Warriner v. Stanton

Opinions of the United

2007 Decisions States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

1-18-2007

Warriner v. Stanton

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential

Docket No. 05-3435

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PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 05-3435

ROBERT TROY WARRINER, JR.,

by his guardian ad litems

R. Troy Warriner, Sr. and Teresa Warriner;

R. TROY WARRINER, SR.;

TERESA WARRINER, individually,

Appellants

v.

ROBERT P. STANTON, M.D.;

ALFRED I. DUPONT HOSPITAL

FOR CHILDREN OF THE DE NEMOURS

FOUNDATION a/k/a ALFRED I. DUPONT HOSPITAL

FOR CHILDREN; ALFRED I. DUPONT INSTITUTE

OF THE NEMOURS FOUNDATION;

THE NEMOURS FOUNDATION, INC.

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. No. 03-cv-02211)

District Judge: Honorable Jerome B. Simandle

Argued September 11, 2006

Before: FUENTES, FISHER and BRIGHT,* Circuit Judges.

(Filed January 18, 2007)

Gerarld A. McHugh, Jr.

Martina W. McLaughlin (Argued)

Raynes, McCarty, Binder, Ross & Mundy

1845 Walnut Street, Suite 2000

Philadelphia, PA 19103

Attorneys for Appellants

Andrew R. Rogoff (Argued)

Pepper Hamilton

18th and Arch Streets

3000 Two Logan Square

Philadelphia, PA 19103

Attorney for Appellee

OPINION OF THE COURT

FISHER, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal from an order of the District Court for

the District of New Jersey granting the defendant’s motion for

*

The Honorable Myron H. Bright, United States Circuit

Judge for the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.

2

summary judgment in a diversity action. The sole issue

presented on appeal is whether the District Court erred in its

choice of law analysis. Applying New Jersey’s “governmental

interest” test, which requires a court to consider the nature and

magnitude of each state’s interest in having its law govern a

particular issue, the District Court concluded Delaware had a

stronger interest than New Jersey in seeing its tort statute of

limitations applied to the medical malpractice claim in this case.

Consequently, it dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim as time-barred

under the Delaware statute. For the reasons stated below, we

will affirm the judgment of the District Court.

I. Factual and Procedural History

Robert Troy Warriner, Jr., a New Jersey resident, was

born in 1989 with a physical deformity called talipes

equinovarus, more commonly known as “club foot.” This

condition was first diagnosed twelve days after Warriner’s birth

by physician Robert Stanton, a specialist in pediatric orthopedic

surgery at the Alfred I. duPont Hospital for Children (“DuPont

Children’s Hospital”) in Wilmington, Delaware. DuPont

Children’s Hospital is owned by The Nemours Foundation, Inc.

(“Nemours”).1 Over the next several years, between 1989 and

1996, Warriner underwent multiple corrective surgeries

performed by Dr. Stanton at DuPont Children’s Hospital.

Warriner’s suit centers on a final surgery performed in

December of 1996. That surgery involved a procedure called

1

The Nemours Foundation is a non-profit organization

created by philanthropist Alfred I. du Pont in 1936. It owns and

operates the Hospital for Children in Wilmington, Delaware, as

well as The Nemours Children’s Clinic in Pensacola, Florida.

3

“bilateral tibia and fibula anterior closing wedge osteotomies,”

which Warriner’s parents believed would allow Warriner to

walk independently. The Warriners allege the surgery was

“inappropriately designed” and resulted in an overcorrection that

further hampered their son’s ability to walk. In the aftermath,

Warriner has undergone additional surgeries and physical

therapy.

In January of 2003, Warriner, by guardians ad litem, filed

a complaint for medical malpractice in New Jersey state court

against Dr. Stanton and his employer, Nemours. Dr. Stanton

was dismissed from the case by agreement of the parties.

Nemours removed the case to federal court and filed a motion to

dismiss on the basis that the case was barred by Delaware’s tort

statute of limitations. The parties entered into a stipulation of

undisputed facts to aid the District Court in determining whether

New Jersey’s or Delaware’s statute of limitations should apply.

That stipulation established the following additional facts. In

1995, Dr. Stanton became licensed in New Jersey at the

instruction of his employer Nemours in order to facilitate

payments from the State of New Jersey for treatment rendered

to New Jersey residents. Dr. Stanton continues to be licensed in

New Jersey and, in order to maintain his license, he takes

continuing education classes each year. Nemours continues to

pay Dr. Stanton’s annual renewal fees and he last renewed his

license in 2003.

In addition, from September 1998 through May 2001, Dr.

Stanton worked as a pediatric specialist with a widely publicized

new health program opened by Nemours in southern New

Jersey. Dr. Stanton was listed in a professional journal in 2001

as an orthopedic specialist available for appointments at the

4

facility. Since 1995, Dr. Stanton has provided medical

treatment to nearly two thousand New Jersey residents at the

southern New Jersey facility, The Nemours Children’s Clinic in

Wilmington, and affiliated sites. Dr. Stanton received his

medical malpractice insurance from The Nemours Foundation

Self-Insurance Trust Fund to cover his medical malpractice

liability. That coverage included medical malpractice claims in

New Jersey as well as Delaware.

Analyzing the choice of law issue under New Jersey’s

governmental interest test, the District Court determined that

Delaware law was applicable and that, as a result, Warriner’s

claims were time-barred under Delaware’s tort statute of

limitations. The District Court reasoned that New Jersey’s

primary interest in the case arose out of Warriner’s New Jersey

residence, and that that interest was greatly attenuated because

New Jersey had no connection to the events and conduct giving

rise to the lawsuit. By contrast, the District Court observed that

all of the events and conduct giving rise to the litigation

occurred in Delaware, and Delaware had a strong, clearly stated

policy interest in protecting its health care providers through its

statute of limitations. In addition, it rejected Warriner’s

argument that New Jersey’s statute of limitations and its minor

tolling provision should apply because Dr. Stanton retained a

New Jersey medical license and was affiliated with a pediatric

practice in New Jersey. It observed that Dr. Stanton was not

licensed in New Jersey at the time the Warriners began seeing

him in Delaware, and he did not see any patients in New Jersey

until nearly two years after the alleged negligent surgery in this

case. The District Court concluded that Delaware’s strong

governmental interest in seeing its law applied to torts alleged

to have occurred within its borders, committed by physicians

5

practicing within those borders, predominated and granted

defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

Warriner filed a timely appeal.

II. Statement of Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

Plaintiffs initially filed an action in New Jersey state

court. Defendants removed the action to the United States

District Court for the District of New Jersey under 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1332 and 1441. We have appellate jurisdiction over the final

judgment of the District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we apply the

same standard the district court was required to use initially.

Public Interest Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. Powell Duffryn

Terminals, Inc., 913 F.2d 64, 76 (3d Cir. 1990). Summary

judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine issue as to

any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. The sole issue

before us on appeal, the District Court’s interpretation and

application of New Jersey’s choice of law rules, is a purely legal

one and therefore subject to plenary review. Simon v. United

States, 341 F.3d 193, 199 (3d Cir. 2003).

III. Discussion

A. New Jersey’s Governmental Interest Test

It is well established that in a diversity action, a district

court must apply the choice of law rules of the forum state to

determine what law will govern the substantive issues of a case.

Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941).

This diversity action was initiated in the United States District

Court for the District of New Jersey, so the District Court

6

properly turned to New Jersey’s choice of law rules. In tort

cases, New Jersey has rejected the strict lex loci delicti rule for

determining choice of law based on the place where the wrong

occurred and replaced it with the more flexible “governmental

interest” test.2 E.g., Veazey v. Doremus, 510 A.2d 1187 (N.J.

1986); Pfau v. Trent Aluminum Co., 263 A.2d 129 (N.J. 1970);

Mellk v. Sarahson, 229 A.2d 625 (N.J. 1967). Applying that

test, the determinative law is “that of the state with the greatest

interest in governing the particular issue.” Veazey, 510 A.2d at

1189. The governmental interest analysis is fact-intensive:

“Each choice-of-law case presents its own unique combination

of facts – the parties’ residence, the place and type of occurrence

and the specific set of governmental interest – that influence the

resolution of the choice-of-law issue presented.” Erny v. Estate

of Merola, 792 A.2d 1208, 1221 (N.J. 2002).

Factors drawn from § 145 of the Restatement (Second) of

Conflicts of Law (1971) guide New Jersey courts in applying the

governmental interest test in tort cases. See Fu v. Fu, 733 A.2d

1133, 1140-41 (N.J. 1999). Those factors are grouped as

2

Until Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 305 A.2d 412 (N.J.

1973), the New Jersey governmental interest approach applied

only to choices of substantive law. Procedural matters, such as

the appropriate statute of limitations, were governed by forum

law. In Heavner, the New Jersey Supreme Court abandoned the

“mechanical rule” that the New Jersey statute of limitations still

applied in cases where a foreign substantive law was chosen, in

an attempt to discourage forum shopping. Instead, New Jersey

“borrows” the statute of limitations of the state whose

substantive law applies to the case. Heavner, 305 A.2d at 418.

7

follows: “(1) the interests of interstate comity; (2) the interests

of the parties; (3) the interests underlying the field of tort law;

(4) the interests of judicial administration; and (5) the competing

interests of the states.” Id. The most important of those factors

in the context of a tort claim is the competing interests of the

states. Id. at 1141. As discussed by the New Jersey Supreme

Court in Fu, the initial focus “should be on what policies the

legislature or court intended to protect by having that law apply

to wholly domestic concerns, and then, whether these concerns

will be furthered by applying that law to the multi-state

situation.” Id.

Fu also provides guidance in approaching the other four

factors. First and foremost, in evaluating the competing

interests of the states and interstate comity, “the most significant

factor[s] in the tort field,” id. at 1142, a court must consider

“whether application of a competing state’s law would frustrate

the policies of other interested states.” Id. at 1141. Second, in

considering the goals of tort law, a court should measure “the

degree to which deterrence and compensation, the fundamental

goals of tort law, would be furthered by the application of a

state’s local law . . . .” Id. However, “because every tort rule,

to some extent, is designed both to deter and to compensate, it

is necessary to evaluate on a case-by-case basis the relative

weight of those underlying purposes with respect to a specific

rule.” Id. The remaining two factors – the interests of the

parties and judicial administration – are much less significant in

the analysis. Erny, 792 A.2d at 1217. “The protection of the

parties’ justified expectations, a factor of extreme importance in

the field of contracts, ordinarily plays little or no part in a

choice-of-law question in the field of torts.” Fu, 733 A.2d at

1141. This is so because “a person who causes an unintentional

8

injury is not necessarily aware of the law that may be applied to

the consequences of his actions.” Id. In addition, to the extent

the interests of judicial administration conflict with a strong

state policy, “that factor must yield.” Id.

The governmental interest inquiry proceeds in two steps.

The first step involves determining whether an actual conflict of

law exists between the states involved, Veazey, 510 A.2d at

1189, because “where the application of either state’s law would

yield the same result, no conflict exists to be resolved.” High v.

Balun, 943 F.2d 323, 325 (3d Cir. 1991). In this case, the

parties do not dispute that an actual conflict of law exists. The

District Court was faced with the election of a statute of

limitations from two possible options ! Delaware’s statute of

limitations, under which plaintiff’s claim was time-barred, or

New Jersey’s statute of limitations, under which the claim was

not time-barred because of a tolling provision that preserves a

minor plaintiff’s claim until the minor reaches the age of

eighteen. Since there is no question in this case that an actual

conflict exists, we devote our analysis to the second element of

the governmental interest inquiry which requires that we

“identify the governmental policies underlying the law of each

state and how those policies are affected by each state’s contacts

to the litigation and to the parties.” Veazey, 510 A.2d at 1189.

B. Policy Interests Underlying Each State’s Statute of

Limitation

Looking at the policies that underlie the respective state

statutes of limitation that are in conflict in this case, we find that

the District Court correctly identified the relevant policy

concerns of both New Jersey and Delaware. With respect to the

New Jersey statute, we have consistently “identified New

9

Jersey’s policies in a tort context as consisting primarily of

compensation and deterrence.” Schum v. Bailey, 578 F.2d 493,

496 (3d Cir. 1978). In addition, the New Jersey statute of

limitations, N.J. Stat. § 2A:14-2, including as it does a minor

tolling provision, evinces a desire on the part of New Jersey to

protect “minors who are presumably not well-versed in legal

matters from the adverse consequences of their inexperience.”

LaFage v. Jani, 766 A.2d 1066, 1075 (N.J. 2001) (citation

omitted).

We can assume Delaware’s statute of limitations, Del.

Code Ann. tit. 18, § 6856, shares New Jersey’s interest in

compensation and deterrence, “[b]ecause every tort rule, to some

extent, is designed both to deter and to compensate.” Fu, 733

A.2d at 1141. However, Delaware’s statute was enacted by the

Delaware legislature with an additional policy concern in mind,

namely concern over a perceived crisis in health care associated

with medical malpractice claims. The Delaware Medical

Malpractice Act was enacted in 1976 “due to the concern over

the law at that time and the rising costs of malpractice liability

insurance,” and specifically addressed the applicable statute of

limitations for medical malpractice claims. Meekins v. Barnes,

745 A.2d 893, 895-96 (Del. 2000). The statute of limitations

was designed to provide “an atmosphere in which the number of

suits and claims of malpractice, as well as the size of judgments

and settlements, would be reduced thereby reducing the cost

and/or maintaining the availability of medical malpractice

insurance for health care providers.” Miller v. Spicer, 822 F.

Supp. 158, 172 (D. Del. 1993); see 60 Del.Laws ch. 373 (1976).

The introductory paragraphs of the 1976 Act elaborate at

length on the policy goals of the legislation, indicating that the

10

main reason for passage of the legislation was the concern over

the rising cost of malpractice liability insurance. 60 Del.Laws

ch. 373.3 The two-year statute of limitations was designed “to

eliminate the uncertainty created by [an] open-ended period of

limitations.” Dunn v. St. Francis Hospital, Inc., 401 A.2d 77, 79

(Del. 1979) (quoting Report of the Delaware Medical

Malpractice Commission, pp. 3-4 (Feb. 26, 1976)). The

Delaware legislature concluded that the uncertainty created by

an open-ended statute of limitations was not only harmful to

health care providers but was also leading to the withdrawal of

health care liability insurers from the state, thus “endangering

the ability of the citizens of Delaware to continue to receive

quality health care as well as adequate and just compensation for

negligent injuries . . . .” Preamble to 60 Del.Laws ch. 373

(1976). To address these various policy concerns, the Delaware

Medical Malpractice Act modified the applicable statute of

3

The Delaware Legislature found, in part, that “the

number of suits and claims for damages both in Delaware and

throughout the Nation as well as the necessary costs of defense

and the size of judgments and settlements thereon, arising from

professional patient care have increased tremendously in the

past several years; and . . . there has been a tremendous increase

in the cost of liability insurance coverage for health care

providers in Delaware, and in some instances the withdrawal of

liability insurance companies from the business of insuring

health care providers in Delaware, endangering the ability of the

citizens of Delaware to continue to receive quality health care as

well as adequate and just compensation for negligent injuries .

. . .” Preamble to 60 Del.Laws, ch. 373 (1976).

11

limitations for medical malpractice claims and settled on a two-

year statute of limitations.

C. Relevant Contacts and their Relationship to the Policy

Interests of Each State

Having identified the governmental policies underlying

each state’s statutes of limitation, we must next determine “how

those policies are affected by each state’s contacts to the

litigation and to the parties.” Veazey, 510 A.2d at 1189. “[I]f a

state’s contacts [with the transaction] are not related to the

policies underlying its law, then that state does not possess an

interest in having its law apply.” Id. This part of the inquiry

involves an examination of whether the states’ contacts to the

litigation align with the policies identified. Erny, 792 A.2d at

1216.

In evaluating the contacts in a choice of law context, the

New Jersey Supreme Court has adopted the approach taken by

the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (“Restatement”)

(1971). Fu, 733 A.2d at 1152 (“Thus, New Jersey now adheres

to the method of analysis set forth in Restatement . . . .”).

Section 145(2) of the Restatement sets forth a list of contacts

that are the most pertinent to the governmental-interest test:

these are (1) the place where the injury occurred; (2) the place

where the conduct causing the injury occurred, (3) the domicile,

residence, nationality, place of incorporation, and place of

business of the parties; and (4) the place where the relationship,

if any between the parties is centered. In this case, those

contacts as stipulated by the parties are as follows:

1. Warriner’s alleged injury occurred in

Delaware.

12

2. Dr. Stanton’s alleged tortious conduct

occurred in Delaware.

3. Warriner is domiciled in New Jersey; The

Nemours foundation is incorporated in

Florida with its principal place of business

in Wilmington, Delaware.

4. Warriner’s ten-year patient-doctor

relationship with Dr. Stanton was based at

DuPont Children’s Hospital in

Wilmington, Delaware. Dr. Stanton never

treated Robert in New Jersey.

Apart from those contacts listed in § 145(2), two

additional contacts exist between the parties and the respective

states:

5. Dr. Stanton became licensed in New

Jersey in 1995 in order to facilitate

collection of payments from New Jersey,

one year prior to the alleged malpractice.

He did not see patients in New Jersey until

two years after the alleged malpractice.

6. In 1997, the year following the accident,

The Nemours Foundation entered into a

pediatric partnership with AtlanticCare in

Southern New Jersey. Dr. Stanton was a

pediatric specialist employed at the

partnership from September 1998 through

May 2001. He was listed in a professional

staff directory as an orthopedic specialist

available for appointments in New Jersey.

13

Examining these respective contacts, we find the District

Court did not err in concluding Delaware law applied. It

correctly placed special emphasis in this case on the fact that all

of the contact between Warriner and Dr. Stanton occurred in

Delaware. In personal injury cases, the New Jersey Supreme

Court has counseled that “the place where the injury occurred is

a contact that, as to most issues, plays an important role in the

selection of the state of the applicable law.” Fu, 733 A.2d at

1142 (quoting Restatement, § 145 cmt. e). Furthermore, it has

explained that “[w]hen both conduct and injury occur in a single

jurisdiction, with only ‘rare exceptions, the local law of the state

where conduct and injury occurred will be applied’ to determine

an actor’s liability.” Id. (quoting Restatement, § 145 cmt. d).

This general rule is followed because “a state has an obvious

interest in regulating the conduct of persons within its territory

and in providing redress for injuries that occurred there.” Id. In

this case, both the allegedly tortious conduct and injury occurred

in Delaware. In fact, Warriner’s entire treatment history –

beginning a mere twelve days after his birth and extending over

nearly a decade – was based in Delaware and undertaken by a

Delaware doctor. Each of these contacts is relevant to

Delaware’s stated public policy of providing a finite period of

time for medical malpractice claims to require plaintiffs to file

timely claims, particularly when those injuries occur within the

State of Delaware. Most importantly, considering the interests

of interstate comity, it is apparent that the application of New

Jersey’s statute of limitations in this case would directly

contravene Delaware’s clearly articulated interest in shielding

its health care providers from liability for a claim that, under its

own considered judgment, expressed through its statute of

limitations, is unquestionably stale. See Erny, 792 A.2d at 1217

14

(“When considering the interests of interstate comity, a court

must determine whether application of a competing state’s law

would frustrate the policies of other interested states.”) (quoting

Fu, 733 A.2d at 1141).

Furthermore, the fact that all the contacts occurring in

this case were in Delaware takes on even greater significance

considering that they were not fortuitous but rather intentionally

initiated by the Warriners themselves. Id. (“The place of injury

becomes less important where it is simply fortuitous.”).

Warriner elected to travel to Delaware from 1989 until 1998 for

specialized medical treatment and, even after his final surgery

with Dr. Stanton in 1996 and the establishment of a

Nemours-related facility in New Jersey in 1997, continued to

receive medical treatment in Delaware. In the context of a

doctor-patient lawsuit, we have observed that “it is only fair that

the law of the state to which the patient has voluntarily traveled,

and in which the doctor has chosen to [practice], be applied to

adjudicate the respective rights, duties, and obligations between

the parties.” Blakesley v. Wolford, 789 F.2d 236, 243 (3d Cir.

1986). In addition, although Warriner was a resident of New

Jersey at the time of the alleged malpractice, “citizens do not . . .

carry their home state’s laws with them wherever they go.”

Amoroso v. Burdette Tomlin Memorial Hosp., 901 F. Supp. 900,

906 (D.N.J. 1995). Indeed, it is hornbook law that “by entering

the state . . . the visitor has exposed himself to the risks of the

territory and should not expect to subject persons living there to

a financial hazard that their law had not created.” Id. (quoting

D. F. Cavers, The Choice of Law Process 146-47 (1965)).

We agree with the Warriners that the fact that Dr. Stanton

was licensed in New Jersey prior to the accident is relevant to

15

New Jersey’s public policy goals of deterring tortious conduct

and providing compensation for victims of such conduct.

However, as stipulated by the parties, Dr. Stanton’s New Jersey

license was obtained at the instruction of his employer in order

to facilitate payments rather than for the purpose of practicing

medicine in New Jersey. And while Dr. Stanton did eventually

begin to see patients in New Jersey, it was not until two years

after the date of the alleged malpractice involving Warriner.

Placed in proper perspective, Dr. Stanton’s limited contact with

New Jersey at the time of Warriner’s injury pales in comparison

to the overwhelming number of contacts with Delaware in this

case, and the exceedingly strong and clearly articulated public

policy interest of Delaware in having its law apply to those

contacts.

In addition, Delaware’s statute of limitations, like all tort

rules, also implicitly reflects a policy interest in deterring

tortious conduct and providing compensation to injured victims,

and Delaware’s own judgment is on equal footing with New

Jersey’s as to how long its health care providers should be

exposed to liability to adequately serve the goals of

compensation and deterrence. Fu, 733 A.2d at 1141 (“Rules . . .

that deny liability are entitled to equal consideration in

choice-of-law determinations as are rules imposing liability.”).

On balance then, it was not erroneous for the District Court to

accord relatively little significance to the fact that Dr. Stanton

has been licensed in New Jersey.4

4

We do not disagree with the dissent that the fact that Dr.

Stanton was licensed in New Jersey is a contact of some

significance. However, we do believe the significance of this

16

It is certainly true that New Jersey has a policy interest in

safeguarding the welfare of minors and ensuring they are

compensated for their injuries. And while we agree with

Warriner that this interest is very substantial, we do not agree

that this interest should in effect trump all other factors in the

governmental interest analysis. Warriner suggests that the

substantial weight New Jersey affords this particular interest is

“confirmed by the overriding weight our courts ascribe to a

child’s New Jersey domicile and residency in the choice of law

analysis.” Br. of Appellant, at 17 (quoting Black v. Walker, 684

A.2d 1011, 1017 (N.J. Super 1996)). The authority cited by

Warriner here, however, is taken entirely out of context and is

unpersuasive.5 In Black v. Walker, supra, a New Jersey

appellate court concluded that “family-law precedent . . .

fact is diminished in light of the overwhelming number of

Delaware contacts in this case.

5

We note appellants fail to cite case law from the New

Jersey Supreme Court for many of their propositions, including

the one discussed here. In construing state law, “we must

determine how the highest court of the State would decide an

issue.” Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Estate of Bosch,

387 U.S. 456, 464-465 (1967). In diversity cases, the decisions

of lower state courts “while attributed some weight, are not

controlling where the highest court of the state has not spoken

on the point . . . . If there be no decision by that court then [we]

must apply what [we] find to be the state law after giving

‘proper regard’ to relevant rulings of other courts of the State.

In this respect, we may be said to be, in effect, sitting as a state

court.” Id. at 465 (citations omitted).

17

confirms the overriding weight our courts ascribe to a child’s

New Jersey domicile and residency in the choice-of-law

analysis.” Id. (emphasis added). As the full quote, as opposed

to the excised version cited by Warriner, makes clear, the

appellate court in Black was considering choice of law in the

context of family law, more specifically in the context of child-

support payments, an area in which it is apparent, indeed

patently obvious, that the interests of a minor are of paramount

concern. This case is therefore of little value to the analysis in

the present case. In the specific context of a torts choice of law

analysis, we find no authority, and appellants have cited none,

suggesting in effect that a state’s interest in compensating its

minors, as opposed to other victims of tortious conduct, should

“unequivocally outweigh” all other policy considerations.6

6

Similarly, we do not find persuasive the cases cited by

the dissent in support of the proposition that New Jersey’s

compensation interest is a trump card in the analysis. Unlike the

case before us, these cases reveal no true conflict between New

Jersey’s compensation interest and the policies of the other

states involved. See Pine v. Eli Lilly & Co., 492 A.2d 1079,

1083 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985) (applying NJ law but

stating “[w]e are unable to conclude that New York has any

compelling interest in having its statute of limitations apply here

to defeat recovery by plaintiff”); Dent v. Cunningham, 786 F.2d

173, 176 (3d Cir. 1986) (“Both New Jersey’s and California’s

policies in a tort context consist primarily of compensation and

deterrence. . . . [W]e conclude that application of New Jersey

law would in no way interfere with California’s interests in

deterrence and compensation.”). In cases such as these, where

there are no “competing state interests” to be balanced, we

18

Consequently, while we give this factor due consideration and

accord it substantial significance, we still must view it in light

of all the policy concerns implicated by the facts before us. And

as substantial as this particular interest may be, when put on the

scales opposite Delaware’s extraordinarily strong interests in

this case, it fails to outweigh them.

Finally, appellants rely heavily on our decision in Schum

v. Bailey, supra, arguing it is virtually indistinguishable from the

case before us and should therefore light our way. While Schum

does in fact confirm “New Jersey’s strong interest in protecting

the compensation rights of its domiciliaries” as well as New

Jersey’s interest in deterring tortious conduct on the part of

medical practitioners, Schum, 578 F.2d at 496-97, we agree with

the District Court that it is distinguishable from the case before

us.

In Schum, a New Jersey resident filed a medical

malpractice claim against her New York physician for tortious

conduct occurring in New York. All of the defendant’s services,

including the surgery at issue, were performed in New York, the

state in which the defendant maintained his major practice.

Applying the governmental interest test, we determined that

New York’s interests in compensating its own domiciliaries and

deterring future misconduct were the same as New Jersey’s, and

that the interests of both states would be adequately served by

application of New Jersey law. Id. at 496 (“Having identified

the relevant policies, and, having examined them in light of this

factual context, it becomes evident that both policies would be

readily concede that New Jersey’s compensation interest may

emerge as “paramount.”

19

served by the application in this case of New Jersey’s own

law.”).

Thus, the key to understanding Schum and how it is

distinguishable from the case before us is that in Schum, there

was no true conflict between the policies of the states of New

York and New Jersey. Id. at 497 (“[S]ince [the] record reveals

no conflict between New York and New Jersey insofar as the

application of their substantive laws is concerned, and since the

record also reveals that New Jersey has a substantial interest in

the application of its own law, we conclude that New Jersey, as

an interested forum, would apply its own law of liability.”)

(emphasis added).7 Schum merely reaffirms that “[i]f a strong

state policy or interest will be neither fostered by applying that

state’s law, nor frustrated by the failure to apply it, it is highly

unlikely that that state has any interest whatsoever in blanketing

that particular issue with its law.” White v. Smith, 398 F. Supp.

130, 134 (D.N.J.1975). See also General Ceramics v. Firemen’s

Fund Ins. Cos., 66 F.3d 647, 656 (3d Cir. 1995) (“A multistate

conflict of laws exists only when contacts are distributed such

that more than one state wants to regulate the case.”) (citations

omitted). By contrast, in this case, as already discussed at

7

Contesting our conclusion that Schum is distinguishable

from our own case for this reason, the dissent cites dicta from

the concurrence in Schum, finding there was indeed a conflict

between New York and New Jersey in having their laws applied.

See Schum, 578 F.2d at 501-02 (Gibbons, J., concurring). We

cite the majority opinion and find it more persuasive on this

particular point.

20

length, there is a clear and substantial conflict between the

concerns of New Jersey’s and Delaware’s law with respect to

the statute-of-limitations issue. The outcome in this case,

therefore, is not prescribed by Schum, as Warriner has so

persistently argued before the District Court and our own Court.

IV. Conclusion

The District Court did not err in its application of New

Jersey’s governmental interest choice of law rule. Nearly all of

the relevant contacts in this medical malpractice case occurred

in Delaware ! the allegedly tortious conduct, the injury, and a

decade long course of treatment involving numerous trips to a

physician based in Delaware and operating out of Delaware. In

addition, Delaware has a clearly articulated policy interest in

regulating malpractice claims through its statute of limitations.

These factors overwhelmed any interest New Jersey had in this

case by virtue of Warriner’s status as a New Jersey resident and

the defendant’s limited professional connection to the state at

the time of injury. Performing the balancing act required by the

governmental interest test, the District Court did not err in

determining that Delaware’s statute of limitations applied to the

claim in this case. It therefore did not err in concluding the

defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

For the reasons stated, we will affirm the judgment of the

District Court.

21

BRIGHT, dissenting.

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion because

New Jersey’s interest in providing a right of action for

compensation to its resident child in this case justifies

application of New Jersey’s statute of limitations. N.J. Stat.

§ 2A:14-2 tolls the applicable statute of limitations for minors

until the minor reaches the age of majority. Del. Code. Ann. tit.

18, § 6856 tolls the statute of limitations for minors until the

minor reaches the age of six years. Robert Warriner is a minor

over the age of six years old, and therefore, the district court’s

application of Delaware’s statute of limitations proved fatal to

his cause of action against Stanton and the hospital parties.

In this instance, the majority does not assign sufficient

weight to New Jersey’s compensation interest. A review of the

cases in New Jersey and in this circuit shows one consistent

result: New Jersey’s statute of limitations, when longer, is

applied in lawsuits for injuries occurring in another state when

brought in New Jersey by New Jersey residents. For example,

in Warner v. Auberge Gray Rocks Inn, Ltee., 827 F.2d 938, 942

(3d Cir. 1987), this court applied New Jersey’s statute of

limitations when a New Jersey resident sued a Canadian entity

for an injury that occurred in Quebec. Quebec’s one-year statute

of limitations had run prior to the commencement of the suit and

New Jersey’s longer statute of limitations had not. Id. at 940.

When applying New Jersey’s statute of limitations, the court

focused on New Jersey’s significant interest in providing a right

of compensation for its residents. See id. at 941-42. Likewise,

in Schum v. Bailey, 578 F.2d 493 (3d Cir. 1978), this court

applied New Jersey law when a New Jersey plaintiff brought an

action against a New York doctor for malpractice alleged to

22

have occurred in New York.8 See id. at 497. Because New

York did not have an applicable discovery rule (relating to when

the statute of limitations begins to run) and New Jersey did,

application of New York’s law, as in the instant case with

Delaware’s law, would have been fatal to plaintiff’s claim. See

id. at 494-95.

Similarly, in Pine v. Eli Lilly & Co., 492 A.2d 1079 (N.J.

Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985), the plaintiff’s residence constituted

the only contact with New Jersey. Notably, the plaintiff had

established residence in New Jersey after discovering his

potential claim would be time barred in New York. Id. at 1081-

82. The court determined that New Jersey’s interest in

compensating its own domiciliaries was paramount and

outweighed other governmental interests, even though the

“’factual contacts’ prong of the governmental interest test alone

would require the ‘borrowing’ of New York’s limitations

statute[.]” Id. at 1083; see also Dent v. Cunningham, 786 F.2d

173, 176, 177 (3d Cir. 1986) (New Jersey’s longer statute of

limitations applied despite significant California contacts

because of New Jersey’s substantial interest in compensating its

own domicilairies).

8

The majority distinguishes this analogous precedent by

explaining, as the district court did, that “in Schum, there was no

true conflict between the policies of the states of New York and

New Jersey.” I disagree. See Schum, 578 F.2d at 501-02

(Gibbons, J., concurring) (finding the existence of a conflict

between New York’s interest in the cost of health care and New

Jersey’s compensation interest).

23

Moreover, the majority exaggerates the impact on

Delaware’s interest in shielding health care providers from stale

claims by focusing on Delaware’s statute of limitations for

medical malpractice claims rather than on the relevant tolling

provisions applicable to the claims of minors. Both Delaware

and New Jersey have expressed a policy of protecting minors by

enacting minor tolling measures. See N.J. Stat. § 2A:14-2

(tolling until minor reaches age of majority, but prior to child’s

thirteenth birthday for medical malpractice claims for injuries

sustained at birth); Del. Code. Ann. tit. 18, § 6856 (tolling until

minor reaches age of six years). Although applying the longer

of the two provisions would impact Delaware’s policy more

than applying the shorter provision would, this presents a

question of degree of impact, not, as the majority describes, a

“direct contravention” of Delaware’s interest.

In this case, also, Stanton and the hospital parties

maintained sufficient contacts with New Jersey residents to

create an expectation that they might be subject to New Jersey

laws. Notably, Stanton held a license to practice medicine in

New Jersey at the time of the injury. The majority attempts to

minimize these contacts by explaining that Stanton held a

license only for the purpose of collecting payments from the

state of New Jersey for medical treatments for New Jersey

patients. Yet, this reason for Stanton’s contacts does not

diminish them.

Of particular concern is that the alleged malpractice in

this case happened to a child. Both Delaware and New Jersey,

by tolling their statutes of limitations as applied to minors, have

expressed a policy to permit children an extended opportunity

to recover for their injuries. Here, this policy expressed by both

24

states requires a conclusion asserting the primacy of the longer

New Jersey statute of limitations to protect the rights of the

injured child.

25