Nathson Fields v. Lawrence Wharrie

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

____________________

No. 13‐1195

NATHSON FIELDS,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

LAWRENCE WHARRIE and DAVID KELLEY,

Defendants‐Appellants.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 10 C 1168 — Matthew F. Kennelly, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED NOVEMBER 1, 2013 — DECIDED JANUARY 23, 2014

____________________

Before POSNER, FLAUM, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

POSNER,  Circuit  Judge.  Before  us  are  appeals  by  two  Illi‐

nois  prosecutors,  Wharrie  and  Kelley,  who  claim  absolute

immunity  from  being  sued  by  Nathson  Fields  under  42

U.S.C. § 1983. Appeals from denial of immunity, though in‐

terlocutory  because  the  case  against  them  remains  pending

in  the  district  court,  are  immediately  appealable  provided

that, as in this case, the claim (in this case claims) of immuni‐

2  No. 13‐1195

ty depends on an issue of law rather than one of fact. Mitch‐

ell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 527–30 (1985).

Fields’ suit charges the defendants with depriving him of

liberty in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s due pro‐

cess  clause  and  committing  torts  of  malicious  prosecution,

intentional  infliction  of  emotional  distress,  and  conspiracy,

in  violation  of  Illinois  law.  Specifically  he  accuses  the  de‐

fendants of having coerced witnesses to give testimony that

the  defendants  (as  well  as  the  witnesses)  knew  to  be  false,

resulting  in  Fields’  conviction  of  two  murders  and  his  im‐

prisonment for 17 years until he was acquitted in a retrial; he

later  received  a  certificate  of  innocence  from  the  court  in

which he had been tried. 735 ILCS 5/2‐702.

This is the defendants’ second round of appeals. Our de‐

cision  in  round  one  sets  forth  the  factual  details  relating  to

Fields’  claims,  672  F.3d  505,  508–09  (7th  Cir.  2012);  we

needn’t repeat them. Fields accuses Wharrie of two separate

acts (one in 1985, the other in 1998) of coercing false testimo‐

ny  from  witnesses,  and  Kelley  of  similar  coercion  in  1998.

We should clarify the terminology used by Fields to describe

his claims. He uses “coerced,” “fabricated,” and “false” tes‐

timony  interchangeably  to  mean  testimony  procured  by  a

prosecutor who  knows  it’s  false. The  use  of  the  three  terms

to  denote  the  same  conduct  is  confusing.  For  they  mean

three different things. Coerced testimony is testimony that a

witness is forced  by improper  means  to give; the testimony

may be true or false. Fabricated testimony is testimony that

is  made  up;  it  is  invariably  false.  False  testimony  is  the

equivalent;  it  is  testimony  known  to  be  untrue  by  the  wit‐

ness and by whoever cajoled or coerced the witness to give

No. 13‐1195  3

it. Much testimony is inaccurate, but not deliberately so and

therefore not false or fabricated as we are using these words.

Originally  the  district  court  had  dismissed,  on  the

ground of absolute prosecutorial immunity, only the federal

claim against Wharrie that was based on his alleged miscon‐

duct in 1985. Fields did not appeal, but the prosecutors did,

challenging  the  district  court’s  refusal  to  dismiss  the  other

claims. Our decision in that first appellate round ordered the

dismissal  of  the  remaining  federal  claims  against  both  de‐

fendants  on  grounds  of  absolute  prosecutorial  immunity.

672  F.3d  at  519.  The  state  law  claims,  also  a  subject  of  the

prosecutors’ appeal, remained in the case. But we didn’t dis‐

cuss them, because we expected that with the federal claims

dismissed  the  district  judge  would  relinquish  jurisdiction

over the state law claims; for they were supplemental claims,

which  normally  are  dismissed  when  the  federal  claims  to

which they are supplemental drop out of the case before tri‐

al.  See  28  U.S.C.  § 1367(c)(3);  Brazinski  v.  Amoco  Petroleum

Additives Co., 6 F.3d 1176, 1182 (7th Cir. 1993); Musson Theat‐

rical,  Inc.  v.  Federal  Express  Corp.,  89  F.3d  1244,  1254–55  (6th

Cir.  1996);  Rodriguez  v.  Doral  Mortgage  Corp.,  57  F.3d  1168,

1177  (1st  Cir.  1995).  Indeed  we  suggested  he  do  that.  672

F.3d at 518–19.

So  the  case  was  still  alive  in  the  district  court,  if  barely,

when  unexpectedly  the  district  judge  granted  the  plaintiff’s

motion  to  reconsider  the  dismissal  of  one  of  his  federal

claims—Wharrie’s alleged fabrication of testimony by a wit‐

ness  during  the  investigation  in  1985  that  led  to  Fields’  in‐

dictment  and  trial—in  light  of  our  intervening  decision  in

Whitlock  v.  Brueggemann,  682  F.3d  567  (7th  Cir.  2012).  The

judge  also  decided  to  retain  supplemental  jurisdiction  of

4  No. 13‐1195

several of Fields’ state law claims. By thus partially stripping

the  defendants  of  absolute  prosecutorial  immunity,  the

judge’s rulings precipitated this, the defendants’ second ap‐

peal.

The claim that the district judge reinstated against Whar‐

rie is the one concerning Wharrie’s investigation of Fields in

1985. Prosecutors, like judges, enjoy absolute immunity from

federal tort liability, whether common law or constitutional,

because of “concern that harassment by unfounded litigation

would  cause  a  deflection  of  the  prosecutor’s  energies  from

his public duties, and the possibility that he would shade his

decisions  instead  of  exercising  the  independence  of  judg‐

ment  required  by  his  public  trust.”  Imbler  v.  Pachtman,  424

U.S. 409, 423 (1976); see also Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579,

581 (2d Cir. 1949) (L. Hand, J.). But the absolute immunity is

only for acts they commit within the scope of their employ‐

ment  as  prosecutors.  Buckley  v.  Fitzsimmons,  509  U.S.  259,

273–76  (1993);  Thomas  v.  City  of  Peoria,  580  F.3d  633,  638–39

(7th Cir. 2009); Pinaud v. County of Suffolk, 52 F.3d 1139, 1147

(2d Cir. 1995). Often their employment duties go beyond the

strictly prosecutorial to include investigation, and when they

do nonprosecutorial work they lose their absolute immunity

and  have  only  the  immunity,  called  “qualified,”  that  other

investigators  enjoy  when  engaged  in  such  work.  Buckley  v.

Fitzsimmons,  supra,  509  U.S.  at  275–76.  Qualified  immunity

“protects  government  officials  ‘from  liability  for  civil  dam‐

ages  insofar  as  their  conduct  does  not  violate  clearly  estab‐

lished  statutory  or  constitutional  rights  of  which  a  reasona‐

ble person would have known.’ Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.

223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818

(1982)).”  Messerschmidt  v.  Millender,  132  S.  Ct.  1235,  1244

(2012).

No. 13‐1195  5

Fields was not arrested until June 1985. Wharrie’s alleged

procurement  of  false statements from a prospective  witness

in Fields’ forthcoming trial had taken place a month earlier.

The trial (the first of Fields’ two trials) took place a year lat‐

er. Wharrie was one of the prosecutors at that trial. Though

as we said a prosecutor’s absolute immunity is limited to the

performance of his prosecutorial duties, and not to other du‐

ties  to  which  he  might  be  assigned  by  his  superiors  or  per‐

form on his own initiative, such as investigating a crime be‐

fore an arrest or indictment, Wharrie argues that he is insu‐

lated from liability for his investigative work by our decision

in  Buckley  v.  Fitzsimmons,  20  F.3d  789  (7th  Cir.  1994).  The

plaintiff  in  that  case,  which  like  this  one  was  a  malicious

prosecution  suit  against  prosecutors,  claimed  that  at  the  in‐

vestigative stage of the criminal case against the plaintiff the

prosecutors had coerced witnesses to testify against him. We

held  that  he  could  not  base  a  legal  claim  on  those  acts  be‐

cause until the evidence obtained by the improper acts was

introduced at his trial he had not been injured and therefore

no  tort  had  been  committed.  “Events  not  themselves  sup‐

porting recovery under § 1983 do not become actionable be‐

cause  they  lead  to  injurious  acts  for  which  the  defendants

possess  absolute  immunity,”  id.  at  796—namely  presenting

the coerced evidence at trial. Presenting evidence at trial is a

core prosecutorial function, protected by absolute prosecuto‐

rial immunity and therefore an insuperable bar to an award

of  damages  in  a  suit  for  malicious  prosecution  against  the

prosecutor.

The  analysis  in  our  Buckley  decision  thus  rests  on  the

principle  that  there  is  no  tort  without  an  actionable  injury

caused by the defendant’s wrongful act, 20 F.3d at 796. That

is  indeed  the  law.  See,  e.g.,  Jackson  v.  Pollion,  733  F.3d  786,

6  No. 13‐1195

790 (7th Cir. 2013). But the act that causes an injury need not

be simultaneous with the injury (indeed it will never be ex‐

actly simultaneous) for the actor to be liable. Think of prod‐

ucts liability. The defect that caused a pipe to burst and flood

your home may have been present when the pipe was man‐

ufactured  years  earlier.  The  manufacturer  would  be  liable

despite  the  lapse  of  time.  The  statute  of  limitations  would

not have begun to run until the pipe burst and caused dam‐

age  (though  if  there  were  a  statute  of  repose,  the  deadline

created by that statute may have passed). It may seem diffi‐

cult to understand why a prosecutor who, acting in an inves‐

tigative  role  before  judicial  proceedings  against  a  criminal

defendant began, coerced a witness or fabricated testimony,

intending that it be used against the defendant and knowing

that  it  would  be  used  against  him,  should  be  excused  from

liability just because the defendant was not harmed until the

witness testified and, as a result, the defendant was convict‐

ed  and  sentenced.  He  who  creates  the  defect  is  responsible

for the injury that the defect foreseeably causes later. Nor is

the only harm that resulting from the conviction and the sen‐

tence. In the present case, as in our recent decision in Julian

v. Hanna, 732 F.3d 842, 847 (7th Cir. 2013), the fabrication of

evidence  harmed  the  defendant  before  and  not  just  during

the trial, because it was used to help indict him.

But  consider  a  case  in  which  a  prosecutor,  whom  we’ll

call  A,  acting  in  a  purely  investigative  role,  fabricates  evi‐

dence against a suspect, but the prosecution of the suspect is

handled  by  a  different  prosecutor,  B,  who  though  knowing

that the evidence was fabricated decides to use it. And sup‐

pose  A  has  second  thoughts  about  what  he  did,  and  tells  B

not to use the evidence. But B goes ahead and uses it. It can

be  argued  that  A  should  not  be  regarded  as  having  caused

No. 13‐1195  7

the use of the evidence at trial. Cf. Whitlock v. Brueggemann,

supra, 682 F.3d at 583–84. B is protected from suit by his ab‐

solute prosecutorial immunity, thus leaving the victim of the

fabricated  evidence  without  a  complete  damages  remedy.

He would have a partial remedy, against A, if A’s fabrication

had inflicted harm against him before his trial, as by causing

him to be indicted, as in Julian v. Hanna, supra.

But  this  is  not  such  a  case  because  Wharrie,  the  alleged

fabricator  of  evidence  against  Fields,  was  also  one  of  his

prosecutors at trial. Nevertheless both Whitlock and the pre‐

sent  case  differ  from  our  Buckley  decision  in  a  respect  that

the panel in Whitlock (which did not question the soundness

of  Buckley)  thought  critical—namely  that  the  misconduct  of

the prosecutor (there was only one) in Whitlock consisted not

in  coercing  witnesses,  as  in  Buckley,  but  in  fabricating  evi‐

dence. (So here is where the terminological distinctions sug‐

gested  earlier  in  this  opinion  bite.)  Whitlock  observes  that

“coercively  interrogating  witnesses,  paying  witnesses  for

testimony,  and  witness‐shopping  may  be  deplorable,  and

these  tactics  may  contribute  to  wrongful  convictions,  but

they  do  not  necessarily  add  up  to  a  constitutional  violation

even when their fruits are introduced at trial,” because “evi‐

dence collected with these kinds of suspect technique, unlike

falsified  evidence  and  perjured  testimony,  may  turn  out  to  be

true.” 682 F.3d at 584 (emphasis added). The prosecutor who

was sued in  Whitlock was part  of  an investigative team  that

told witnesses what to say knowing that what the team was

telling  them  was  false.  See  id.  at  571–72.  This  is  different

from  coercing  a  reluctant  witness  to  say  what  may  be  true.

The  point  is  not  that  coercion  is  legally  irrelevant;  far  from

it—coercion (which in an extreme case could amount to tor‐

ture)  may  be  an  essential  tool  in  “persuading”  a  witness  to

8  No. 13‐1195

fabricate  testimony.  The  point  is  only  that  coercion  per  se

does  not  make  a  prosecutor  acting  as  an  investigator  liable

should  the  coerced  evidence  be  used  to  obtain  a  conviction

of  an  innocent  criminal  defendant.  If  the  evidence  obtained

by  coercion  is  sound  and  the  defendant  would  have  been

indicted, found guilty, and sentenced, without it (though in

fact  he  was  innocent),  the  only  victim  of  government  mis‐

conduct  is  the  witness  who  was  coerced;  and  that  is  not

Fields.

In  Buckley  the  plaintiff  had  alleged  that  the  coerced  evi‐

dence  was  not  only  coerced,  but  false.  But  our  opinion  de‐

scribed the primary victims, and the only ones with standing

to complain, as the coerced witnesses themselves. “Coercing

witnesses  to  speak,”  we  said,  “rather  than  loosening  their

tongues  by  promises  of  reward,  is  a  genuine  constitutional

wrong,  but  the  persons  aggrieved  would  be  Cruz  and  Her‐

nandez  [the  allegedly  coerced  witnesses]  rather  than  Buck‐

ley. Overbearing tactics violate the right of the person being

interrogated  to  be  free  from  coercion.  Buckley  cannot  com‐

plain that the prosecutors may have twisted Cruz’s arm, any

more than he can collect damages because they failed to read

Cruz Miranda warnings or searched Cruz’s house without a

warrant.  Rights  personal  to  their  holders  may  not  be  en‐

forced by third parties.” 20 F.3d at 794–95 (citations omitted).

This  is  analogous  to  the  rule  that  a  criminal  defendant  will

not be heard to object to the admission against him of proba‐

tive evidence unlawfully seized from a third party. Minneso‐

ta v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 90–91 (1998); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S.

128, 148–50 (1978).

This  “tough  luck”  rule  doesn’t  apply  when  there  is  no

coerced witness but nevertheless fabricated evidence; the ev‐

No. 13‐1195  9

idence  might  be  given  by  a  paid  police  informant—a  com‐

pensated  witness,  not  a  coerced  one.  That  is  the  distinction

drawn  in  Whitlock,  and  Wharrie  acknowledges  that  if  Whit‐

lock is the law he loses his defense of absolute immunity be‐

cause  he  is accused of  fabricating evidence before trial;  and

so  he  asks  us  to  overrule  Whitlock  as  inconsistent  with  our

Buckley  decision.  Fabrication  was  alleged  in  Buckley  as  well,

but  as  the  language  we  just  quoted  from  that  opinion  re‐

veals,  the  focus  was  on  coercion,  and  the  primary  victims,

and only victims held to have standing to sue, were the co‐

erced witnesses.

In asking us to overrule Whitlock, Wharrie ignores the al‐

ternative  of  overruling  Buckley  as  being  inconsistent  with

(the  newer)  Whitlock.  There’s  no  need  to  embrace  either  al‐

ternative. Because the cases are distinguishable and the pre‐

sent case falls on the Whitlock side of the line, we agree with

the  district  judge’s  reinstatement  of  Fields’  claim  against

Wharrie  for  the  latter’s  alleged  fabrication  of  evidence  in

1985, before Fields’ indictment and arrest.

Wharrie  is  asking  us  to  bless  a  breathtaking  injustice.

Prosecutor,  acting  pre‐prosecution  as  an  investigator,  fabri‐

cates evidence and introduces the fabricated evidence at tri‐

al.  The  innocent  victim  of  the  fabrication  is  prosecuted  and

convicted  and  sent  to  prison  for  17  years.  On  Wharrie’s  in‐

terpretation of our decision in Buckley, the prosecutor is insu‐

lated from liability because his fabrication did not cause the

defendant’s  conviction,  and  by  the  time  that  same  prosecu‐

tor got around to violating the defendant’s right he was ab‐

solutely  immunized.  So:  grave  misconduct  by  the  govern‐

ment’s lawyer at a time where he was not shielded by abso‐

lute  immunity;  no  remedy  whatsoever  for  the  hapless  vic‐

10  No. 13‐1195

tim.  In  Buckley,  in  contrast,  two  victims—the  coerced  wit‐

nesses—had a damages remedy, and the fact that there thus

were potential plaintiffs could be expected to have some de‐

terrent effect against future misconduct. To extend Buckley to

overrule Whitlock would leave a victim of graver misconduct

(because coercion does not always result in fabrication of ev‐

idence—even  torture  must  often  elicit  truthful  confessions)

completely unprotected.

That’s not only an offensive and indeed senseless result,

but it doesn’t jibe with the Supreme Court’s decision in Buck‐

ley,  where  we  read  that  “the  [fact  that]  prosecutors  later

called  a  grand  jury  to  consider  the  evidence  this  work  pro‐

duced  does  not  retroactively  transform  that  work  from  the

administrative  into  the  prosecutorial.  A  prosecutor  may  not

shield  his  investigative  work  with  the  aegis  of  absolute  im‐

munity  merely  because,  after  a  suspect  is  eventually  arrest‐

ed, indicted, and tried, that work may be retrospectively de‐

scribed  as  ‘preparation’  for  a  possible  trial;  every  prosecutor

might  then  shield  himself  from  liability  for  any  constitutional

wrong against innocent citizens by ensuring that they go to trial.”

Buckley  v.  Fitzsimmons,  supra,  509  U.S.  at  275–76  (emphasis

added,  footnote  omitted);  see  also  Zahrey  v.  Coffey,  221  F.3d

342, 349, 354 (2d Cir. 2000); McGhee v. Pottawattamie County,

547 F.3d 922, 932–33 (8th Cir. 2008); Moore v. Valder, 65 F.3d

189, 194–95 (D.C. Cir. 1995). A prosecutor cannot retroactive‐

ly immunize himself from conduct by perfecting his wrong‐

doing  through  introducing  the  fabricated  evidence  at  trial

and  arguing that the tort  was not completed until a time at

which he had acquired  absolute immunity. That would  cre‐

ate a “license to lawless conduct,” which the Supreme Court

has said that qualified immunity is not to do. Harlow v. Fitz‐

gerald,  457  U.S.  800,  819  (1982).  Wharrie’s  interpretation  of

No. 13‐1195  11

our decision in Buckley would place that decision in conflict

with  the  Supreme  Court’s  Buckley  decision,  by  giving  abso‐

lute immunity to prosecutor‐investigators who having fabri‐

cated  evidence  make  sure  that  the  evidence  is  used  to  con‐

vict the innocent victim of the fabrication.

So Wharrie has not demonstrated an entitlement to abso‐

lute  immunity—nor  to  qualified  immunity  for  the  fabrica‐

tion, either. For it was established law by 1985 (indeed long

before),  when  the  fabrication  is  alleged  to  have  occurred,

that  a  government  lawyer’s  fabricating  evidence  against  a

criminal defendant was a violation of due process. See Napue

v.  Illinois,  360  U.S.  264,  269  (1959);  Pyle  v.  Kansas,  317  U.S.

213, 215–16 (1942); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 110, 112–

13 (1935) (per curiam). It is true that the cases we’ve just cit‐

ed involved not merely the fabrication, but the introduction

of  the  fabricated  evidence  at  the  criminal  defendant’s  trial.

For  if the  evidence hadn’t  been used against  the  defendant,

he  would  not  have  been  harmed  by  it,  and  without  a  harm

there is, as we noted earlier, no tort. But when the question is

whether to grant immunity to a public employee, the focus is

on  his  conduct,  not  on  whether  that  conduct  gave  rise  to  a

tort in a particular case. As the Court said in Harlow v. Fitz‐

gerald, supra, 457 U.S. at 819, the test for qualified immunity

is  “the  objective  legal  reasonableness  of  an  official’s  acts.

Where  an  official  could  be  expected  to  know  that  certain

conduct  would  violate  statutory  or  constitutional  rights,  he

should  be  made  to  hesitate;  and  a  person  who  suffers  injury

caused  by  such  conduct  may  have  a  cause  of  action”  (emphasis

added)—or may not.

So  notice  the  disjunction:  the  immunity  depends  on  the

official’s  acts;  the  existence  of  a  cause  of  action  depends  on

12  No. 13‐1195

the  illegality  of  those  acts  and  on  whether  an  injury  results,

because, to repeat, no injury—no tort. Recall the earlier point

derived  from  the  Supreme  Court’s  decision  in  Buckley  that

without  that  distinction  a  prosecutor  who  in  a  pre‐

prosecution  investigative  role  fabricates  evidence  obtains

immunity simply by turning over the fabricated evidence to

the  prosecutor,  or  prosecuting  the  defendant  himself,  for  in

neither  case  is  he  the  direct  cause  of  the  defendant’s  injury

(the wrongful conviction).

It remains to consider two of Fields’ state law claims. The

first  arises  from  the  same  1985  conduct  alleged  of  Wharrie

that  we’ve  been  discussing.  The  second  is  false  testimony

allegedly  coerced  by  defendant  Kelley  in  1998,  while  Fields

was awaiting the retrial of his murder case.

The district court held, and both parties agree, that the Il‐

linois rule of absolute prosecutorial immunity is the same as

the  federal  rule.  Actually  that’s  not  entirely  clear.  The  last

time the Supreme Court of Illinois spoke to the issue it held

that all Illinois officials—including judges—enjoy immunity

only  “from  liability  for  error  or  mistake  of  judgment  in  the

exercise of their duty in the absence of corrupt or malicious mo‐

tives.”  People  ex  rel.  Schreiner  v.  Courtney,  43  N.E.2d  982,  986

(Ill.  1942)  (emphasis  added).  That’s  not  absolute  immunity.

But 71 years on, it is doubtful that this is still the law in Illi‐

nois. The Illinois Appellate Court seems not to think so. See,

e.g.,  Frank  v.  Garnati,  989  N.E.2d  319,  322  (Ill.  App.  2013);

White  v.  City  of  Chicago,  861  N.E.2d  1083,  1087–88  (Ill.  App.

2006); Weimann v. Kane County, 502 N.E.2d 373, 377 (Ill. App.

1986); People v. Patrick J. Gorman Consultants, Inc., 444 N.E.2d

776,  779  (Ill.  App.  1982);  Coleson  v.  Spomer,  334  N.E.2d  344,

347  (Ill.  App.  1975).  And  the  state’s  supreme  court  has  not

No. 13‐1195  13

called a halt to the trend in the intermediate appellate court.

E.g.,  Frank  v.  Garnati,  996  N.E.2d  12  (Ill.  2013)  (denying  ap‐

peal). Although some cases recite what sounds like the rule

from Courtney, in none was immunity denied on the ground

of bad faith. See, e.g., Aboufariss v. City of DeKalb, 713 N.E.2d

804, 812 (Ill. App. 1999).

Since, as just explained, Illinois may not even have abso‐

lute  prosecutorial  immunity,  and  since  Wharrie  does  not

claim that if Illinois does have it, it is more absolute than the

federal rule, and since we’ve already held that Wharrie is not

entitled to absolute immunity from being sued on the federal

claims against him, there is no basis for giving him absolute

prosecutorial  immunity  from  the  state  law  claims  for  the

same conduct alleged as a violation of Illinois tort law.

Kelley’s  alleged  procurement  of  false  testimony  took

place  in  1998,  in  preparation  for  Fields’  second  trial  and

therefore  in  the  midst  of  his  prosecution.  Once  prosecution

begins, bifurcating a prosecutor’s role between investigation

and prosecution is no longer feasible. If in the course of a tri‐

al  a  prosecutor  were  to  urge  one  of  his  witnesses  to  lie,  it

would  be  arbitrary  to  describe  this  as  an  investigative  act

separate  from  prosecution;  the  prosecutor’s  conduct  would

have  been  “intimately  associated  with  the  judicial  phase  of

the criminal process,” and he would therefore be entitled to

absolute immunity. Imbler v. Pachtman, supra, 424 U.S. at 430;

see  also  Smith  v.  Power,  346  F.3d  740,  742  (7th  Cir.  2003);

Warney v. Monroe County, 587 F.3d 113, 120–21 (2d Cir. 2009);

Genzler v. Longanbach, 410 F.3d 630, 638 (9th Cir. 2005) (inves‐

tigation  “bound  up  with  the  judicial  process”).  It  would  be

unlike the case discussed in the Supreme Court’s Buckley de‐

cision  of prosecutors held by the Court not to be entitled  to

14  No. 13‐1195

absolute immunity for fabricating evidence “during the ear‐

ly stages of the investigation” when “police officers and as‐

sistant prosecutors were performing essentially the same in‐

vestigatory functions.” Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, supra, 509 U.S.

at 262–63.

The  district  judge  ruled  after  our  first  decision  and  con‐

sistently  with  the  analysis  just  presented  that  Wharrie  had

absolute prosecutorial  immunity under state as well  as  fed‐

eral law for his allegedly procuring false testimony in antici‐

pation of Fields’ retrial in 1998, and Fields has not appealed

that ruling. We cannot understand on what basis the district

judge  distinguished  the  identical  conduct  alleged  against

Kelley  in  the  same  stage  of  the  same  proceeding  against

Fields, and so denied his motion to dismiss the claim against

him. True, Kelley may not yet have been “officially” part of

the trial team at Fields’ retrial, but he was already function‐

ing as part of the team and that’s all that matters, as we not‐

ed  in  our  first  opinion.  See  672  F.3d  at  511–12,  515–16;  see

also Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 343–45 (2009).

And so, to summarize, the denial of Wharrie’s motion to

dismiss  the  federal  and  state  claims  against  him  relating  to

the fabrication of false statements from a witness during the

investigation  in  1985  is  affirmed,  but  the  denial  of  Kelley’s

motion  to  dismiss  the  1998  state  law  claims  against  him  is

reversed  with  instructions  that  the  district  court  reconsider

that denial in light of the analysis in this opinion.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.

No. 13-1195 15

SYKES, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in

part. I agree that Fields’s claims against Kelley are barred by

absolute immunity. See Majority op. at 12–14. In our earlier

opinion in this case, we held that Wharrie is absolutely

immune from suit on similar allegations of

misconduct—specifically, that Wharrie coerced Earl Hawkins

to falsely implicate Fields in the 1984 murders of Talman

Hickman and Jerome Smith during the interval between

Fields’s first and second trials, while his postconviction

proceedings were ongoing and in anticipation of retrial. See

Fields v. Wharrie (“Fields I”), 672 F.3d 505, 511–16 (7th Cir. 2012).

The allegations against Kelley are materially indistinguishable

from the allegations against Wharrie stemming from this time

period. The only difference is that Kelley is accused of induc-

ing another witness, Randy Langston, to make a false identifi-

cation of Fields. But this act, like Wharrie’s alleged coercion of

Hawkins, took place during the judicial phase of the criminal

process and was functionally prosecutorial. So Kelley, like

Wharrie, is absolutely immune from suit for this conduct. See

Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 340–45 (2009); Imbler v.

Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430–31 (1976); Fields I, 672 F.3d at

510–15.

Illinois apparently follows the federal law on absolute

immunity, see Frank v. Garnati, 989 N.E.2d 931, 934 (Ill. App. Ct.

2013); White v. City of Chicago, 861 N.E.2d 1083, 1088–94 (Ill.

App. Ct. 2006); the parties do not argue otherwise. Accord-

ingly, I join the majority opinion to the extent that it reverses

the district court’s order permitting the state-law claims

against Kelley to proceed. See Majority op. at 12–14.

Unlike my colleagues, however, I would also reverse the

district court’s decision to reinstate the § 1983 and state-law

claims against Wharrie for his conduct in 1985, before Fields

was charged. Fields alleges that during the investigation of the

16 No. 13-1195

Hickman and Smith murders, Wharrie coerced Anthony

Sumner, a fellow gang member, to falsely implicate him in the

crimes. Fields I, 672 F.3d at 508–09. As we explained in our

earlier opinion, Fields was convicted of killing Hickman and

Smith based in part on Sumner’s testimony, but he won a new

trial for unrelated reasons (the trial judge had been bribed),

was acquitted on retrial, and obtained a certificate of inno-

cence.1 Id. at 509. His complaint seeks damages under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 for violation of his right to due process; he also asserts

several state-law theories of liability for the wrongful convic-

tions.2

To the extent that the § 1983 and state-law claims against

Wharrie are based on his alleged coercion of the false state-

ment from Sumner, absolute immunity does not apply. That

act took place before there was probable cause to arrest

Fields—that is, before the judicial process began—and was not

functionally prosecutorial, so Wharrie cannot claim to be

absolutely immune from suit for damages. Buckley v.

Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273–76 (1993); Buckley v. Fitzsimmons,

20 F.3d 789, 794 (7th Cir. 1994).

But Wharrie remains protected by qualified immunity, see

Buckley, 509 U.S. at 275–76, which “is available unless the acts

violated ‘clearly established’ constitutional norms,” Buckley,

1

Sumner recanted his testimony after Fields’s first trial. See Fields v. Wharrie

(“Fields I”), 672 F.3d 505, 517 (7th Cir. 2012). The status of Fields’s certificate

of innocence is in flux. The Illinois Appellate Court reversed the circuit

court’s issuance of it, see People v. Fields, 959 N.E.2d 1162, 1163 (Ill. App. Ct.

2011), and as far as I can tell, proceedings on remand remain pending in

Cook County Circuit Court.

2

Fields sued several Chicago police officers in addition to the two

prosecutors, but this interlocutory appeal, like the earlier one, concerns only

the prosecutors’ claims of absolute and qualified immunity.

No. 13-1195 17

20 F.3d at 794. The Supreme Court’s decision in Buckley

addressed only absolute prosecutorial immunity; the Court did

not have occasion to decide the qualified-immunity question.

That is, the Court did not decide whether coercing or otherwise

inducing a witness to give a false statement during a criminal

investigation violates clearly established constitutional rights.

But we decided that very question when the Supreme Court

returned Buckley to this court for further proceedings.

In our decision on remand in Buckley, we held that coercing

or otherwise soliciting a witness to falsely incriminate a suspect

during a criminal investigation does not violate any established

constitutional rights—except perhaps the rights of the witness

who is coerced. Id. at 794–97. If the suspect is charged, then

failing to disclose the false statement’s corrupt origins at trial

violates his due-process right to a fair trial under the rule of

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and knowingly using

perjured testimony to convict him is a more general violation

of his due-process right to a fair trial. See Buckley, 20 F.3d at

794–95; see also Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 n.6 (1994)

(plurality opinion); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959);

Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935); Serino v. Hensley,

735 F.3d 588, 592 (7th Cir. 2013); Newsome v.McCabe, 256 F.3d

747, 750–52 (7th Cir. 2001). But a prosecutor who commits

these acts or omissions at trial is functioning quintessentially

as a prosecutor, so under well-established immunity law, he is

absolutely immune from suit for damages under § 1983. Van de

Kamp, 555 U.S. at 340–45; Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430–31; Fields I,

672 F.3d at 510–15; Buckley, 20 F.3d at 794–96.

In contrast, a prosecutor who coerces or otherwise procures

a false statement from a witness during an investigation, before

probable cause exists and the judicial process has begun, is not

protected by absolute immunity, but he is entitled to qualified

immunity because his conduct does not violate clearly estab-

18 No. 13-1195

lished constitutional rights. Buckley, 20 F.3d at 794–98. Due-

process rights are not implicated at this stage; they arise later,

when judicial proceedings are instituted. Id. Accordingly,

extracting a false statement from a witness during a criminal

investigation is not independently actionable as a constitu-

tional violation, and Buckley holds that “events not themselves

supporting recovery [against prosecutors] under § 1983 do not

become actionable because they lead to injurious acts for which

[the prosecutors] possess absolute immunity.” Id. at 796.

In our earlier opinion in this case, we relied on this

qualified-immunity holding from Buckley as an alternative

basis for finding Wharrie and Kelley immune from suit under

§ 1983 for their solicitation of false statements from Hawkins

and Langston. Fields I, 672 F.3d at 516–18. Citing Buckley, we

noted that “fabricating evidence, including in the form of

testimony, is not an actionable constitutional wrong. … The

constitutional violation occurs when the means by which the

testimony was acquired are not disclosed at trial—or when

other information that impeach[es] the testimony’s reliability

is not shared with the defense.” Id. at 516–17. Our alternative

holding in Fields I followed the rule, established in Buckley, that

even if a prosecutor participates in securing a false statement

from a witness during a criminal investigation, his “absolutely

immunized prosecutorial decision to proceed to trial and

introduce the [witness’s] testimony” forecloses suit against

him; there is no independently cognizable due-process claim

for his investigative misconduct.3 Id. at 517 (discussing

Wharrie’s qualified immunity); see also id. at 517–18 (discussing

Kelley’s qualified immunity).

3

There might be an actionable Fourth Amendment claim for false arrest, but

Fields has not made that claim here.

No. 13-1195 19

Three months after we issued our opinion in Fields I, a new

decision of this court, Whitlock v. Brueggemann, 682 F.3d 567

(7th Cir. 2012), unsettled Buckley (and by extension, unsettled

Fields I as well), which led the district court to do an about-face

on remand in this case. Wharrie’s new appeal requires us to

decide whether Whitlock and Buckley can be reconciled. I think

the answer is plainly “no.”

As my colleagues have noted, Whitlock drew a distinction,

for qualified-immunity purposes, between a prosecutor who

coercively interrogates witnesses and a prosecutor who

fabricates evidence. See Majority op. at 7–9. Whitlock observed

that coercion and unsavory tactics like paying for testimony

and witness shopping “may be deplorable, and … may

contribute to wrongful convictions, but they do not necessarily

add up to a constitutional violation even when their fruits are

introduced at trial … [because] [e]vidence collected with these

kinds of suspect techniques, unlike falsified evidence and

perjured testimony, may turn out to be true.” 682 F.3d at 584.

This proposed distinction between “coerced” and “fabricated”

evidence was the linchpin for distinguishing Buckley and

permitting the claim against the prosecutor in Whitlock to

proceed. The Whitlock panel thought the prosecutors in Buckley

had been accused of coercing witnesses and using other

suspect tactics but were not alleged to have fabricated evi-

dence, and on that basis distinguished the case. Id. at 584–85.

Regrettably, that was a mistake. In fact, both Buckley and

Whitlock involved allegations that prosecutors had coerced,

cajoled, paid for, or otherwise solicited falsified statements from

witnesses—in other words, they fabricated evidence. Indeed,

Buckley repeatedly refers to allegations that prosecutors

coercively obtained “false inculpatory statements” from

witnesses and “fabricated” or “manufactured” testimony and

20 No. 13-1195

evidence from an expert.4 20 F.3d at 794–95. So regardless of

whether Whitlock’s proposed distinction between “coerced”

and “fabricated” witness statements is valid in theory—and

makes a difference in the constitutional analysis—it simply

was not present as a factual matter and therefore cannot

provide a basis on which to distinguish Buckley from Whitlock.5

4

More specifically, Stephen Buckley alleged that prosecutors coerced two

witnesses to falsely implicate him during a murder investigation. See

Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 20 F.3d 789, 794–96 (7th Cir. 1994). He also alleged

that the prosecutors paid an expert witness for forensic evidence—a

bootprint identification—that they knew was false. Id. at 795–96. The

prosecutors indicted and tried Buckley for murder; the jury deadlocked,

and while Buckley was awaiting retrial, someone else confessed to the

crime. See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 264 (1993). We held that the

prosecutors were entitled to qualified immunity for their pre-charging

misconduct because the solicitation of false evidence—by whatever device

(whether coercion or payment)—does not violate clearly established

constitutional rights; the use of the false evidence at trial may have violated

Buckley’s due-process right to a fair trial, but the prosecutors were

absolutely immune for that misconduct. Buckley, 20 F.3d at 794–97.

The facts of Whitlock were materially identical. There, the plaintiffs

alleged that a witness had been coerced to give a false statement implicating

them in a double murder and that another witness falsely incriminated

them after being plied with money and alcohol. See Whitlock v. Brueggemann,

682 F.3d 567, 572 (7th Cir. 2013). They were convicted based in part on the

false testimony of these witnesses, and after their convictions were

overturned (based on Brady violations), they sued the police officers and the

prosecutor who were involved in the investigation and prosecution. As I

have noted, in rejecting the prosecutor’s claim of qualified immunity, the

Whitlock panel distinguished Buckley by drawing a distinction between

coerced and fabricated evidence, apparently overlooking the fact that both

cases involved allegations of coercion and fabrication.

5

Judge Kennelly, who is handling this case in the trial court, saw the

problem immediately. Although he followed Whitlock because it is the later-

decided case, he pointedly noted that “[b]oth the defendants in Whitlock and

the defendants in Buckley[] were alleged to have coerced false inculpatory

(continued...)

No. 13-1195 21

Yet my colleagues perpetuate the distinction here. See

Majority Op. at 2–3, 7–9. I appreciate the force of stare decisis;

we should try to harmonize the two cases if we can. With

respect, however, harmonization is impossible. Whitlock and

Buckley are factually indistinguishable and legally irreconcil-

able. They cannot both be the law. We must decide which one

is correct.6

5

(...continued)

statements from witnesses. … Thus there is no apparent factual distinction

between the underlying fabricatory conduct in Whitlock and that in

Buckley[].” Fields v. City of Chicago, No. 10 C 1168, 2012 WL 6705790, at *5

(N.D. Ill. Dec. 26, 2012).

6

My colleagues have acknowledged that both Whitlock and Buckley involved

prosecutors who were alleged to have fabricated evidence during an

investigation. See Majority op. at 8. They maintain that the cases can still be

distinguished because “the focus [in Buckley] was on coercion, and the

primary victims, and only victims held to have standing to sue, were the

coerced witnesses.” Id. at 9. They read Whitlock as holding that Buckley’s

“ ‘tough luck’ rule doesn’t apply when there is no coerced witness but

nevertheless fabricated evidence; the evidence might be given by a paid

police informant—a compensated witness, not a coerced one.” Id. at 8–9.

There are several problems with this analysis. First, our decision in

Buckley had nothing to do with the standing of the coerced witnesses; we

mentioned this point only to explain that although the witnesses might

have a claim for violation of their constitutional rights during the investiga-

tion, Buckley—the only plaintiff in the case—did not. See Buckley, 20 F.3d at

794–97. Second, in straining to maintain Whitlock’s distinction between

coerced and fabricated evidence, my colleagues continue to disregard the

material factual identity between Buckley and Whitlock—both cases involved

allegations of pre-charging fabrication of evidence, some of which was

allegedly coerced. See supra n.4. Finally, my colleagues do not explain the

constitutional basis for the coercion/fabrication distinction. It’s not clear

why it makes a difference in the qualified-immunity analysis, which asks

whether the pre-charging misconduct violates established constitutional

rights.

22 No. 13-1195

For my part, I think Buckley is correct and Whitlock should

be reconsidered. Because mine is the minority view here, any

reconsideration of Whitlock must await a petition for rehearing

en banc, which Wharrie may choose to pursue or forego. For

the record, I’ll briefly sketch the conceptual difficulty Whitlock

has introduced, which I believe warrants the full court’s

attention.

I have already described Buckley’s qualified-immunity

holding, which was and remains sound. Whitlock rejected

qualified immunity for a similarly situated prosecutor by using

common-law causation principles to find an actionable

constitutional violation where one did not otherwise exist. I do

not agree with this development in our circuit’s law.

As I’ve explained, Buckley contains two important princi-

ples of immunity law that apply in suits alleging prosecutorial

misconduct: (1) a prosecutor’s use of fabricated evidence at

trial may be actionable as a violation of the defendant’s right

to due process—under the rubric of Brady or perhaps more

generally as a violation of the right to a fair trial—but the

prosecutor is absolutely immune from suit under Imbler and

related cases, see 20 F.3d at 794–95; and (2) a prosecutor’s

fabrication of evidence against a suspect during an investiga-

tion is covered by qualified immunity because it doesn’t

violate clearly established constitutional rights, see id. at

794–98. Whitlock’s innovation is to use common-law causation

analysis to eliminate the effect of both forms of immunity. The

panel held that “[t]he actions of an official who fabricates

evidence that later is used to deprive someone of liberty can be

both a but-for and proximate cause of the due process viola-

tion.”7 Whitlock, 682 F.3d at 583.

7

Although it’s not entirely clear, the due-process violation to which

(continued...)

No. 13-1195 23

As applied to a prosecutor, this reasoning circumvents both

qualified and absolute immunity. Both immunities are well

established and important. See Van de Kamp, 555 U.S. at 341–43

(absolute immunity); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818

(1982) (qualified immunity); Imbler, 424 U.S. at 424–26 (absolute

immunity). Absolute immunity can sometimes produce harsh

results, but it has long been thought necessary to encourage

and protect the vigorous performance of the prosecutorial

function. See Van de Kamp, 555 U.S. at 341–43; Imbler, 424 U.S.

at 424–26.

In a shorthand version, the rule announced in Whitlock is

basically this: A prosecutor who falsifies evidence during an

investigation violates no clearly established constitutional

rights and thus has qualified immunity from suit (see Buckley),

but his conduct is nonetheless actionable as a non-immune

subsidiary “cause” (both but-for and proximate) of a due-

process violation that occurs later, when the prosecutor

introduces the falsified evidence at trial—even though the

prosecutor is absolutely immune from suit for the due-process

violation. In other words, the only conduct that can possibly

7

(...continued)

Whitlock refers can only be a violation of the procedural right to a fair trial.

That much is implicit in the context of the case and the content of the

opinion, which does not address the more complicated and unsettled

question whether the Due Process Clause provides a substantive ground of

protection against malicious prosecution. See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266,

271–74 (1994) (“Where a particular Amendment provides an explicit textual

source of constitutional protection against a particular sort of government

behavior, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of ‘substantive

due process,’ must be the guide for analyzing these claims.” (plurality

opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also id. at 275–76 (Scalia, J.,

concurring); id. at 283–86 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Serino v. Hensley,

735 F.3d 588, 592–94 (7th Cir. 2013); Julian v. Hanna, 732 F.3d 842, 845–48

(7th Cir. 2013); Newsome v. McCabe, 256 F.3d 747, 750–53 (7th Cir. 2001).

24 No. 13-1195

form the basis of a constitutional claim—the prosecutor’s trial

conduct—is fully protected by absolute immunity, but the

prosecutor can be sued anyway, based on the causal link

between his nonactionable investigative conduct and his

immunized trial conduct.

Aside from destabilizing immunity law, this chain of

reasoning overlooks some basic differences between common-

law and constitutional torts. Common-law causation rules flow

from the nature of duty and breach in tort law. Everyone has

a general tort duty to refrain from doing an act or omitting a

precaution that creates a foreseeable, unreasonable risk of

harm to other persons or property. See generally RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1965) (defining negligence). The duty

is broad and undifferentiated and is owed to everyone at all

times, and anyone who breaches it is liable for harms factually

and proximately caused.

Constitutional rights—and the corresponding duties

imposed on governmental actors—are not like the generalized

rights and duties imposed by negligence law. They are

implicated at specific times and in specific circumstances. As

relevant here, Fields’s due-process rights came into play after

he was charged; the Brady disclosure duty is an aspect of the

right to a fair trial, as is the broader right not to have the trial

process subverted by the knowing introduction of falsified

evidence. See Serino, 735 F.3d at 592; Newsome, 256 F.3d at

751–52; Buckley, 20 F.3d at 796–97. So Wharrie’s act of extract-

ing a false statement from Sumner during the investigative

phase of the case did not violate Fields’s due-process rights. A

prosecutor who commits this kind of misconduct has behaved

deplorably but has breached no constitutional duty and thus

committed no constitutional wrong.

Common-law causation analysis cannot be used to trans-

form an act that does not violate the Constitution into one that

No. 13-1195 25

does. That, in essence, is the effect of Whitlock. It turns the

prosecutor’s nonactionable investigative misconduct into an

actionable constitutional wrong by recharacterizing it as a

subsidiary “cause” of a due-process violation that occurs later

at trial but is absolutely immunized.

To help explain and justify Whitlock, my colleagues analo-

gize to product-liability causation rules. See Majority op. at 6.

I think the analogy exposes a key conceptual problem in the

analysis. The pipe maker who negligently manufactures a pipe

breaches his general tort duty to refrain from acts that create an

unreasonable risk of harm to persons or property. The breach

may not cause harm until the pipe bursts, and the statute of

limitations does not begin to run until the harm occurs. But the

breach of duty occurs at the point of negligent manufacture,

and the manufacturer will be liable for harm that flows

causally from that breach. (In the law of strict product liability,

the manufacturer’s sale of the defective pipe starts the causal

chain, but the basic point about the order of analysis—

duty/breach/cause—remains the same.)

Section 1983 does not impose an analogous generalized

duty on governmental agents to refrain from putting people at

an unreasonable risk of harm. Rather, § 1983 creates a cause of

action for damages against state and local officials who inflict

specific deprivations of federal rights. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983

(creating a cause of action against any official who, under color

of state law, “subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of

the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof

to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities

secured by the Constitution and laws”). It is well understood

that § 1983 “ ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but

merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights

elsewhere conferred.’ ” Albright, 510 U.S. at 811 (plurality

opinion) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3

26 No. 13-1195

(1979)). In other words, the Constitution supplies the rights

and duties and otherwise fills in the content of a § 1983 claim.

So “[t]he first step in any such claim is to identify the specific

constitutional right allegedly infringed.” Id.

Here, the right allegedly infringed is the due-process right

to a fair trial, but under the rationale of Whitlock, the asserted

act of infringement occurred before any fair-trial duty arose. To

put the problem colloquially, Whitlock puts the causation cart

before the duty horse. A prosecutor who coerces a witness to

falsely incriminate a suspect during a criminal investigation

breaches no constitutional duty owed to the suspect. If the

suspect is charged, then suborning perjury against him at trial

would violate his due-process rights—so too would withhold-

ing evidence about the coercion of the witness. But these are

trial rights, and a prosecutor’s violation of them is absolutely

immunized. The prosecutor’s investigative misconduct cannot

independently support a due-process claim; that conduct

violates no due-process duty.

It is true, as my colleagues have noted, that the Supreme

Court said the following in Buckley:

A prosecutor may not shield his investigative

work with the aegis of absolute immunity

merely because, after a suspect is eventually

arrested, indicted, and tried, that work may be

retrospectively described as ‘preparation’ for a

possible trial; every prosecutor might then shield

himself from liability for any constitutional

wrong against innocent citizens by ensuring that

they go to trial.

Buckley, 509 U.S. at 276. This passage in the Court’s opinion

simply drives home the point that prosecutors are not pro-

tected by absolute immunity for their pre-charging miscon-

No. 13-1195 27

duct. That much is clear from the very next sentence: “When

the functions of prosecutors and detectives are the same, as

they were here, the immunity that protects them is also the

same.” Id. That’s an obvious reference to qualified immunity.

It’s worth repeating that the Court sent Buckley back to us

to decide the qualified-immunity question. We unambiguously

held—in 1994—that falsifying evidence during an investigation

does not violate established constitutional rights, and “events

not themselves supporting recovery [against prosecutors]

under § 1983 do not become actionable because they lead to

injurious acts for which [the prosecutors] possess absolute

immunity.” Buckley, 20 F.3d at 796.

Directly contradicting that clear holding of Buckley, my

colleagues now conclude that “it was established law by 1985,

when the fabrication is alleged to have occurred, that a

government lawyer’s fabricating evidence against a criminal

defendant was a violation of due process.” Majority op. at 11

(emphasis added). For this proposition they cite Napue v.

Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959); Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942);

and Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935), but these cases do

not hold that fabricating evidence violates due process. Rather,

they hold that the use of falsified evidence or perjured testi-

mony at trial violates the defendant’s due-process right to a

fair trial and is grounds for habeas or other postconviction

relief. See Napue, 360 U.S. at 269; Pyle, 317 U.S. at 215–16;

Mooney, 294 U.S. at 112–13. As my colleagues have noted, the

qualified-immunity inquiry asks whether a reasonable public

official could be expected to know that the conduct in question

violates constitutional rights. See Majority op. at 11 (citing

Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819). The specific conduct in question

here—inducing a witness to tell a lie during an investiga-

tion—is clearly wrong, but it does not violate any constitu-

tional rights.

28 No. 13-1195

So although my colleagues have formally left Buckley in

place, the core of the opinion—its qualified-immunity

holding—is effectively overruled.

Finally, a brief comment on my colleagues’ assertion that

adhering to Buckley would work a “breathtaking injustice” and

produce “an offensive and indeed senseless result.”8 Id. at 9, 10.

These are strong words. No one doubts that wrongful convic-

tions are unjust; a person who is convicted and punished for a

crime he did not commit has a serious moral claim to a

compensatory remedy. Usually the law provides one, com-

monly in the form of a Brady claim against the officers who

were involved in suppressing exculpatory evidence during the

prosecution. It’s possible that in some cases the effect of

absolute immunity—or the combined effect of absolute and

qualified immunity—might leave a wrongly convicted person

without an actionable damages claim against any of the

wrongdoers. I could be wrong, but I don’t think that happens

very often. Prosecutors do not work alone, and if the police

officers working with them withhold exculpatory information

about coerced or fabricated evidence, the aggrieved defendant

will have a good § 1983 claim against the officers for violation

of Brady. The Brady duty is well established, and the claim

against the officers is available regardless of whether the

prosecutor participated in the “creation” of the fabricated

evidence or the cover-up at trial or both. That basically

describes this case.9

8

Actually they refer to the “breathtaking injustice” of accepting Wharrie’s

“conception” of Buckley, Majority op. at 9, but the real objection seems to be

with Buckley itself.

9

Moreover, the wrongly convicted need not worry that officers who violate

Brady will be judgment proof because Illinois requires municipalities to

(continued...)

No. 13-1195 29

My colleagues also perceive a need to authorize a damages

remedy as a deterrent against rogue prosecutors. Id. at 10.

That’s a valid concern, but it doesn’t justify finding a cogniza-

ble constitutional violation where one does not exist. The

policy justification for absolute immunity accepts that deter-

rence can be achieved in other ways. Although a complicit

prosecutor escapes civil liability for damages, he remains

subject to criminal prosecution and professional discipline for

his misdeeds; he is not immune from these consequences for

his misconduct. See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 429. The prospect of

criminal liability and disbarment are powerful deterrents. See

id. (“These [criminal and professional] checks undermine the

argument that the imposition of civil liability is the only way

to insure that prosecutors are mindful of the constitutional

rights of persons accused of crime.”).

In the end, the policy behind absolute prosecutorial

immunity “reflects ‘a balance’ of ‘evils’ ” based on a judgment

that it is “ ‘better … to leave unredressed the wrongs done by

dishonest officers than to subject those who try to do their duty

to the constant dread of retaliation.’ ” Van de Kamp, 555 U.S. at

340 (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949)

(Hand, J.)). Moreover, as we said in Buckley, “[q]ualified

immunity does not permit us to recognize … [new constitu-

9

(...continued)

indemnify their police officers. See 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/9-102 (“A local

public entity is empowered and directed to pay any tort judgment or

settlement for compensatory damages … for which it or an employee while

acting within the scope of his employment is liable … .”). People who are

wrongly convicted in Illinois can also seek a certificate of innocence,

entitling them to a monetary award from the Illinois Court of Claims of up

to $199,150. See 704 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/8(c). Fields initially obtained a

certificate of innocence, and a compensation check was issued to him by the

Court of Claims, but the Illinois Appellate Court reversed and remanded.

See People v. Fields, 959 N.E.2d at 1163–66.

30 No. 13-1195

tional] right[s] in this litigation.” Buckley, 20 F.3d at 797.

Although Wharrie’s alleged wrongdoing may go unredressed

via a federal damages remedy against him, Fields has an

ongoing § 1983 claim against the police officers who were

allegedly complicit in withholding exculpatory evidence about

the circumstances surrounding Sumner’s false statement.

In sum, applying Buckley requires a conclusion that Wharrie

is entitled to qualified immunity for his investigative miscon-

duct; his act of soliciting Sumner’s false statement did not

violate clearly established constitutional rights and does “not

become actionable because [it led to] injurious acts for which

[the prosecutor] possess[es] absolute immunity.” Id. at 796.

Applying Whitlock, my colleagues conclude that Wharrie’s

investigative misconduct is actionable as a non-immune

subsidiary “cause” of his absolutely immunized due-process

violation at trial. I would reconsider Whitlock, restore Buckley,

and reverse with instructions to dismiss the § 1983 claim

against Wharrie. With no federal claim remaining, the district

court ordinarily should relinquish jurisdiction over the state-

law claims against him. See Fields I, 672 F.3d at 518–19.

For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur in part and

dissent in part.