Opinion

State ex rel. Magsig v. Toledo (Slip Opinion)

160 Ohio St. 3d 342
156 N.E.3d 899
2020 Ohio 3416

Court: Ohio Supreme Court
Filed: Jun 24, 2020
Status: Published
On the bench: French, J.
Cited by: 12 cases
Authority: More cited than 64.0%

The opinion

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State

ex rel. Magsig v. Toledo, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-3416.]

NOTICE

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an

advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to

promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65

South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other

formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before

the opinion is published.

SLIP OPINION NO. 2020-OHIO-3416

THE STATE EX REL. MAGSIG v. THE CITY OF TOLEDO.

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it

may be cited as State ex rel. Magsig v. Toledo, Slip Opinion No.

2020-Ohio-3416.]

Civil law—R.C. 1901.20(A)(1) expressly vests exclusive jurisdiction over

noncriminal traffic-law adjudications in the municipal courts—A city does

not have jurisdiction to conduct its own quasi-judicial proceedings to

adjudicate a person’s liability for violating a municipal traffic ordinance—

Writ granted.

(No. 2019-1526—Submitted March 3, 2020—Decided June 24, 2020.)

IN PROHIBITION.

________________

FRENCH, J.

{¶ 1} In this original action, relator, Susan Magsig, seeks a writ of

prohibition to prevent respondent, the city of Toledo, from conducting an

administrative hearing to adjudicate her liability for violating a municipal traffic

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ordinance. On November 15, 2019, we granted an alternative writ. 157 Ohio St.3d

1489, 2019-Ohio-4696, 134 N.E.3d 1199. We now grant a writ of prohibition.

I. Background

{¶ 2} Toledo has a civil-enforcement system for red-light and speeding-

camera violations. Toledo Municipal Code (“TMC”) 313.12(a)(1). Under that

system, the owner (or, in some cases, the operator) of a vehicle is liable for a penalty

of $120 for operating a vehicle in excess of the designated speed limit. TMC

313.12(c)(2) and (d)(2). The offense is “deemed a noncriminal violation for which

a civil penalty” is imposed, and the penalty does not include the imposition of points

toward a license suspension. TMC 313.12(d)(2).

{¶ 3} Toledo cites such violations by sending the vehicle owner a citation

called a “Notice of Liability.” TMC 313.12(a)(3). The owner has 21 days from the

date on the notice in which to file an appeal with a hearing officer. TMC

313.12(d)(4). Appeals are conducted through an administrative process established

by the municipal police department. Id. “The failure to give notice of appeal or

pay the civil penalty within [the 21-day] time period shall constitute a waiver of the

right to contest the citation,” id., will be “considered an admission” of liability, id.,

and will result in the imposition of an additional $25 penalty, TMC 313.12(d)(5).

{¶ 4} On August 19, 2019, Toledo’s automated system generated a notice

of liability for a speeding offense allegedly committed by Magsig.1 The notice

informed Magsig that she had until October 11 to respond. Magsig requested a

hearing before the city’s administrative-hearing officer, which the city scheduled

for November 19.

{¶ 5} On November 4, however, Magsig commenced the present action for

a writ of prohibition to prevent Toledo from conducting the administrative hearing

on the grounds that R.C. 1901.20(A)(1), as amended by 2019 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 62

1. The parties have stipulated to the authenticity of the exhibits attached to the complaint.

January Term, 2020

(“H.B. 62”) (effective July 3, 2019), vests exclusive jurisdiction in the municipal

courts to adjudicate every alleged noncriminal traffic-law violation. On November

15, we denied Toledo’s motion to dismiss and granted an alternative writ, ordering

the parties to present evidence and file briefs in accordance with S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.05.

157 Ohio St.3d 1489, 2019-Ohio-4696, 134 N.E.3d 1199. The parties have

submitted stipulations of fact and filed briefs. Ohio Attorney General Dave Yost

has submitted an amicus brief urging that this court grant Magsig a writ of

prohibition.

II. Legal analysis

{¶ 6} Three elements are necessary for a writ of prohibition to issue: the

exercise of judicial (or quasi-judicial) power, the lack of authority for the exercise

of that power, and the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

State ex rel. Elder v. Camplese, 144 Ohio St.3d 89, 2015-Ohio-3628, 40 N.E.3d

1138, ¶ 13. However, if the absence of jurisdiction is patent and unambiguous, a

petitioner need not establish the third prong, the lack of an adequate remedy at law.

State ex rel. Sapp v. Franklin Cty. Court of Appeals, 118 Ohio St.3d 368, 2008-

Ohio-2637, 889 N.E.2d 500, ¶ 15. “When a court patently and unambiguously

lacks jurisdiction to consider a matter, a writ of prohibition will issue to prevent

assumption of jurisdiction regardless of whether the lower court has ruled on the

question of its jurisdiction.” Dept. of Adm. Servs., Office of Collective Bargaining

v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 54 Ohio St.3d 48, 562 N.E.2d 125 (1990), syllabus.

{¶ 7} Toledo does not dispute that its hearing officer will be exercising

quasi-judicial authority. Quasi-judicial power refers to “the power to hear and

determine controversies between the public and individuals that require a hearing

resembling a judicial trial.” State ex rel. Wright v. Ohio Bur. of Motor Vehicles, 87

Ohio St.3d 184, 186, 718 N.E.2d 908 (1999). Magsig contends that the hearing

officer patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction. We agree and conclude that

Toledo’s patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction to carry out its red-light and

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speeding-camera civil-enforcement system is clear on the face of

R.C. 1901.20(A)(1).

{¶ 8} R.C. 1901.20(A)(1), as amended by H.B. 62, provides that a

municipal court “has jurisdiction over the violation of any ordinance of any

municipal corporation within its territory, including exclusive jurisdiction over

every civil action concerning a violation of a state traffic law or a municipal traffic

ordinance.” (Emphasis added.) The express language of the statute confers

exclusive jurisdiction on the municipal courts to adjudicate civil actions for a

municipal traffic-law violation. Toledo’s ordinance allowing an administrative-

hearing officer to adjudicate noncriminal traffic-law violations contravenes the

statute’s plain language.

{¶ 9} In opposing the writ, Toledo makes three arguments, which we

address below.

A. This court’s decision in Walker v. Toledo

{¶ 10} First, Toledo argues that this court has already ruled in Walker v.

Toledo, 143 Ohio St.3d 420, 2014-Ohio-5461, 39 N.E.3d 474, that R.C. 1901.20

contains no language barring Toledo from implementing its own civil

administrative-enforcement system under its home-rule authority. But our holding

in Walker was made in the context of a different statutory scheme and is no longer

applicable.

{¶ 11} The version of R.C. 1901.20(A)(1) that was in effect at the time of

our Walker decision did not give municipal courts exclusive jurisdiction over cases

involving traffic-camera citations. Id. at ¶ 1-3. The previous version of

R.C. 1901.20(A)(1) stated: “The municipal court has jurisdiction of the violation of

any ordinance of any municipal corporation within its territory * * *.”

Am.Sub.S.B. No. 98, 147 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 7357. We held that “any” did not

mean the same thing as “exclusive,” and that the statute could therefore not be read

as conferring exclusive jurisdiction over civil traffic-law violations on municipal

January Term, 2020

courts. Id. at ¶ 25. But as amended by H.B. 62 in 2019, R.C. 1901.20(A)(1) now

states that municipal courts have “exclusive jurisdiction over every civil action

concerning a violation of a state traffic law or a municipal traffic ordinance.”

(Emphasis added). The current version of R.C. 1901.20(A)(1) clearly and

unambiguously reserves for municipal courts exclusive authority to adjudicate

every civil traffic-law violation. And that statutory grant of jurisdiction “cannot be

impaired or restricted by any municipal charter or ordinance provision.” Cupps v.

Toledo, 170 Ohio St. 144, 151, 163 N.E.2d 384 (1959).

B. Preemption under R.C. 1901.20(A)(1)

{¶ 12} Alternatively, Toledo argues that R.C. 1901.20(A)(1) does not

preempt its administrative scheme. Rather, Toledo contends that R.C.

1901.20(A)(1) divests jurisdiction only from other courts, not from administrative

bodies. In other words, despite the language in the amended statute, Toledo

suggests that the jurisdiction of the municipal courts is not truly exclusive.

According to Toledo, the language that the General Assembly added “can be read

to mean ‘jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other court’ ” but not to the exclusion

of a municipal administrative body.

{¶ 13} Toledo’s argument runs counter to the plain language of the statute,

which vests the municipal courts with exclusive jurisdiction, without limitations.

Toledo’s preferred construction of the statute requires us to add words to the text,

which we are not permitted to do. In re Adoption of P.L.H., 151 Ohio St.3d 554,

2017-Ohio-5824, 91 N.E.3d 698, ¶ 27.

{¶ 14} We reject Toledo’s argument that H.B. 62 preserved the jurisdiction

of local administrative-hearing officers for noncriminal traffic-law violations.

C. Constitutionality of certain provisions enacted in H.B. 62

{¶ 15} Finally, Toledo argues that R.C. 1901.20(A) is unenforceable

because other provisions enacted in H.B. 62 are unconstitutional. Toledo points to

R.C. 4511.096(C) and (D), which require a municipality to file specific documents

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in municipal court in photo-enforcement cases. And Toledo contends that these—

and other similar statutes that purport to set rules for a municipal court’s

operation—violate the separation-of-powers doctrine and Article IV, Section 5(B)

of the Ohio Constitution, the Modern Courts Amendment of 1968.

{¶ 16} But even assuming these provisions are unconstitutional (a question

we emphatically do not decide), Toledo does not claim that the exclusive-

jurisdiction clause of R.C. 1901.20(A) itself violates the Constitution. To the

contrary, the authority of the General Assembly to set the jurisdiction of the

municipal courts is undisputed.

{¶ 17} Toledo’s constitutional challenge to unrelated amendments that

H.B. 62 made to other statutes fails to account for the authority of courts to sever

unconstitutional portions of a statute without affecting other portions of the statute

or related provisions. See State v. Romage, 138 Ohio St.3d 390, 2014-Ohio-783, 7

N.E.3d 1156, ¶ 15; Geiger v. Geiger, 117 Ohio St. 451, 466, 160 N.E. 28 (1927);