The People v. Rhian Taylor

No. 134

The People &c.,

Respondent,

v.

Rhian Taylor,

Appellant.

Joel B. Rudin, for appellant.

Sharon Y. Brodt, for respondent.

ABDUS-SALAAM, J.:

The dispositive issue on this appeal is whether a trial

court abuses its discretion and commits reversible error when, in

response to a request from a deliberating jury, it does not

provide the jury with a substantial portion of requested evidence

regarding the potential bias of key prosecution witnesses and

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then suggests to the jury that there is no other evidence

relevant to its inquiry. Under the circumstances of this case,

we hold that the trial court abused its discretion in taking such

actions, necessitating reversal of defendant's convictions.

I.

Based on his alleged shooting of Wayne Peacock and

Darion Brown, which resulted in Brown's death, defendant Rhian

Taylor was indicted and tried on charges of murder in the second

degree (see Penal Law § 125.25 [1]), attempted murder in the

second degree (see Penal Law §§ 110.00; 125.25 [1]), assault in

the first degree (see Penal Law § 120.10 [1]), assault in the

second degree (see Penal Law § 120.05), reckless endangerment in

the first degree (see Penal Law § 120.25) and two counts of

criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (see Penal

Law §§ 265.03 [1] [b]; 265.03 [3]). According to the People's

proof at trial, the shooting occurred during a dispute outside

the location of a party in Queens.

Specifically, on the night of August 10, 2007, Brown

drove Peacock, as well as their friends Seprel Turner and Anthony

Hilton, to the site of the festivities. Upon their arrival and

while they remained in the car, Brown tried to flirt with a

friend of Hilton's, despite Hilton's admonition not to do so. A

man, whom Turner and Hilton later identified as defendant,

purportedly took offense at Brown's actions and shot into the

car, striking Brown repeatedly in the torso. One shot also hit

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Peacock, who immediately woke from a nap in the passenger seat

and hence did not see the shooter's face. Brown frantically

drove away but soon hit a nearby pole, and he was knocked

unconscious. Peacock, Turner and Hilton scattered. Turner and

Hilton then met up at Turner's house. About 10 minutes later,

Hilton and Turner returned to the scene of the shooting, and

although the police had already arrived, the men did not speak to

the officers. The officers retrieved Brown from the car, and he

was rushed to the hospital, where he died.

Within a couple of days, Peacock led the police to

Turner, who was shown a photo array and identified defendant as

the shooter. Acting on this identification, the police searched

for defendant, who eventually surrendered. On August 14, Turner

identified defendant in a lineup. Meanwhile, Hilton learned that

the police were looking for him, and he decided to speak to them;

in Hilton's telling, "[b]ecause they w[ere] riding around the

neighborhood with [his] picture" and he was "going to court for a

case," he "felt [he] had to take care of it." Hilton informed

the police of his observations of the crime, and he identified

defendant in a photo array as the perpetrator.

Months later, in 2008, Hilton was arrested on unrelated

charges. Because Hilton was already on probation in connection

with another criminal matter, he was charged with violating his

probation. When Hilton appeared in court to answer the

specifications of a probation violation, the prosecutor who

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handled the instant case also attended that court appearance and

requested that no bail be set in Hilton's case. In August 2009,

Hilton pleaded guilty to the violation without any negotiated

plea. The court returned Hilton to a five-year term of

probation. While he continued serving his probation term, Hilton

shoplifted a scarf from a store, leading to his arrest and

eventual conviction on a charge of criminal possession of stolen

property. Hilton also had prior convictions for menacing and

disorderly conduct.

As for Turner, over a year after the shooting, in late

2009, he was arrested for unlawfully possessing a weapon.

Thereafter, the People and Turner negotiated a plea agreement,

under which Turner would plead guilty to criminal possession of a

weapon in the second degree, a felony, and to criminal possession

of a weapon in the fourth degree, a misdemeanor, and if he

testified truthfully at defendant's trial, the felony charge

would be dismissed and Turner could re-plead to the misdemeanor

charge, resulting in a purely probationary sentence. On February

25, 2010, Turner pleaded guilty to the aforementioned charges and

executed a written cooperation agreement memorializing the

bargain.

At trial, Turner acknowledged that he would obtain

other benefits as a natural consequence of the deal. For

example, by receiving only a misdemeanor conviction, he could not

be sentenced as a second felony offender on any future crime that

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he might commit. And, Turner, who was pursuing a career as a rap

artist, would avoid incarceration, thereby ensuring that he would

not jeopardize his recently signed contract with a record label

due to imprisonment. As previously noted, Turner and Hilton were

the only witnesses who identified defendant as the man who shot

Brown and Peacock.

After the presentation of proof of the foregoing facts

at trial, the parties presented their summation arguments. In

his summation, defense counsel argued that Hilton and Turner had

been motivated to testify falsely against defendant, and in

addition to the People's written cooperation agreement with

Turner, counsel cited Turner's testimony about the additional

benefits he would naturally receive from his plea and Hilton's

testimony about the People's intervention at his probation

hearing as proof of the witnesses' bias in favor of the People.

Counsel also argued that Hilton had a motive to kill Brown out of

jealousy over Brown's flirtation with Hilton's friend, and

counsel denounced Turner and Hilton as untrustworthy criminals

whose testimony should be discounted. In her summation, the

prosecutor countered that the only material benefits which Turner

had received were those set forth in the cooperation agreement,

and she insisted that the People's advocacy for Hilton's release

without bail in his case did not give Hilton a motive to testify

favorably to the People in this case.

Prior to the start of the jury's deliberations, the

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parties agreed that the court could submit any exhibits in

evidence to the jury upon request without having to reconvene the

parties and the jury in open court. The next day, the

deliberations commenced, and before any proceedings occurred in

open court, the jury issued three notes. The first note said,

"We would like to see all the People's exhibits of the car,

inside, outside and the scene in evidence collected." The second

note said, "We would like to see two photo arrays. We would also

like a sketch of the scene." The third note stated, "We would

like a readback of Anthony Hilton's testimony and S. Turner's

testimony with regard to their stories about being in the car

prior to and up to just after the shooting." When proceedings

resumed on the record, the court read the three notes to the

parties and explained that the first two had already been

"complied with pursuant to [the parties'] agreement." With

respect to the third note requesting a readback of Hilton's and

Turner's testimony, the court announced that it was ready to

respond with the readback. The parties did not object to the

court's responses to the notes, either as previously delivered or

proposed, and the court had the testimony requested in the third

note read to the jury.

The next day, prior to the start of proceedings on the

record, the jury issued its fourth and fifth notes. The fourth

note declared, "[W]e would like to see the benefits offered to

Mr. Hilton and Mr. Turner, please." The fifth note stated, "We

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would like to have definition of reasonable doubt." In response

to the fourth note asking to see the benefits offered to the

witnesses, the court sent the jurors the written cooperation

agreement between the People and Turner, without consulting the

parties. Thereafter, on the record, the court allowed the

parties to inspect the two notes, and it read the contents of the

notes aloud.

Defense counsel objected to the court's response to the

fourth note. Counsel essentially asserted that the response was

incomplete without a readback of Turner's and Hilton's testimony

about the benefits they had received outside the context of the

written cooperation agreement, such as the career-related and

sentencing benefits to Turner and the pretrial release obtained

by Hilton in his probation matter. The court replied that the

jurors "didn't ask for that" and had "gotten the agreement,"

adding, "If they want anything more I'll be there to listen."

When the court returned the jurors to the courtroom, it said, "I

believe we sent in to you the cooperation agreement with Mr.

Turner. That's what is in evidence." Next, the court proceeded

to answer the fifth note, stated, "We will be here if you need

anything," and sent the jurors back to the jury room.

Outside the presence of the jury, the court told

defense counsel that its comments had accurately indicated to the

jurors that they had received only an agreement between the

People and Turner in response to their request and that they

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could ask for additional materials if they so desired. Referring

to the court's statement to the jury about "what [was] in

evidence," counsel responded by suggesting that this statement

had been inaccurate because the written cooperation agreement did

not represent the entirety of the evidence of the witnesses'

benefits. Counsel reiterated his belief that the jurors had

wanted to receive all evidence of benefits conferred upon both

witnesses, including the testimony about the benefits not

memorialized in the cooperation agreement. The court rejected

counsel's arguments, deciding that the jurors' use of the term

"see" in the fourth note revealed their desire to receive only

evidence that could be visually inspected, i.e., the written

cooperation agreement.

Following the contested fourth note, deliberations

continued for just over two more days, and the jury issued, and

the court answered, several more notes, including one stating

that the jury was deadlocked. Finally, on the fifth day of

deliberations, the jury rendered a verdict convicting defendant

of second-degree murder, second-degree assault, two counts of

second-degree weapons possession and first-degree reckless

endangerment. After post-verdict proceedings not relevant to the

disposition of this appeal, the court sentenced defendant to an

aggregate prison term of 20 years to life, to be followed by five

years of postrelease supervision, and defendant appealed.

The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed defendant's

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convictions (see People v Taylor, 120 AD3d 842, 842-843 [2d Dept

2014]). As relevant here, the Appellate Division rejected

defendant's contention that the trial court had improperly

responded to the fourth jury note by failing to read back

Turner's and Hilton's testimony about the benefits they received

in other cases based on their aid to the People in defendant's

case (see id. at 842-843). Essentially adopting the trial

court's reasoning, the Appellate Division declared, "While it may

have been preferable for the court to seek further clarification

from the jury with respect to its request to 'see the benefits,'

the wording of the subject jury note, particularly when read in

conjunction with several other notes, demonstrated that the jury

was requesting only the physical exhibit," and therefore the

court's "response did not fall outside the acceptable bounds of

its discretion, and thus satisfied the requirement of CPL 310.30"

(id. [internal citations omitted]). A Judge of this Court

granted defendant leave to appeal, and we now reverse.

II.

CPL 310.30 provides that, "[u]pon such request" for

evidence or legal instruction from a deliberating jury, "the

court must direct that the jury be returned to the courtroom and,

after notice to both the people and counsel for the defendant,

and in the presence of the defendant, must give such requested

information or instruction as the court deems proper" (CPL

310.30). Similarly, absent a withdrawal of the jury's inquiry or

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similar circumstances, common-law principles of procedural

fairness generally require the court to furnish the jury with

information requested during its deliberations, and the court has

significant discretion in determining the proper scope and nature

of the response (see People v Gonzalez, 293 NY 259, 262-263

[1944] ["The general rule in the United States is that 'the court

may and ordinarily should give the jurors additional instructions

on their request.'"], quoting 23 C. J. S. Criminal Law, § 1376,

subd. c., at 1046); see also People v Malloy, 55 NY2d 296, 302-

303 [1982]). Thus, regardless of whether the issue is framed

under CPL 310.30 or common-law rules governing jury

deliberations, where, as here, the defendant has preserved for

our review a specific objection to the contents of the trial

court's response to a jury note, we must determine whether the

trial court acted within the bounds of its discretion in

fashioning an answer to the jury's inquiry (see Malloy, 55 NY2d

at 302; see also People v Cooke, 292 NY 185, 188 [1944] [noting

that, under a pre-CPL 310.30 statute, which reflected to some

extent the common law, not every refusal to answer the jury in a

particular manner constituted reversible error]). In determining

whether the trial court abused its discretion and committed

reversible error, "[t]he factors to be evaluated are the form of

the jury's question, which may have to be clarified before it can

be answered, the particular issue of which inquiry is made, the

[information] actually given and the presence or absence of

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prejudice to the defendant" (Malloy, 55 NY2d at 302; see People v

Steinberg, 79 NY2d 673, 684 [1992]).

In this case, an evaluation of those factors

demonstrates that the trial court abused its discretion by

declining to provide the jurors with information that they

plainly wanted and incorrectly characterizing the state of the

evidence on the subject of their inquiry. In that regard, the

form of the jury's request in the fourth note showed that the

jury wished to review all evidence of the benefits which Hilton

and Turner acquired as a result of their assistance in the

prosecution of defendant. Because the jurors asked to see the

benefits offered to "Mr. Hilton and Mr. Turner" (emphasis added),

the form of their inquiry reflected their desire to examine the

evidence of benefits conferred upon both witnesses, and that

evidence necessarily included both the written cooperation

agreement between the People and Turner and the witnesses'

testimony about the advantages of their cooperation with the

People.

Contrary to the trial court's supposition, the jury

could not have desired exclusively to receive the written

cooperation agreement, as that agreement did not provide any

benefits to Hilton and simply memorialized a portion of the

benefits received by Turner. Given the jury's entreaty for all

proof of Turner's and Hilton's gains related to their assistance

in the prosecution of defendant, the court should have supplied

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the jurors not only with the cooperation agreement, but also

with: Turner's testimony that the cooperation agreement's

provision for a non-prison sentence enabled him to keep a

potentially lucrative recording deal; his testimony that his plea

to a misdemeanor allowed him to avoid receiving a predicate

felony offender adjudication on any future conviction; and

Hilton's testimony that the trial prosecutor in defendant's case

spared him from having to post bail in his probation proceeding.

Although, as the trial court noted, the jurors'

expressed wish "to see" the pertinent evidence might have implied

a desire solely to view an exhibit, this single phrase did not

undermine the note's otherwise clear request for the entirety of

the evidence of benefits conferred upon Turner and Hilton,

especially in light of the context in which the note was issued.

Notably, in their summations, both parties disputed the extent to

which the written cooperation agreement and the witnesses'

testimony on the subject of benefits reflected the witnesses'

motives to testify in favor of the People, thereby drawing the

jurors' attention to all of that evidence in a manner that would

naturally prompt them to request that proof in its entirety.

More importantly, prior to the issuance of the fourth note, the

jurors had expressed their desire to visually inspect physical

exhibits by specifically referring to particular physical

objects, such as "photo arrays," "sketch[es]" or "exhibits," and

therefore, had the jurors wanted to receive only the written

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cooperation agreement in reply to their fourth note, they

presumably would have asked to see "the agreement" or "the

exhibit" setting forth the benefits to Turner. Instead, the

jurors framed their request in terms of evidence of "the

benefits" offered to the witnesses, period, without limiting the

inquiry to an "exhibit" or physical object. Given the clear

meaning of the note in context, the court improperly focused on

the phrase "to see" in disregard of the remaining contents of the

note and then proceeded to submit only the cooperation agreement

to the jurors (cf. People v Lykes, 81 NY2d 767, 770 [1993]

[approving the trial court's handling of a jury note in part

because the court "did not limit or channel the jury's

question"]). The court should have at least inquired as to

whether the note in fact meant what its terms and the surrounding

circumstances overwhelmingly suggested.

In addition, since the issue about which the jury

inquired, namely the People's favorable treatment of Turner and

Hilton, was essential to the jury's ability to judge the

credibility of the sole witnesses to identify defendant as

Brown's killer and Peacock's assailant, the court's inadequate

response to the jury's query on that central issue further

reflected the court's abuse of its discretion. Given the lack of

any other testimony or physical evidence that defendant was the

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shooter1, Hilton's and Turner's credibility became the key issue

at trial, and in light of the witnesses' respective criminal

pasts, the truthfulness of their testimony was subject to serious

dispute, calling for particular care in fashioning a fair and

complete response to the jurors' inquiry into the matter. In

addition to the written cooperation agreement, the other evidence

sought by the jurors had an especially strong bearing on the

witnesses' credibility. Indeed, because the requested testimony

showed that the trial prosecutor had helped Hilton to win

pretrial release in another case, this testimony suggested that

Hilton had a motive to testify falsely in favor of the

prosecution at defendant's trial out of gratitude for the

prosecutor's aid. Likewise, Turner's testimony that his

cooperation with the People enabled him to avoid imprisonment,

prevent future adverse sentencing adjudications and continue

making a living showed that he had a motive to give false

testimony against defendant in order to reap those rewards. That

being so, the court abused its discretion by withholding a highly

significant portion of what the jury had asked for regarding an

essential issue at trial (see generally People v Lourido, 70 NY2d

428, 435 [1987]; cf. People v Mercado, 91 NY2d 960, 963 [1998]).

Moreover, after the court failed to supply the jurors

1

Although defendant's DNA was found on a cigarette filter

near several shell casings at the scene of the shooting, this

evidence showed that defendant was in close proximity to the

shooting and not that he was necessarily the shooter.

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with the full extent of the requested evidence, the court made

comments suggesting that the remainder of the sought-after proof

did not exist, and the combination of the court's failure to give

the jury necessary information and its inaccurate follow-up

remarks prejudiced the defense. Specifically, when the court

told the jurors that the written cooperation agreement between

the People and Turner was "what [was] in evidence" in relation to

their note, the court incorrectly indicated that there was no

evidence, other than the agreement, regarding benefits received

by Hilton and Turner, even though testimony about such benefits

did in fact exist. Based on this statement, the jurors may have

erroneously believed that either their recollection of the

existence of such evidence was faulty or the testimony they had

sought was irrelevant, prompting them to cease their inquiry into

this important evidence based on false assumptions. Since the

People's proof of defendant's identity as the shooter was less

than overwhelming and the court's response to the note seriously

inadequate, the court abused its discretion as a matter of law,

and reversal is required.

In reaching this conclusion, we do not signal any

erosion of a trial court's discretion in answering jury notes.

In acting within the bounds of discretion delineated by People v

Malloy (55 NY2d at 296) and similar cases, a trial court retains

leeway to shape its response to the jurors' inquiry based on the

record as a whole and the applicable law, and if the court

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entertains some doubt as to the meaning of a jury note, it can

and should seek clarification from the jury (see Lykes, 81 NY2d

at 769-770). Additionally, if some of the circumstances here

were to arise in isolation in other cases, they might not support

the conclusion that the trial court abused its discretion in

answering a note, for no single factor is dispositive. Thus, we

go no further than to hold that, under the totality of the

circumstances in this case, the trial court abused its discretion

as a matter of law by failing to adequately answer the jurors'

fourth note and creating a false impression of the nature of the

evidence.

III.

Because defendant's challenge to the substance of the

trial court's response to the jury's fourth note mandates

reversal of his convictions, we need not decide whether the court

committed a mode of proceedings error by revealing the contents

of the fourth note to the parties only after it had sent the

cooperation agreement to the jury, and we express no opinion on

that matter. For the same reason, we need not address

defendant's remaining contentions. Accordingly, the order of the

Appellate Division should be reversed and a new trial ordered.

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People v Rhian Taylor

No. 134

RIVERA, J.(concurring):

I concur in the result only, and agree with the

majority that defendant's convictions must be reversed, but on

different grounds. Moreover, because I find the majority's

analysis an unnecessary and overly broad reading of our case law

on the proper handling of jury requests, I decline to join its

interpretation of the legal requirements set by this Court in

this area.

In People v O'Rama (78 NY2d 270, 276-277 [1991]), this

Court held that CPL 310.30 imposes on a court the duty to notify

counsel of a substantive juror inquiry, and the duty to

meaningfully respond to the jury. In accordance with our

interpretation of CPL 310.30, an utter failure to respond cannot

be termed "meaningful" in any sense of the word (see People v

Lourido, 70 NY2d 428, 435 [1987]). Furthermore, we recently

reaffirmed in People v Walston (23 NY3d 986, 989 [2014]) that

fulfillment of these duties is a core responsibility of the trial

court. Thus, the court's failure to fulfil these

responsibilities constitutes a mode of proceedings error, which

does not require preservation (id.; People v Alcide, 21 NY3d 687,

692 [2013] [a mode of proceedings error will result where a judge

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fails to afford meaningful response to the jury]). This error

also requires reversal and a new trial (People v Roberites, 115

AD3d 1291, 1293 [2014] [court's failure to provide notice to

counsel constituted a mode of proceedings error which requires

reversal and a new trial]).

As the majority correctly describes, the jury note

expressed the jurors' desire to review the evidence of the

benefits accorded to Anthony Hilton and Seprel Turner, which

obliged the court to provide evidence relating to both

witnesses.* However, the court failed to provide any information

at all regarding the benefits granted to Hilton, notwithstanding

the existence of testimony in the record readily available to

address such a request. Thus, on the facts of this case, the

*

The fact that the inquiries were included in one jury note

is irrelevant for purposes of the analysis because a court's duty

to provide a meaningful response for each request remains

unchanged, and a complete failure to reply to any inquiry is

error (see People v Stocks, 101 AD3d 1049, 1051 [2d Dept 2012]

[finding O'Rama violation where court failed to provide defense

counsel with notice of jury note, which contained, in part, a

substantive request]; see also People v Brown, 125 AD3d 1550 [4th

Dept 2015] [treating one note with multiple requests as separate

inquiries and finding no O'Rama violation where defense counsel

participated in the formulation of a response to the factual

inquiries, and did not preserve for review the court's response

to the part of the note concerning the readback of testimony];

People v Jackson, 105 AD3d 607 [1st Dept 2013] [finding no

violation but analyzing different parts of one note separately]).

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Court's response to the jury's request to review information

relating to Hilton was no response at all, and as such

constituted a mode of proceedings error under our O'Rama

jurisprudence. That error requires reversal and, therefore,

there is no need to consider, as the majority does, whether

Supreme Court abused its discretion.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Order reversed and a new trial ordered. Opinion by Judge Abdus-

Salaam. Judges Pigott, Stein and Fahey concur. Judge Rivera

concurs in result in a separate opinion in which Chief Judge

Lippman concurs.

Decided October 27, 2015

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