suggesting that the City Charter language “must be obeyed” because the “voters have the last word,” and the City and union are not free to “simply ignore” the 2001 Charter amendment in a collective bargaining agreement
How later courts described this case
- suggesting that the City Charter language “must be obeyed” because the “voters have the last word,” and the City and union are not free to “simply ignore” the 2001 Charter amendment in a collective bargaining agreement
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Hildebrandt, J.,
dissenting.
{¶ 45} Because I believe that there was substantial evidence demonstrating that the city had acted in bad faith by placing the charter amendment on the ballot and because the city violated R.C. Chapter 4117 by refusing to bargain over the change to the terms and conditions of employment for assistant police chiefs, I dissent.
{¶ 46} Although the majority recognizes that one of the essential purposes of R.C. Chapter 4117 is to promote good-faith bargaining, it fails to uphold that purpose. There was substantial evidence in the record that the city had acted in bad faith. The mayor of the city and other city officials publicly acknowledged that the CBA would have to be renegotiated if the charter amendment passed. But instead of requesting that the union enter into midterm bargaining, the city chose to unilaterally implement the charter amendment, which changed the terms and conditions of employment for assistant police chiefs that the city had originally agreed upon. This did not demonstrate or support a finding of “good faith.”
{¶ 47} Further, I agree with the trial court that the term “higher-level legislative body” contemplates a situation where a superior legislative or executive authority acts beyond the control of the public entity that is the party to the labor agreement in such a way that it frustrates the purpose of the labor agreement. It does not apply in a situation where, as here, the city, the public-entity party to the CBA, places legislation before the voters that unilaterally affects the terms and conditions of employment already agreed upon in the CBA. I find it relevant that but for city council placing the charter amendment on the ballot, the voters could not have approved the charter amendment. (The city council was essentially the public-entity party to the CBA here, as city council had the ultimate authority to approve all labor agreements that the city entered into.)
{¶ 48} Thus, the charter amendment was not the “will of the people,” as the city argues, but instead was the will of the city. Unfortunately, SERB has set a
*582
dangerous precedent by allowing the city to circumvent the rights of the union and to frustrate the purpose of Ohio’s collective-bargaining law by allowing a public employer to agree to certain terms and conditions of employment with a union and then shortly thereafter pass legislation that conflicts with those terms. “Courts should not allow public employers to disregard the terms of their collective bargaining agreements whenever they find it convenient to do so. On the contrary, the courts will require public employers to honor their contractual obligations to their employees just as the courts require employees to honor their contractual obligations to their employers.”
15
15
.
Mahoning Cty. Bd. of Mental Retardation & Developmental Disabilities v. Mahoning Cty. TMR Edn. Assn.
(1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 80, 84 , 488 N.E.2d 872 .