Opinion

Trans Rail America, Inc. v. Enyeart

  • 123 Ohio St. 3d 1
  • 913 N.E.2d 948
  • 2009 Ohio 3624
Court
Ohio Supreme Court
Filed
Jul 30, 2009
Status
Published
On the bench
Cupp, Stratton, O'Connor, O'Donnell, Moyer, Pfeifer, Lanzinger
Cited by
10 cases
Authority
More cited than 32.1%

finding -6- the word “includes” following a list of examples in a statute is illustrative rather than an exhaustive list

How later courts described this case

  • finding -6- the word “includes” following a list of examples in a statute is illustrative rather than an exhaustive list

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

[Cite as Trans Rail Am., Inc. v. Enyeart, 123 Ohio St.3d 1, 2009-Ohio-3624.]

TRANS RAIL AMERICA, INC., APPELLEE, v. ENYEART, APPELLANT.

[Cite as Trans Rail Am., Inc. v. Enyeart, 123 Ohio St.3d 1, 2009-Ohio-3624.]

Administrative procedure — Environmental Review Appeals Commission —

Application for license for facility for disposal of construction and

demolition debris — Appealability of determination that application is

incomplete — R.C. 3745.04 — Requirement of finality.

(No. 2008-0359 — Submitted January 14, 2009 — Decided July 30, 2009.)

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County,

Nos. 07AP-273 and 07AP-284, 2007-Ohio-7144.

__________________

CUPP, J.

{¶ 1} The issue in this case is whether the Environmental Review

Appeals Commission (“ERAC”) has jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a decision

of a local board of health that a license application for a facility for the disposal of

construction and demolition debris is incomplete. We conclude that ERAC has

jurisdiction to entertain such an appeal if the letter is a final decision that

substantially affects the applicant’s property or other legal rights.

I

{¶ 2} In May 2004, appellee, Trans Rail America, Inc. (“Trans Rail”),

applied to the Trumbull County Health Department for a license to establish a

facility for disposal of construction and demolition debris (“C&DD”).1 In July

2004, Dr. James Enyeart, Trumbull County health commissioner, advised Trans

1. The Trumbull County Health Department is an approved health district within the meaning of

Ohio Adm.Code 3745-37-08 and former R.C. 3714.06(A), which means that the district had the

authority to issue licenses for C&DD facilities. In an area without a health district on an approved

list, the director of environmental protection may issue such licenses. R.C. 3714.051(A)(2); former

R.C. 3714.06(A), 1990 Am. Sub.H.B. No. 366, 143 Ohio Laws, Part III, 4670.

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Rail by letter that he could not consider the application because it was incomplete,

and he informed Trans Rail of the incomplete aspects of its application. On July

29, 2004, representatives of Trans Rail (CT Consultants, an engineering firm) met

with Enyeart to discuss the application. A year and a half later, on December 16,

2005, Enyeart received from CT Consultants Trans Rail’s written response to

Enyeart’s letter, including additional information to support the license

application.

{¶ 3} Enyeart again determined that the application was incomplete and

so notified Trans Rail in a letter dated February 15, 2006. Attached to the letter

was a detailed report outlining additional information that Enyeart (through the

health department’s consulting firm, Bennett and Williams Environmental

Consultants, Inc.) had determined was necessary for the application to be

considered on the merits. Most of the information requested related to the

previously identified areas in which Enyeart had found the application incomplete

in July 2004, although some of the items identified as incomplete were explained

in further detail. CT Consultants and HzW Environmental Consultants responded

on behalf of Trans Rail in letters dated March 30, 2006. Those letters included

some additional or corrected information in support of the C&DD license

application and, in some cases, an explanation of where the requested information

could be found in the original application. Some responses indicated that Trans

Rail did not believe that the information was required, at least not at the initial

licensure stage. (Neither of those letters indicated specifically that Trans Rail had

no further information to provide other than what was in the March 30 letters.) In

the March 30 letter of CT Consultants, Trans Rail urged Enyeart to reconsider his

decision that the application was incomplete. Despite the information Trans Rail

submitted on March 30, Enyeart in a letter dated May 31, 2006, again determined

that Trans Rail’s application was incomplete and outlined the additional

information still needed to complete the application. The May 31 letter did not

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January Term, 2009

raise new areas of information that the director requested, but instead related to

areas identified in the February 2006 letter and report from Enyeart. Many of the

comments in Enyeart’s consultant’s May 30, 2006 letter to him indicated that

Trans Rail’s responses to date had not answered the questions Enyeart and his

consultant had asked. In other areas, the letter indicated that Enyeart’s earlier

comments had been addressed. The letter from Enyeart’s consultant ended with a

recommendation that “the Health District offer to meet with the Applicant to

discuss the new comments, if appropriate.”

{¶ 4} On June 30, 2006, Trans Rail filed an appeal to ERAC of Enyeart’s

May 31, 2006 letter. Trans Rail sought an order from ERAC determining that

Trans Rail’s license application was complete within the meaning of Ohio

Adm.Code 3745-37-02 and ordering the department “to process Trans Rail’s

C&DD License Application.”

{¶ 5} Enyeart moved to dismiss Trans Rail’s appeal, asserting that

ERAC lacked jurisdiction because the May 31, 2006 letter was not a final act or

action of the department appealable under R.C. 3745.04. ERAC dismissed the

appeal. ERAC determined that the letter was not a final, appealable action but an

intermediate step in the continuing application process.

{¶ 6} Trans Rail appealed to the Tenth District Court of Appeals. The

court reversed ERAC’s order, reasoning that ERAC has appellate jurisdiction

under R.C. 3745.04(B) “to consider whether the application is complete and, if it

is,” to order the department to either issue or deny Trans Rail a license. Trans Rail

Am., Inc. v. Enyeart, 10th Dist. No. 07AP-273 and 07AP-284, 2007-Ohio-7144, ¶

10. The appellate court held that it was not necessary to consider whether

Enyeart’s May 31, 2006 letter constituted a final “action” of the board of health,

because ERAC’s authority under R.C. 3745.04(B) to order the performance of an

“act” was separate from, and did not depend on, ERAC’s authority under that

statute to “vacat[e] or modify[] the action of the director or a local board of

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health.” Id., ¶ 11. The dissenting judge on the court of appeals would have held

that ERAC’s statutory authority to order the performance of an “act” was limited

to ordering relief in furtherance of its determination of an appeal from a final

action of a director or a board of health. Id. at ¶ 21, 30, and 32 (French, J.,

dissenting).

{¶ 7} Enyeart sought discretionary review in this court, asserting that

R.C. 3745.04(B) authorizes ERAC to review only final actions of the director or a

board of health and that letters requesting additional information from license

applicants are not final actions and therefore not appealable to ERAC. We

accepted the appeal. 118 Ohio St.3d 1432, 2008-Ohio-2595, 887 N.E.2d 1202.

II

{¶ 8} The answer to the question presented for our review depends upon

the proper construction of R.C. 3745.04, which authorizes appeals of certain

orders to ERAC. That statute provides:

{¶ 9} “(A) * * *

{¶ 10} “As used in this section, action or act includes the adoption,

modification, or repeal of a rule or standard, the issuance, modification, or

revocation of any lawful order other than an emergency order, and the issuance,

denial, modification, or revocation of a license, permit, lease, variance, or

certificate, or the approval or disapproval of plans and specifications pursuant to

law or rules adopted thereunder.

{¶ 11} “(B) Any person who was a party to a proceeding before the

director of environmental protection may participate in an appeal to the

environmental review appeals commission for an order vacating or modifying the

action of the director or a local board of health, or ordering the director or board

of health to perform an act. The environmental review appeals commission has

exclusive original jurisdiction over any matter that may, under this section, be

brought before it. * * *

4

January Term, 2009

{¶ 12} “* * *

{¶ 13} “(D) An appeal shall be in writing and shall set forth the action

complained of and the grounds upon which the appeal is based.

{¶ 14} “The appeal shall be filed with the commission within thirty days

after notice of the action. * * *

{¶ 15} “* * *

{¶ 16} “Within seven days after receipt of the notice of an appeal filed

under division (B) of this section, the director or local board of health, as

applicable, shall prepare and certify to the commission a record of the

proceedings out of which the appeal arises, including all documents and

correspondence, and a transcript of all testimony.

{¶ 17} “* * *

{¶ 18} “The filing of an appeal does not automatically suspend or stay

execution of the action appealed from. Upon application by the appellant, the

commission may suspend or stay the execution pending immediate determination

of the appeal * * *.” (Emphasis added.)

A

{¶ 19} The court of appeals determined that the phrase “or ordering the

director or board of health to perform an act” in R.C. 3745.04(B) sets forth a

separate basis for ERAC’s appellate jurisdiction in addition to review of final

actions of the board. 2007-Ohio-7144, ¶ 11. The appellate court held that “the

statute invests the ERAC with jurisdiction over two types of appeals: (1) an

appeal from an ‘action’ that the ERAC may vacate or modify, and (2) an appeal

requesting that the ERAC order the performance of an ‘act.’ ” Id., ¶ 9. The court

concluded that because R.C. 3745.04(A) defines “action” and “act” to include

“the issuance, denial, modification, or revocation of a license,” R.C. 3745.04(B)

authorizes ERAC to order the department to perform the act of issuing or denying

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the license Trans Rail requested if ERAC first determines that Trans Rail’s license

application is complete. Id. at ¶ 9, 10.

1

{¶ 20} We are not persuaded that R.C. 3745.04 can be read as providing

an independent basis for ERAC to exercise appellate jurisdiction over a nonfinal

decision of a board of health or the director. R.C. 3745.04(B) provides for

appeals to ERAC “for an order vacating or modifying the action of the director or

a local board of health, or ordering the director or board of health to perform an

act.” R.C. 3745.04(A) defines both “action” and “act” to include “the issuance,

modification, or revocation of any lawful order other than an emergency order,

and the issuance, denial, modification, or revocation of a license, permit, lease,

variance, or certificate,” among other matters.

{¶ 21} R.C. 3745.04(D) contemplates that a definite and identifiable

action will give rise to an appeal to ERAC. R.C. 3745.04(D) requires appeals to

ERAC to “set forth the action complained of.” (Emphasis added.) Appeals to

ERAC must be filed within 30 days “after notice of the action.” (Emphasis

added.) R.C. 3745.04(D). Compilation of the “record of the proceedings out of

which the appeal arises,” including a “transcript of all testimony,” under R.C.

3745.04(D), also presupposes an appeal from a decision that is in some sense

final. The availability of a stay of “the action appealed from,” in R.C. 3745.04(D),

also assumes that the action is not an intermediary step in an ongoing, yet-to-be-

concluded process.

{¶ 22} The statutory scheme gives the director (or, in this case, the local

board of health) the role of initial review and determination of license

applications. R.C. 3714.051(A)(2); former R.C. 3714.06(A), 1990 Am.Sub.H.B.

No. 366, 143 Ohio Laws, Part III, 4670. R.C. 3714.053 now requires public

hearings. The general statutory scheme provides for hearings to be conducted

either before the director or local board or before ERAC on appeal, with regard to

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January Term, 2009

decisions granting, denying, or revoking licenses. R.C. 3745.07 (the director of

environmental protection may issue a proposed order to grant or deny a license,

and if the director denies or issues a license not preceded by a proposed order, a

person who is adversely affected may appeal to ERAC); R.C. 3745.05 (if no

adjudication hearing was conducted, ERAC shall conduct a hearing de novo on

appeal).

{¶ 23} Allowing appeals of nonfinal licensing decisions could undermine

the statutory framework. If actions or acts need not be final to be appealed, then

successive appeals of interim decisions of the reviewing body would be possible.

If ERAC were to be inundated with appeals of nonfinal decisions, the flood could

delay the time for decision on appeals and thus slow the license-review process as

a whole.

{¶ 24} Determining which nonfinal decisions would trigger appeal rights

would be less than clear, making it difficult for a would-be appellant even to

determine when the 30-day appeal time in R.C. 3745.04(D) begins to run.

Additionally, as discussed below, appellate court and ERAC decisions concerning

appellate jurisdiction under R.C. 3745.04(B) have required some indicia of

finality of a decision to be appealable, even if the decision is not designated as

final.

{¶ 25} We agree with the dissenting judge below that the better reading of

ERAC’s authority under R.C. 3745.04(B) to “order[] the director or the board of

health to perform an act” permits ERAC, upon review of a final action, to direct

the licensing entity to grant the approval that the licensing entity failed or refused

to grant. 2007-Ohio-7144, ¶ 17 (French, J., dissenting). In that instance, ERAC

would not be ordering a modification of the action, or merely vacating the

decision below, but would be ordering the board of health or director to take the

action that it believes should have been taken but was not. The fact that R.C.

3745.04(A) defines “act” and “action” interchangeably supports this view. R.C.

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3745.04(A) lists examples of decisions that constitute either “acts” or “actions.”

For example, a decision to issue or deny a license may be an “action” or “act”

under R.C. 3745.04(A). Under R.C. 3745.04(B), an action such as a denial of a

license may be appealed to ERAC, and ERAC has authority under the statute not

only to vacate that order but also to order the director or a board of health to

perform the act of issuing the license.

{¶ 26} We hold that ERAC’s statutory authority to order the performance

of an act is ancillary to ERAC’s appellate jurisdiction to review final actions of a

local board of health or the director of environmental protection. ERAC may

order the board or director to perform an act in accordance with ERAC’s decision

on appeal of an action, rather than simply vacating or modifying the action. This

reading of R.C. 3745.04 comports with ERAC’s expertise and authority to review

decisions granting or denying licenses consistent with environmental-law

requirements.

2

{¶ 27} Having decided that ERAC’s authority under R.C. 3745.04(B) to

“order[ ] the director or board of health to perform an act” does not provide an

independent basis for ERAC to entertain appellate jurisdiction over nonfinal

decisions of a local board of health, we next consider whether a board’s

determination that a C&DD license application is incomplete is an immediately

appealable action under R.C. 3745.04(A) and (B).

{¶ 28} R.C. 3745.04(A) defines both “action” and “act” to include “the

issuance, denial, modification, or revocation of a license,” but the question here is

whether a license applicant may appeal a determination that the license

application is incomplete. The determination that a license application is

incomplete is not listed as an “action” or “act” under R.C. 3745.04(A). However,

R.C. 3745.04(A)’s definition of “action” or “act,” which may be appealed to

ERAC, is not limited to the decisions listed in that statute. The statute says that

8

January Term, 2009

“action” or “act” includes certain things, thus showing the General Assembly’s

intent to illustrate the types of actions that may be appealable, rather than to set

out an exhaustive list. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Maynard (1984), 22 Ohio

App.3d 3, 6, 22 OBR 37, 488 N.E.2d 220 (holding that the predecessor to ERAC

had appellate jurisdiction to consider whether it was reasonable and lawful for the

director of environmental protection to adopt standards for the disposal and

storage of hazardous waste without adopting a rule allowing interested parties a

right to petition the director for changes in the state hazardous-waste program).

{¶ 29} When an action is not listed in R.C. 3745.04(A), ERAC has

considered whether the form of the document shows that it is a final action.

ERAC has determined, for example, that documents that designate the decision as

a final action or advise the recipient of the right to appeal or that have been

entered on the director’s journal are indicative of final “actions.” See, e.g., Trans

Rail Am., Inc. v. Enyeart, 2007-Ohio-7144, ¶ 33 (French, J., dissenting); Lake v.

Jones (Nov. 20, 2003), ERAC Nos. 255300 and 255601, 2003 WL 23358112. The

May 31, 2006 letter from Enyeart to Trans Rail does not contain these indicia of a

final action.

{¶ 30} The court of appeals and ERAC also review the substance of the

challenged decision to ascertain whether it finally determines some matter that

affects the appellant’s substantial rights, privileges, or property. In Dayton Power

& Light Co. v. Schregardus (10th Dist.1997), 123 Ohio App.3d 476, 704 N.E.2d

589, for example, the court reversed ERAC’s dismissal of an appeal from the

director’s decision to place a property on a master site list of contaminated

properties. Government officials and other businesses reviewed that list when

evaluating property. Because appellant had no opportunity either to contest the

inclusion of its property on the list before the list was made public or to have

appellant’s property removed from the list, the court remanded the case to ERAC

to hear the owner’s claim that inclusion of the property on the master site list

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“affected a substantial legal right with finality and/or that Ohio EPA exceeded its

authority by promulgating” the list. Id. at 481. ERAC’s jurisdiction to hear the

appeal was not defeated by the fact that the action complained of was not listed in

R.C. 3745.04(A).

{¶ 31} The key issue in determining whether a particular decision not

listed in R.C. 3745.04(A) is an action or act that may be appealed under R.C.

3745.04(B) is whether it is in some sense a final decision that substantially affects

the appellant’s property or other legal rights, even if it is not designated as final.

Dayton Power & Light. Cain Park Apts. v. Nied (1981), 10th Dist. Nos. 80AP-

817, 80AP-852, 80AP-867, 80AP-868, and 80AP-869, 1981 WL 3294, relied

upon by Trans Rail, confirms this approach. In Cain Park Apts., appellants,

owners of apartment buildings, applied to Ohio EPA to register their incinerators

to dispose of residential waste. The appellants received letters from EPA advising

them that the information they submitted about the nature and quantity of the

emissions from their incinerators was deficient and that if appellants failed to

provide the requested information within two weeks, their registration

applications would be returned. Then-applicable regulations provided that EPA

could treat a defective application as if it had not been filed at all. Ohio

Adm.Code 3745-35-02(B)(9), 1979-1980 Ohio Monthly Record 4270.

Appellants appealed these letters to ERAC’s predecessor, the Environmental

Board of Review (“EBR”), which held that it had no jurisdiction over the appeals.

{¶ 32} Upon review, the court of appeals in Cain Park Apts. held that the

return of appellants’ registration application as defective was an appealable action

because it was tantamount to a denial of the application. The fact that EPA could

return an application without further hearing or compliance with the procedures

for denial of an application made the challenged decision the legal equivalent of a

denial, i.e., a final decision with regard to the application submitted.

10

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{¶ 33} In this case, the applicable rule states, “An incomplete application

[for a C&DD facility] shall not be considered.” Ohio Adm.Code 3745-37-

02(A)(2). The rule further requires that the applicant must be notified of the

nature of the deficiency within 60 days of the application. Id. Ohio Adm.Code

3745-37-02(A)(3) also provides that if the licensing authority determines that

information in addition to that required by Ohio Adm.Code 3745-37-02 is

necessary to determine whether the application satisfies the license requirements,

the applicant must supply that information as a precondition to further

consideration of the license application. The rules thus contemplate additional

proceedings after an initial determination that a C&DD application is incomplete,

including notification of the precise nature of the deficiencies and specification of

any further information required to consider the application. These rules suggest

that in the usual case, a decision that an application is incomplete, accompanied

by a specification of the precise nature of the deficiencies and a reasonable

request for additional information, will not be a final act or action of the licensing

agency.

{¶ 34} However, as ERAC explained in this case, the requirement of a

final decision does not mean that the licensing entity (a board of health or the

director of environmental protection) can evade appellate review under R.C.

3745.04(B) simply by deeming a license application incomplete and repeatedly

and unreasonably requesting additional information before the licensing entity

will consider the application on its merits. Application requirements in statutes

and administrative rules, as reasonably amplified by the licensing agency, will be

instructive regarding whether an application for a license is complete. See, e.g.,

CECOS Internatl., Inc., v. Shank (1991), 74 Ohio App.3d 43, 55, 598 N.E.2d 40.

Even if a decision is not designated a final action, it may be a reviewable final

11

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action if it in effect determines any legal right or privilege of the appellant.

Dayton Power & Light; Cain Park Apts.2

B

{¶ 35} In this case, ERAC dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction but

stated that Enyeart’s decision to request more information was reasonable. The

court of appeals determined that ERAC erred in reaching the merits of the issue of

whether Trans Rail’s application was incomplete without holding a hearing. 2007-

Ohio-7144, ¶ 14. That ruling is not before us.

{¶ 36} Because the court of appeals construed R.C. 3745.04(B) as

providing ERAC with appellate jurisdiction to order a licensing agency to

“perform an act” independently of whether the underlying decision was a final

action, the court of appeals did not consider whether the board’s May 31, 2006

letter was a final decision. 2007-Ohio-7144, ¶ 11. We now vacate the court of

appeals’ judgment on that basis, and we remand this case to the court of appeals

for a determination whether Enyeart’s May 31, 2006 letter determining Trans

Rail’s application to be incomplete was a final decision appealable to ERAC

under R.C. 3745.04(B) under the criteria outlined above.3

III

2. Amicus Ohio attorney general suggests that in a proper case, mandamus would be available to

compel the board of health or the director to act upon a complete application. We are not so

certain, but we leave that question for another day.

3. Trans Rail contends that it had a substantial interest in obtaining a determination that its C&DD

license application was complete before the new siting criteria provided in 2005 Am.Sub.H.B. No.

397 took effect. Section 3 of that act allowed applications for C&DD facilities that were submitted

before July 1, 2005, and were found to be complete as of that time to be considered under the

existing siting criteria rather than the more stringent criteria in H.B. 397. Under Section 3, the

director of environmental protection was to determine whether the law’s grandfather provision

applied to a particular applicant within 45 days after having receiving the applicant’s request for

such a determination. Trans Rail contends that it has a substantial interest in a determination of

whether its application was complete before the new siting criteria in HB 397 took effect and that

therefore the decision to deem the application incomplete was appealable to ERAC. Because we

are remanding to the court of appeals, we do not address this contention now.

12

January Term, 2009

{¶ 37} Accordingly, we hold that the court of appeals erred in concluding

that Enyeart’s letter that declared Trans Rail’s application to be incomplete and

requested further information was appealable to the Environmental Review

Appeals Commission without regard to whether it was a final action of the

Trumbull County Board of Health. We vacate the judgment below and remand the

case to the court of appeals for a determination whether Enyeart’s letter was a

final decision appealable to ERAC under the criteria outlined in this opinion.

Judgment vacated

and cause remanded.

LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, and O’DONNELL, JJ., concur.

MOYER, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part.

PFEIFER and LANZINGER, JJ., dissent.

__________________

MOYER, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.

{¶ 38} I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the Environmental

Review Appeals Commission (“ERAC”) has jurisdiction to review only final

decisions of a local board of health or the director of environmental protection,

but for different reasons. I would also hold that the Trumbull County Health

Department’s actions in this case, refusing to consider a license application

because it was incomplete, did not constitute a final decision, and, therefore,

ERAC properly determined that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

I

{¶ 39} The proper resolution of this case follows directly from the precise

text of the statute at issue, R.C. 3745.04, which provides ERAC’s appellate

jurisdiction. When interpreting a statute, we first look to its plain language and

apply it as written if the meaning is unambiguous. State v. Lowe, 112 Ohio St.3d

507, 2007-Ohio-606, 861 N.E.2d 512, ¶ 9. R.C. 3745.04(B) provides: “Any

person who was a party to a proceeding before the director of environmental

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protection may participate in an appeal to the environmental review appeals

commission for an order vacating or modifying the action of the director or a local

board of health, or ordering the director or board of health to perform an act.”

{¶ 40} The majority determines that this section requires a final

determination by the local board of health because “ERAC’s statutory authority to

order the performance of an act is ancillary to ERAC’s appellate jurisdiction to

review final actions of a local board of health or the director of environmental

protection.” Majority opinion at ¶ 26. The majority’s rationale in support, that

this ancillary authority allows ERAC to order some act, such as issuing a license,

rather than merely vacating an order, ignores the fact that ERAC could order that

same act simply by modifying the original order pursuant to its primary grant of

authority in R.C. 3745.04 to vacate or modify. More important, the majority’s

analysis belies the proper construction of the statutory text as described by the

dissent. There is nothing in the statute to suggest that the second grant of

authority is somehow ancillary to the first. As noted in the dissent, the

conjunction “or” is used to establish two separate grants of jurisdiction.

{¶ 41} This latter construction does not, however, mean that ERAC can

consider appeals without a final action by the local board of health, as the dissent

contends. The first part of the sentence in R.C. 3745.04(B) providing for appeals

to ERAC states that “[a]ny person who was a party” may appeal. (Emphasis

added.) The past tense used in the statute presumes that the proceeding being

appealed to ERAC has concluded, resulting in some final action by the local

board of health. If the local board has not yet taken any action on a license

application, for example, then the applicant would still be a party to that

proceeding and he would not meet the plain text of the statutory requirement for

ERAC appellate jurisdiction. R.C. 3745.04(B) does therefore require a final

action by a local board of health or the director of environmental protection for a

party to appeal to ERAC.

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January Term, 2009

{¶ 42} Were this court to read the statute to allow appeals of nonfinal

actions, the limited appeal system established by the General Assembly would be

meaningless. A party could completely bypass the local board of health in favor

of immediately petitioning ERAC to order the local board to perform some act.

That arrangement would thwart legislative intent and put a heavy burden on the

resources of ERAC.

II

{¶ 43} A determination by a local board of health or the director of

environmental protection that a license application is incomplete, as occurred in

this case, cannot constitute a final action under R.C. 3745.04 so that ERAC would

have jurisdiction to hear an appeal. As noted by the majority, once an application

is deemed to be incomplete, the regulations require that the applicant be notified

of the deficiency to allow the applicant to supplement the application. Ohio

Adm.Code 3745-37-02(A)(2). The license-approval proceeding is still ongoing at

this stage. The regulations specifically contemplate further consideration of an

application once the deficiencies have been rectified. See id.

{¶ 44} The majority concludes that a decision of a local board of health

that an application is incomplete may still be a final action “if it in effect

determines any legal right or privilege of the appellant.” Majority opinion at ¶ 34.

But such a decision will never completely determine the applicant’s legal rights

because the local board will have reached no decision regarding the applicant’s

right to a license, and once an application’s deficiencies are remedied, the

application will then be considered and ruled upon.

{¶ 45} The majority further contends that a contrary holding could allow a

local board or the director of environmental protection to evade review if it seeks

to deny an applicant from obtaining a license by perpetually deeming the

application incomplete. An aggrieved applicant could, however, file an action in

mandamus to compel the local board or director to consider the application, if it is

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in fact complete, and either issue or deny a license. For an action to lie in

mandamus a relator must demonstrate (1) a clear legal right to the relief sought,

(2) a clear legal duty of the respondent to perform the requested action, and (3)

the lack of an adequate remedy at law. State ex rel. Ohio Assn. of Pub. School

Emps. v. Batavia Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 191, 198,

729 N.E.2d 743.

{¶ 46} R.C. 3714.051 satisfies the first two parts of the test by requiring a

board of health or the director of environmental protection to issue a license for a

facility for the disposal of construction and demolition debris if the proposal

complies with the appropriate rules and standards. An applicant would further

have no adequate remedy at law, because R.C. 3745.04 permits appeals to ERAC

only of final decisions by the local board or director, as discussed above. We

have held that “when a state agency’s decision is discretionary and by statute not

subject to appeal, an action in mandamus is the sole avenue of relief available to a

party challenging the agency’s decision.” Ohio Academy of Nursing Homes v.

Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 114 Ohio St.3d 14, 2007-Ohio-2620, 867

N.E.2d 400, ¶ 32.

III

{¶ 47} I concur in the majority’s holding that R.C. 3745.04(B) requires a

final action by the local board of health or director to permit an appeal to ERAC.

I dissent, however, from the conclusion that a letter from a local board deeming a

license application incomplete can constitute a final action and be subject to

appeal. I would therefore reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.

__________________

LANZINGER, J., dissenting.

{¶ 48} Does the Environmental Review Appeals Commission (“ERAC”)

have jurisdiction over Trans Rail’s appeal? I would hold that it does.

16

January Term, 2009

{¶ 49} Appellee Trans Rail attempted to submit an application for a

license for a facility for the disposal of construction and demolition debris in

Trumbull County. The company argues that timing for a completed application

was important because more stringent siting criteria were to take effect on July 1,

2005. It made a first submission to the health department in May 2004 but was

told that the application was incomplete. Even though it submitted additional

information in December 2005 and on March 30, 2006, its application was still

deemed incomplete, meaning that by regulation, its application would not even be

considered. Ohio Adm.Code 3745-37-02(A)(2). In other words, Trans Rail’s

license would not be issued or denied.

{¶ 50} The majority accepts appellant’s argument that R.C. 3745.04

requires a final action of the director of environmental protection or a local board

of health in order for ERAC to have jurisdiction over an appeal. Nevertheless,

R.C. 3745.04(B) provides that a party may appeal to ERAC for “an order

vacating or modifying the action of the director or a local board of health, or

ordering the director or board of health to perform an act.” (Emphasis added.)

{¶ 51} “Act” or “action” is defined in R.C. 3745.04(A):

{¶ 52} “As used in this section, ‘action’ or ‘act’ includes the adoption,

modification, or repeal of a rule or standard, the issuance, modification, or

revocation of any lawful order other than an emergency order, and the issuance,

denial, modification, or revocation of a license, permit, lease, variance, or

certificate, or the approval or disapproval of plans and specifications pursuant to

law or rules adopted thereunder.” (Emphasis added.)

{¶ 53} R.C. 3745.04 contains no provision that ERAC has jurisdiction

over final actions only, but other provisions in R.C. Title 37 suggest that when a

party is appealing an action of the director or local board to ERAC, that action

must be a final one. See R.C. 3704.036(B)(3)(c) (when the director approves or

disapproves an administrative Title V permit amendment, the director’s

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SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

determination “is a final action appealable to the environmental review appeals

commission under section 3745.04 of the Revised Code”) and 3734.05(I)(6) (the

director’s approval or disapproval of a Class 1 modification application “is not a

final action that is appealable under Chapter 3745. of the Revised Code,” but the

director’s approval or disapproval of a Class 2 or Class 3 modification application

“is a final action that is appealable under that chapter”).

{¶ 54} Even if actions of the director or local board must be final to be

appealable, R.C. 3745.04 still allows a party to file an appeal requesting ERAC to

order the director or board to perform an act. The plain language of the statute

establishes two distinct ways in which a party may appeal to ERAC: a party may

appeal for an order “vacating or modifying the action of the director or a local

board of health, or ordering the director or board of health to perform an act.”

(Emphasis added.) R.C. 3745.04(B). As the court of appeals explained, “the

statute invests the ERAC with jurisdiction over two types of appeals: (1) an

appeal from an ‘action’ that the ERAC may vacate or modify, and (2) an appeal

requesting that the ERAC order the performance of an ‘act.’ ” 2007-Ohio-7144, ¶

9.

{¶ 55} The majority, however, holds that ERAC’s ability to order the

performance of an act is ancillary to its jurisdiction to review actions of the

director or local board. In doing so, it adds words to the statute by requiring that

before a party may seek an order that the department “perform an act,” there must

first be “a final decision that substantially affects the applicant’s property or other

legal rights.” Majority opinion at ¶ 1.

{¶ 56} To accomplish this result, the majority phrases the issue before us

as “whether a license applicant may appeal a determination that the license

application is incomplete.” Nevertheless, as the court of appeals noted, “Trans

Rail’s appeal requests that the ERAC order the Health Department to either issue

or deny it a license to establish a construction and demolition debris facility.”

18

January Term, 2009

2007-Ohio-7144, ¶ 10. Trans Rail, in effect, is asking ERAC for an order

compelling the health board to act by either issuing or denying the license. Each

of these two actions is listed in the statutory definition of “act,” which includes

“issuance, denial, modification, or revocation of a license.” R.C. 3745.04(A).

Trans Rail is not asking ERAC to review a final order. This is not a premature

appeal — it is an action seeking the second type of relief that ERAC is authorized

to give: an order requiring Enyeart to grant or deny a license. The order itself, of

course, is appealable according to the first type of jurisdiction provided for in

R.C. 3745.04.

{¶ 57} In concluding that the second type of jurisdiction is ancillary to the

first, the majority also fails to recognize the significance of the General

Assembly’s use of the word “or” in establishing the two types of jurisdiction

given to ERAC. By allowing for an appeal for an order “vacating or modifying

the action of the director or a local board of health, or ordering the director or

board of health to perform an act,” the statute is phrased in a way that clearly

states that parties may base their appeals on either the first or second type of

jurisdiction provided for in R.C. 3745.04. (Emphasis added.) This language

indicates the General Assembly’s intention to give ERAC two coequal appellate

powers. Therefore, the majority is mistaken in concluding that the second type of

jurisdiction is ancillary to the first.

{¶ 58} In addition, by first requiring a final decision before a party may

seek an order requiring the director or board to perform an act, the majority

allows undue extension of the licensing process. A board of health or the director

of environmental protection may continue to deem a license application

incomplete and request additional information indefinitely. Indeed, in this case,

Trans Rail alleges that it has repeatedly complied with the requirements for its

license application, yet the director persists in stating that the application is

incomplete and that no ruling may be made upon it. Unless “it is in some sense a

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SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

final decision that substantially affects the appellant’s property or other legal

rights,” majority opinion at ¶ 31, the licensing entity’s lack of decision will

continue to evade appellate review under the majority’s reading of R.C.

3745.04(B).

{¶ 59} Because the requirement of final action is not set forth within R.C.

3745.04 as a prerequisite for ERAC’s jurisdiction in appeals requesting ERAC to

order the director or board to act, I would not write it in. If the General Assembly

wishes to limit the jurisdiction of ERAC in this second type of appeal, it may do

so by amending the statute. I respectfully dissent and would affirm the judgment

of the Tenth District Court of Appeals.

PFEIFER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion.

__________________

Morganstern, MacAdams & DeVito Co. and Michael A. Partlow, for

appellee.

Ronald James Rice Co., L.P.A., and Robert C. Kokor, for appellant.

Richard Cordray, Attorney General, Benjamin C. Mizer, Solicitor General,

Kimberly A. Olson, Deputy Solicitor, and Sari L. Mandel, Assistant Attorney

General, urging reversal for amicus curiae state of Ohio.

Ulmer & Berne, L.L.P., Robert J. Karl, and Sherry L. Hesselbein, urging

reversal for amicus curiae Hubbard Environmental and Land Preservation.

Frost Brown Todd, L.L.C., and Christopher S. Habel, urging affirmance

for amicus curiae National Solid Waste Management Association.

Walter & Haverfield, L.L.P., Michael A. Cyphert, and Michael

Schmeltzer, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Construction and Demolition

Association of Ohio, Inc.

_____________________

20

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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