handwritten document 40 detailing yet another version of events and seeking Loyd’s
testimony in support of that version.41 In this version, the defendant claimed that
he was never part of the escape plan, that he actively sought to prevent the attack
on Capt. Knapps by interfering with Edge and Carley’s efforts to hit Capt. Knapps
on the head with a mallet, that he stayed with Sgt. Walker to protect her throughout
the ordeal until he left the building, and that he never signed Warden Cain’s
amnesty note.
After the State rested, the defendant called numerous witnesses, the bulk of
whom were uninvolved inmates who provided testimony consistent with that
presented at pre-trial motion to suppress hearings regarding alleged correctional
40
The defendant’s fourteen-page document to Loyd was comprised of a six-page letter to Loyd,
with a new version of events, and an eight-page questionnaire guiding Loyd through the
testimony the defendant wanted him to provide. The defendant’s letter also stated that the
defendant wanted Loyd to tell the truth. However, the method by which the defendant sent the
letter to Loyd was apparently designed to avoid detection and review by Angola authorities. The
defendant addressed the envelope to a non-existent “attorney” in Baton Rouge, marked it “Legal
Mail,” and the return address on the envelope was the address belonging to Loyd. Angola
personnel returned the envelope to Loyd without opening it, believing it to be an attorney-client,
privileged communication. The defendant stipulated that he wrote the document.
41
The defendant likely sought out Loyd’s assistance for several reasons. First, he was an inmate
counsel and might be considered a more credible witness than other inmates. Second, Loyd did
not give a statement to investigators in the days following the murder, due to injuries sustained in
the tactical team takeover, and therefore Loyd could not be confronted with a prior conflicting
account. Loyd did provide some testimony, however, at the 2008 evidentiary hearings on the
motions to suppress uninvolved inmate and co-defendant statements.
30
officer brutality. 42 In addition, the defendant called Durham’s former fiancée,
Carmen Fielder, who testified that Durham’s autopsy and the media accounts of
Durham’s death were inconsistent; she further testified that she was surprised
when: Angola cremated Durham’s body, without consent, while Durham’s father
was deciding whether to seek a second autopsy; that the paperwork related to
Durham’s cremation appeared to be backdated; and that Angola personnel would
not tell her who ordered the cremation.
The defendant’s former defense counsel, Burton Guidry, was called to
testify regarding the photographs taken on January 6, 2000 of the defendant’s
injuries, allegedly incurred on the evening of the attempted escape and murder, and
regarding his (Mr. Guidry’s) role in Durham’s wrongful death suit, which
prompted his dismissal as a member of the defendant’s initially-appointed defense
team because of the likelihood of conflict.
The defendant’s last witness was Jeff Scozzafava, a stipulated expert in
crime scene investigation and reconstruction and bloodstain pattern interpretation.
Mr. Scozzafava disagreed with what he characterized as Col. Scanlan’s
42
Inmate Wimberly claimed that he was kicked in the face, lost two teeth, received medical
treatment, and ultimately received a settlement in a federal lawsuit. Inmate Daniels claimed that
he was hit and kicked in the education building, that he was hit on the bus, that he was beaten
and abused at Camp C, and that he received a settlement in a federal lawsuit; he also recognized
the defendant as one of the inmates running up and down the education building hallway with
Carley, Mathis, Durham, and Edge. Former inmate Miller stated that he was not beaten, that he
did not see anyone beaten, and that he did not participate in the federal lawsuit. Former inmate
Johns testified that he was beaten repeatedly throughout the night of the attempted escape and
murder and that he received a settlement in a federal lawsuit; he also claimed - inconsistently
with all versions proffered by the defendant - that the defendant was with him in Classroom One
the entire night until Carley removed Sgt. Walker at shank-point. Inmate Lowe told the
defendant during his testimony, “I got attacked from something you-guys were trying to pull-off,
brother . . . . I’m really getting upset right now. I’m just being honest with you . . . . Because I
had mad love for Capt. Knapps. I wouldn’t have never done the man that way.” Inmate Lowe
also informed the jury that Capt. Knapps would occasionally play with the inmate band and had
previously given inmate Lanerie a guitar; he also stated that he saw the defendant and two other
white inmates retrieve items from an unlocked file cabinet in the band room at some point, and
he heard Brown inform the band members, “We done took over the building. I got Knapp [sic]
in the bathroom . . . . I knocked his pu**y a** out.” Inmate Wardlaw stated that he was beaten
and kicked during the initial tactical team entry into the education building, and he was hit a few
times on the walkway to the bus. Inmate Clofer claimed that he was hit on the walkway and that
he received a settlement in the federal lawsuit; he also claimed that he saw the defendant get
punched and kicked near the bus.
31
overreaching conclusions because: (1) Mr. Lane and Mr. Vara failed to process the
crime scene and collect evidence properly, and Col. Scanlan failed to account for
the lack of crime scene preservation and chain of custody issues with respect to
various evidence collected from the scene; and (2) Col. Scanlan interpreted some
bloodstain patterns incorrectly (i.e., there could have been no arterial spurt, as
testified to by Col. Scanlan, because the autopsy did not indicate any artery had
been compromised). Mr. Scozzafava did not, however, present an alternative
theory of the crime, and he admitted that none of his criticisms altered the findings
regarding the defendant’s bloody left shoeprint on the officers’ restroom floor,
between the drain and the stall, or that Capt. Knapps’ blood was on the defendant’s
hands, shoes, and clothing at the time of processing or otherwise linked to him.
Mr. Scozzafava also admitted that the location of the defendant’s footprint did not
support the version of events last claimed by the defendant, in his covert letter and
questionnaire to inmate Loyd (in which the defendant admitted he was present in
the restroom and claimed he had to “duck walk” with Capt. Knapps’ head on his
leg while Brown pulled them into the restroom), or any other version. Mr.
Scozzafava further admitted that Col. Scanlan’s interpretation of the tiny blood
spatter on the grey sweatshirt found in Classroom One, which was linked to the
defendant as a habitual wearer, as impact evidence of the defendant’s direct and
active involvement in Capt. Knapps’ murder was as plausible a theory as an
alternative theory.
Following the State’s closing argument, in which it stressed Capt. Knapps’
blood on the defendant’s clothing, shoes, and hands, and the defendant’s role in the
attempted aggravated escape and aggravated kidnappings of Lt. Chaney and Sgt.
Walker, as well as his surrender and attempts to alter his version of events to
account for evidence against him as he learned of it, the defendant elected to give a
32
lengthy closing argument. Therein, the defendant gave another detailed version of
events, in which he asserted and/or conceded, inter alia, the following:
• The defendant knew of the escape plan days before December 28, 1999, and
agreed to participate even though he knew Brown was a large man recruited
to overpower targeted officers and at least some of the others had various
weapons;
• The defendant was in the hallway with other involved inmates when Capt.
Knapps entered the building, and Durham punched Capt. Knapps as Capt.
Knapps exited the officers’ restroom;
• Because Capt. Knapps was resisting the inmates’ efforts to handcuff him,
Edge tried to hit Capt. Knapps with one of the mallets as the defendant,
Cooper, Carley, and Brown ran toward them. Carley grabbed the mallet,
Capt. Knapps tried to handcuff himself to Carley, and Carley began hitting
Capt. Knapps with the defendant standing next to Carley, attempting to stop
the beating (and by implication, subjecting the defendant’s sweatshirt to
possible cast-off bloodstain patterns);
• Capt. Knapps yelled, “Help me, Help me,” while grabbing hold of the
defendant’s legs, and Durham attempted to fight the defendant off of
Carley;
• Brown intervened and pulled Capt. Knapps into the restroom, jerking Capt.
Knapps off of the defendant’s legs but allowing Capt. Knapps to grab the
defendant’s sweatshirt;43
• The defendant went further into the restroom than previously admitted
because Durham entered behind him with a knife and then the defendant
exited the restroom, leaving the other five inmates in the restroom with
Capt. Knapps;
• The defendant discarded his denim jacket and sweatshirt in the inmates’
restroom when his efforts to remove Capt. Knapps’ blood proved
unsuccessful, and he proceeded to Classroom One;
• With respect to events related to Sgt. Walker, the defendant claimed
inconsistently that it “[n]ever crossed [his] mind [Carley] was going to hurt
her” as Carley held a long, bloody, ice pick-like shank to her throat while
moving her from Classroom One to the cell block bundle room and
instructing her to speak on the telephone with Angola personnel; the
defendant also claimed that he stayed with Sgt. Walker the entire time to
protect her;
• The defendant could not release Sgt. Walker as she requested because
Mathis was guarding the exit door with a knife;
• The defendant encouraged the others to surrender and told them to ask to
speak with the FBI or the Attorney General, if they did not want to negotiate
with Angola personnel;
• Durham, along with Brown and Carley, threatened to decapitate everyone
when Warden Cain refused to let the involved inmates talk to other state and
federal negotiators;
• The defendant spoke briefly with Col. Stewart on the telephone and
identified himself by name;
43
The defendant denied ever using the term “duck walk,” even though he used it in his letter and
questionnaire to Loyd.
33
• It was Carley, and not the defendant, who encouraged the involved inmates
to change their clothing, as the defendant had already changed his shirt and
jacket;
• When Warden Cain and others started talking to the involved inmates
through the door, the defendant became very nervous and feared dying so he
wrote the note to his mother and placed it Sgt. Walker’s pocket;
• The defendant walked past Warden Cain and the amnesty note without
signing it, and numerous Angola records reflect that Angola personnel
routinely misspell his name J-E-F-F-E-R-Y, which is consistent with the
note;
• “As soon as I saw what they did with Capt. Knapps, I was no longer part of
it.”
• “If Capt. Knapps wouldn’t have struggled so hard, Capt. Knapps would be
alive.”
• “Am I guilty of trying to leave? Yeah. Stupid. That’s an escape though. Am
I guilty of what happened in that hallway? Yeah, because I was out in the
hallway. Shouldn’t have happened.”
• With respect to his left shoe print in the officers’ restroom, the defendant
admitted:
• “Look, this is the print they showed you all. All right.
Was it my shoe? It was. Not denying it. All right. I’ll
admit that.”
• At that time, “[Capt. Knapps] is bleeding. He has been
bleeding. Bleeding out in the hallway, his head, his
hands, his shoulder, all this stuff.”
• “So, if I step back at the time somewhere when Captain
Knapps is at my feet and I’ve got a heel print there, I’m
not going to deny that’s how it got there, but I did leave. I
walked out.”
• “If I had been in there [after the significant struggle
reflected by the blood all over the restroom and when
Capt. Knapps received the fatal blows], you would find
much more than one single footprint.”44
During its rebuttal argument, the State stressed the defendant’s efforts to
manipulate his version of the story to account for: the evidence against him; the
testimony of the experts that the volume of blood in the restroom, efforts to revive
Capt. Knapps, and the inmates’ control of the crime scene for nearly two hours
likely destroyed or obscured other relevant evidence; and the competency of Mr.
Lane and Mr. Vara’s evidence collection efforts in the crime scene given to them.
44
Photographs of the crime scene reveal additional partial shoe prints consistent with the pattern
on the soles of the defendant’s shoes. The State apparently chose to focus on the clearest print,
which identified the brand of the defendant’s shoe as well as a notch Angola personnel place on
the shoes of inmates.
34
After closing arguments and during the jurors’ lunch break, the trial court
was informed that the daughter of juror Teresa Keating was in a hospital intensive
care unit following a medical emergency, and he spoke briefly with the juror in the
presence of counsel, before releasing and replacing her with one of the alternate
jurors.
Thereafter, the trial court instructed the jury and separated the remaining
three alternates, and the jury commenced guilt phase deliberations at 1:40 p.m. on
May 15, 2011. At 3:22 p.m., the jury requested to hear the instructions on first
degree murder and principals again and then deliberations were resumed at 3:29
p.m. Eighteen minutes later, the jury returned with a unanimous verdict of guilty
as charged, and, on the request of the defense, the trial court polled each juror, who
affirmed his or her vote of guilty.
The penalty phase of the defendant’s trial commenced on May 16, 2011.
The defendant waived his right to self-representation and stipulated to his identity
as the person charged with, and convicted of, the 1984 first degree murder of
Andrew Cheswick.45 After brief opening statements by the State and the defense,46
Capt. Knapps’ sister, Christine Whitstine, testified that her brother was one of
eleven children, that he had two teenage children, and that he cared for the young
45
We note that this court set aside the defendant’s prior death sentence, for the first degree
murder of Andrew Cheswick, finding that the State’s discussion of appellate review during the
penalty phase opening statements “so denigrated the responsibility of the jury as to deprive the
defendant of a fair determination of sentence.” State v. Clark, 492 So.2d 862, 870-72 (La.
1986). The trial evidence, in the Cheswick murder case, established that on October 18, 1984,
the defendant entered Studebaker’s Lounge, his former place of employment, at 10:00 a.m.,
when another lounge employee, the victim Andrew Cheswick, was verifying cash register tapes
and preparing bank deposit forms. The defendant remained there after four sales representatives
left the lounge. At 11:00 a.m. a Wells Fargo employee discovered the victim, with three gunshot
wounds to the head; over $2,600.00 was missing from the safe and cash drawers. During his
initial interview with police, the defendant handed over two bank deposit slips, totaling
$2,635.50. During monitored jailhouse communications, the defendant admitted to his
girlfriend, “I did it.” He also told his father, “I am ninety-nine percent sure they got me.” As in
the instant case, the defendant made several attempts to manipulate evidence and to present
exculpatory testimony via other inmates.
46
With respect to opening statements, defense counsel conceded that the State had sufficient
proof of each of the four asserted statutory aggravating circumstances set forth in LSA-C.Cr.P.
art. 905.4(A).
35
autistic child of his fiancée before he died. Capt. Knapps’ mother, twin brother,
and fiancée passed away between the time of Capt. Knapps’ murder and the
defendant’s trial.
Ms. Whitstine further testified that the family’s relationship with Angola
commenced in 1954, when their father began working there, and Capt. Knapps’
mother, seven of the eleven siblings, including Ms. Whitstine, and other extended
family members also worked there. Ms. Whitstine stated that the entire family was
last together on Christmas Eve, just days before the murder, and she identified
persons in five photographs of Capt. Knapps with family members and his fiancée.
She explained the family routinely got together on weekends, and Capt. Knapps
was “the entertainer” in the family, playing the guitar and singing.
Capt. Knapps’ brother-in-law and music partner, Shannon Herring, also
testified. He identified several non-testifying family members in the courtroom
and informed the jury of Capt. Knapps’ musical passion and talent, playing two to
three times per week, including at family get-togethers. He described Capt.
Knapps as “the focal point” of family events because of his musical contributions.
The jury observed an edited two-and-one-half minute video of Capt. Knapps at a
family function.
The State also called Dr. Michael Welner, a stipulated expert in forensic
psychiatry. 47 Dr. Welner testified that he based his opinions about the defendant
on numerous records (including: evidence and testimony related to the defendant’s
prior conviction; evidence and testimony from the Capt. Knapps’ murder
investigation and proceedings; the defendant’s prison records, including
disciplinary, psychological, medical, and pharmacy records; transcripts of over a
year of telephone calls between the defendant, his mother, and others; and prior
47
The trial court previously heard argument on the defendant’s motion to exclude evidence of
future dangerousness and denied it.
36
statements by the defendant’s friends and family); however, Dr. Welner did not
interview the defendant. Dr. Welner evaluated the defendant against the PCL-R
psychopathy checklist and determined that the defendant is not a psychopath. Dr.
Welner also considered where the defendant fell on the nine levels of risk set forth
in the Violence Risk Assessment Guide, and he found the defendant scored at level
four (with level nine as the highest risk of violence). Dr. Welner further assessed
the defendant on the HCR-20 (a twenty-item tool for assessing history, clinical,
and risk factors) and determined that the defendant was notable for his history of
previous violence, employment instability, negative attitudes in custody, and
exposure to destabilizing influences, stress, and unmanageability in the context of
maximum security custody or secure custody in the past.
Dr. Welner viewed the defendant’s middle age and avoidance of lethal
violence over the intervening eleven years since the Knapps murder as positives,
but noted both of these factors also applied to the defendant before Capt. Knapps’
murder on December 28, 1999.48 Dr. Welner also cited as positive prognostic
factors that the defendant: was not in a gang, had good impulse control, had no
history of physically preying on other inmates, had a “very supportive” and loving
family, was “quite educated” with “many different skills,” and had no history of
substance abuse, psychotic illness, or head trauma. Again, all of these positive
factors were also present prior to the murder of Capt. Knapps.
On the negative side, Dr. Welner emphasized that the defendant killed in
1984, and he killed again in the instant 1999 murder in a maximum security
setting. Dr. Welner also noted that the defendant had a history of scheming to the
point of outlandishness, secreting weapons, circumventing natural boundaries and
obstacles established to keep others safe, and “getting very angry when he doesn’t
48
Defendant was in his late thirties at the time of the murder, and he was fifty years old at the
time of trial.
37
get his way when something means a lot to him.” Dr. Welner pointed out that all
of these negative behavior patterns were present the night of Capt. Knapps’
murder, and he opinioned that they were likely to be repeated under the conditions
of the defendant’s confinement. Dr. Welner described how a situation in which the
defendant felt frustrated and powerless, combined with an opportunity to use his
creativity while engaged in a group of scheming peers, increased the defendant’s
risk of violence even in a secure setting.
On cross-examination, Dr. Welner expressed concern, even if the defendant
remains confined under the most restrictive conditions at Angola, because he found
the defendant to be an “usually resourceful individual” “so savant in the culture of
concealment and hidden movement, that to an unclear degree [the defendant] is
unusually able to navigate restrictions so they are not as restrictive depending on
what he wants.” Dr. Welner went on to describe, in general terms, instances in the
defendant’s Angola records that supported his opinion that the defendant would
“find ways to make things happen” because he is “clever” and “persistent” even
under the most restrictive conditions. Thereafter, the State rested.
The defendant first called Larry Clark, then chairman of the pardon board
and no relation to the defendant, to testify regarding the procedure by which, and
unlikelihood of, the governor’s exercise of the pardon power in a first degree
murder case. Several friends and family also testified on the defendant’s behalf.
Sherry Richard, the wife of the defendant’s long-time friend Lance Richard,
testified that the defendant would come to their home, enjoying game nights and
occasionally staying with them, and visited them in the hospital on the day their
third child was born right before he was arrested in 1984 for Andrew Cheswick’s
murder. Ms. Richard said the defendant has maintained his relationship with the
Richard family since then, calling collect from time to time.
38
Lance Richard testified he and the defendant became best friends at Morgan
City High School, often hunting and fishing together, doing “crazy things” (like
trespassing on “Judge Robinson’s land”), and working together at a regional
restaurant in high school and later at fencing and trucking companies. Mr. Richard
characterized their relationship as “very close,” “[p]robably just like a brother”; he
expressed continuing disbelief in the defendant’s involvement in the two murders
of which he had been convicted.
The defendant’s older brother, Christopher Clark, testified about various
aspects of the Clark family life. When the defendant was eight, their father,
Talmadge “Sonny” Clark, was convicted of armed robbery so their mother, Edie
Guy, had to raise the four kids (brothers Christopher, Jeffrey, Tom, and daughter
Tracy) alone. Before that time, Christopher recalled Sonny drank and beat him and
the defendant’s mother like they were “his punching bag.” Eventually, Christopher
and Sonny reconciled and would go visit the defendant frequently at Angola, until
Christopher got arrested in 1999 and served five years on a drug charge, Sonny
died in 2006, and Christopher started traveling more frequently for work. The
defendant used to call Christopher collect regularly, but Christopher cancelled his
landline when he started traveling. One of Christopher’s two sons maintained a
relationship with the defendant, and Christopher stated that he was open to his six
grandchildren knowing the defendant when they were older.
The defendant’s mother, Edie Guy, also testified and provided additional
information regarding the defendant’s family history and upbringing. After
discussing her own parents and her courtship with the defendant’s father, she
described their quick marriage and having four children in six years, while the
defendant’s father attended LSU on a golf scholarship and worked part-time at
night at Sears; she worked when she could at a local department store. Both sets of
grandparents assisted financially. Ms. Guy testified:
39
As you can see by my two sons, they never miss[ed] meals. They
were well fed. But it was hard. It was a struggle. And I don’t mind
saying Sonny began to drink and Sonny was fantastic sober, was a
wonderful father, a lot of fun to be around. But when he took that
first drink, that was it. He became an ogre.
The young family moved somewhat frequently with Sonny drinking nightly and
“literally beating the crap out of [her].” She testified that at some point Sonny
committed armed robbery at a Baton Rouge bank, and law enforcement arrested
him at the family home, removing him in shackles in front of the children while
she was away at work. Sonny was sentenced to eight years in Angola, and he
served four years.
Ms. Guy testified that she left Baton Rouge, with the children, for a job in
Morgan City when Sonny got out on parole. However, while on parole, Sonny
committed another armed robbery at the same bank. Ms. Guy did not mention
Sonny’s second sentence, but obviously he was out of prison by the time he and
Christopher began visiting the defendant at Angola in 1985.
Ms. Guy described the defendant’s brother Christopher as the “hellion”
child, so she sent him to live with her mother, described as a 4’7” Cajun marine
drill sergeant. Ms. Guy stated that the defendant had “a mind of his own,” but was
more “manageable” for a single mother working long hours. After graduating high
school, Ms. Guy related that the defendant joined the Army and worked
intermittently in Morgan City until his arrest in 1984.
With respect to the defendant’s reaction to Sonny’s criminal behavior, Ms.
Guy testified:
Now, I will tell you this. In Morgan City, Jeffrey never really wanted
to accept the fact that his father was a criminal or had robbed the
bank. I mean, it just wasn’t something he wanted to live with. And
we had many discussions about that. But living in Morgan City, like I
said, I worked all day long. I would come home after 5:00 o’clock,
5:30, made sure they had their homework done and cooked supper,
little television, and everybody went to bed. But the one thing about
one particular afternoon, I came in from work and Jeffrey was sitting
on the sofa by himself. The other kids weren’t there. And I saw him
40
sitting with this box on his lap. I said what is that? And he said, this
is - I think this is stuff from dad. Okay. Well, I walked over and
looked at it, started lifting out stuff . . . . [Under the boys’ seasonal
clothing and coats] is a jacket, a wig, and a gun . . . . He said, mom, is
this what I think it is. I said, yep, it is. It’s what the FBI has been
looking for against your dad . . . . And he pleaded with me, do not call
the FBI, do not turn this stuff over because he knew it would be the
final nail in the FBI’s case . . . . And for the longest time, Jeffrey
wouldn’t forgive me for that. Even though he did not have a real
close relationship with his dad at the time, he just would not forgive
me for giving this stuff up.
Ms. Guy expressed her sorrow for Andrew Cheswick’s mother, offered her
condolences to Capt. Knapps’ family, described how each member of the
defendant’s family has supported and maintained contact with the defendant in
their own way over the years of his incarceration, and identified the ways in which
she believed the defendant could contribute to others if the jury voted for a life
sentence (e.g., the defendant earned his paralegal degree with straight A’s and
apparently helped the family by offering advice as to legal issues).
The defendant also called Deputy Warden Vannoy to discuss the conditions
of the defendant’s incarceration since Capt. Knapps’ murder. Initially, the
defendant was on restricted lockdown in a one-man cell for twenty-three hours per
day, with one hour to shower and visit with other inmates housed on the same tier,
and three hours per week in a pen in the exercise yard. At some point, the
defendant managed to get transferred to Hunt Correctional Center, and he moved
from lockdown to a working cell block. When Warden Vannoy became aware of
this transfer, he informed his superior and had the defendant returned to Angola’s
restricted lockdown, where he will likely remain for as long as he is at Angola. On
cross-examination, Warden Vannoy stated that the defendant will continue to be
able to write and visit with his family members and friends while on lockdown.
He also described how informing Capt. Knapps’ mother of her son’s death was the
hardest thing he has ever done.
41
Following closing arguments and the trial court’s charge, the jury
deliberated for what is listed on the trial transcript as “a short break” and
unanimously returned a verdict sentencing the defendant to death for the murder of
Captain Knapps.
In accordance with the jury’s verdict, on May 23, 2011, the trial court
sentenced the defendant to death. On August 12, 2011 the trial court heard
arguments on the defendant’s motion for reconsideration of sentence, in which he
claimed that the trial court had discretion to set aside the jury’s death sentence and
that the death sentence was unconstitutional based on evolving standards of
decency. The motion for reconsideration of the sentence was denied.
On appeal, the defendant makes thirty-seven assignments of error. After a
thorough review, we find no reversible error in the defendant’s conviction and
sentence.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Guilt Phase Issues
Insufficient Proof of Specific Intent
In his first assignment of error, the defendant argues that the State failed to
present sufficient evidence of his specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm
as required by R.S. 14:30(A)(1) and (2). In reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a conviction, the appellate court must determine that the
evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient to
convince a rational trier of fact that all of the elements of the crime had been
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Captville, 448 So.2d 676, 678 (La.
1984) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316-19, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2787-89,
61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (“[N]o person shall be made to suffer the onus of a criminal
conviction except upon sufficient proof - defined as evidence necessary to
convince a trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of every
42
element of the offense . . . . [T]he relevant question is whether, after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt.”).49 See also LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 821(B) (“A post verdict judgment of
acquittal shall be granted only if the court finds that the evidence, viewed in a light
most favorable to the state, does not reasonably permit a finding of guilty.”).
Specific criminal intent is defined as “that state of mind which exists when
the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed
criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act.” LSA-R.S. 14:10(1).
Specific intent need not be proven as a fact, but may be inferred from the
defendant’s actions and the circumstances of the transaction. State v. Broaden,
99-2124, p. 18 (La. 2/21/01), 780 So.2d 349, 362, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 884, 122
S.Ct. 192, 151 L.Ed.2d 135 (2001); State v. Cousan, 94-2503, p. 13 (La.
11/25/96), 684 So.2d 382, 390. Specific intent may be formed in an instant. State
v. Wright, 01-0322, p. 11 (La. 12/4/02), 834 So.2d 974, 984, cert. denied, 540
U.S. 833, 124 S.Ct. 82, 157 L.Ed.2d 62 (2003); State v. Cousan, 94-2503 at p. 13,
684 So.2d at 390. Assuming every fact to be proved that the evidence tends to
prove, circumstantial evidence must “exclude every reasonable hypothesis of
innocence.” LSA-R.S. 15:438.
The defendant argues that the State’s evidence was insufficient because “not
one witness saw [him] attacking Capt. Knapps” or “saw a weapon in [his] hands at
any time.” In addition, he claims “so much blood was spilled and spread to so
49
To prove the defendant was a principal to first degree murder, the State had to show that he
had the specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm while engaged in the perpetration or
attempted perpetration of an aggravated kidnapping or aggravated escape or that the victim was a
peace officer engaged in the performance of his lawful duties, pursuant to LSA-R.S.
14:30(A)(1)-(2). See also LSA-R.S. 14:24 (“All persons concerned in the commission of a
crime, whether present or absent, and whether they directly commit the act constituting the
offense, aid and abet in its commission, or directly or indirectly counsel or procure another to
commit the crime, are principals.”).
43
many places by so many people that making a reliable determination as to how the
blood got where it got is beyond the capacity of any rational juror.”
As an initial matter, the defendant’s arguments ignore: the testimony of
inmate Shockley (to whom the defendant admitted to participating in the attack and
hitting Capt. Knapps in the head with the mallet); the testimony of inmate Taylor
(who saw the defendant in the hallway with what appeared to be blood on his grey
sweatshirt, pants, and hands and holding what appeared to be a weapon in his
hands); and the testimony of Col. Scanlan (whose testimony revealed the
defendant’s active and dynamic participation in the crime, based on the
defendant’s transfer lift shoeprints found in the officer’s restroom, where Capt.
Knapps lost substantial amounts of blood, as well as on the blood spatter pattern on
the grey sweatshirt linked to defendant, as the habitual wearer).
It is well-settled that appellate courts will not review the trier of fact’s
credibility determinations. See State v. Mussall, 523 So.2d 1305, 1311 (La. 1988)
(holding that, based on the precepts announced in Jackson v. Virginia, a
reviewing court should not substitute its judgment for the trier of fact’s “rational
credibility calls” or as to “what the verdict should be”; however, “the jury cannot
be permitted to speculate if the evidence is such that reasonable jurors must have a
reasonable doubt”); State v. Corkern, 03-1393, p. 3 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/17/04), 897
So.2d 57, 60, writ denied, 04-2627 (La. 2/18/05), 896 So.2d 29 (“The reviewing
court will not assess the credibility of witnesses or reweigh the evidence to
overturn a fact finder’s determination of guilt.”). See also LSA-Const. Art. V, Sec.
10(B) (“In criminal cases its appellate jurisdiction extends only to questions of
law.”). The jury’s decision to accept or reject a witness’s testimony is given great
deference. See State v. Tate, 01-1658, p. 6 (La. 5/20/03), 851 So.2d 921, 929,
cert. denied, 541 U.S. 905, 124 S. Ct. 1604, 158 L. Ed. 2d 248 (2004) (“The trier of
fact makes credibility determinations and may, within the bounds of rationality,
44
accept or reject the testimony of any witness; thus, a reviewing court may impinge
upon the fact finder’s discretion ‘only to the extent necessary to guarantee the
fundamental protection of due process of law.’”) (citing State v. Mussall, 523
So.2d at 1310). In the instant case, the jury determined that the testimony of the
State’s witnesses was more credible than the self-serving statements of the
defendant and his witnesses.
In addition, despite the defendant’s efforts to provide alternative
explanations for the evidence tying him to Capt. Knapps’ murder and to
participation in the attempted aggravated escape and aggravated kidnappings, no
reasonable hypothesis of innocence was presented in this case. With respect to
specific intent alone, the defendant admitted from the beginning that the escape
plan included armed and physically-imposing inmates targeting specific
correctional officers to achieve the planned escape. On implementation, when the
plan failed to be successful, the defendant and the other involved inmates clearly
abandoned whatever notions they may have had about executing the escape plan
without injuring or killing the hostages. Viewed in a light most favorable to the
prosecution, the physical evidence showed, inter alia, that: (1) Capt. Knapps’
blood was on every outer layer of clothing tied to the defendant, on layers of
clothing underneath as saturation stains, and on the defendant’s hands and shoes;
and (2) the defendant was present in the officers’ restroom when Capt. Knapps had
suffered at least great bodily harm, if not the fatal blows to his head, as evidenced
by the defendant’s bloody lift transfer shoeprints. This evidence combined with
the defendant’s post-murder behavior, in continuing to direct the evolving plan and
negotiations with Angola personnel, which included observing without the
slightest objection his accomplices’ repeated threats to Sgt. Walker with the bloody
ice pick-like shank, provide ample support that a rational jury could have found
that the defendant possessed the requisite intent to kill or to inflict great bodily
45
harm beyond a reasonable doubt. In addition, despite the defendant’s periodic
claim that the involved inmates never intended to hurt anyone, he admitted in his
letter to Warden Vannoy that the involved inmates discussed killing Lt. Ross as
part of the planned escape and, in fact, killed Capt. Knapps because they could not
locate Lt. Ross (and Capt. Knapps refused to tell them where Lt. Ross was),
apparently thinking that killing a state prison guard would somehow facilitate their
transfer to federal prison.
The jurors could reasonably have considered this additional evidence of the
defendant’s intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm. Moreover, the jury may have
found credible the testimony of inmate Shockley, regarding the jailhouse
confession made by the defendant in which he stated that he was the one who hit
Capt. Knapps in the head with the mallet in the restroom (in effect inflicting the
fatal blows), while Durham stabbed Capt. Knapps in the chest.50
Thus, direct and circumstantial evidence linked the defendant to the first
degree murder of Capt. Knapps, and the totality of the evidence, viewed in the light
most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient to convince beyond a reasonable
doubt the jury, who obviously resolved issues of credibility against the defendant,
that the defendant had formed the requisite specific intent to take the life of Capt.
Knapps. This assignment of error is without merit.
“Minor Role” Renders Death Penalty Unconstitutional
In his second assignment of error, the defendant argues that his “minor
participation” in Capt. Knapps’ murder renders imposition of the death penalty
against him unconstitutional, in violation of the Sixth and Eight Amendments of
50
As indicated hereinafter, the autopsy revealed that the involved inmates inflicted numerous
potentially fatal wounds to Capt. Knapps. In addition to the fatal mallet blows to his head, Capt.
Knapps was also stabbed in the head, chest, and spleen, as well cut on the throat, narrowly
missing his carotid artery and jugular vein.
46
the U.S. Constitution. The defendant asserts that the jurors were never required to
determine that the defendant “both killed and intended to kill Capt. Knapps.”
This court summarized the most relevant Eighth Amendment jurisprudence
in State v. Anthony, 98-0406 (La. 04/11/00), 776 So.2d 376, cert. denied, 531
U.S. 934, 121 S.Ct. 320, 148 L.Ed.2d 258 (2000):
Under Enmund v. Florida, [458 U.S. 782, 102 S.Ct. 3368, 73
L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982)], an aider and abettor may not receive the death
penalty for felony murder, if he does not himself kill, attempt to kill, or
intend to kill. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 797, 102 S.Ct. at 3376 (emphasis
added). However, the United States Supreme Court modified the
Enmund decision slightly in Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 107
S.Ct. 1676, 95 L.Ed.2d 127 (1987). In Tison, the Court found that the
Eighth Amendment does not prohibit the death penalty in the case of a
defendant who participates in a felony, which results in murder, if the
defendant’s participation is “major” and “the defendant has a mental
element of reckless indifference.” Tison, 481 U.S. at 158, 107 S.Ct.
at 1688.
Id., 98-0406, pp. 13-14, 776 So.2d at 386.51
As discussed hereinabove, regarding the sufficiency of the evidence as to the
defendant’s specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, sufficient evidence
was presented to the jury from which the jury clearly concluded that neither the
degree of the defendant’s participation nor mental state at the time of the attempted
escape and murder of Capt. Knapps would exempt him from imposition of the
death penalty.
The physical evidence of the defendant’s active and direct participation in
the crime (e.g., blood spatter on his sweatshirt and other clothing as well as his
51
In State v. Anthony, all three perpetrators to a restaurant robbery/murder brought handguns
and potatoes, which they placed on each gun’s barrel as a crude silencer. Id., 98-0406 at pp. 3-5,
776 So.2d at 380-81. The planning exhibited in bringing such a device to the restaurant robbery
strongly suggested that each of the gunmen anticipated using his weapon. Even though Philip
Anthony claimed on appeal that he was not the shooter, one of the victims survived to testify that
the last person he saw before the shots rang out in the walk-in cooler was defendant, who was
holding a gun with a potato on the end. Moreover, the State’s circumstantial evidence
demonstrated that of the three perpetrators, the defendant’s shoes were the most heavily
encrusted with potato particles. Accordingly, the court ruled that “even without establishing that
the defendant was the triggerman, his conviction is valid because he was involved in a felony-
murder and he intended, from the outset, to kill these victims.” Id., 98-0406, pp. 13-14, 776
So.2d at 386.
47
blood soaked pants, and bloodstained jacket, shoes, and hands), dynamic presence
at the murder scene (e.g., blood transfer shoe prints in the restroom), detailed
knowledge regarding what took place in that restroom (e.g., defendant’s account
set forth in the October 17, 2001 letter to Warden Vannoy), and jailhouse
confession to participating in the attack and bludgeoning of Capt. Knapps in the
head with one of the mallets, inter alia, provide substantial support that his
participation was in fact major. In addition, even under one of the defendant’s
many versions, his behavior throughout the ordeal more than adequately reflects
reckless indifference.
The defendant also introduces a new argument on appeal, challenging the
adequacy of the jury instructions, which included a reference to specific intent to
inflict great bodily harm as set forth in LSA-R.S. 14:30(A)(1), in light of Enmund.
However, the defendant did not raise this objection below and therefore may not
assign it as error, as stated in LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 801, which provides in pertinent
part: “A party may not assign as error the giving or failure to give a jury charge or
any portion thereof unless an objection thereto is made before the jury retires or
within such time as the court may reasonably cure the alleged error. The nature of
the objection and grounds therefor shall be stated at the time of objection. The
court shall give the party an opportunity to make the objection out of the presence
of the jury.” Moreover, the argument ignores Tison’s modification to Enmund,
and, regardless, intent to inflict great bodily harm appears to be a more culpable
mental state than reckless indifference. In addition, contrary to the defendant’s
assertion, a review of the jury instructions does not reveal that the trial court
incorrectly defined the crime. This assignment is without merit.
Evolving Standards of Decency
The defendant argues in his third assignment of error that developments
since the Supreme Court’s Tison decision suggest that the Court may soon revisit
48
the Enmund standard of permitting imposition of the death penalty only for those
who kill, attempt to kill, or intend to kill. Although the defendant correctly points
out that the Supreme Court has removed certain categories of death penalty eligible
offenders and offenses over time, the thrust of his argument is not that this court
should deem the death penalty unconstitutional per se, but rather it should do so in
this defendant’s case based on his allegedly limited role. Thus, his argument
merely reworks his “minor role” argument, asserted in his second assignment of
error. This assigned error is without merit.
Inconsistent Theories Against Co-Defendants
In the defendant’s fourth assignment of error he argues that: (1) the State
highlighted different evidence and called different witnesses at each co-defendant’s
trial; and (2) the State’s crime scene reconstruction expert Col. Scanlan testified
that Capt. Knapps was murdered in the officers’ restroom, and Col. Scanlan did not
observe sufficient evidence, collected by Mr. Lane and Mr. Vara from the crime
scene, to opine at the defendant’s trial whether the involved inmates initially
attacked Capt. Knapps in the hallway, while he testified during the co-defendants’
trials that the attack likely started in the hallway. Although the defendant
withdrew his adoption of his co-defendant’s motion on this issue in the trial
court,52 we address the arguments raised on appeal in light of the potential due
process concerns.
As a general matter, due process forbids the State from employing
inconsistent and irreconcilable theories to secure convictions against individuals
52
We note that the defendant adopted co-defendant Mathis’ Motion #47, entitled “Motion to Bar
Inherently Inconsistent Prosecutions.” On April 28, 2006 the trial court held oral argument on
the motion and deferred ruling on it until such time as an objection could be made at trial. The
trial court declared that the motion was “moot” and that it would “defer any action on that to a
point in time during the course of the trial, before the trial, or after the trial, to be raised by a
contemporaneous objection,” or the trial court indicated that the matter could be raised post-trial,
by written motion. However, on May 21, 2010, the defendant withdrew his adoption of this
motion by stating, “As to [Motion #] 47, the motion to bar inherently inconsistent prosecutions,
this has been withdrawn by the defense as it relates to Mr. Clark since it is not relevant to him
since he is the initial defendant of the five defendants to be tried.”
49
for the same offenses arising from the same event. State v. Dressner, 08-1366, p.
19 (La. 7/6/10), 45 So.3d 127, 140, cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1271, 131 S.Ct. 1605,
179 L.Ed.2d 500 (2011) (citing Smith v. Groose, 205 F.3d 1045, 1048-49 (8th Cir.
2000), cert. denied sub nom. Gammon v. Smith, 531 U.S. 985, 121 S.Ct. 441, 148
L.Ed.2d 446 (2000) (wherein convictions of murder-robbery accomplices were
obtained at separate trials, through diametrically opposed testimony from a third
participant, and such manipulation of evidence were held to have rendered the
trial(s) fundamentally unfair, requiring reversal)). See also State v. Scott, 04-
1312, p. 79-83 (La. 1/19/06), 921 So.2d 904, 956-58, cert. denied, 549 U.S. 858,
127 S.Ct. 137, 166 L.Ed.2d 100 (2006), overruled in part on other grounds by
State v. Dunn, 07-0878 (La. 1/25/08), 974 So.2d 658. Cf. Nichols v. Scott, 69
F.3d 1255, 1268-72 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied sub nom Nichols v. Johnson, 518
U.S. 1022, 116 S.Ct. 2559, 135 L.Ed.2d 1076 (1996) (holding that a defendant’s
guilty plea does not preclude prosecution of a co-defendant when it could not be
determined whose gun caused the fatal wound).
This court has stated that, in a situation in which the State has adopted
fundamentally inconsistent positions in co-perpetrators’ separate trials, basic
fairness may require the trial court to permit the defendant to expose the
inconsistencies. State v. Dressner, 08-1366 at pp. 19-20, 45 So.3d at 140 (citing
State v. Lavalais, 95-0320, p. 13 (La. 11/25/96), 685 So.2d 1048, 1056, cert.
denied, 522 U.S. 825, 118 S.Ct. 85, 139 L.Ed.2d 42 (1997); State v. Wingo, 457
So.2d 1159, 1166 (La. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1030, 105 S.Ct. 2049, 85
L.Ed.2d 322 (1985)). Thus, absent discovery of significant new evidence, the State
cannot offer inconsistent theories or facts regarding the same crime in seeking to
convict co-defendants at separate trials. State v. Dressner, 08-1366 at p. 20, 45
So.3d at 140 (citing Thompson v. Calderon, 120 F.3d 1045, 1058 (9th Cir.
1997)).
50
In assessing an “inconsistent theories” claim, this court has generally
distinguished the use of mutually exclusive theories from selective emphasis on
evidence relating to the culpability of the defendant at trial. State v. Dressner, 08-
1366 at p. 20, 45 So.3d at 140; State v. Wingo, 457 So.2d at 1166. This court
explored the distinction in State v. Scott, supra, a case in which three men robbed
a bank while armed with weapons and fatally wounded two tellers. State v. Scott,
04-1312 at pp. 2-4, 921 So.2d at 913-14. The Scott defendant was convicted of
first degree murder and sentenced to death. Id., 04-1312 at p. 1, 921 So.2d at 912-
13. On appeal, he assigned as error that the State had argued at his trial that he was
responsible for the death of both tellers, although the State argued at a co-
defendant’s trial that the co-defendant was the shooter. Id., 04-1312 at p. 79, 921
So.2d at 956. Finding no due process violation, this court relied on the fact that the
prosecutor who tried both Scott and his co-defendant did not argue a division of
their culpabilities at either trial. Id., 04-1312 at p. 81, 921 So.2d at 957. Rather, at
both trials, the State argued that both the Scott defendant and his co-defendant
possessed specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, and moreover, this
court noted that nothing the State had articulated at the co-defendant’s trial
exculpated Scott; both Scott and his co-defendant were equally guilty as principals.
Id. Thus, there was no due process violation because the State’s theories of the
case were not mutually exclusive. Id., 04-1312 at p. 81-83, 921 So.2d at 958.
This distinction highlights the general consensus that, to violate due process,
the inconsistency must exist at the core of a state’s cases against the co-defendants.
Smith v. Groose, 205 F.3d at 1052 (“We do not hold that prosecutors must present
precisely the same evidence and theories in trials for different defendants. Rather,
we hold only that the use of inherently factually contradictory theories violates the
principles of due process.”). Several jurisdictions have employed the requirement
that the inconsistencies go “to the core” of a state’s case. See Brandon Buskey, “If
51
the Convictions Don’t Fit, You Must Acquit: Examining the Constitutional
Limitations on the State’s Pursuit of Inconsistent Criminal Prosecutions,” 36
N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 311, 327 (2012); Sifrit v. State, 383 Md. 77, 105,
857 A.2d 65, 81 (Md. Ct. App. 2004) (“The theme requiring an inconsistency at
the core of the state’s case before finding a due process violation runs throughout
the majority of cases that have addressed the issue.”). It follows that, although a
defendant has a right to a fair proceeding before an impartial factfinder based on
reliable evidence, he does not have a right to prevent the prosecution from arguing
a justifiable inference from a complete evidentiary record, even if the prosecutor
has argued for a different inference from the then-complete evidentiary record in
another trial. Stumpf v. Robinson, 722 F.3d 739, 751 (6th Cir. 2013).
Applying this framework and even considering the instant defendant’s
reference to portions of the trial transcripts from the prosecutions of co-
perpetrators Carley, Edge, and Brown, we conclude that nothing argued by the
defendant, as having been presented in a co-defendant’s trial, appears in any way
inconsistent with the evidence presented at his trial. For example (and assuming
the defendant’s references are accurate), the State’s presentation of evidence at
Carley’s trial, establishing that Carley was involved in planning the escape before
the defendant became involved, was seen wielding a bloody ice pick-like shank,
and made numerous inculpatory statements was entirely consistent with the
evidence adduced at the defendant’s trial. Likewise, evidence of Edge’s early
involvement in the escape plan and possession of a mallet found to have Capt.
Knapps’ blood on it was presented at the trials of both Edge and the defendant.
With respect to Brown, witnesses at both trials testified Brown had a mallet in his
possession at some point. Apparently, an unidentified witness may have testified
at Brown’s trial that Brown said, “Go get [Carley] off the phone,” to the defendant
52
at some point, but that evidence is neither inconsistent with anything presented at
the defendant’s trial nor related to a core issue.
As to the defendant’s complaint about the State’s theory, regarding the
location of the attack and murder of Capt. Knapps, from the beginning the State’s
theory of the crime, as set forth in its opening statement at the defendant’s trial,
was that Capt. Knapps was attacked in the hallway and dragged into the security
officers’ restroom, where the inmates bludgeoned and stabbed him to death.
Whether the State’s crime scene reconstruction expert Col. Scanlan could point to
evidence to support the initial attack-in-the-hallway aspect of that theory, nothing
about Col. Scanlan’s testimony at the defendant’s trial is contradictory to that
theory or even a core issue despite the defendant’s arguments to the contrary. Col.
Scanlan admitted on cross-examination that the initial attack could have taken
place in the hallway near the doorway to the officers’ restroom but the crime scene
evidence, as collected by Mr. Lane and Mr. Vara hours after the murder, revealed
slight evidence of that aspect of the State’s theory. That one or more of the
defendant’s various attempts to explain the physical evidence against him may
have relied heavily on his assertion of an initial attack on Capt. Knapps in the
hallway and subsequent dragging and/or “duck walking” with Capt. Knapps
somehow clinging to his pants and sweatshirt with sufficient strength to pull the
defendant into the restroom, does not render the precise location of the initial
attack, or the State’s theory related thereto, a core issue in the case. Under the
circumstances here, whether the involved inmates initially attacked Capt. Knapps
in the hallway, the doorway, or just inside the officers’ restroom does not appear to
be an issue of core relevance sufficient to disturb the defendant’s conviction,
particularly when he expressly abandoned the issue below.
53
Exclusion of Certain Witness Statements
The defendant complains in his fifth assignment of error that the trial court
erred in excluding testimony from Major Holden regarding information obtained
during the initial interviews from two uninvolved inmates who were unable to
testify at defendant’s trial.53
Both the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Art. I, §16
of the Louisiana Constitution ensure a defendant the right to present a defense and,
as found in Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 1049, 35
L.Ed.2d 297 (1973), few rights are more fundamental. Moreover, all relevant
evidence necessary to the defense must be presented for full adjudication of the
case and, in some circumstances, including statements that may not fall under any
statutorily recognized exception to the hearsay rule. See State v. Vigee, 518 So.2d
501, 503-05 (La. 1988). See State v. Van Winkle, 94-0947, pp. 4-6 (La. 6/30/95),
658 So.2d 198, 201-02 (holding that the exclusion of hearsay evidence suggesting
that the defendant’s roommate killed the victim was reversible error); State v.
Gremillion, 542 So.2d 1074, 1078 (La. 1989) (“While the statement does not fit
into any of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule, it should have,
nevertheless, been admitted into evidence due to its reliability and trustworthy
nature.”). In Chambers v. Mississippi, the Supreme Court reasoned that when
constitutional rights, directly affecting ascertainment of guilt are implicated, even
well-established evidentiary rules may not be mechanistically applied to subvert
the ends of justice.54 Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. at 302, 93 S.Ct. at 1049.
53
The referenced inmates were Henry Hadwin, who died in 2000, and Donald Williamson, who
was unavailable to testify at trial for unknown reasons.
54
The Chambers Court stated:
Few rights are more fundamental than that of an accused to present
witnesses in his own defense . . . . In the exercise of this right, the accused, as is
required of the State, must comply with established rules of procedure and
evidence designed to assure both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of
guilt and innocence. Although perhaps no rule of evidence has been more
54
At trial, the following exchange took place during Maj. Holden’s cross-
examination:
[Defendant]: Do you recognize that document?[55]
[Holden]: Yes.
[Defendant]: Do you recall if you were the one to prepare that
document?
[Holden]: Yes.
[The Court]: Let’s get it marked. It’s a 5 now or whatever you
want to put on it.
[Defendant]: I think it’s D-5.
* * *
[Defendant]: If you would, please turn to Page 5.
* * *
[Defendant]: Where I have it marked on the paragraph.
[Holden]: Here.
[Defendant]: Please read that to yourself and refresh yourself.
[Holden]: Okay.
[Defendant]: Based on that, were you informed that Robert
Carley and --
[Holden]: Yes.
[State]: Objection. It calls for a hearsay response. Unless
that witness is here to testify, Your Honor, it’s
hearsay.
[The Court]: I understand your objection. Ask the question and
don’t answer it unless I tell you you can.
[Holden]: Yes, sir.
[The Court]: Ask your question.
[Defendant]: Based on the information given in your interviews,
do you have reason to believe that Robert Carley
ever struck Captain Knapps with a mallet?
respected or more frequently applied in jury trials than that applicable to the
exclusion of hearsay, exceptions tailored to allow the introduction of evidence
which in fact is likely to be trustworthy have long existed. The testimony rejected
by the trial court here bore persuasive assurances of trustworthiness and thus was
well within the basic rationale of the exception for declarations against interest.
That testimony also was critical to Chambers’ defense. In these circumstances,
where constitutional rights directly affecting the ascertainment of guilt are
implicated, the hearsay rule may not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends
of justice.
55
Presumably, the defendant was referring to a report prepared by Maj. Holden, summarizing his
investigations in 1999. Although marked as D-5, it was not offered or admitted into evidence.
The defendant attached a portion of it to his appellate brief. The report does state that the
uninvolved inmate Hadwin observed Durham and Carley attacking Capt. Knapps in the hallway
and then saw Brown drag Capt. Knapps into the officers’ restroom as the defendant suggests.
With respect to the uninvolved inmate Williamson’s statement, however, the report does not
provide that Williamson observed the defendant fighting with Durham and Carley in the hallway
as the defendant claims; rather, it states, “[Williamson] said he heard someone say that Jeffrey
Clark, Joel Durham, and Robert Carley was fighting.” It also states, “[Williamson] later
remembered that when he went to the bathroom he heard [the defendant] ask Robert Carley,
“Why did you have to hit him so hard?” Carley replied, “I had to stab him to shut him up.” In
addition, it provides that Edge informed investigators that he and the defendant had the two
mallets. Also, it indicated that Mathis said the defendant had the half pair of scissors when they
took Lt. Chaney hostage.
55
[The Court]: Objection is sustained. You don’t have to answer
it.
[Defendant]: Turn to page 5 and look at the second paragraph,
second part.
[Holden]: Okay.
[Defendant]: Based on your interview, do you have information
that Jeffrey Clark was fighting with Joel Durham
or Robert Carley in the hallway?
[State]: Judge, same objection.
[The Court]: Same ruling. It’s sustained. You don’t have to
answer it.
[Defendant]: No more questions, Your Honor.
[The Court]: You’re done with the witness, Mr. Clark?
[Defendant]: I am, Your Honor.[56]
Although the defendant raised no contemporaneous objection or other
indication that this testimony was key to his defense, the defendant now argues that
the trial court’s exclusion of the hearsay evidence interfered with his fundamental
right to present a defense. Because the defendant raised no such argument in the
district court, he is not entitled to assert the matter here. See LSA-C.Cr.P. art.
841(A) (“An irregularity or error cannot be availed of after verdict unless it was
objected to at the time of occurrence. A bill of exceptions to rulings or orders is
unnecessary. It is sufficient that a party, at the time the ruling or order of the court
is made or sought, makes known to the court the action which he desires the court
to take, or of his objections to the action of the court, and the grounds therefor.”);
LSA-C.E. art. 103 (“Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or
excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected, and . . . [w]hen
the ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely objection or motion to admonish the
jury to limit or disregard appears of record, stating the specific ground of objection
. . . .”); State v. Taylor, 93-2201, pp. 4-7 (La. 2/28/96), 669 So.2d 364, 367-69
(“[T]he contemporaneous objection rule contained in La.Code Crim.P. art. 841(A)
and La.Code Evid. art. 103, does not frustrate the goal of efficiency. Instead, it is
56
In addition, the defense objected on hearsay grounds to Maj. Holden’s testimony, during the
State’s direct examination, about what another inmate told him in the investigation, and the
objection was sustained.
56
specifically designed to promote judicial efficiency by preventing a defendant from
gambling for a favorable verdict and then, upon conviction, resorting to appeal on
errors which either could have been avoided or corrected at the time or should have
put an immediate halt to the proceedings.”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 860, 117 S.Ct.
162, 136 L.Ed.2d 106 (1996).
Moreover, aside from whether the inmate statements to investigators are of a
reliable and trustworthy nature, the more important aspect of the testimony, which
the defendant sought to elicit from Maj. Holden (that the defendant was fighting
with Durham and Carley in the hallway and purportedly trying to interfere with the
attack on Capt. Knapps), is not supported by the information in Maj. Holden’s
report (indicating that the defendant, Durham, and Carley were in the hallway
fighting but did not state with whom or imply they were fighting with each other,
as the defendant suggests). Furthermore, such testimony appears to be double or
triple hearsay, as Williamson told investigators that he heard an unidentified
person say the inmates were in the hallway fighting. This assignment of error is
without merit.
Removal of Appointed Counsel Burton Guidry
The defendant asserts in his sixth assignment of error that the removal of one
of his initially appointed defense counsel, Burton Guidry, over his objection,
violated his federal and state rights to counsel.57
57
On April 20, 2000 the defendant filed, pro se, an objection to the removal of Mr. Guidry,
claiming that he had sent a letter to the trial court on March 16, 2000, seeking reappointment of
Mr. Guidry and asserting a waiver of any potential conflicts. The defendant argued that the
continued appointment of his other defense counsel, Bert Garraway, was insufficient because
Mr. Garraway lacked the funds to conduct the type of investigation that Mr. Guidry had been
undertaking. Apparently, the defendant no longer asserts this argument, which made little sense
in light of the fact that the State had paid for nearly all aspects of the defense, including the fees
and expenses of counsel, investigators, and experts. In addition, as the State points out, Mr.
Guidry did not appear on the list of counsel certified to work on capital cases at the time the
grand jury returned the indictment in 2004, and therefore was not eligible to represent the
defendant post-indictment even without the conflict of interest-related issues. Instead, the
defendant now complains that the trial court erred in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing prior
to Mr. Guidry’s removal and in failing to explore alternatives to removal. The defendant raised
neither of these issues below, and therefore they are not properly preserved for appeal. See LSA-
57
Under federal and state law, criminal defendants with retained counsel have
a right to both effective assistance of counsel and counsel of choice, whereas
defendants with appointed counsel only have the right to effective representation
(“a criminal defendant is not entitled to choose his appointed private counsel or the
appointed public defender”). State v. Reeves, 06-2419, p. 39-47 (La. 5/5/09), 11
So.3d 1031, 1058-62, cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1031, 130 S.Ct. 637, 175 L.Ed.2d 490
(2009). Moreover, neither the federal nor state constitutions provide a criminal
defendant represented by appointed counsel with a “right to maintain a particular
attorney-client relationship in the absence of a right to counsel of choice.” Id., 06-
2419 at p. 53, 11 So.3d at 1066.
In accordance with the dictates of the United States Constitution
Amendment VI and XIV, as well as Louisiana Constitution Article I, Section 13, a
criminal defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel includes a right to
conflict-free counsel. State v. Franklin, 400 So.2d 616, 620 (La. 1981). In State
v. Cisco, 01-2732, pp. 21-22 (La. 12/3/03), 861 So.2d 118, 132-33, cert. denied,
541 U.S. 1005, 124 S.Ct. 2023, 158 L.Ed.2d 522 (2004), this court made clear:
We stress the importance of the trial judge’s protecting the
defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights, even if a defendant expresses a
desire to proceed with conflicted counsel. Because courts “possess an
independent interest in ensuring that criminal trials are conducted
within the ethical standards of the profession and that the legal
proceedings appear fair to all that observe them[,]” Wheat v. United
States, 486 U.S. 153, 160, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 1698, 100 L.Ed.2d 140
(1988), the defendant’s ability to waive certain conflicts is not
unfettered. Id. For example, in United States v. Fulton, 5 F.3d 605,
612 (2d Cir. 1993), the court stated, “When a lawyer’s conflict, actual
or potential, may result in inadequate representation of a defendant or
jeopardize the federal court’s institutional interest in the rendition of a
just verdict, a trial judge has discretion to disqualify an attorney or
C.Cr.P. art. 841(A); LSA-C.E. art. 103; State v. Taylor, 93-2201 at pp. 4-7, 669 So.2d at 367-
69, supra. Moreover, the defendant cites no support for his contention that he was entitled to the
continued appointment of counsel when a substantial likelihood of conflict existed. The
defendant’s reliance on State v. Bell, 04-1183, pp. 7-10 (La. App. 3 Cir. 03/02/05), 896 So.2d
1236, 1241-43, is misplaced. There, the court of appeal determined that the trial court did not err
in finding that the public defender’s representation of the victim’s father in a separate class
action case was too remote and in appointing another attorney to assist the public defender in the
criminal case in cross-examination of the victim’s father should he be called to testify. Id.
58
decline a proffer of waiver.” Nonetheless, a trial court ruling on
potential conflicts when raised pretrial is entitled to broad discretion,
regardless of whether the court permits or refuses enrollment of
potentially conflicted counsel after a valid waiver. Wheat, 486 U.S.
at 164, 108 S.Ct. at 1700. [Footnote omitted.]
In the instant case, the record reflects that the trial court appointed Mr.
Guidry and Bert Garraway to represent the defendant shortly after the arrest
warrant issued. 58 Mr. Guidry was removed three months later, on March 13, 2000,
because Mr. Guidry chose to undertake the representation of the heirs of Joel
Durham, the involved inmate who was shot and killed during Sgt. Walker’s rescue.
In ordering the removal of Mr. Guidry, the trial court stated that there was a
“substantial likelihood that a conflict of interest will exist.” Thus, despite the
defendant’s unsupported suggestion that Angola personnel somehow orchestrated
the removal of Mr. Guidry because Mr. Guidry was effectively representing him,
the defendant had no constitutional right to choose his appointed counsel, maintain
an attorney-client relationship with appointed counsel, or waive an actual
conflict. 59 With respect to the conflict, Mr. Guidry’s representation of Durham’s
58
The defendant’s characterization of Mr. Guidry’s representation is misleading. As an initial
matter, Mr. Guidry filed only the first three of the initial preliminary motions, each filed January
5, 2000, without the appearance of co-counsel, Mr. Garraway. Although the record includes
neither the initial order of appointment, nor a relevant minute entry, the defendant and his appeal
counsel have averred that the trial court appointed Garraway and Guidry on January 4 or 5, 2000.
59
As a general rule, Louisiana courts have held that an attorney laboring under an actual conflict
of interest cannot render effective legal assistance to the defendant whom he is representing.
State v. Cisco, 01-2732 at p. 17, 861 So.2d at 129. An actual conflict of interest has been
defined, as follows:
If a defense attorney owes duties to a party whose interests are adverse to those of
the defendant, then an actual conflict exists. The interest of the other client and
the defendant are sufficiently adverse if it is shown that the attorney owes a duty
to the defendant to take some action that could be detrimental to the other client.
Id., 01-2732 at p. 18, 861 So.2d at 130 (quoting Zuck v. Alabama, 588 F.2d 436 (5th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 833, 100 S.Ct. 63, 62 L.Ed.2d 42 (1979)). The issue of conflicting
loyalties may arise in several different contexts and includes when “‘an attorney runs into a
conflict because he or she is required to cross-examine a witness who is testifying against the
defendant and who was or is a client of the attorney.’” State v. Cisco, 01-2732 at p. 17, 861
So.2d at 129 (quoting State v. Tart, 93-0772, p. 19 (La. 2/9/96), 672 So.2d 116, 125, cert.
denied, 519 U.S. 934, 117 S.Ct. 310, 136 L.Ed.2d 227 (1996)). Given that the degree of
participation and culpability of the five co-defendants and Joel Durham has remained a primary
focus of these cases for nearly two decades, it is not difficult to envision numerous scenarios
wherein Mr. Guidry’s strategic choices might be improperly influenced by his representation of
59
heirs in a civil case involved the exact same series of events at issue in the
defendant’s criminal case. Given the defendant’s defense from the beginning was
that others, including Durham, were more responsible for the events of December
28, 1999, than the defendant, that defense was substantially at odds with the
version of events Mr. Guidry would likely advocate on behalf of Durham’s heirs.
In addition, the defendant’s right to effective representation was not
compromised. The more experienced Mr. Garraway remained on the defendant’s
case until his untimely death in November 2005. Moreover, even though the
defendant chose to represent himself with the assistance of his appointed counsel
during certain aspects of his trial, he repeatedly praised his subsequently appointed
attorneys and noted that if he had the money to hire anyone, he would hire them
without any mention of the now-lauded Mr. Guidry. 60 This assignment of error is
without merit.
Faretta Waiver
In his seventh assignment of error, the defendant argues that his decision to
represent himself during certain portions of his trial, while knowingly and
intelligently made, was involuntary due to his “attorneys’ unilateral decision to
concede [his] guilt of first degree murder over [his] objection.” The record shows
that the factual basis of this argument is false.
the Durham heirs, to the detriment of the defendant’s criminal defense, or at some point face
cross-examination of the defendant in the Durham civil trial. Even though the Durham wrongful
death action terminated with the death of Joel Durham’s last surviving heir at some later date, the
appropriateness of the trial court’s earlier removal of Mr. Guidry was not thereby undermined.
60
During the Faretta colloquy preceding his second trial, the defendant praised his appointed
counsel, stating, “For the record, I would like to say, first off, that it’s never been a question of
my attorneys’ competency or their representation on my behalf. They’re excellent attorneys and
very good at what they do.” In the sealed portion of the Faretta colloquy, the defendant stated,
“I know how good my attorneys are. If I had a million dollars, they would be the first ones I
would go to.” Likewise, in March 2008, the defendant sought to withdraw from his previously
granted hybrid representation with appointed attorneys D’Amico and Lotwick, stating that he
was satisfied with the job they were doing and finding them “very competent.”
60
Based on defense counsel’s opening statement in the defendant’s first trial
for the murder of Capt. Knapps, which resulted in a mistrial, to which the
defendant referred during the Faretta colloquy, his counsels’ plan was to concede
only that he was involved in the attempted aggravated escape, a fact wholly
supported by the testimony of numerous inmates and correctional officers and
defendant’s own actions and statements before, and following, efforts to secure the
Camp D education building. During the first trial, defense counsel stated:
Let me tell you right now, ladies and gentlemen, because I’m
not here to try to fool you or mislead you in any way. Evidence is
going to be presented that will prove that Jeffrey Clark was involved
in the aggravated - in the attempted aggravated escape. I’m not here
to tell you any different, but I want you to know the truth.
But what the evidence isn’t going to show is that Jeffrey Clark
was involved in the death, the first-degree murder death, of Captain
Knapps. He did not have specific intent to kill or commit great bodily
harm. He did not know that whoever killed Captain Knapps had that
specific intent to kill or create great bodily harm.
* * *
The evidence is going to show that he did not have specific
intent to kill or commit great bodily harm; therefore, he is not guilty
of first-degree murder.
Indeed, the defendant’s own explanation for seeking to represent himself on
specific aspects of the trial (in questioning the fact witnesses during the guilt
phase), as stated during the extensive Faretta colloquies between the defendant
and the trial court, does not support the argument now presented. 61 In addition, the
defendant explained during his opening statement that the reason he invoked his
right to participate in his representation was “because it [was] important to [him]
that you ladies and gentlemen of the jury get an opportunity to gauge the type of
61
In the sealed portion of the Faretta colloquy, the defendant explained that he did not have a
conflict with his counsel, but rather a difference in opinion regarding the proper way of
presenting the case. He explained that he would “much prefer the death penalty” over counsels’
approach of building jury trust by admitting participation in the attempted aggravated escape,
thereby rendering a second degree murder conviction and life sentence more likely, because he
would have more assistance with his appeal and post-conviction efforts and therefore, in his
view, a greater chance to have his conviction overturned.
61
person [he is] . . . better if [he] talk[s] and look[s] at [them], rather than if [he] just
sit[s] mute at defense counsel [table].”
As a general matter, an acknowledgment of some degree of culpability may
form part of sound defense strategy. See, e.g., State v. Brooks, 505 So.2d 714,
724 (La. 1987) (trial counsel’s strategy in acknowledging the defendant bore some
culpability, in being in the company of the murderer at the scene of the crime, did
not constitute ineffective assistance), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 947, 108 S.Ct. 337, 98
L.Ed.2d 363 (1987); State v. Holmes, 95-0208, pp. 7-8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/29/96),
670 So.2d 573, 577-78. See also State v. McCoy, 14-1449, 2016 WL 6506004
(La. 10/19/16), ___ So.3d ___.
In addition, the defendant does not challenge the adequacy of the trial
court’s compliance with Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45
L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), ensuring the defendant’s decision to represent himself, during
certain aspects of the trial, was clear and unequivocal. 62 Nor could he reasonably
62
Both the Louisiana and federal constitutions guarantee a criminal defendant’s right to
assistance of counsel. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799
(1963); State v. Brooks, 452 So.2d 149, 155 (La. 1984). Nevertheless, an accused may elect to
waive the right to counsel and represent himself. The assertion of the right to self-representation
must be clear and unequivocal. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. at 2541; State v. Hegwood,
345 So.2d 1179, 1181-82 (La. 1977). The relinquishment of counsel must be knowing and
intelligent. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-65, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed.2d 1461
(1938); State v. Strain, 585 So.2d 540, 542-43 (La. 1991). The Supreme Court has expressly
declined to “prescribe . . . any formula or script to be read to a defendant who states that he elects
to proceed without counsel.” Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 88, 124 S.Ct. 1379, 1387, 158
L.Ed.2d 209 (2004). However, the accused “should be made aware of the dangers and
disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that he knows what he is
doing and his choice is made with eyes open.” Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. at 2541
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). See also United States v. Davis, 269 F.3d 514,
518-19 (5th Cir. 2001) (noting that, although the court “has consistently required . . . Faretta
warnings,” there is “no sacrosanct litany for warning defendants against waiving the right to
counsel,” and district courts must exercise discretion “[d]epending on the circumstances of the
individual case”). In addressing the issue of standby counsel, this court has held that “[h]ybrid
representation in which a defendant acts in tandem with counsel in questioning witnesses or in
presenting closing argument does not implicate Faretta.” State v. Mathieu, 10-2421, pp. 7-8
(La. 7/1/11), 68 So.3d 1015, 1019 (citing United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662, 683 (6th Cir.
2004); United States v. Leggett, 81 F.3d 220, 222 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). However, this court has
cautioned that “to the extent that hybrid representation in which defendant and counsel ‘act, in
effect, as co-counsel, with each speaking for the defense during different phases of the trial,’
results partially in pro se representation, ‘allowing it without a proper Faretta inquiry can create
constitutional difficulties.’” State v. Mathieu, 10-2421 at p. 8, 68 So.3d at 1019 (quoting 3
LaFave, Criminal Procedure, § 11.5(g), pp. 765-67).
62
do so, as the record reflects over thirty pages of discussion regarding the
defendant’s capacity, knowledge, and ability to comply with courtroom,
evidentiary, and criminal procedure, with his attorneys’ assistance, understanding
of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, and the voluntary nature of
his request.63 Following this colloquy, which took place just before the
commencement of the Witherspoon64 voir dire, the trial court granted the
defendant’s request to act as co-counsel to represent himself with his attorneys’
assistance, as to the questioning of fact witnesses for the State and defense, with
the understanding that his attorneys would handle all expert witnesses and, if
necessary, all aspects of the penalty phase, as defendant requested. The following
day, the trial court held another conference, in chambers, to determine if the
defendant should be appointed lead counsel and to cl
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