Walker v. Toledo (Slip Opinion)

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as

Walker v. Toledo, Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-5461.]

NOTICE

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in

an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested

to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio,

65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or

other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be

made before the opinion is published.

SLIP OPINION NO. 2014-OHIO-5461

WALKER, APPELLEE, v. THE CITY OF TOLEDO ET AL., APPELLANTS.

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it

may be cited as Walker v. Toledo, Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-5461.]

Municipalities have home-rule authority under Ohio Constitution, Article XVIII,

to impose civil liability on traffic violators through an administrative

enforcement system—Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section 1 and R.C.

1901.20 do not endow municipal courts with exclusive authority over

traffic-ordinance violations—Municipalities have home-rule authority to

establish administrative proceedings, including administrative hearings,

in furtherance of traffic ordinances, that must be exhausted before

offenders or the municipality can pursue judicial remedies.

(No. 2013-1277—Submitted June 11, 2014—Decided December 18, 2014.)

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Lucas County, No.

L-12-1056, 2013-Ohio-2809.

______________

KENNEDY, J.

{¶ 1} In this discretionary appeal from the Sixth District Court of

Appeals, we determine whether the court of appeals erred in holding that the city

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

of Toledo’s civil administrative enforcement of its traffic ordinances violates

Article IV, Section 1 of the Ohio Constitution. We accepted the following

propositions of law from appellant city of Toledo:

1. Neither R.C. § 1901.20 nor Ohio Constitution, Article

IV, Section 1 are offended when a home rule municipality enacts,

by ordinance, a civil administrative process for photo enforcement

of speed and red light violation.

2. R.C. § 1901.20 does not confer exclusive jurisdiction

over civil administrative violations of municipal codes to

municipal courts.

{¶ 2} We also accepted a proposition of law from appellant Redflex

Traffic Systems, Inc., which asserts: “Ohio municipalities have the home-rule

authority to maintain pre-suit administrative proceedings, including conducting

administrative hearings, in furtherance of their civil traffic enforcement

ordinances.”

{¶ 3} We reaffirm our holding in Mendenhall v. Akron, 117 Ohio St.3d

33, 2008-Ohio-270, 881 N.E.2d 255, that municipalities have home-rule authority

under Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution to impose civil liability on traffic

violators through an administrative enforcement system. We also hold that Ohio

Constitution, Article IV, Section 1, which authorizes the legislature to create

municipal courts, and R.C. 1901.20, which sets the jurisdiction of municipal

courts, do not endow municipal courts with exclusive authority over civil

administrative enforcement of traffic-law violations. Finally, we hold that Ohio

municipalities have home-rule authority to establish administrative proceedings,

including administrative hearings, related to civil enforcement of traffic

ordinances, and that these administrative proceedings must be exhausted before

2

January Term, 2014

offenders or the municipality can pursue judicial remedies. We therefore reverse

the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the cause to the trial court for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 4} This case comes to us as an appeal from the court of appeals’

reversal of the trial court’s dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6).

“In construing a complaint upon a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,

we must presume that all factual allegations of the complaint are true and make all

reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.” Mitchell v. Lawson Milk

Co., 40 Ohio St.3d 190, 192, 532 N.E.2d 753 (1988). Therefore, the facts are

accepted as true as presented in appellee’s complaint.

{¶ 5} In 2008, the city of Toledo enacted Toledo Municipal Code

(“TMC”) 313.12, authorizing an automated traffic-law-enforcement system that

assesses civil penalties against a vehicle’s owner for speeding and red-light

violations. The enforcement apparatus includes a camera and a vehicle sensor

and automatically produces photos, video, or digital images of vehicles violating

these traffic laws. TMC 313.12(b)(1). Redflex Traffic Systems, Inc., provides

the equipment and shares the revenue with Toledo.

{¶ 6} Toledo transportation officials, as well as Toledo’s police and law

departments, administer the program. TMC 313.12(a)(2). When the Redflex

equipment records a traffic violation, the city forwards a notice of liability to the

vehicle’s registered owner advising that a civil penalty of $120 has been assessed

against him or her. TMC 313.12(a)(3)(B) and 313.12(d)(1) and (2). The notice of

liability is not a criminal citation; it is a notice of civil liability and has no

collateral consequences, such as the assignment of points against the owner’s

driver’s license. TMC 313.12(c)(5) and 313.12(d)(1) and (2). The notice states

that the owner must pay or file an appeal within 21 days of the date listed on the

notice. TMC 313.12(a)(3)(C) and 313.12(d)(4).

3

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

{¶ 7} Failure to pay or appeal within that period is deemed a waiver of

the right to contest liability and is considered an admission. TMC 313.12(d)(4).

If an owner appeals, an administrative hearing is held, and if the owner offers

evidence to show the hearing officer that he or she was not driving the vehicle

when the violation occurred, the owner will not be held responsible for the

violation. TMC 313.12(c)(4).

{¶ 8} Under TMC 313.12(d)(4), appeals are heard through an

administrative process established by the Toledo police department. That

provision adds that a “decision in favor of the City of Toledo may be enforced by

means of a civil action or any other means provided by the Ohio Revised Code.”

{¶ 9} R.C. 2506.01 provides the mechanism for further appeal. It states,

“[E]very * * * decision of any officer * * * of any political subdivision of the

state may be reviewed by the court of common pleas of the county in which the

principal office of the political subdivision is located.”

{¶ 10} Bradley Walker, appellee, received a notice of liability for a traffic

violation under TMC 313.12, and he paid the city $120, without pursuing an

administrative appeal. He then filed a class-action complaint against Toledo and

Redflex for unjust enrichment, seeking their disgorgement of all civil penalties.

The complaint asserted that TMC 313.12 is unconstitutional because it usurps the

jurisdiction of the municipal court, is unconstitutionally vague, and violates due

process. Appellants filed motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim for which

relief can be granted pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6), which the trial court granted.

{¶ 11} Walker appealed, and in a split decision, the Sixth District Court of

Appeals reversed, holding that TMC 313.12 is an unconstitutional violation of

Article IV, Section 1 of the Ohio Constitution (“The judicial power of the state is

vested in a supreme court, courts of appeals, courts of common pleas and

divisions thereof, and such other courts inferior to the supreme court as may from

time to time be established by law”). The court held that without the express

4

January Term, 2014

approval of the General Assembly, Toledo had divested the Toledo Municipal

Court of the power granted to it by the legislature in R.C. 1901.20. That statute

states that a “municipal court has jurisdiction of the violation of any ordinance of

any municipal corporation within its territory.”

{¶ 12} The Sixth District also held that because the case was on appeal

from a trial court’s granting a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss, Walker’s

allegation in his complaint that Toledo had never established an administrative

appeal process must be accepted as true. Because Walker alleged that Toledo had

offered him no notice and meaningful opportunity to be heard, the court of

appeals said that Walker’s due-process allegation survived the motion to dismiss.

Toledo and Reflex appealed on the issue whether Toledo’s civil administrative

enforcement of its traffic ordinances violates the Ohio Constitution or R.C.

1901.20, and we accepted jurisdiction.

II. Legal Analysis

A. A city’s enacting an ordinance providing for civil administrative

enforcement of traffic offenses does not violate the Ohio

Constitution

{¶ 13} We agree with appellants that a city’s enacting an ordinance

providing for a civil administrative enforcement of traffic laws does not offend

R.C. 1901.20 or Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section 1. We have already held

that municipalities act within their constitutional home-rule powers when they

establish automated systems for imposing civil liability on traffic-law violators.

Mendenhall v. Akron, 117 Ohio St.3d 33, 2008-Ohio-270, 881 N.E.2d 255,

syllabus. Walker invokes R.C. 1901.20 and Ohio Constitution, Article IV,

Section 1 to assert that TMC 313.12 impairs the Toledo Municipal Court’s

constitutionally protected jurisdiction over violations of local ordinances.

However, this argument is inconsistent with our holding in Mendenhall and does

not cause us to reconsider it.

5

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

{¶ 14} The facts of Mendenhall are instructive. After a child was killed in

a hit-and-run accident in a school crosswalk, Akron passed an ordinance

implementing an “automated mobile speed enforcement system.” Id. at ¶ 4.

According to the Akron City Council, the statute’s purpose was to “ ‘assist the

Akron Police Department by alleviating the need for conducting extensive

conventional traffic enforcement in and around school zones.’ ” Id. at ¶ 5. The

ordinance created a system that was purely civil in nature and did not modify any

state speed limits. Id. at ¶ 6. Violators received notices of civil liability and could

pay the civil fines or pursue an administrative appeal. Id. at ¶ 7-8. Kelly

Mendenhall received a notice of liability for speeding, which was dismissed on

administrative appeal. Id. at ¶ 10. Like Walker, Mendenhall filed a class-action

suit against the municipality for a declaratory judgment, an injunction, and a

monetary award. Id. at ¶ 11. Mendenhall asserted that the Akron ordinance

conflicted with Ohio’s general laws regulating traffic, thereby exceeding Akron’s

home-rule authority and violating due process. Id. at ¶ 9.

{¶ 15} The case was removed to federal court. Id. at ¶ 11. The United

States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, then

certified to us the following issue pursuant to S.Ct.Prac.R. XVIII (now

S.Ct.Prac.R. 9.01): “Whether a municipality has the power under home rule to

enact civil penalties for the offense of violating a traffic signal light or for the

offense of speeding, both of which are criminal offenses under the Ohio Revised

Code.” Id. at ¶ 2.

{¶ 16} After examining this question, we issued “a written opinion stating

the law governing the question or questions certified.” S.Ct.Prac.R. 9.08. We

first analyzed a municipality’s powers granted under Ohio Constitution, Article

XVIII, Section 3. It states, “Municipalities shall have authority to exercise all

powers of local self-government and to adopt and enforce within their limits such

local police, sanitary and other similar regulations, as are not in conflict with

6

January Term, 2014

general laws. ” Section 7 of Article XVIII complements Section 3. It states,

“Any municipality may frame and adopt or amend a charter for its government

and may, subject to the provisions of section 3 of this article, exercise thereunder

all powers of local self-government.”

{¶ 17} We then concluded: “[Akron’s] ordinance provides for a

complementary system of civil enforcement that, rather than decriminalizing

behavior, allows for the administrative citation of vehicle owners under specific

circumstances. Akron has acted within its home rule authority granted by the

Constitution of Ohio.” Id. at ¶ 42. We therefore reject Walker’s claim that in

creating a civil administrative traffic-law-enforcement system that is similar to the

system set forth in the Akron ordinance at issue in Mendenhall, Toledo has

unconstitutionally usurped the General Assembly’s exclusive power to create

courts under Article IV, Section 1 of the Ohio Constitution.

{¶ 18} Walker nevertheless counters that Article XVIII, Sections 3 and 7

of the Ohio Constitution do not authorize home-rule power in the area of

administrative review of civil liability for traffic-law offenses unless the General

Assembly specifically authorizes such administrative processes through statute.

The Sixth District Court of Appeals found this point persuasive and noted that

while many local boards review municipal-ordinance violations, “most” of them

do so under specific enabling authority from the General Assembly, and not under

Ohio Constitution, Article XVIII alone. 2013-Ohio-2809, 994 N.E.2d 467, ¶ 35

(6th Dist.). Appellants concede that the General Assembly has not enacted

statutes specifically authorizing municipalities to adopt civil traffic-law-

enforcement ordinances.

{¶ 19} As Redflex emphasizes, however, “most” is not all. Municipal

taxi-cab review boards set licensing requirements, hold hearings, and review

violations without specific statutory authority. Redflex notes that Columbus has a

“refuse-collection code,” Columbus City Code Title 13, that the Revised Code

7

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

does not authorize but that has provisions similar to TMC 313.12 in that it

provides for sending notices of violation when residents and businesses are not in

compliance with the city’s refuse ordinances and sets out an appeal process in

which a board hears appeals. Columbus City Code 1303.05 and 1303.10.

Furthermore, the fact that the General Assembly enacted R.C. 2506.01, which

provides for appeals from local administrative decisions, supports appellants’

claim that charter cities have constitutional and legislative authority to self-govern

in these ways under their home-rule authority. See Bazell v. Cincinnati, 13 Ohio

St.2d 63, 233 N.E.2d 864 (1968), paragraph one of the syllabus.

{¶ 20} Walker additionally claims that TMC 313.12 violates the

separation-of-powers doctrine implicitly embedded in the framework of the Ohio

Constitution because the municipality has taken over a judicial function bestowed

exclusively on the municipal courts by R.C. 1901.20 and Ohio Constitution,

Article IV, Section 1. We acknowledge that home-rule authority “does not

include the power to regulate the jurisdiction of courts.” Cupps v. Toledo, 170

Ohio St. 144, 163 N.E.2d 384 (1959), paragraph one of the syllabus.

{¶ 21} However, as noted above, the reality of municipal civil

enforcement of ordinances does not involve regulating the jurisdiction of courts.

As we made clear in Mendenhall, civil enforcement of municipal ordinances

complements the work of the courts. It does not restrict it. Id. at ¶ 42. Neither

R.C. 1901.20 nor Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section 1 undermines our

analysis in Mendenhall. We therefore reaffirm that Ohio Constitution, Article

XVIII, Sections 3 and 7 grant municipalities the authority to protect the safety and

well-being of their citizens by establishing automated systems for imposing civil

liability on traffic-law violators. Mendenhall is dispositive on the

constitutionality of municipalities’ civil administrative processes for enforcement

of red-light and speeding violations captured by automated systems.

8

January Term, 2014

B. R.C. 1901.20 does not confer exclusive jurisdiction over traffic-

ordinance violations on municipal courts

{¶ 22} We also agree with Toledo and Redflex that the Sixth District

Court of Appeals misinterpreted R.C. 1901.20 in holding that it gives municipal

courts exclusive authority over traffic-ordinance violations. Walker argues, and

the Sixth District held, that the term “any” in R.C. 1901.20 means “every” and

“all”: “The municipal court has jurisdiction of the violation of any ordinance of

any municipal corporation within its territory” except certain noncriminal parking

violations that are handled by another bureau. (Emphasis added.) Therefore, he

asserts, the Toledo Municipal Court must have exclusive authority over the

notices of liability issued under TMC 313.12.

{¶ 23} We disagree. First, as discussed above, we have expressly held

that Akron’s civil traffic-law-enforcement ordinance (which is substantially

similar to Toledo’s) “complements rather than conflicts with state law.”

Mendenhall, 117 Ohio St.3d 33, 2008-Ohio-270, 881 N.E.2d 255, ¶ 37.

Consequently, reading R.C. 1901.20(A)(1) as prohibiting civil enforcement of

traffic ordinances under home-rule authority would require us to overrule

Mendenhall.

{¶ 24} Consistent with Mendenhall, therefore, we agree with the

dissenting opinion in the court of appeals in this case that no rule of statutory

construction compels us to find that “any,” as used in R.C. 1901.20(A)(1), is

synonymous with “exclusive.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 97

(2002) does not list “exclusive” as a synonym of “any.” Instead, it defines “any”

as “one indifferently out of more than two”; “every”; and “one or some of

whatever kind,” and the like. The same source defines “exclusive” as “having

power to exclude”; “limiting or limited to possession, control, or use”; “single,

sole.” Neither term appears in the definition of the other. Id. at 97 and 793.

9

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

{¶ 25} Furthermore, the General Assembly does not use “any” and

“exclusive” interchangeably. See, e.g., R.C. 2743.02(F) (court of claims has

“exclusive, original jurisdiction to determine” personal-immunity issues of certain

defendants; R.C. 3781.20(B) (a certified local board of building appeals has

“exclusive jurisdiction” over rulings of the local chief enforcement official); R.C.

1901.181(A)(1) (housing division of municipal court has “exclusive jurisdiction”

in a civil action to enforce local building code). “When the General Assembly

intends to vest exclusive jurisdiction in a court or agency, it provides it by

appropriate statutory language.” State ex rel. Banc One Corp. v. Walker, 86 Ohio

St.3d 169, 171-172, 712 N.E.2d 742 (1999). The Revised Code, Mendenhall, and

other caselaw support appellants in their assertion that R.C. 1901.20(A)(1) allows

complementary civil enforcement of traffic laws. R.C. 1901.20 does not confer

exclusive jurisdiction over civil traffic-law violations on municipal courts.

C. Ohio municipalities have home-rule authority to establish presuit

civil administrative proceedings in furtherance of their traffic-law

enforcement ordinances

{¶ 26} Consistent with our disposition of Toledo’s two propositions of

law, we agree with Redflex’s proposition that municipalities have home-rule

authority to establish presuit civil administrative proceedings, including

administrative hearings, on civil liability for traffic-law violations.

{¶ 27} In deciding otherwise, the court of appeals made much of our

statement in Mendenhall that “there are due process questions regarding the

operation of the Akron Ordinance and those similar to it,” but that “those

questions are not appropriately before us at this time and will not be discussed

here.” Mendenhall, 117 Ohio St.3d 33, 2008-Ohio-270, 881 N.E.2d 255, ¶ 40.

2013-Ohio-2809, 994 N.E.2d 467, ¶ 13. The court of appeals found this language

to be “an express limitation on the scope of the Mendenhall decision,” id., and a

10

January Term, 2014

signal from this court that Mendenhall would have little general application, id. at

¶ 12.

{¶ 28} The court of appeals misread Mendenhall. Our holding that a

complementary system of civil enforcement of traffic laws is within a

municipality’s home-rule power acknowledges that administrative procedures

must be established in furtherance of this power. See, for example, our discussion

of Akron’s ordinance, which sets forth civil administrative-appeal proceedings,

which appear to be almost identical to Toledo’s. Mendenhall at ¶ 6-8. See also

State ex rel. Scott v. Cleveland, 112 Ohio St.3d 324, 2006-Ohio-6573, 859 N.E.2d

923, ¶ 24 (Cleveland’s administrative disposition of civil traffic-law-violation

liability was “an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law by way of the

administrative proceedings”). As Walker has brought nothing to our attention to

show that Toledo’s administrative proceedings are inconsistent with home-rule

authority as sanctioned by this court in other cases, we must agree with Redflex

that Toledo’s administrative-enforcement proceedings are appropriate.

III. Conclusion

{¶ 29} Based on the foregoing, we reaffirm our holding in Mendenhall v.

Akron, 117 Ohio St.3d 33, 2008-Ohio-270, 881 N.E.2d 255, that municipalities

have home-rule authority under Ohio Constitution, Article XVIII, to impose civil

liability on traffic violators through an administrative enforcement system. We

also hold that Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section 1, which authorizes the

legislature to create municipal courts, and R.C. 1901.20, which sets the

jurisdiction of municipal courts, do not endow municipal courts with exclusive

authority over traffic-ordinance violations. Finally, we hold that Ohio

municipalities have home-rule authority to establish administrative proceedings,

including administrative hearings, in furtherance of these ordinances, that must be

exhausted before offenders or the municipality can pursue judicial remedies. We

therefore reverse the judgment of the court of appeals with regard to its holding

11

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

that the ordinance infringes upon the jurisdiction of the municipal court, and we

remand the cause to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

Judgment reversed.

O’CONNOR, C.J., and GWIN, and LANZINGER, JJ., concur.

PFEIFER, FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., dissent.

W. SCOTT GWIN, of the Fifth Appellate District, sitting for O’DONNELL, J.

_________________________

O’NEILL, J., dissenting.

{¶ 30} This case can be reduced to a single narrow issue: Does a city

council have the power to limit the municipal court’s jurisdiction in “traffic

camera” cases and confer jurisdiction on a nonelected hearing officer? The

answer is a resounding no. As the Sixth District correctly concluded, one need

only look at R.C. 1901.20(A)(1) for the answer. That statute provides:

The municipal court has jurisdiction of the violation of any

ordinance of any municipal corporation within its territory, unless

the violation is required to be handled by a parking violations

bureau or joint parking violations bureau pursuant to Chapter 4521.

of the Revised Code, and of the violation of any misdemeanor

committed within the limits of its territory.

(Emphasis added.)

{¶ 31} It is evident under this statute that the General Assembly has

vested the municipal court with jurisdiction over the violation of any ordinance

generally and any misdemeanor specifically, other than parking violations. The

term “any ordinance” does not need interpreting. It is clear on its face. Other

than the specifically mentioned parking-violation ordinances, “any ordinance”

12

January Term, 2014

covers “any ordinance,” which includes Toledo Municipal Code (“TMC”) 313.12.

This is the only logical interpretation of this statute. Clearly, the legislature

understands how to make exceptions to a general rule, as it did in R.C.

1901.20(A)(1) with parking violations. One principle of statutory construction is

that “ ‘if a statute specifies one exception to a general rule or assumes to specify

the effects of a certain provision, other exceptions or effects are excluded.’ ”

Thomas v. Freeman, 79 Ohio St.3d 221, 224-225, 680 N.E.2d 997 (1997), quoting

Black’s Law Dictionary 581 (6th Ed.1990). Hence, the “any ordinance” language

in this statute covers TMC 313.12, since there is no specific exception set forth

for ordinance violations captured by traffic cameras. The Sixth District was

correct when it stated:

Toledo Municipal Code 313.12 is an ordinance of a municipal

corporation within the territory encompassed by the Toledo

Municipal Court and is not a parking violation; therefore, the

violation of Toledo Municipal Code 313.12 is subject to the

jurisdiction of the Toledo Municipal Court. Any attempt, in whole

or in part, to divest the court of that jurisdiction violates the

authority of the General Assembly to set the jurisdiction of the

court, thus violating Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section l.

Walker v. Toledo, 2013-Ohio-2809, 994 N.E.2d 467, ¶ 24 (6th Dist.).

{¶ 32} In this case, the Toledo City Council has divested the Toledo

Municipal Court of part of its jurisdiction by vesting jurisdiction over traffic-

camera cases in a hearing officer. A hearing officer is simply not a substitute for

a municipal court judge who has been elected to preside over judicial matters.

TMC 313.12 is a direct infringement of the municipal court’s jurisdiction as well

as the legislature’s right to confer jurisdiction on the court and the right of the

13

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

general population to elect those empowered to determine whether laws have

been violated.

{¶ 33} The majority bases its decision, in part, on Mendenhall v. Akron,

117 Ohio St.3d 33, 2008-Ohio-270, 881 N.E.2d 255. But Mendenhall addressed

the issue of home-rule authority and the constitutionality of a municipality’s

imposing civil liability for traffic-law violations captured by traffic cameras. The

present case is not about home rule and does not implicate Mendenhall. It is

solely about the jurisdiction of the Toledo Municipal Court and whether TMC

313.12 unlawfully intrudes upon and reduces that jurisdiction. It does.

Accordingly, I would affirm the decision of the Sixth District Court of Appeals

and remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings.

{¶ 34} I respectfully dissent.

PFEIFER and FRENCH, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion.

___________________

Mayle, Ray & Mayle, L.L.C., Andrew R. Mayle, Jeremiah S. Ray, and

Ronald J. Mayle; and Murray & Murray Co., L.P.A., and John T. Murray, for

appellee.

Adam W. Loukx, Toledo Law Director, and Eileen M. Granata; and

Crabbe, Brown & James, L.L.P., Andy Douglas, Larry H. James, and Jeffrey D.

Houser, for appellant city of Toledo.

Bricker & Eckler, L.L.P., Quintin F. Lindsmith, James P. Schuck, and

Sommer L. Sheely, for appellant Redflex Traffic Systems, Inc.

Baker & Hostetler, L.L.P., Gregory V. Mersol, and Chris Bator; and

Barbara A. Langhenry, Cleveland Director of Law, and Gary S. Singletary and

John Mills, Assistant Directors of Law, urging reversal for amici curiae Xerox

State & Local Solutions, Inc., and city of Cleveland.

Frost Brown Todd, L.L.C., Philip K. Hartmann, Yazan S. Ashrawi, and

Stephen J. Smith; John Gotherman; Jennifer S. Gams, Assistant City Attorney,

14

January Term, 2014

Columbus; and John C. Musto, Assistant City Attorney, Dayton, urging reversal

for amici curiae the Ohio Municipal League, the city of Columbus, and the city of

Dayton.

Ronald Riley, East Cleveland Law Director; and Squire Sanders, L.L.P.,

Richard S. Gurbst, and F. Maximilian Czernin, urging reversal for amici curiae

city of East Cleveland and American Traffic Solutions, Inc.

Richard C. Pfeiffer Jr., Columbus City Attorney, and Jennifer S. Gams and

Janet Hill Arbogast, Assistant City Attorneys, urging reversal for amicus curiae

city of Columbus.

Freda J. Levenson, Jennifer Martinez Atzberger, and Drew S. Dennis,

urging affirmance for amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio

Foundation.

Maurice A. Thompson, urging affirmance for amici curiae 1851 Center for

Constitutional Law; State Representatives Dale Mallory, John Adams, Ron Maag,

John Becker, Matt Lynch, Rick Perales, Terry Boose, Margaret Conditt, Terry

Blair, Richard Adams, Bob Hacket, Peter Stautberg, Cliff Rosenberger, Mike

Dovilla, Tim Derickson, Dave Hall, Alicia Reece, Louis Blessing III, Bill

Patmon, Peter Beck, and John Barnes; and State Senators Kris Jordan, Shannon

Jones, Joseph Uecker, Tom Patton, Jonathan Ecklund, Timothy Schaffer, and

William Seitz.

_________________________

15