People's Mojahedin Organization v. Department of State

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 17, 2003 Decided May 9, 2003

No. 01-1465

& No. 01-1476

PEOPLE’S MOJAHEDIN ORGANIZATION OF IRAN,

PETITIONER

v.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND

COLIN L. POWELL, SECRETARY OF STATE,

RESPONDENTS

Petitions for Review of Orders of the

Department of State

Jacob A. Stein argued the cause for petitioner. With him

on the briefs were George A. Fisher and Ronald G. Precup.

Douglas Letter, Litigation Counsel, U.S. Department of

Justice, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent.

Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

2

Before: EDWARDS and SENTELLE, Circuit Judges, and

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SENTELLE.

Separate concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge

EDWARDS.

SENTELLE, Circuit Judge: The People’s Mojahedin Organi-

zation of Iran (‘‘PMOI’’ or ‘‘Petitioner’’) seeks review of 1999

and 2001 decisions of the Secretary of State (collectively with

the Department of State ‘‘the Secretary’’ or ‘‘Respondent’’)

designating Petitioner as a foreign terrorist organization.

After review of Petitioner’s various claims that the designa-

tion violates constitutional and statutory rights of Petitioner,

we conclude that the Secretary acted according to law and in

full compliance with the requirements of the Constitution.

We therefore deny the petitions for the reasons set forth

more fully below.

I. Background

We note at the outset that this is PMOI’s third petition to

this court to review designations of the PMOI as a foreign

terrorist organization. See People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran

v. Dep’t. of State, 182 F.3d 17 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (‘‘PMOI’’);

Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep’t. of State, 251

F.3d 192 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (‘‘NCOR’’). Our opinions disposing

of the prior petitions fully set forth the necessary back-

ground. Nonetheless, in order to lend a full understanding to

the present proceedings, we will briefly review the statute, as

well as the prior petitions and our disposition of them, before

proceeding to the issues immediately before us in this case.

The Anti–Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(‘‘Anti–Terrorism Act’’ or ‘‘AEDPA’’), 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (2000),

empowers the Secretary of State to designate an entity as a

‘‘foreign terrorist organization.’’ See generally, PMOI, 182

F.3d 17; NCOR, 251 F.3d 192. This designation causes the

blocking of any funds which the organization has on deposit

with any financial institution in the United States, 18 U.S.C.

3

§ 2339B(a)(2) (2000); exclusion from the United States of

representatives of the organization, 8 U.S.C.

§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(IV) & (V) (2000); and pertinent to our

jurisdiction to review the designations before us, the Act

imposes criminal penalties on any persons ‘‘knowingly pro-

vid[ing] material support or resources’’ to such organization,

18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1). As we noted on one of the earlier

visits, ‘‘[d]espite the seriousness of the consequences’’ of the

designation, the process leading to it is ‘‘a truncated one.’’

NCOR, 251 F.3d at 196. As we set out in more detail on the

two earlier petitions, see PMOI, 182 F.3d at 21–22, and

NCOR, 251 F.3d at 196–97, the Secretary compiles an admin-

istrative record and makes findings based on that record as to

whether the organization meets the statutory criteria for

designation as a foreign terrorist organization. Two features

distinguish this procedure from other administrative proceed-

ings governed by the Administrative Procedure Act (‘‘APA’’),

5 U.S.C. § 557(c) (2000). First, the AEDPA does not express

any right of the aggrieved party to comment on the adminis-

trative record or to present evidence for inclusion in that

record. See PMOI, 182 F.3d at 19; NCOR, 251 F.3d at 196.

Secondly, and most pertinent to the present review, the

statute expressly states that the Secretary is to consider the

classified information in making a designation and that classi-

fied information is not subject to disclosure under the Act

except to a reviewing court ex parte and in camera. 8 U.S.C.

§ 1189(a)(3)(B). A designation under the Act persists for two

years, and the Secretary may re-designate a foreign organiza-

tion as a foreign terrorist organization for succeeding two-

year periods. Id. § 1189(a)(4)(B).

In order for the Secretary to designate a foreign organiza-

tion as a foreign terrorist organization, he must make three

findings based on the administrative record, that:

A. the organization is a foreign organization;

B. the organization engages in terrorist activity TTT;

and

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C. the terrorist activity or terrorism of the organization

threatens the security of United States nationals or the

national security of the United States.

Id. § 1189(a)(1)(A)-(C). See PMOI, 182 F.3d at 21.

An organization designated as a foreign terrorist organiza-

tion must seek judicial review of the designation in this court

under § 1189(b). That section empowers us only to ‘‘hold

unlawful and set aside’’ designations that we find to be

(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or oth-

erwise not in accordance with law;

(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or

immunity;

(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limi-

tation, or short of statutory right;

(D) lacking substantial support in the administrative rec-

ord taken as a whole or in classified information submit-

ted to the court under paragraph (2), or

(E) not in accord with the procedures required by law.

8 U.S.C. § 1189(b)(3).

The Secretary has made successive designations of Peti-

tioner as a foreign terrorist organization in 1997, 1999, and

2001. Following the 1997 designation, Petitioner sought re-

view in a proceeding that generated our opinion in PMOI. In

that petition, the PMOI argued that the procedure for desig-

nation violated its due process rights to notice and hearing.

We easily disposed of any constitutional claim, holding that

‘‘[a] foreign entity without property or presence in this coun-

try has no constitutional rights under the due process

clauseTTTT’’ PMOI, 182 F.3d at 22. We then proceeded to

consider the rights of the organization under the statute.

This consisted principally of determining the legal sufficiency

of the Secretary’s administrative record to support the three

findings under § 1189(a)(1). As to the first, that the petition-

er was a foreign organization, there was no dispute; it was.

Id. at 24. As to the third, that ‘‘the terrorist activity of the

organization threatens the security of United States nationals

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or the national security of the United States’’ we held that to

present a nonjusticiable question. Id. at 23. Such questions

concerning the foreign policy decisions of the Executive

Branch present political judgments, ‘‘ ‘decisions of a kind for

which the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor respon-

sibilities and have long been held to belong in the domain of

political power not subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry.’ ’’

Id. at 23 (quoting Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v.

Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948)).

That left us solely with the question of the sufficiency of

the administrative record to support the Secretary’s determi-

nation that ‘‘the organization engages in terrorist activity.’’

We found that record sufficient. Id. at 24–25.

When the Secretary re-designated the PMOI as a foreign

terrorist organization in October of 1999, the organization

again petitioned this court for review. One item in the 1999

designation differed from the 1997 designation. In 1999 the

Secretary’s designation included a finding that the National

Council of Resistance of Iran, which claimed to be an organi-

zation independent of the PMOI, was an alias for the other

organization and that the National Council was therefore a

foreign terrorist organization as well—indeed, the same for-

eign terrorist organization. The National Council also peti-

tioned for review. We consolidated the two petitions. Peti-

tioners again raised the due process question with regard to

the failure of the statute to grant them notice of the content

of the file and an opportunity to be heard. The Secretary’s

finding that the NCOR and the PMOI were one and the same

made a material difference in the result of our review on the

constitutional question. Whereas the record before the court

in PMOI had established that the petitioning organization did

not have property or presence in the United States and was

therefore not entitled to assert due process rights under the

Constitution, on the record before us in the second case the

evidence supported the proposition that the National Council

did have such presence or property and was therefore enti-

tled to assert that claim. See NCOR, 251 F.3d at 201–02.

We therefore considered the merits of the due process claim.

We held that the statute, as applied by the Secretary, did not

6

provide ‘‘the fundamental requirement of due process,’’ that

is, ‘‘the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a

meaningful manner.’’ Id. at 208 (internal quotations omitted)

(citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)).

Based on our holding that the designees had not received

the process they were due, we remanded the question to the

Secretary for reconsideration. Id. at 209. We directed that

on remand the Secretary should provide the petitioners ‘‘the

opportunity to file responses to the nonclassified evidence

against them, to file evidence in support of their allegations

that they are not terrorist organizations,’’ and provide them

‘‘an opportunity to be meaningfully heard’’ on the issues

before the Secretary. Id. After the remand, the Secretary

provided the PMOI with an opportunity to respond to the

unclassified evidence, considered all material submitted by

the PMOI along with both the unclassified and classified

material in file, and reentered the 1999 designation on Sep-

tember 24, 2001, followed by a new two-year designation on

October 5, 2001, based on material in the 1997 and 1999

administrative records, together with a new record compiled

in 2001. The PMOI once again petitioned this court for

relief.

II. Analysis

A. Due Process and Sufficiency of Evidence

Petitioner raises several arguments. First, it contends that

its redesignation as a terrorist organization under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1189 is unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of

the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution because the statute

permitted the Secretary to rely upon secret evidence–the

classified information that respondents refused to disclose

and against which PMOI could therefore not effectively de-

fend. We reject this contention. As noted above, that stat-

ute authorizes designation of a foreign terrorist organization

when the Secretary finds three elements. As to the first,

that is that the organization is a foreign organization, there is

not and cannot be any dispute. The People’s Mojahedin is so

assuredly a foreign organization that until the Secretary’s

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designation of the NCOR as its alias, it could not even

establish a presence in the United States. See PMOI, 182

F.3d at 22–23. Nothing has changed in that regard since our

prior decisions on the subject.

As to the second element, the PMOI advances a colorable

argument: that the Secretary was able under § 1189(a)(3)(B)

to ‘‘consider classified information in making [this designa-

tion]’’ and that the classified information was not ‘‘subject to

disclosure’’ except to the court ex parte and in camera for

purposes of this judicial review. Petitioner contends that this

violates the due process standard set forth in Abourezk v.

Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1061 (D.C. Cir. 1986), ‘‘that a court

may not dispose of the merits of a case on the basis of ex

parte, in camera submissions.’’ While colorable, this argu-

ment will not carry the day.

First, we have already set forth in NCOR the due process

standards that the Secretary must meet in making designa-

tions under the statute. We held that the Constitution

requires the Secretary in designating foreign terrorist organi-

zations to provide to the potential designees, ‘‘notice that the

designation is impending.’’ NCOR, 251 F.3d at 208. We

further required that the Secretary must afford the potential

designee an ‘‘opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time

and in a meaningful manner.’’ Id. at 209 (citing Mathews v.

Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 333). The record reflects that the

Secretary complied with our instructions.

Granted, petitioners argue that their opportunity to be

heard was not meaningful, given that the Secretary relied on

secret information to which they were not afforded access.

The response to this is twofold. We already decided in

NCOR that due process required the disclosure of only the

unclassified portions of the administrative record. 251 F.3d

at 207–09. We made that determination informed by the

historically recognized proposition that under the separation

of powers created by the United States Constitution, the

Executive Branch has control and responsibility over access

to classified information and has ‘‘ ‘compelling interest’ in

withholding national security information from unauthorized

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persons in the course of executive business.’’ Dep’t. of the

Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527 (1988) (quoting Snepp v.

United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 n.3 (1980)). In the context of

another statutory scheme involving classified information, we

noted the courts are often ill-suited to determine the sensitivi-

ty of classified information. United States v. Yunis, 867 F.2d

617, 623 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (‘‘Things that did not make sense to

[a judge] would make all too much sense to a foreign counter

intelligence specialistTTTT’’). The Due Process Clause re-

quires only that process which is due under the circumstances

of the case. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481

(1972) (‘‘due process is flexible and calls for such procedural

protections as the particular situation demands.’’). We have

already established in NCOR the process which is due under

the circumstances of this sensitive matter of classified intelli-

gence in the effort to combat foreign terrorism. The Secre-

tary has complied with the standard we set forth therein, and

nothing further is due.

However, even if we err in describing the process due, even

had the Petitioner been entitled to have its counsel or itself

view the classified information, the breach of that entitlement

has caused it no harm. This brings us to Petitioner’s statuto-

ry objection. Petitioner argues that there is not adequate

record support for the Secretary’s determination that it is a

foreign terrorist organization under the statute. However, on

this element, even the unclassified record taken alone is quite

adequate to support the Secretary’s determination. Indeed,

as to this element—that is, that the organization engages in

terrorist activities—the People’s Mojahedin has effectively

admitted not only the adequacy of the unclassified record, but

the truth of the allegation. By statutory definition, ‘‘terrorist

activity’’ is

any activity which is unlawful under the laws of the place

where it is committed (or which, if TTT committed in the

United States, would be unlawful under the laws of the

United States or any State) and which involves any of the

following:

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(I) The hijacking or sabotage of any conveyance (in-

cluding an aircraft, vessel, or vehicle).

(II) The seizing or detaining, and threatening to kill,

injure, or continue to detain, another individual in

order to compel a third person (including a govern-

mental organization) to do or abstain from doing any

act as an explicit or implicit condition for the release of

the individual seized or detained.

(III) A violent attack upon an internationally protect-

ed person (as defined in section 1116(b)(4) of Title 18)

or upon the liberty of such a person.

(IV) An assassination.

(V) The use of any—

(a) biological agent, chemical agent, or nuclear

weapon or device, or

(b) explosive or firearm (other than for mere per-

sonal monetary gain),

with intent to endanger, directly or indirectly, the

safety of one or more individuals or to cause substan-

tial damage to property.

(VI) A threat, attempt, or conspiracy to do any of the

foregoing.

8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii) (2000 & Supp. 2003).

By its own admission, the PMOI has

(1) attacked with mortars the Islamic Revolutionary

Prosecutor’s Office; (2) assassinated a former Iranian

prosecutor and killed his security guards; (3) killed the

Deputy Chief of the Iranian Joint Staff Command, who

was the personal military adviser to Supreme Leader

Khamenei; (4) attacked with mortars the Iranian Central

Command Headquarters of the Islamic Revolutionary

Guard Corps and the Defense Industries Organization in

Tehran; (5) attacked and targeted with mortars the

offices of the Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei, and of

the head of the State Exigencies Council; (6) attacked

with mortars the central headquarters of the Revolution-

10

ary Guards; (7) attacked with mortars two Revolutionary

Guards Corps headquarters; and (8) attacked the head-

quarters of the Iranian State Security Forces in Tehran.1

Were there no classified information in the file, we could

hardly find that the Secretary’s determination that the Peti-

tioner engaged in terrorist activities is ‘‘lacking substantial

support in the administrative record taken as a whole,’’ even

without repairing to the ‘‘classified information submitted to

the court.’’ 8 U.S.C. § 1189(b)(3)(D).

To summarize, the Secretary did not deprive Petitioner of

any process to which it was constitutionally entitled. Even if

the record supported a finding of violation of due process,

such a violation would be harmless as the unaffected portion

of the record is ample to support the determination made.

The remaining element under § 1189(a)(1) is that ‘‘the

terrorist activity or terrorism of the organization threatens

the security of United States nationals or the national securi-

ty of the United States.’’ Id. § 1189(a)(1)(C). The thrust of

Petitioner’s argument is that its allegedly terrorist acts were

not acts of terrorism under the statute, because they do not

meet the requirement of subsection (C). Petitioner argues

that the attempt to overthrow the despotic government of

Iran, which itself remains on the State Department’s list of

state sponsors of terrorism, is not ‘‘terrorist activity,’’ or if it

is, that it does not threaten the security of the United States

or its nationals. We cannot review that claim. In PMOI we

expressly held that that finding ‘‘is nonjusticiable.’’ 182 F.3d

at 23. As we stated in that decision, ‘‘it is beyond the judicial

function for a court to review foreign policy decisions of the

Executive Branch.’’ Id. (citing Chicago & Southern Air

Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111

(1948)). Even if we differed with the analysis of the prior

panel of this court, which we do not, we are bound by its

decision. LaShawn v. Barry, 87 F.3d 1389, 1395 (D.C. Cir.

1996) (one panel of the court does not have the authority to

overrule another). In short, we find neither statutory nor

1We note that Petitioner does not contest the ‘‘unlawfulness’’ of

these acts as required by 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii).

11

due process errors in the Secretary’s designation of petitioner

as a foreign terrorist organization.

B. Petitioner’s Other Claims

Petitioner raises several other arguments to the effect that

the designation violates its constitutional rights. Those war-

ranting separate discussion fall under the general heading of

First Amendment claims. Petitioner’s argument that its

First Amendment rights have been violated rests on the

consequences of the designation. Petitioner argues that by

forbidding all persons within or subject to the jurisdiction of

the United States from ‘‘knowingly provid[ing] material sup-

port or resources,’’ 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1), to it as a desig-

nated foreign terrorist organization, the statute violates its

rights of free speech and association guaranteed by the First

Amendment. We disagree.

As the Ninth Circuit held in Humanitarian Law Project v.

Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1135 (9th Cir. 2000), the statute ‘‘is not

aimed at interfering with the expressive component of [the

organization’s] conduct but at stopping aid to terrorist

groups.’’ It is conduct and not communication that the

statute controls. We join the Ninth Circuit in observing that

‘‘there is no constitutional right to facilitate terrorism by

giving terrorists the weapons and explosives with which to

carry out their grisly missions.[2] Nor, of course, is there a

right to provide resources with which terrorists can buy

weapons and explosives.’’ Id. at 1133.

Although we have reviewed Petitioner’s other arguments,

none warrants relief, nor separate discussion.

2 Although not raised by either party, at the instruction of the

court the parties addressed the possibility that the 1999 designation

was moot. Both parties agree, as does the court, that a realistic

possibility exists of prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. § 2339A–2339C

for crimes related to the terrorist designation of the PMOI during

the period of that designation so that this controversy escapes

mootness under the ‘collateral consequences’ exception recognized

in, e.g., Public Utilities Comm’n of California v. FERC, 100 F.3d

1451, 1460 (9th Cir. 1996); National Iranian Oil Co. v. Mapco

Int’l., Inc., 983 F.2d 485, 490 (3d Cir. 1992).

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III. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that in the

designation and redesignation of the People’s Mojahedin of

Iran as a foreign terrorist organization, the Secretary of

State afforded all the process that the organization was due,

and that this designation violated neither statutory nor consti-

tutional rights of the Petitioner. We therefore deny the

petitions for review.

So ordered.

1

EDWARDS, Circuit Judge, concurring: I concur in the judg-

ment denying the petitions for review. I find it unnecessary,

however, to reach the constitutional due process challenge to

the Secretary’s use of classified evidence to designate peti-

tioner.

The public, unclassified administrative record, including

petitioner’s own submissions to the Secretary, contains more

than enough evidence to support the determination that peti-

tioner engages in terrorist activity. The Government fol-

lowed the procedures that we required in National Council of

Resistance of Iran v. Department of State, 251 F.3d 192 (D.C.

Cir. 2001). Petitioner offered a wealth of submissions to the

Secretary, which the public record now includes. Not only is

there enough evidence in the public record to support the

Secretary’s determination that petitioner engaged in the acts

alleged, there appears to be no dispute over the facts support-

ing that determination. And, for the reasons stated in the

majority opinion, I agree that petitioner’s activities clearly fall

within the statutory definition of ‘‘terrorist activity’’ under 8

U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii) (2000 & Supp. 2003). Therefore, I

find it unnecessary to reach petitioner’s constitutional due

process challenge to the Secretary’s use of secret, classified

material to bolster its determination.

In sum, because there is substantial, unrefuted evidence in

the public, unclassified record for the designation of petition-

er as a foreign terrorist organization, I agree that the petition

for review should be denied.