stating that “pretermitting any question of bad faith, which is not here raised, it is our conclusion that the attorney general, as the chief law officer of the state, was fully empowered to make any bona fide disposition of the cause as in his judgment might be deemed to be to the best interest of the state, unless inhibited by organic law”
How later courts described this case
- stating that “pretermitting any question of bad faith, which is not here raised, it is our conclusion that the attorney general, as the chief law officer of the state, was fully empowered to make any bona fide disposition of the cause as in his judgment might be deemed to be to the best interest of the state, unless inhibited by organic law”
- noting that the attorney general’s “ ‘power ... to control litigation involves the power to discontinue if and when, in his opinion, this should be done.’ ” (quoting 5 Am.Jur. 240 § 11)
- acknowledging “the broad powers 52 Case: 17-11009 Date Filed: 12/13/2019 Page: 53 of 83 vested in the attorney general both by common law and under various statutes” and referring to the Attorney General as “the chief law officer of the state”
- attorney general could, over the objection of the director of the Department of Revenue, settle an action the attorney general had filed; governor’s power not involved
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
On Rehearing.
PER CURIAM.
Because of the earnestness of able counsel in their contention that the rendition of •the consent judgment partakes of that judicial character which forbade the issuance of the writ to coerce performance by the lower court, we think this brief ■response to be in order.
Whatever may be the holdings elsewhere, this court has long been committed to the' principle that the act of rendering a consent judgment, lawfully agreed upon between parties, sui juris, and within the jurisdiction of the court, is ministerial and not judicial as these terms are considered in that connection. Mudd v. Lanier, 247 Ala. 363 , 24 So.2d 550 (4); Cowley v. Farrow, 193 Ala. 381, 383 , 69 So. 114 ; Carr v. Illinois Central R. Co., 180 Ala. 159, 166 , 60 So. 277 , 43 L.R.A., N.S., 634.
The fact that the public interest is involved in no way detracts from the soundness of the principle if, as was pointed out in the original opinion, the consent agreement was lawful, that is, one made in. good faith and within the power of the attorney general to enter into.
With due respect to the able argument advanced on rehearing, we think the principles originally announced to be sound and well supported by competent authority and therefore adhere thereto.
Opinion extended and’ application for rehearing overruled.
FOSTER, LAWSON, and STAKELY, JJ., concur.
BROWN and LIVINGSTON, JJ., dissent.