Megaland GP, L.L.C. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision (Slip Opinion)

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as

Megaland GP, L.L.C. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-4918.]

NOTICE

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in

an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested

to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio,

65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or

other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be

made before the opinion is published.

SLIP OPINION NO. 2015-OHIO-4918

MEGALAND GP, L.L.C., APPELLEE, v. FRANKLIN COUNTY BOARD OF REVISION

ET AL.; COLUMBUS CITY SCHOOLS BOARD OF EDUCATION, APPELLANT.

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it

may be cited as Megaland GP, L.L.C. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision,

Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-4918.]

Board of Tax Appeals—Procedure—Small-claims docket—A “party that is a

taxpayer” for purposes of R.C. 5703.021 means one whose standing as a

party to the case before the BTA is predicated on the ownership of taxable

property in the county under R.C. 5715.19(A)(1).

(No. 2014-1977—Submitted June 9, 2015—Decided December 3, 2015.)

APPEAL from the Board of Tax Appeals, No. 2014-3677.

____________________

Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} This case comes before us on an appeal filed by the Columbus City

Schools Board of Education from an interim order of the Board of Tax Appeals

(“BTA”), denying the school board’s motion to return this case back to the BTA’s

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regular docket from its small-claims docket. See R.C. 5703.021(D). The school

board seeks a reversal of that order.

{¶ 2} We must first decide whether we have jurisdiction over this appeal;

if we do, we must then decide whether the BTA erred in denying the school

board’s motion to have the case returned to the BTA’s regular docket.

{¶ 3} We answer the first question in the affirmative and the second in the

negative. We therefore exercise jurisdiction to review the interim order, and we

affirm the BTA’s denial of the school board’s motion. We also remand for

further proceedings.

BACKGROUND: THE BTA’S SMALL-CLAIMS DOCKET

{¶ 4} In 2013, the General Assembly passed Sub.H.B. No. 138, intended

as a BTA reform bill. 2013 Ohio Laws File 37. One part of that act created a

“small claims docket” at the BTA. See R.C. 5703.021.

{¶ 5} The two key distinctions between small-claims cases and those on

the regular docket are that (1) small-claims cases have less formal (and

presumably less expensive) hearings and (2) the BTA’s decisions in small-claims

cases are not appealable. R.C. 5703.021(E) and (F). The school board states that

the latter provision is the reason it is pursuing an appeal from the BTA’s interim

order here: if it does not succeed in removing the case from the small-claims

docket, the BTA’s ultimate disposition cannot be appealed.

{¶ 6} Under R.C. 5703.021(B), the small-claims docket is available for the

following types of cases:

 Appeals to the BTA from the boards of revision in which the property

at issue qualifies for the 10 percent tax reduction (sometimes called

“rollback”) set forth in R.C. 319.302, i.e., the property is used as one-,

two-, or three-family residential real estate or for farming. It is this

provision that justified referral to the small-claims docket in this case.

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 Appeals from determinations of the tax commissioner or of municipal-

income-tax review boards in which the amount of tax in controversy

does not exceed $10,000.

{¶ 7} Procedurally, an appeal to the BTA is assigned to the small-claims

docket in one of two instances:

 If “the appellant is one or more taxpayers that requests assignment of

the appeal to the small claims docket,” R.C. 5703.021(C)(1)(a), which

is the situation in this case.

 If “the appellant is not a taxpayer, and the appellant files with the

notice of appeal a written statement from every taxpayer that is a party

to the appeal stating that each such taxpayer consents to the appeal

being assigned to the small claims docket,” R.C. 5703.021(C)(1)(b).

{¶ 8} R.C. 5703.021(D) requires the BTA to return small-claims-docket

cases to the regular docket under three circumstances:1

 Upon the request of a party that is a taxpayer,

 When the appeal presents an issue of public or great general interest or

presents a constitutional issue, or

 When the BTA determines that the appeal does not meet the

requirements for assigning the case to the small-claims docket under

R.C. 5703.021(B).

The school board’s motion was predicated solely on the first reason.

1

On December 5, 2014, the school board filed an appeal from a similar BTA order in Sarsol,

L.L.C. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, case No. 2014-2090. We dismissed that case for failure to

prosecute when the school board failed to file a brief. 141 Ohio St.3d 1482, 2015-Ohio-722, 26

N.E.3d 819. In Sarsol, the BTA interpreted R.C. 5703.021(D) to require that the school board

both be a “taxpayer” and “also allege that ‘the appeal presents an issue of public or great general

interest or presents a constitutional issue’ or request that the board determine that the appeal does

not qualify for the small claims docket.” BTA No. 2014-3657, 2014 Ohio Tax LEXIS 5412, 1-2

(Dec. 2, 2014). The school board treats that holding as being at issue here and argues that it is

wrong. But a review of the record indicates that the conjunctive reading that the BTA gave the

statute in Sarsol is not at issue here. Accordingly, we decline to address the point.

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PROCEDURAL HISTORY

{¶ 9} Megaland GP, L.L.C., holds title to a parcel of residential real estate

and filed a complaint in March 2013 challenging the auditor’s valuation of the

property at issue for tax year 2012. The school board filed a countercomplaint

seeking retention of the auditor’s valuation.

{¶ 10} After holding a hearing, the Franklin County Board of Revision

(“BOR”) dismissed the complaint under R.C. 5715.19(A)(2) because it was the

second-filed complaint by Megaland within a triennial “interim period.”

Although the owner had indicated that “the property lost value due to a casualty”

on the complaint form as a reason justifying the second filing, see R.C.

5715.19(A)(2)(b), the BOR apparently concluded that the basis for the complaint

was an ongoing condition, not an event that occurred that would justify a new

complaint for tax year 2012.

{¶ 11} Megaland appealed to the BTA from the dismissal order. On the

prescribed form of the notice of appeal, Megaland marked “yes” in response to a

question asking whether the case should be referred to the small-claims docket.

Pursuant to the BTA’s rules, the case was placed on the small-claims docket. See

Ohio Adm.Code 5717-1-07.

{¶ 12} On or about October 8, 2014, the school board filed a motion to

return the case to the regular docket, stating two grounds for doing so. First, the

school board claimed that because the BOR order appealed from was a dismissal

rather than a determination of value, the case did not qualify for the small-claims

docket. Second, the school board claimed that it was a taxpayer and invoked the

right under R.C. 5703.021(D) of “a party that is a taxpayer” to demand that the

case be returned to the regular docket.

{¶ 13} On October 16, 2014, the BTA examiner issued an order denying

the motion. It states,

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The board of education * * * has not alleged that the appeal

“presents an issue of public or great general interest or presents a

constitutional issue” and its contention that the appeal does not

meet the requirements of R.C. 5703.021(B) are [sic] not well

taken. Accordingly, the BOE’s motion is overruled and the small

claims telephonic hearing shall proceed as currently scheduled.

BTA No. 2014-3677, 2014 Ohio Tax LEXIS 4753, 1 (Oct. 16, 2014). The school

board has appealed from the denial of its motion.

THE ORDER APPEALED FROM IS A FINAL, APPEALABLE ORDER

{¶ 14} Because we have before us an interim order rather than a decision

disposing of all claims as to all parties, we issued an order requiring the school

board to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for lack of a final,

appealable order. The school board responded to the show-cause order on April

29, 2015.

{¶ 15} In its response, the school board cited R.C. 2505.02(B)(2) and our

decision in Southside Community Dev. Corp. v. Levin, 116 Ohio St.3d 1209,

2007-Ohio-6665, 878 N.E.2d 1048.

{¶ 16} In Southside Community Dev. Corp., we decided that appeals from

BTA decisions are subject to analysis under the “final order” provision, R.C.

2505.02(B). Id. at ¶ 5. Specifically, BTA appeals constitute “special

proceedings” under R.C. 2505.02(B), and if a BTA interim order “affect[s] a

substantial right,” it may be immediately appealed to this court. Id. at ¶ 6-7. A

“substantial right” is a “right that the United States Constitution, the Ohio

Constitution, a statute, the common law, or a rule of procedure entitles a person to

enforce or protect.” R.C. 2505.02(A)(1). We have held that the right of a board

of education to participate in real-property-valuation proceedings constitutes a

substantial right for purposes of R.C. 2505.02. See MB West Chester, L.L.C. v.

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Butler Cty. Bd. of Revision, 126 Ohio St.3d 430, 2010-Ohio-3781, 934 N.E.2d

928, ¶ 14.

{¶ 17} There are two prongs of the test for determining whether a BTA

interim order meets the appealability standard: the existence and substantiality of

the right, and the efficacy of a later appeal. See Cleveland Clinic Found. v. Levin,

120 Ohio St.3d 1210, 2008-Ohio-6197, 898 N.E.2d 589, ¶ 6-7. The first prong is

resolved by MB West Chester. Just as the board of education in that case had a

“substantial right” to notification and participation in the taxpayer’s appeal there,

so too does the school board in this case have a substantial right to participate in

Megaland’s BTA appeal by virtue of its status as countercomplainant below.

{¶ 18} As for the second prong, there can be no question that the school

board’s position cannot be vindicated on a later appeal, because the BTA’s

retention of the case on the small-claims docket effectively forecloses any appeal

from the ultimate BTA decision, under R.C. 5703.021(F).

{¶ 19} We conclude that we have jurisdiction to consider the claim of

error that the school board raises in this appeal. Before doing so, we note that

usually, parties are afforded the opportunity for oral argument in appeals from the

BTA. S.Ct.Prac.R. 17.01(B), 17.07. However, in interlocutory appeals such as

this, we have expedited our decision in order to avoid undue delay in the

prosecution of the case below. See Cleveland Clinic Found. at ¶ 14. Here, the

briefing is complete and we proceed to decide the merits without oral argument.2

2

We also note that Megaland’s brief was submitted and signed by Normann Rafizadeh, who is not

an attorney licensed to practice law in the state of Ohio. With certain exceptions not applicable

here, a non-attorney who prepares legal papers to be filed in court on behalf of a corporate entity

such as a limited liability company engages in the unauthorized practice of law. Disciplinary

Counsel v. Kafele, 108 Ohio St.3d 283, 2006-Ohio-904, 843 N.E.2d 169, ¶ 14-15. Accordingly,

we sua sponte strike Megaland’s brief from the record and admonish Mr. Rafizadeh to desist from

any further unauthorized practice of law.

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THE SCHOOL BOARD’S MOTION WAS PROPERLY DENIED BECAUSE ITS STANDING

AS A PARTY DID NOT DEPEND UPON ITS OWNING TAXABLE PROPERTY

{¶ 20} R.C. 5703.021(D) provides,

Notwithstanding division (B) of this section, the board shall

reassign an appeal initially assigned to the small claims docket to

the regular docket upon the request of a party that is a taxpayer,

when the appeal presents an issue of public or great general

interest or presents a constitutional issue, or when the board

determines that the appeal does not meet the requirements of

division (B) of this section.

(Emphasis added).

{¶ 21} The school board claims that it is “a taxpayer” under this provision.

The school board did indeed own taxable property in Franklin County during the

time period at issue. The question here is one of statutory construction: Does the

school board qualify as “a party that is a taxpayer” for purposes of returning the

case to the regular docket?

{¶ 22} We hold that “a party that is a taxpayer” under R.C. 5703.021(D)

means one whose standing as a party to the case before the BTA is predicated on

the ownership of taxable property in the county under R.C. 5715.19(A)(1).

Because the school board’s status as a party to these proceedings depends solely

upon its having filed a countercomplaint before the BOR in its capacity as an

affected board of education pursuant to R.C. 5715.19(B), the school board does

not come within the intended meaning of “taxpayer” for purposes of R.C.

5703.021.

{¶ 23} Indeed, there can be little doubt that by authorizing “taxpayers” to

obtain both referral of the case to the small-claims docket under R.C. 5703.021(C)

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and removal of the case back to the regular docket under subsection (D), the

legislature intended to withhold the privileges provided under the statute from

those parties whose standing is predicated on their status as public officials or

boards. Otherwise, almost any party would be accorded those privileges, and the

whole point of making them hinge on taxpayer status would be lost.

{¶ 24} We also note that R.C. 5703.021(C)(2) permits referral to the

small-claims docket by a nontaxpayer if that party presents a written agreement of

all the taxpayers supporting the referral. Under the school board’s reading of the

statute, if the county auditor or the board of revision as a party to the BTA appeal

desired to refer the case to the small-claims docket, the auditor or the board of

revision would have to ascertain whether the board of education in the case

happened to own taxable property in order to determine whether the board of

education’s consent to the referral was needed.

{¶ 25} We reject the school board’s reading and conclude that the

legislature intended the parties to be able to ascertain “taxpayer” status under R.C.

5703.021 by reviewing the record in the case as to the standing of each party and

that it did not intend to require an additional inquiry into whether a governmental

board happened to own taxable property in the county.

{¶ 26} It is important to state here what we are not holding. We do not

hold that a board of education can never qualify as “a party that is a taxpayer”

under R.C. 5703.021(D). Under R.C. 5715.19(A)(1), a board of education that

owned taxable property in the same county as the property at issue could

theoretically file a valuation complaint in its capacity as property owner; if it did

so, it could qualify as a “taxpayer” under R.C. 5703.021. That issue is not

presented here, and we do not decide it; we note only that our holding in this case

does not extend to that situation.

{¶ 27} In the present case, the school board is a party only by virtue of its

countercomplaint. Its standing to have filed the countercomplaint under R.C.

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5715.19(B) depended on its being a board of education; its status as a property

owner was completely irrelevant. Under these circumstances, we hold that the

school board could not invoke its status as an owner of taxable property for

purposes of qualifying as a “party that is a taxpayer” under R.C. 5703.021. The

BTA therefore acted reasonably and lawfully in denying its motion.

CONCLUSION

{¶ 28} For the foregoing reasons, we exercise jurisdiction in this appeal,

and we affirm the BTA’s order denying the school board’s motion to return the

case from the small-claims docket to the regular BTA docket. We also remand to

the BTA for further proceedings.

Judgment accordingly.

O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER and O’NEILL, JJ., concur.

O’DONNELL, J., concurs in judgment only.

LANZINGER, KENNEDY, and FRENCH, JJ., dissent.

_________________

FRENCH, J., dissenting.

{¶ 29} I respectfully dissent from the judgment affirming the interim order

of the Board of Tax Appeals (“BTA”), which denied the Columbus City Schools

Board of Education’s motion to return this case from the BTA’s small-claims

docket to its regular docket. In my view, R.C. 5703.021(D) unambiguously

requires the BTA to grant the school board’s motion. I would therefore reverse

the interim order and remand this case for further proceedings on the BTA’s

regular docket.

{¶ 30} The question here is whether the school board is “a party that is a

taxpayer” under R.C. 5703.021(D), which requires the BTA to reassign an appeal

initially assigned to the small-claims docket to the BTA’s regular docket “upon

the request of a party that is a taxpayer.” If the school board is “a party that is a

taxpayer,” the BTA was obligated to return this appeal to its regular docket.

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{¶ 31} Property owner Megaland GP, L.L.C., appealed to the BTA after

the Franklin County Board of Revision dismissed Megaland’s valuation

complaint. Upon Megaland’s request, the BTA assigned the appeal to its small-

claims docket pursuant to R.C. 5703.021(C). The school board, a

countercomplainant, filed a motion to return the appeal to the BTA’s regular

docket, arguing that the appeal did not qualify for the small-claims docket and

that regardless, it had a right as a party-taxpayer to demand that the case be

returned to the regular docket pursuant to R.C. 5703.021(D). Without addressing

the school board’s status as a party-taxpayer, the BTA denied the school board’s

motion upon its determination that the appeal met the statutory requirements for

the small-claims docket. BTA No. 2014-3677, 2014 Ohio Tax LEXIS 4753 (Oct.

16, 2014). The majority opinion affirms based on its conclusion that the school

board is not “a party that is a taxpayer” under R.C. 5703.021(D).

{¶ 32} “The primary rule in statutory construction is to give effect to the

legislature’s intention.” Cline v. Ohio Bur. of Motor Vehicles, 61 Ohio St.3d 93,

97, 573 N.E.2d 77 (1991). To discern legislative intent, we consider the statutory

language, reading all words and phrases in context and in accordance with rules of

grammar and common usage. State ex rel. Steele v. Morrissey, 103 Ohio St.3d

355, 2004-Ohio-4960, 815 N.E.2d 1107, ¶ 21; R.C. 1.42. When statutory

language is unambiguous, we apply it as written, without resort to additional rules

of statutory interpretation or considerations of public policy. Zumwalde v.

Madeira & Indian Hill Joint Fire Dist., 128 Ohio St.3d 492, 2011-Ohio-1603,

946 N.E.2d 748, ¶ 23-24, 26.

{¶ 33} The statutory language in R.C. 5703.021(D) is unambiguous and

requires no further interpretation. Written in broad terms, R.C. 5703.021(D)

requires the BTA to reassign an appeal to the regular docket upon request by “a

party that is a taxpayer.” The school board became a party to this action upon the

filing of its countercomplaint. R.C. 5715.19(B). And as the majority opinion

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acknowledges, the school board is a taxpayer that owns real property in Franklin

County. Nothing more is required. I therefore agree with the school board’s

claims that it is “a party that is a taxpayer” under R.C. 5703.021(D) and that it

therefore had a right to demand that the case be returned to the BTA’s regular

docket.

{¶ 34} Without expressly finding ambiguity in the statutory language, the

majority opinion impermissibly restricts that language by holding that “ ‘a party

that is a taxpayer’ under R.C. 5703.021(D) means one whose standing as a party

to the case before the BTA is predicated on the ownership of taxable property in

the county under R.C. 5715.19(A)(1).” (Emphasis added.) Majority opinion at

¶ 22 Under R.C. 5715.19(A)(1), those who may file a valuation complaint

include “[a]ny person owning taxable real property in the county,” whether or not

the owner of the subject property, and “the board of education of any school

district with any territory in the county.” Under R.C. 5715.19(B), those who may

then file a countercomplaint include the owner of the subject property and a

school board.

{¶ 35} While acknowledging that a board of education qualifies as “a

party that is a taxpayer” when it files a valuation complaint in its capacity as a

property owner, the majority opinion suggests that the General Assembly

intended to distinguish a party who has filed a valuation complaint by virtue of its

ownership of taxable property from a school board whose standing arises under

R.C. 5715.19(B) simply from its status as a board of education, as is the case here.

But nothing in R.C. 5703.021(D) suggests the need to consider the source of a

party’s standing. Had the General Assembly intended the right in R.C.

5703.021(D) to extend only to taxpayers who file complaints pursuant to R.C.

5715.19(A)(1) based on their ownership of taxable property, it could easily have

said so in R.C. 5703.021(D). The General Assembly did not, however,

incorporate into the statutory language the distinction that the majority opinion

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draws. Whether the school board’s right to participate in this action is premised

upon its status as a taxpayer or upon its status as a school board is irrelevant under

R.C. 5703.021(D) when the school board is a taxpayer in the county.

{¶ 36} Because the plain statutory language of R.C. 5703.021(D) does not

support the limitation the majority opinion grafts onto it, I respectfully dissent and

would reverse the BTA’s interim order and remand this matter to the BTA for

further proceedings on its regular docket.

LANZINGER and KENNEDY, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion.

_________________

Rich & Gillis Law Group, L.L.C., and Mark H. Gillis, for appellant.

_________________

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