Reyes Mata v. Lynch

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2014 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

REYES MATA v. LYNCH, ATTORNEY GENERAL

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14–185. Argued April 29, 2015—Decided June 15, 2015

After petitioner Noel Reyes Mata, an unlawful resident alien, was con-

victed of assault in a Texas court, an Immigration Judge ordered him

removed to Mexico. Mata’s attorney filed a notice of appeal with the

Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA or Board), but never filed a brief,

and the appeal was dismissed. Acting through different counsel,

Mata filed a motion to reopen his removal proceedings, as authorized

by statute. See 8 U. S. C. §1229a(c)(7)(A). Acknowledging that he had

missed the 90-day deadline for such motions, see §1229a(c)(7)(C)(i),

Mata argued that his previous counsel’s ineffective assistance was an

exceptional circumstance entitling him to equitable tolling of the time

limit. But the BIA disagreed and dismissed the motion as untimely.

The BIA also declined to reopen Mata’s removal proceedings sua

sponte based on its separate regulatory authority. See 8 CFR

§1003.2(a). On appeal, the Fifth Circuit construed Mata’s equitable

tolling claim as an invitation for the Board to exercise its regulatory

authority to reopen the proceedings sua sponte, and—because circuit

precedent forbids the court to review BIA decisions not to exercise

that authority—dismissed Mata’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Held: The Fifth Circuit erred in declining to take jurisdiction over

Mata’s appeal. A court of appeals has jurisdiction to review the BIA’s

rejection of an alien’s motion to reopen. Kucana v. Holder, 558 U. S.

233, 253. Nothing about that jurisdiction changes where the Board

rejects a motion as untimely, or when it rejects a motion requesting

equitable tolling of the time limit. That jurisdiction likewise remains

unchanged if the BIA’s denial also contains a separate decision not to

exercise its sua sponte authority. So even assuming the Fifth Circuit

is correct that courts of appeals lack jurisdiction to review BIA deci-

sions not to reopen cases sua sponte, that lack of jurisdiction does not

2 REYES MATA v. LYNCH

Syllabus

affect jurisdiction over the decision on the alien’s motion to reopen. It

thus follows that the Fifth Circuit had jurisdiction over this case.

The Fifth Circuit’s contrary decision rested on its construing

Mata’s motion as an invitation for the Board to exercise its sua sponte

discretion. Court-appointed amicus asserts that the Fifth Circuit’s

recharacterization was based on the premise that equitable tolling in

Mata’s situation is categorically forbidden. In amicus’s view, the

court’s construal was therefore an example of the ordinary practice of

recharacterizing a doomed request as one for relief that may be

available. But even if equitable tolling is prohibited, the Fifth Cir-

cuit’s action was not justified. If Mata is not entitled to relief on the

merits, then the correct disposition is to take jurisdiction and affirm

the BIA’s denial of his motion. For a court retains jurisdiction even if

a litigant’s request for relief lacks merit, see Steel Co. v. Citizens for

Better Environment, 523 U. S. 83, 89, and a federal court has a “vir-

tually unflagging obligation,” Colorado River Water Conservation

Dist. v. United States, 424 U. S. 800, 817, to assert jurisdiction where

it has that authority. Nor can the established practice of recharacter-

izing pleadings so as to offer the possibility of relief justify an ap-

proach that, as here, renders relief impossible and sidesteps the judi-

cial obligation to assert jurisdiction. Pp. 4–8.

558 Fed. Appx. 366, reversed and remanded.

KAGAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,

C. J., and SCALIA, KENNEDY, GINSBURG, BREYER, ALITO, and SO-

TOMAYOR, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-

ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 14–185

_________________

NOEL REYES MATA, PETITIONER v. LORETTA E.

LYNCH, ATTORNEY GENERAL

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

[June 15, 2015]

JUSTICE KAGAN delivered the opinion of the Court.

An alien ordered to leave the country has a statutory

right to file a motion to reopen his removal proceedings.

See 8 U. S. C. §1229a(c)(7)(A). If immigration officials

deny that motion, a federal court of appeals has jurisdic-

tion to consider a petition to review their decision. See

Kucana v. Holder, 558 U. S. 233, 242, 253 (2010). Not-

withstanding that rule, the court below declined to take

jurisdiction over such an appeal because the motion to

reopen had been denied as untimely. We hold that was

error.

I

The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 66 Stat.

163, as amended, 8 U. S. C. §1101 et seq., and its imple-

menting regulations set out the process for removing

aliens from the country. An immigration judge (IJ) con-

ducts the initial proceedings; if he orders removal, the

alien has the opportunity to appeal that decision to

the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA or Board).

§§1229a(a)(1), (c)(5). “[E]very alien ordered removed” also

2 REYES MATA v. LYNCH

Opinion of the Court

“has a right to file one motion” with the IJ or Board

to “reopen his or her removal proceedings.” Dada v.

Mukasey, 554 U. S. 1, 4–5 (2008); see §1229a(c)(7)(A).

Subject to exceptions not relevant here, that motion to

reopen “shall be filed within 90 days” of the final removal

order. §1229a(c)(7)(C)(i). Finally, the BIA’s regulations

provide that, separate and apart from acting on the alien’s

motion, the BIA may reopen removal proceedings “on its

own motion”—or, in Latin, sua sponte—at any time. 8

CFR §1003.2(a) (2015).

Petitioner Noel Reyes Mata is a Mexican citizen who

entered the United States unlawfully almost 15 years ago.

In 2010, he was convicted of assault under the Texas

Penal Code. The federal Department of Homeland Secu-

rity (DHS) immediately initiated removal proceedings

against him, and in August 2011 an IJ ordered him re-

moved. See App. 6–13. Mata’s lawyer then filed a notice

of appeal with the BIA, indicating that he would soon

submit a written brief stating grounds for reversing the

IJ’s decision. But the attorney never filed the brief, and

the BIA dismissed the appeal in September 2012. See

App. 4–5.

More than a hundred days later, Mata (by then repre-

sented by new counsel) filed a motion with the Board to

reopen his case. DHS opposed the motion, arguing in part

that Mata had failed to file it, as the INA requires, within

90 days of the Board’s decision. Mata responded that the

motion was “not time barred” because his first lawyer’s

“ineffective assistance” counted as an “exceptional circum-

stance[ ]” excusing his lateness. Certified Administrative

Record in No. 13–60253 (CA5, Aug. 2, 2013), p. 69. In

addressing those arguments, the Board reaffirmed prior

decisions holding that it had authority to equitably toll the

90-day period in certain cases involving ineffective repre-

sentation. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 7; see also, e.g., In re

Santa Celenia Diaz, 2009 WL 2981747 (BIA, Aug. 21,

Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015) 3

Opinion of the Court

2009). But the Board went on to determine that Mata was

not entitled to equitable tolling because he could not show

prejudice from his attorney’s deficient performance; ac-

cordingly, the Board found Mata’s motion untimely. See

App. to Pet. for Cert. 7–8. And in closing, the Board de-

cided as well that Mata’s case was not one “that would

warrant reopening as an exercise of” its sua sponte author-

ity. Id., at 9 (stating that “the power to reopen on our own

motion is not meant to be used as a general cure for filing

defects” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Mata petitioned the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-

cuit to review the BIA’s denial of his motion to reopen,

arguing that he was entitled to equitable tolling. The

Fifth Circuit, however, declined to “address the merits

of Mata’s equitable-tolling . . . claim[ ].” Reyes Mata v.

Holder, 558 Fed. Appx. 366, 367 (2014) (per curiam). It

stated instead that “[i]n this circuit, an alien’s request [to

the BIA] for equitable tolling on the basis of ineffective

assistance of counsel is construed as an invitation for the

BIA to exercise its discretion to reopen the removal pro-

ceeding sua sponte.” Ibid. And circuit precedent held that

courts have no jurisdiction to review the BIA’s refusal to

exercise its sua sponte power to reopen cases. See ibid.

The Court of Appeals thus dismissed Mata’s appeal for

lack of jurisdiction.

Every other Circuit that reviews removal orders has

affirmed its jurisdiction to decide an appeal, like Mata’s,

that seeks equitable tolling of the statutory time limit to

file a motion to reopen a removal proceeding.1 We granted

——————

1 See, e.g., Da Silva Neves v. Holder, 613 F. 3d 30, 33 (CA1 2010) (per

curiam) (exercising jurisdiction over such a petition); Iavorski v. INS,

232 F. 3d 124, 129–134 (CA2 2000) (same); Borges v. Gonzales, 402 F.

3d 398, 406 (CA3 2005) (same); Kuusk v. Holder, 732 F. 3d 302, 305–

306 (CA4 2013) (same); Barry v. Mukasey, 524 F. 3d 721, 724–725 (CA6

2008) (same); Pervaiz v. Gonzales, 405 F. 3d 488, 490 (CA7 2005)

(same); Hernandez-Moran v. Gonzales, 408 F. 3d 496, 499–500 (CA8

4 REYES MATA v. LYNCH

Opinion of the Court

certiorari to resolve this conflict. 574 U. S. ___ (2015).

And because the Federal Government agrees with Mata

that the Fifth Circuit had jurisdiction over his appeal, we

appointed an amicus curiae to defend the judgment be-

low.2 We now reverse.

II

As we held in Kucana v. Holder, circuit courts have

jurisdiction when an alien appeals from the Board’s denial

of a motion to reopen a removal proceeding. See 558 U. S.,

at 242, 253. The INA, in combination with a statute cross-

referenced there, gives the courts of appeals jurisdiction to

review “final order[s] of removal.” 8 U. S. C. §1252(a)(1);

28 U. S. C. §2342. That jurisdiction, as the INA expressly

contemplates, encompasses review of decisions refusing

to reopen or reconsider such orders. See 8 U. S. C.

§1252(b)(6) (“[A]ny review sought of a motion to reopen or

reconsider [a removal order] shall be consolidated with the

review of the [underlying] order”). Indeed, as we ex-

plained in Kucana, courts have reviewed those decisions

for nearly a hundred years; and even as Congress cur-

tailed other aspects of courts’ jurisdiction over BIA rul-

ings, it left that authority in place. See 558 U. S., at

242–251.

Nothing changes when the Board denies a motion to

reopen because it is untimely—nor when, in doing so, the

Board rejects a request for equitable tolling. Under the

INA, as under our century-old practice, the reason for the

——————

2005) (same); Valeriano v. Gonzales, 474 F. 3d 669, 673 (CA9 2007)

(same); Riley v. INS, 310 F. 3d 1253, 1257–1258 (CA10 2002) (same);

Avila-Santoyo v. United States Atty. Gen., 713 F. 3d 1357, 1359, 1362–

1364 (CA11 2013) (per curiam) (same). Except for Da Silva Neves,

which did not resolve the issue, all those decisions also held, on the

merits, that the INA allows equitable tolling in certain circumstances.

See infra, at 7–8.

2 We appointed William R. Peterson to brief and argue the case, 574

U. S. ___ (2015), and he has ably discharged his responsibilities.

Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015) 5

Opinion of the Court

BIA’s denial makes no difference to the jurisdictional

issue. Whether the BIA rejects the alien’s motion to re-

open because it comes too late or because it falls short in

some other respect, the courts have jurisdiction to review

that decision.

Similarly, that jurisdiction remains unchanged if the

Board, in addition to denying the alien’s statutorily au-

thorized motion, states that it will not exercise its sepa-

rate sua sponte authority to reopen the case. See supra, at

1–2. In Kucana, we declined to decide whether courts

have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s use of that discre-

tionary power. See 558 U. S., at 251, n. 18. Courts of

Appeals, including the Fifth Circuit, have held that they

generally lack such authority. See, e.g., Enriquez-

Alvarado v. Ashcroft, 371 F. 3d 246, 249–250 (CA5 2004);

Tamenut v. Mukasey, 521 F. 3d 1000, 1003–1004 (CA8

2008) (en banc) (per curiam) (citing other decisions).

Assuming arguendo that is right, it means only that judi-

cial review ends after the court has evaluated the Board’s

ruling on the alien’s motion. That courts lack jurisdiction

over one matter (the sua sponte decision) does not affect

their jurisdiction over another (the decision on the alien’s

request).

It follows, as the night the day, that the Court of Ap-

peals had jurisdiction over this case. Recall: As authorized

by the INA, Mata filed a motion with the Board to reopen

his removal proceeding. The Board declined to grant Mata

his proposed relief, thus conferring jurisdiction on an

appellate court under Kucana. The Board did so for time-

liness reasons, holding that Mata had filed his motion

after 90 days had elapsed and that he was not entitled to

equitable tolling. But as just explained, the reason the

Board gave makes no difference: Whenever the Board

denies an alien’s statutory motion to reopen a removal

case, courts have jurisdiction to review its decision. In

addition, the Board determined not to exercise its sua

6 REYES MATA v. LYNCH

Opinion of the Court

sponte authority to reopen. But once again, that extra

ruling does not matter. The Court of Appeals did not lose

jurisdiction over the Board’s denial of Mata’s motion just

because the Board also declined to reopen his case sua

sponte.

Nonetheless, the Fifth Circuit dismissed Mata’s appeal

for lack of jurisdiction. That decision, as described earlier,

hinged on “constru[ing]” Mata’s motion as something it

was not: “an invitation for the BIA to exercise” its

sua sponte authority. 558 Fed. Appx., at 367; supra, at 3.

Amicus’s defense of that approach centrally relies on a

merits-based premise: that the INA forbids equitable

tolling of the 90-day filing period in any case, no matter

how exceptional the circumstances. See Brief for Amicus

Curiae by Invitation of the Court 14–35. Given that is so,

amicus continues, the court acted permissibly in “rechar-

acteriz[ing]” Mata’s pleadings. Id., at 36. After all, courts

often treat a request for “categorically unavailable” relief

as instead “seeking relief [that] may be available.” Id., at

35, 38. And here (amicus concludes) that meant constru-

ing Mata’s request for equitable tolling as a request for

sua sponte reopening—even though that caused the Fifth

Circuit to lose its jurisdiction.

But that conclusion is wrong even on the assumption—

and it is only an assumption—that its core premise about

equitable tolling is true.3 If the INA precludes Mata from

——————

3 Weexpress no opinion as to whether or when the INA allows the

Board to equitably toll the 90-day period to file a motion to reopen.

Moreover, we are not certain what the Fifth Circuit itself thinks about

that question. Perhaps, as amicus asserts, the court believes the INA

categorically precludes equitable tolling: It is hard to come up with any

other reason why the court construes every argument for tolling as one

for sua sponte relief. See Brief for Amicus Curiae by Invitation of the

Court 2, 10, 14, n. 2. But the Fifth Circuit has stated that position in

only a single sentence in a single unpublished opinion, which (according

to the Circuit) has no precedential force. See Lin v. Mukasey, 286 Fed.

Appx. 148, 150 (2008) (per curiam); Rule 47.5.4 (2015). And another

Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015) 7

Opinion of the Court

getting the relief he seeks, then the right course on appeal

is to take jurisdiction over the case, explain why that is so,

and affirm the BIA’s decision not to reopen. The jurisdic-

tional question (whether the court has power to decide if

tolling is proper) is of course distinct from the merits

question (whether tolling is proper). See Steel Co. v. Citi-

zens for Better Environment, 523 U. S. 83, 89 (1998)

(“[T]he absence of a valid . . . cause of action does not

implicate subject-matter jurisdiction”). The Fifth Circuit

thus retains jurisdiction even if Mata’s appeal lacks merit.

And when a federal court has jurisdiction, it also has a

“virtually unflagging obligation . . . to exercise” that au-

thority. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v.

United States, 424 U. S. 800, 817 (1976). Accordingly,

the Court of Appeals should have asserted jurisdiction

over Mata’s appeal and addressed the equitable tolling

question.

Contrary to amicus’s view, the practice of recharacteriz-

ing pleadings so as to offer the possibility of relief cannot

justify the Court of Appeals’ alternative approach. True

enough (and a good thing too) that courts sometimes

construe one kind of filing as another: If a litigant mis-

brands a motion, but could get relief under a different

label, a court will often make the requisite change. See,

e.g., 12 J. Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice, §59.11[4] (3 ed.

2015) (explaining how courts treat untimely Rule 59 mo-

tions as Rule 60 motions because the latter have no time

limit). But that established practice does not entail side-

stepping the judicial obligation to exercise jurisdiction.

And it results in identifying a route to relief, not in render-

ing relief impossible. That makes all the difference be-

——————

unpublished decision cuts in the opposite direction, “hold[ing] that the

doctrine of equitable tolling applies” when exceptional circumstances

excuse an alien’s failure to meet the 90-day reopening deadline. See

Torabi v. Gonzales, 165 Fed. Appx. 326, 331 (CA5 2006) (per curiam).

So, in the end, it is hard to say.

8 REYES MATA v. LYNCH

Opinion of the Court

tween a court’s generously reading pleadings and a court’s

construing away adjudicative authority.

And if, as amicus argues, that construal rests on an

underlying merits decision—that the INA precludes any

equitable tolling—then the Court of Appeals has effectively

insulated a circuit split from our review. Putting the

Fifth Circuit to the side, all appellate courts to have ad-

dressed the matter have held that the Board may some-

times equitably toll the time limit for an alien’s motion to

reopen. See n. 1, supra. Assuming the Fifth Circuit

thinks otherwise, that creates the kind of split of authority

we typically think we need to resolve. See this Court’s

Rule 10(a). But the Fifth Circuit’s practice of recharacter-

izing appeals like Mata’s as challenges to the Board’s

sua sponte decisions and then declining to exercise juris-

diction over them prevents that split from coming to light.

Of course, the Court of Appeals may reach whatever con-

clusion it thinks best as to the availability of equitable

tolling; we express no opinion on that matter. See n. 3,

supra. What the Fifth Circuit may not do is to wrap such

a merits decision in jurisdictional garb so that we cannot

address a possible division between that court and every

other.

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of

the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015) 1

THOMAS, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 14–185

_________________

NOEL REYES MATA, PETITIONER v. LORETTA E.

LYNCH, ATTORNEY GENERAL

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

[June 15, 2015]

JUSTICE THOMAS, dissenting.

The Court’s opinion in this case elides an important

distinction between construing a court filing and recharac-

terizing it. See Castro v. United States, 540 U. S. 375, 386

(2003) (SCALIA, J., concurring in part and concurring in

judgment) (discussing this distinction). Courts routinely

construe ambiguous filings to make sense out of them, as

parties—both counseled and uncounseled—sometimes

submit documents lacking even rudimentary clarity. See,

e.g., Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 989

F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1287 (MD Ala. 2013) (“The filings and

arguments made by the plaintiffs on these claims were

mystifying at best”). Recharacterization is something very

different: It occurs when a court treats an unambiguous

filing as something it is not. That practice is an unusual

one, and should be used, if at all, with caution. See Cas-

tro, 540 U. S., at 385–386 (opinion of SCALIA, J.). Courts

should not approach recharacterization with a freewheel-

ing attitude, but with “regard to the exceptional nature of

recharacterization within an adversarial system.” Ibid.

Recharacterization has, for example, been used “deliber-

ately to override a pro se litigant’s choice of a procedural

vehicle.” Id., at 386 (disapproving of the practice). But it

is not the role of courts to “create a ‘better correspondence’

between the substance of a claim and its underlying pro-

2 REYES MATA v. LYNCH

THOMAS, J., dissenting

cedural basis.” Ibid.

In my view, then, it makes all the difference whether

the Court of Appeals here properly construed an ambigu-

ous motion or recharacterized an unambiguous motion

contrary to Mata’s stated choice of procedural vehicle.

Although the majority’s opinion does not address this

point, Mata’s motion to reopen does not expressly state

whether he was invoking statutory relief under 8 U. S. C.

§1229a(c)(7)(A) or instead requesting sua sponte reopening

under the Board of Immigration Appeals’ asserted inher-

ent authority. Had the Court of Appeals engaged in the

discretionary action of construing that ambiguous filing, it

might not have abused its discretion by concluding that

Mata really meant to ask for sua sponte reopening rather

than equitable tolling of the statutory time bar.

The Court of Appeals, however, did not purport to con-

strue an ambiguous motion. Instead, it applied what

appears to be a categorical rule that all motions to reopen

that would be untimely under §1229a(c)(7)(A) must be

construed as motions for sua sponte reopening of the pro-

ceedings. See 558 Fed. Appx. 366, 367 (CA5 2014) (per

curiam) (“In this circuit, an alien’s request for equitable

tolling on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel is

construed as an invitation for the BIA to exercise its dis-

cretion to reopen the removal proceeding sua sponte”).

That rule would appear to foreclose a litigant from ever

filing an untimely statutory motion to reopen removal

proceedings seeking equitable tolling, as well as to invite

improper recharacterization in the event any such a mo-

tion is filed. The Court of Appeals should have assessed

Mata’s motion on its own terms. It erred in not doing so.

The reason it erred, though, has nothing to do with its

fidelity to our precedents discussing “the judicial obliga-

tion to exercise jurisdiction,” ante, at 7. That obligation

does not allow evasion of constitutional and statutory

jurisdictional prerequisites. It is true that “when a federal

Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015) 3

THOMAS, J., dissenting

court has jurisdiction, it also has a ‘virtually unflagging

obligation to . . . exercise’ that authority.” Ibid. (quoting

Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States,

424 U. S. 800, 817 (1976)). But that “unflagging obliga-

tion” arises only if a court actually has jurisdiction. Fed-

eral courts have no obligation to seek out jurisdiction, nor

should they misconstrue filings to satisfy jurisdictional

requirements. Rather, federal courts should “presume

that [they] lack jurisdiction unless the contrary appears

affirmatively from the record.” See DaimlerChrysler Corp.

v. Cuno, 547 U. S. 332, 342, n. 3 (2006). And they should

apply the ordinary rule that the party asserting federal

jurisdiction bears the burden of proving that jurisdictional

prerequisites are met. Ibid. The practice of construing

filings does not alter the usual rules of establishing juris-

diction in federal court.

I would vacate and remand for the Court of Appeals to

consider the BIA’s judgment without the burden of what

appears to be a categorical rule demanding that Mata’s

motion be construed (or recharacterized) as a request for

sua sponte reopening. Because the majority does more

than this by reversing the judgment below, I respectfully

dissent.