Eppley v. Tri-Valley Local School District Board of Education

[Cite as Eppley v. Tri-Valley Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 122 Ohio St.3d 56, 2009-Ohio-

1970.]

EPPLEY, ADMR., APPELLEE, v. TRI-VALLEY LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICT

BOARD OF EDUCATION, APPELLANT, ET AL.

[Cite as Eppley v. Tri-Valley Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn.,

122 Ohio St.3d 56, 2009-Ohio-1970.]

Wrongful-death actions — R.C. 2125.04 — Saving statute — The saving statute

for wrongful-death actions, R.C. 2125.04, does not violate the right to

equal protection of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United

States Constitution and Section 2, Article I of the Ohio Constitution.

(No. 2008-0366 — Submitted January 21, 2009 — Decided May 5, 2009.)

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Muskingum County,

No. CT2007-0022, 2008-Ohio-32.

__________________

SYLLABUS OF THE COURT

The saving statute for wrongful death actions, R.C. 2125.04, does not violate the

right to equal protection of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment to

the United States Constitution and Section 2, Article I of the Ohio

Constitution.

__________________

LANZINGER, J.

{¶ 1} In this case, we are asked to determine the constitutionality of R.C.

2125.04, the wrongful death saving statute. Because we hold that the statute does

not violate the right to equal protection of the law, we reverse the judgment of the

court of appeals insofar as it holds that the statute is unconstitutional.

I. Case Background

{¶ 2} Joshua M. Eppley, a student in the Tri-Valley Local School

District, died on November 26, 2003, in an accident while a passenger in a car

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

driven by Corey W. Jenkins. Appellee, Randy J. Eppley, the administrator of

Joshua’s estate, initially filed a complaint on August 3, 2005, for wrongful death

against Tri-Valley Local School Board and Tri-Valley Local School District.1

Eppley dismissed the case without prejudice under Civ.R. 41(A)(1)(a) on

September 15, 2005. He refiled the case the following year on September 7.

{¶ 3} The refiled complaint alleged that unnamed employees of the

school district engaged in willful, wanton, and reckless conduct by allowing

Corey to remove Joshua from school premises without the permission of Joshua’s

parents and that Joshua’s death was the result of that conduct. The school board

and the district filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the

statute of limitations had run on the complaint before refiling and that they were

immune from liability.

{¶ 4} Eppley responded that the general saving statute, R.C. 2305.19,

rather than the wrongful death saving statute, R.C. 2125.04, applied to the refiled

action. He argued in the alternative that R.C. 2125.04 violated his right to equal

protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and

Section 2, Article I of the Ohio Constitution. The trial court dismissed the

complaint with prejudice under Civ.R. 12 but did not state a reason for the

dismissal.

{¶ 5} Eppley appealed, and the Fifth District Court of Appeals reversed

the judgment. It held, inter alia, that R.C. 2125.04 violates the right to equal

protection because there is no legitimate state interest to which the wrongful death

saving statute is rationally related. Eppley v. Tri-Valley Local School Dist., 5th

Dist. No. CT2007-0022, 2008-Ohio-32, ¶ 38. We accepted the discretionary

1. The complaint also named as defendants John Does 1 through 5. Since John Does 1 through 5

have not been served with a complaint, we need not treat them as parties in this appeal.

2

January Term, 2009

appeal of the school board2 on whether R.C. 2125.04 denies wrongful death

claimants the equal protection of the law.

II. Legal Analysis

A. The Saving Statutes, R.C. 2305.19(A) and 2125.04

{¶ 6} The parties have raised two statutes as potentially applicable. The

first, the general saving statute relied upon by appellee and the court of appeals,

states: “In any action that is commenced or attempted to be commenced, if in due

time a judgment for the plaintiff is reversed or if the plaintiff fails otherwise than

upon the merits, the plaintiff or, if the plaintiff dies and the cause of action

survives, the plaintiff’s representative may commence a new action within one

year after the date of the reversal of the judgment or the plaintiff’s failure

otherwise than upon the merits or within the period of the original applicable

statute of limitations, whichever occurs later. This division applies to any claim

asserted in any pleading by a defendant.” (Emphasis added.) R.C. 2305.19(A).

{¶ 7} The second statute, specifically referring to wrongful death actions,

states: “In every civil action for wrongful death commenced or attempted to be

commenced within the time specified by division (D)(1) or (D)(2)(c), (d), (e), (f),

or (g) of section 2125.02 of the Revised Code, if a judgment for the plaintiff is

reversed or the plaintiff fails otherwise than upon the merits and if the time limited

by any of those divisions for the commencement of the action has expired at the

date of the reversal or failure, the plaintiff or, if the plaintiff dies and the cause of

action survives, the personal representative of the plaintiff may commence a new

civil action for wrongful death within one year after that date.” (Emphasis

added.) R.C. 2125.04.

2. The court of appeals held that the school district could not be sued. Eppley v. Tri-Valley Local

School Dist., 5th Dist. No. CT2007-0022, 2008-Ohio-32, ¶ 49. We denied appellee’s cross-

appeal, which also challenged the court of appeals’ judgment. Therefore, the school board is the

only appellant.

3

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

{¶ 8} As the Fifth District Court of Appeals observed, before 2000, both

statutes granted a plaintiff an additional year in which to refile an action

dismissed without prejudice only if dismissal occurred after the original statute of

limitations had run. Eppley, 2008-Ohio-32, at ¶ 16. Sometimes referred to as the

“malpractice trap,” this meant that a plaintiff whose case had been dismissed

without prejudice before the original statute of limitations had run was required to

refile the action within the original statutory time, regardless of how much time

was left. Id.

{¶ 9} The General Assembly amended the general saving statute in 2004,

closing the malpractice trap and permitting a plaintiff to refile within one year

after dismissal or within the time remaining under the statute of limitations,

whichever is longer. Eppley, 2008-Ohio-32, at ¶ 17. The General Assembly,

however, did not similarly amend the saving statute pertaining to wrongful death

actions. Id. at ¶ 18. In making its determination that R.C. 2125.04, rather than

R.C. 2305.19, applies, the court of appeals noted that the specific statute takes

precedence over a general statute. Id. at ¶ 22. See State v. Volpe (1988), 38 Ohio

St.3d 191, 194, 527 N.E.2d 818.3

{¶ 10} Since the wrongful death saving statute is the specific statute, R.C.

2125.04 applies, and the complaint was untimely filed. The fatal accident

occurred November 26, 2003, and the case was dismissed without prejudice on

September 15, 2005. Under R.C. 2125.04, Eppley’s refiling deadline was not

extended to September 15, 2006. Because the action was dismissed before the

two-year statute of limitations ran, Eppley still had only two years from the date

of the accident, until November 26, 2005, to bring suit. The question then is

whether R.C. 2125.04 violates the right to equal protection.

3. We declined jurisdiction over Eppley’s cross-appeal, which argued that R.C. 2305.19 is the

appropriate statute, and so we will proceed on the basis that the wrongful death saving statute,

R.C. 2125.04, applies.

4

January Term, 2009

B. Constitutionality of R.C. 2125.04

{¶ 11} The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution

provides that “[n]o State shall * * * deny to any person within its jurisdiction the

equal protection of the laws.” Ohio’s Equal Protection Clause in turn provides

that “[a]ll political power is inherent in the people. Government is instituted for

their equal protection and benefit * * *.” Section 2, Article I, Ohio Constitution.

We have held that the equal protection provisions of the Ohio and federal

Constitutions are functionally equivalent and require the same analysis. State v.

Thompson, 95 Ohio St.3d 264, 2002-Ohio-2124, 767 N.E.2d 251, ¶ 11, citing Am.

Assn. of Univ. Professors, Cent. State Univ. Chapter v. Cent. State Univ. (1999),

87 Ohio St.3d 55, 59, 717 N.E.2d 286.

{¶ 12} We first recognize that statutes are presumed to be constitutional

and that courts have a duty to liberally construe statutes in order to save them

from constitutional infirmities. Desenco, Inc. v. Akron (1999), 84 Ohio St.3d 535,

538, 706 N.E.2d 323.

{¶ 13} Because of the presumption of constitutionality, we must consider

the nature of rights that are claimed to be at issue, for these determine the nature

of our review. When challenging a statute on constitutional grounds, a party may

present a facial challenge to the statute as a whole or challenge the statute as

applied to a specific set of facts. Harrold v. Collier, 107 Ohio St.3d 44, 2005-

Ohio-5334, 836 N.E.2d 1165, ¶ 37; Belden v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. (1944),

143 Ohio St. 329, 28 O.O. 295, 55 N.E.2d 629. See United States v. Salerno

(1987), 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697. The court of appeals

treated Eppley’s constitutional challenge as an as-applied challenge. Eppley at ¶

38. We agree. Eppley therefore has the burden of presenting a presently existing

state of facts that make the statute unconstitutional under the appropriate level of

scrutiny. See Belden, 143 Ohio St. 329, 28 O.O. 295, 55 N.E.2d 629.

5

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

{¶ 14} In an equal protection claim, government actions that affect

suspect classifications or fundamental interests are subject to strict scrutiny by the

courts. See Grutter v. Bollinger (2003), 539 U.S. 306, 326, 123 S.Ct. 2325, 156

L.Ed.2d 304; Washington v. Glucksberg (1997), 521 U.S. 702, 720-721, 117 S.Ct.

2258, 138 L.Ed.2d 772; see also Thompson, 95 Ohio St.3d 264, 2002-Ohio-2124,

767 N.E.2d 251, at ¶ 13. A wrongful death action, however, does not implicate

either a suspect classification or a fundamental interest. See Keaton v. Ribbeck

(1979), 58 Ohio St.2d 443, 12 O.O.3d 375, 391 N.E.2d 307 (applying rational

basis review to a wrongful death statute).

{¶ 15} Under the rational basis review, a statute that implicates neither a

fundamental right nor a suspect classification does not violate the Equal

Protection Clause if the statute is rationally related to a legitimate government

interest. Menefee v. Queen City Metro (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 27, 29, 550 N.E.2d

181. We grant “substantial deference” to the judgment of the General Assembly

in a rational basis review. State v. Williams (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 513, 531, 728

N.E.2d 342. Therefore, we must determine whether there is a legitimate reason to

treat a plaintiff who sues for wrongful death under R.C. 2125.04 differently from

any other plaintiff.

{¶ 16} Eppley argued before the court of appeals that strict scrutiny is

appropriate because parents have a fundamental right to enjoy a loving

relationship with their children. However, R.C. 2125.04 does not implicate this

right because, on its face, it addresses only the right to refile a wrongful death

lawsuit. It does not address the parent-child relationship. Furthermore, an action

for wrongful death is governed solely by the terms of the wrongful death statute.

See Keaton, 58 Ohio St.2d at 446, 12 O.O.3d 375, 391 N.E.2d 307. Therefore, it

is not a fundamental right that merits strict scrutiny.

{¶ 17} Eppley argues that there is no rational basis for the General

Assembly to extend the general saving statute in R.C. 2305.19 but not to do so in

6

January Term, 2009

R.C. 2125.04 and that the different language is a drafting error. This argument is

speculative at best. The General Assembly explained that it amended R.C.

2125.04, and other portions of the Revised Code, to further the state’s “rational

and legitimate * * * interest in making certain that Ohio has a fair, predictable

system of civil justice that preserves the right of those who have been harmed by

negligent behavior, while curbing the number of frivolous lawsuits.” Section

3(A)(3), Am.Sub.S.B. 80, 150 Ohio Laws, Part V, 7,915, 8,024. If a statute bears

a rational relationship to a government interest, our role is not to cross-check the

General Assembly’s findings to ensure that we would agree with its conclusions.

Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, 116 Ohio St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d

420, ¶ 58.

{¶ 18} The school board suggests several differences between general tort

claims and wrongful death claims that provide a rational basis for a different

wrongful death saving statute. General tort claims are direct actions, while

wrongful death claims are derivative in nature, brought on behalf of the

decedent’s next of kin; wrongful death claims are statutory, while claims for

personal injury are common-law claims; the proceeds in wrongful death claims

are recovered for distribution to the beneficiaries designated under the statute of

descent and distribution, R.C. 2105.06, whereas personal injury awards are made

directly to the injured party; and although damages in general tort actions have

been limited by R.C. 2315.18, damages recoverable in wrongful death claims

cannot be limited. Section 19a, Article I, Ohio Constitution.

{¶ 19} We find these last two differences to be persuasive. Resolving

claims expeditiously is a legitimate government interest. Unlike the general

saving statute, the wrongful death saving statute prevents a plaintiff who has

dismissed his or her claim before the expiration of the initial statutory period from

refiling after expiration and thereby extinguishes the claim. The more restrictive

wrongful death saving statute prevents delaying the timely disbursement of the

7

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

estate of the deceased when damages are recovered for distribution to the

beneficiaries of the estate. It also protects defendants against claims that cannot

be limited statutorily. R.C. 2125.04 is therefore constitutional because it is

rationally related to the legitimate government interest of resolving cases

expeditiously. It applies equally to all who are similarly situated and does not

violate equal protection.

C. Statutory Immunity Claim

{¶ 20} When the trial court dismissed the complaint, it did not indicate

whether the dismissal was because the action had been untimely filed or because

the school board had statutory immunity. The court of appeals remanded the

case, holding both that R.C. 2125.04 is unconstitutional and that because the issue

of statutory immunity had not been fully developed on the record, the court had

no basis to dismiss the action. Eppley v. Tri-Valley Local School District, 5th

Dist. No. CT 2007-0022, 2008-Ohio-32, ¶ 38, 49. Because we hold R.C. 2125.04

to be constitutional as applied to this action, the trial court properly dismissed the

action.

{¶ 21} We need not reach the issue of statutory immunity. Having upheld

the constitutionality of R.C. 2125.04, we have found that the action was untimely

filed. While we have been asked to consider the nonconstitutional issue of

statutory immunity, jurisdiction is a condition precedent to a court’s ability to

hear a case. State ex rel. Tubbs Jones v. Suster (1998), 84 Ohio St.3d 70, 75, 701

N.E.2d 1002. The timely filing of a complaint is essential to prosecute a wrongful

death cause of action. R.C. 2125.02(D)(1) (“a civil action for wrongful death

shall be commenced within two years after the decedent’s death”); see also

Brookbank v. Gray (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 279, 291, 658 N.E.2d 724. Because

R.C. 2125.02(D)(1) is a restriction that qualifies the cause of action, we have no

occasion to reach the school board’s second and third propositions of law once the

constitutionality of R.C. 2125.04 has been upheld.

8

January Term, 2009

III. Conclusion

{¶ 22} We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and hold that the

saving statute for wrongful death actions, R.C. 2125.04, does not violate the right

to equal protection of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United

States Constitution and Section 2, Article I of the Ohio Constitution.

Judgment reversed.

MOYER, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL, and

CUPP, JJ., concur.

PFEIFER, J., dissents.

__________________

PFEIFER, J., dissenting.

{¶ 23} I prefer to see the distinction between the saving clauses contained

in R.C. 2125.04 and 2305.19(A) as the result of legislative inadvertence. The

General Assembly fixed the “malpractice trap” associated with the saving statute

in R.C. 2305.19, and given that R.C. 2305.19(A) applies “[i]n any action that is

commenced or attempted to be commenced,” the General Assembly could have

assumed that it would apply to wrongful-death actions. (Emphasis added.)

Everyone makes mistakes, even the Ohio General Assembly.

{¶ 24} The amendment of R.C. 2305.19(A) was meant to fix inequitable

treatment of certain plaintiffs: “The framers of the amendment expressed concern

that the pre-amendment version treated arguably * * * similarly situated plaintiffs

differently, by giving a plaintiff who exercises a Rule 41(A)(1) dismissal a full

year to refile, while a plaintiff who dismisses before the statute [of limitations]

runs possibly only one or two days to refile. The amendment permits plaintiffs

one year to refile, or the time left (if any) on an unexpired statute of limitations,

whichever is later.” (Footnote omitted.) 3 Anderson’s Ohio Civil Practice (2008)

148-40, Section 148.13.

9

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

{¶ 25} If the General Assembly’s inaction in failing to make the same

change to R.C. 2125.04 was purposeful, that is more disturbing than a mistake.

There is no rational basis to distinguish between wrongful-death plaintiffs and all

other plaintiffs in fixing the malpractice trap. Is there a rational basis to fix a

disparity that existed between plaintiffs that dismissed civil claims within a few

days of each other but to not have that fix apply to wrongful-death plaintiffs? If

the General Assembly’s aim is to speed along wrongful-death claims, as the

majority posits, it has not adopted a rational method to achieve that end.

Wrongful-death plaintiffs still have the ability to extend the lives of their claims,

as long as they wait to dismiss their claims until the statute of limitations has

passed. To encourage prompt dismissals and refilings, the General Assembly

should have made the same amendment to R.C. 2125.04 as it made to R.C.

2305.19(A). If the General Assembly’s aim was to perpetuate a malpractice trap

only for wrongful-death plaintiffs in order to limit overall damages awarded in

wrongful-death cases, that would constitute an illegitimate attempt to limit the

damages recoverable in wrongful-death claims and would violate Section 19a,

Article I, of the Ohio Constitution.

{¶ 26} The majority has attempted to attribute rationality to the General

Assembly’s unintentional act. The General Assembly thus emerges worse than if

it had been merely mistaken.

__________________

Elk & Elk Co., Ltd., Martin S. Delahunty, John W. Gold, and Peter D.

Traska, for appellee.

Britton, Smith, Peters & Kalail Co., L.P.A., David Kane Smith, and

Michael E. Stinn, for appellant.

______________________

10