Atlantic Sounding Co. v. Townsend

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2008 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

ATLANTIC SOUNDING CO., INC., ET AL. v.

TOWNSEND

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 08–214. Argued March 2, 2009—Decided June 25, 2009

Atlantic Sounding Co. allegedly refused to pay maintenance and cure to

respondent Townsend for injuries he suffered while working on its

tugboat, and then filed this declaratory relief action regarding its ob

ligations. Townsend filed suit under the Jones Act and general mari

time law, alleging, inter alia, arbitrary and willful failure to provide

maintenance and cure. He filed similar counterclaims in the declara

tory judgment action, seeking punitive damages for the maintenance

and cure claim. The District Court denied petitioners’ motion to dis

miss the punitive damages claim, but certified the question for inter

locutory appeal. Following its precedent, the Eleventh Circuit held

that punitive damages may be awarded for the willful withholding of

maintenance and cure.

Held: Because punitive damages have long been an accepted remedy

under general maritime law, and because neither Miles v. Apex Ma

rine Corp., 498 U. S. 19, nor the Jones Act altered this understand

ing, punitive damages for the willful and wanton disregard of the

maintenance and cure obligation remain available as a matter of

general maritime law. Pp. 2–19.

(a) Settled legal principles establish three points central to this

case. Pp. 2–9.

(i) Punitive damages have long been an available remedy at

common law for wanton, willful, or outrageous conduct. English law

during the colonial era accorded juries the authority to award such

damages when warranted. And American courts have likewise per

mitted such damages since at least 1784. This Court has also found

punitive damages authorized as a matter of common-law doctrine.

See, e.g., Day v. Woodworth, 13 How. 363. Pp. 3–5.

2 ATLANTIC SOUNDING CO. v. TOWNSEND

Syllabus

(ii) The common-law punitive damages tradition extends to

claims arising under federal maritime law. See Lake Shore & Michi

gan Southern R. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U. S. 101, 108. One of this

Court’s first cases so indicating involved an action for marine tres

pass. See The Amiable Nancy, 3 Wheat. 546. And lower federal

courts have found punitive damages available in maritime actions for

particularly egregious tortious acts. Pp. 5–6.

(iii) Nothing in maritime law undermines this general rule’s ap

plicability in the maintenance and cure context. The maintenance

and cure obligation dates back centuries as an aspect of general

maritime law, and the failure of a seaman’s employers to provide

adequate medical care was the basis for awarding punitive damages

in cases decided in the 1800’s. This Court has since registered its

agreement with such decisions and has subsequently found that in

addition to wages, “maintenance” includes food and lodging at the

ship’s expense, and “cure” refers to medical treatment, Lewis v. Lewis

& Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U. S. 438, 441. Moreover, an owner’s fail

ure to provide proper medical care for seamen has provided lower

courts the impetus to award damages that appear to contain at least

some punitive element. Pp. 7–8.

(iv) Under these settled legal principles, respondent is entitled to

pursue punitive damages unless Congress has enacted legislation

that departs from the common-law understanding. P. 9.

(b) The plain language of the Jones Act does not provide a basis for

overturning the common-law rule. Congress enacted the Jones Act to

overrule The Osceola, 189 U. S. 158, where the Court prohibited a

seaman or his family from recovering for injuries or death suffered

due to his employers’ negligence. To that end, the Act created a

statutory negligence cause of action, but it did not eliminate pre

existing remedies available to seamen for the separate common-law

cause of action based on maintenance and cure. The Act bestows the

right to “elect” to bring a Jones Act claim, thereby indicating a choice

of actions for seamen—not an exclusive remedy. Because the then

accepted remedies arose from general maritime law, it necessarily

follows that Congress envisioned their continued availability. See

Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U. S. 347, 354. Had the Jones Act been

the only remaining remedy available, there would have been no elec

tion to make. And, the only statutory restrictions on general mari

time maintenance and cure claims were enacted long after the Jones

Act’s passage and limit availability for only two discrete

classes: foreign workers on offshore oil and mineral production facili

ties and sailing school students and instructors. This indicates that

“Congress knows how to” restrict the traditional maintenance and

cure remedy “when it wants to.” Omni Capital Int’l, Ltd. v. Rudolf

Cite as: 557 U. S. ____ (2009) 3

Syllabus

Wolff & Co., 484 U. S. 97, 106. This Court has consistently observed

that the Jones Act preserves common-law causes of action such as

maintenance and cure, see. e.g., The Arizona v. Anelich, 298 U. S.

110, and its case law supports the view that punitive damages

awards, in particular, continue to remain available in maintenance

and cure actions, see Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U. S. 527. Pp. 9–13.

(i) Contrary to petitioners’ argument, Miles does not limit recov

ery to the remedies available under the Jones Act. Miles does not

address either maintenance and cure actions in general or the avail

ability of punitive damages for such actions. Instead, it grappled

with the entirely different question whether general maritime law

should provide a cause of action for wrongful death based on unsea

worthiness. The Court found that the Jones Act and the Death on

the High Seas Act (DOHSA), along with state statutes, supported

recognition of a general maritime rule for wrongful death of a sea

man. However, since Congress had chosen to limit the damages

available in the Jones Act and DOHSA, excluding damages for loss of

society or lost future earnings, 498 U. S., at 21, 31–32, its judgment

must control the availability of remedies for wrongful-death actions

brought under general maritime law, id., at 32–36. Miles’ reasoning

does not apply here. Unlike Miles’ situation, both the general mari

time cause of action here (maintenance and cure) and the remedy

(punitive damages) were well established before the Jones Act’s pas

sage. And unlike Miles’ facts, the Jones Act does not address the

general maritime cause of action here or its remedy. It is thus possi

ble to adhere to the traditional understanding of maritime actions

and remedies without abridging or violating the Jones Act; unlike

wrongful-death actions, this traditional understanding is not a mat

ter to which “Congress has spoken directly.” See id., at 31. More

over, petitioners’ contrary view was directly rejected in Norfolk Ship

building & Drydock Corp. v. Garris, 532 U. S. 811, 820. If Miles

presented no barrier to the Garris Court’s endorsement of a previ

ously unrecognized maritime cause of action for negligent wrongful

death, there is no legitimate basis for a contrary conclusion here.

Like negligence, the duty of maintenance and cure and the general

availability of punitive damages have been recognized “for more than

a century,” 532 U. S., at 820. And because respondent does not ask

this Court to alter statutory text or “expand” the maritime tort law’s

general principles, Miles does not require eliminating the general

maritime remedy of punitive damages for the willful or wanton fail

ure to comply with the duty to pay maintenance and cure. The fact

that seamen commonly seek to recover under the Jones Act for main

tenance and cure claims, does not mean that the Jones Act provides

the only remedy. See Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, Inc., 287 U. S.

4 ATLANTIC SOUNDING CO. v. TOWNSEND

Syllabus

367, 374–375. The laudable quest for uniformity in admiralty does

not require narrowing available damages to the lowest common de

nominator approved by Congress for distinct causes of action.

Pp. 13–19.

496 F. 3d 1282, affirmed and remanded.

THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which STEVENS,

SOUTER, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined. ALITO, J., filed a dissenting

opinion, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and SCALIA and KENNEDY, JJ., joined.

Cite as: 557 U. S. ____ (2009) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash

ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 08–214

_________________

ATLANTIC SOUNDING CO., INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS

v. EDGAR L. TOWNSEND

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

[June 25, 2009]

JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question presented by this case is whether an in

jured seaman may recover punitive damages for his em

ployer’s willful failure to pay maintenance and cure.

Petitioners argue that under Miles v. Apex Marine Corp.,

498 U. S. 19 (1990), seamen may recover only those dam

ages available under the Jones Act, 46 U. S. C. §30104.

We disagree. Historically, punitive damages have been

available and awarded in general maritime actions,

including some in maintenance and cure. We find

that nothing in Miles or the Jones Act eliminates that

availability.

I

Respondent Edgar L. Townsend was a crew member of

the Motor Tug Thomas. After falling on the steel deck of

the tugboat and injuring his arm and shoulder, respondent

claimed that petitioner Atlantic Sounding,1 the owner of

the tugboat, advised him that it would not provide main

——————

1 Atlantic Sounding Co., Inc., is a wholly owned subsidiary of Weeks

Marine, Inc., the other petitioner in this case.

2 ATLANTIC SOUNDING CO. v. TOWNSEND

Opinion of the Court

tenance and cure. See 496 F. 3d 1282, 1283 (CA11 2007).

“A claim for maintenance and cure concerns the vessel

owner’s obligation to provide food, lodging, and medical

services to a seaman injured while serving the ship.”

Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U. S. 438, 441

(2001).

Petitioners thereafter filed an action for declaratory

relief regarding their obligations with respect to mainte

nance and cure. Respondent filed his own suit under the

Jones Act and general maritime law, alleging negligence,

unseaworthiness, arbitrary and willful failure to pay

maintenance and cure, and wrongful termination. In

addition, respondent filed similar counterclaims in the

declaratory judgment action, seeking punitive damages for

the denial of maintenance and cure. The District Court

consolidated the cases. See 496 F. 3d, at 1283–1284.

Petitioners moved to dismiss respondent’s punitive

damages claim. The District Court denied the motion,

holding that it was bound by the determination in Hines v.

J. A. LaPorte, Inc., 820 F. 2d 1187, 1189 (CA11 1987) (per

curiam), that punitive damages were available in an

action for maintenance and cure. The court, however,

agreed to certify the question for interlocutory appeal. See

496 F. 3d, at 1284. The United States Court of Appeals for

the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the District Court that

Hines controlled and held that respondent could pursue

his punitive damages claim for the willful withholding of

maintenance and cure. 496 F. 3d, at 1285–1286. The

decision conflicted with those of other Courts of Appeals,

see, e.g., Guevara v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 59 F. 3d

1496 (CA5 1995) (en banc); Glynn v. Roy Al Boat Man

agement Corp., 57 F. 3d 1495 (CA9 1995), and we granted

certiorari, 555 U. S. ___ (2008).

II

Respondent claims that he is entitled to seek punitive

Cite as: 557 U. S. ____ (2009) 3

Opinion of the Court

damages as a result of petitioners’ alleged breach of their

“maintenance and cure” duty under general maritime law.

We find no legal obstacle to his doing so.

A

Punitive damages have long been an available remedy

at common law for wanton, willful, or outrageous conduct.

Under English law during the colonial era, juries were

accorded broad discretion to award damages as they saw

fit. See, e.g., Lord Townsend v. Hughes, 2 Mod. 150, 86

Eng. Rep. 994 (C. P. 1676) (“[I]n civil actions the plaintiff

is to recover by way of compensation for the damages he

hath sustained, and the jury are the proper judges

thereof” (emphasis in original)); 1 T. Sedgwick, Measure of

Damages §349, p. 688 (9th ed. 1912) (hereinafter Sedg

wick) (“Until comparatively recent times juries were as

arbitrary judges of the amount of damages as of the

facts”). The common-law view “was that ‘in cases where

the amount of damages was uncertain[,] their assessment

was a matter so peculiarly within the province of the jury

that the Court should not alter it.’ ” Feltner v. Columbia

Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U. S. 340, 353 (1998) (quoting

Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U. S. 474, 480 (1935); alteration in

original).

The jury’s broad discretion to set damages included the

authority to award punitive damages when the circum

stances of the case warranted. Just before the ratification

of the Constitution, Lord Chief Justice Pratt explained

that “a jury ha[s] it in [its] power to give damages for more

than the injury received. Damages are designed not only

as a satisfaction to the injured person, but likewise as a

punishment to the guilty, to deter from any such proceed

ing for the future, and as a proof of the detestation of the

jury to the action itself.” Wilkes v. Wood, Lofft 1, 18–19,

98 Eng. Rep. 489, 498–499 (C. P. 1763); see also Pacific

Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U. S. 1, 25 (1991) (SCALIA,

4 ATLANTIC SOUNDING CO. v. TOWNSEND

Opinion of the Court

J., concurring in judgment) (“[P]unitive or ‘exemplary’

damages have long been a part of Anglo-American law”);

Huckle v. Money, 2 Wils. 205, 207, 95 Eng. Rep. 768, 769

(C. P. 1763) (declining to grant a new trial because the

jury “ha[s] done right in giving exemplary damages”).

American courts have likewise permitted punitive dam

ages awards in appropriate cases since at least 1784. See,

e.g., Genay v. Norris, 1 S. C. L. 6, 7 (C. P. and Gen. Sess.

1784) (approving award of “very exemplary damages”

because spiking wine represented a “very wanton out

rage”); Coryell v. Colbaugh, 1 N. J. L. 77 (1791) (conclud

ing that a breach of promise of marriage was “of the most

atrocious and dishonourable nature” and supported “dam

ages for example’s sake, to prevent such offences in future”

(emphasis in original)). Although some States elected not

to allow juries to make such awards, the vast majority

permitted them. See 1 Sedgwick §§352, 354, at 694, 700.

By the middle of the 19th century, “punitive damages were

undoubtedly an established part of the American common

law of torts [and] no particular procedures were deemed

necessary to circumscribe a jury’s discretion regarding the

award of such damages, or their amount.” Haslip, supra,

at 26–27 (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment).

This Court has also found the award of punitive dam

ages to be authorized as a matter of common-law doctrine.

In Day v. Woodworth, 13 How. 363 (1852), for example, the

Court recognized the “well-established principle of the

common law, that in actions of trespass and all actions on

the case for torts, a jury may inflict what are called exem

plary, punitive, or vindictive damages upon a defendant

. . . .” Id., at 371; see also Philadelphia, W., & B. R. Co. v.

Quigley, 21 How. 202, 214 (1859) (“Whenever the injury

complained of has been inflicted maliciously or wantonly,

and with circumstances of contumely or indignity, the jury

are not limited to the ascertainment of a simple compensa

tion for the wrong committed against the aggrieved per

Cite as: 557 U. S. ____ (2009) 5

Opinion of the Court

son”); Barry v. Edmunds, 116 U. S. 550, 562 (1886)

(“[A]ccording to the settled law of this court, [a plaintiff]

might show himself, by proof of the circumstances, to be

entitled to exemplary damages calculated to vindicate his

right and protect it against future similar invasions”).

B

The general rule that punitive damages were available

at common law extended to claims arising under federal

maritime law. See Lake Shore & Michigan Southern R.

Co. v. Prentice, 147 U. S. 101, 108 (1893) (“[C]ourts of

admiralty . . . proceed, in cases of tort, upon the same

principles as courts of common law, in allowing exemplary

damages . . .”). One of this Court’s first cases indicating

that punitive damages were available involved an action

for marine trespass. See The Amiable Nancy, 3 Wheat.

546 (1818). In the course of deciding whether to uphold

the jury’s award, Justice Story, writing for the Court,

recognized that punitive damages are an available mari

time remedy under the proper circumstances. Although

the Court found that the particular facts of the case did

not warrant such an award against the named defendants,

it explained that “if this were a suit against the original

wrong-doers, it might be proper to . . . visit upon them in

the shape of exemplary damages, the proper punishment

which belongs to such lawless misconduct.” Id., at 558;

see also Barry, supra, at 563 (“In The Amiable Nancy,

which was the case of a marine tort, Mr. Justice Story

spoke of exemplary damages as ‘the proper punish

ment which belongs to . . . lawless misconduct’ ” (citation

omitted)).

The lower federal courts followed suit, finding that

punitive damages were available in maritime actions for

tortious acts of a particularly egregious nature. See, e.g.,

McGuire v. The Golden Gate, 16 F. Cas. 141, 143 (No.

8,815) (CC ND Cal. 1856) (“In an action against the perpe

6 ATLANTIC SOUNDING CO. v. TOWNSEND

Opinion of the Court

trator of the wrong, the aggrieved party would be entitled

to recover not only actual damages but exemplary,—such

as would vindicate his wrongs, and teach the tort feasor

the necessity of reform”); Ralston v. The State Rights, 20

F. Cas. 201, 210 (No. 11,540) (DC ED Pa. 1836) (“[I]t is not

legally correct . . . to say that a court cannot give exem

plary damages, in a case like the present, against the

owners of a vessel”); Boston Mfg. Co. v. Fiske, 3 F. Cas.

957 (No. 1,681) (CC Mass. 1820) (Story, J.) (“In cases of

marine torts, or illegal captures, it is far from being un

common in the admiralty to allow costs and expences, and

to mulct the offending parties, even in exemplary dam

ages, where the nature of the case requires it”). In short,

prior to enactment of the Jones Act in 1920, “maritime

jurisprudence was replete with judicial statements ap

proving punitive damages, especially on behalf of passen

gers and seamen.” Robertson, Punitive Damages in

American Maritime Law, 28 J. Mar. L. & Comm. 73, 115

(1997) (hereinafter Robertson); see also 2 Sedgwick §599b,

at 1156 (“Exemplary damages are awarded in Admiralty,

as in other jurisdictions”); 2 J. Sutherland, Law of Dam

ages §392, p. 1272 (4th ed. 1916) (“As a rule a court of

equity will not award [punitive] damages, but courts of

admiralty will . . .” (footnote omitted)).2

——————

2 Althoughpunitive damages awards were rarely upheld on judicial

review, but see Roza v. Smith, 65 F. 592, 596–597 (DC ND Cal. 1895);

Gallagher v. The Yankee, 9 F. Cas. 1091, 1093 (No. 5,196) (DC ND Cal.

1859), that fact does not draw into question the basic understanding

that punitive damages were considered an available maritime remedy.

Indeed, in several cases in which a judgment awarding punitive dam

age awards was overturned on appeal, the reversal was based on

unrelated grounds. See, e.g., The Margharita, 140 F. 820, 824 (CA5

1905); Pacific Packing & Nav. Co. v. Fielding, 136 F. 577, 580 (CA9

1905); Latchtimacker v. Jacksonville Towing & Wrecking Co., 181 F.

276, 278 (CC SD Fla. 1910).

Cite as: 557 U. S. ____ (2009) 7

Opinion of the Court

C

Nothing in maritime law undermines the applicability of

this general rule in the maintenance and cure context.

See G. Gilmore & C. Black, Law of Admiralty §6–13,

p. 312 (2d ed. 1975) (hereinafter Gilmore & Black) (ex

plaining that a seaman denied maintenance and cure “has

a free option to claim damages (including punitive dam

ages) under a general maritime law count”); Robertson 163

(concluding that breach of maintenance and cure is one of

the particular torts for which general maritime law would

most likely permit the awarding of punitive damages

“assuming . . . the requisite level of blameworthiness”).

Indeed, the legal obligation to provide maintenance and

cure dates back centuries as an aspect of general maritime

law, and the failure of a seaman’s employers to provide

him with adequate medical care was the basis for award

ing punitive damages in cases decided as early as the

1800’s.

The right to receive maintenance and cure was first

recognized in this country in two lower court decisions

authored by Justice Story. See Harden v. Gordon, 11

F. Cas. 480 (No. 6,047) (CC Me. 1823); Reed v. Canfield, 20

F. Cas. 426 (No. 11,641) (CC Mass. 1832). According to

Justice Story, this common-law obligation to seamen was

justified on humanitarian and economic grounds: “If some

provision be not made for [seamen] in sickness at the

expense of the ship, they must often in foreign ports suffer

the accumulated evils of disease, and poverty, and some

times perish from the want of suitable nourishment. . . .

[T]he merchant himself derives an ultimate benefit [be

cause i]t encourages seamen to engage in perilous voyages

with more promptitude, and at lower wages.” Harden,

supra, at 483; see also Reed, supra, at 429 (“The seaman is

to be cured at the expense of the ship, of the sickness or

injury sustained in the ship’s service”).

This Court has since registered its agreement with these

8 ATLANTIC SOUNDING CO. v. TOWNSEND

Opinion of the Court

decisions. “Upon a full review . . . of English and Ameri

can authorities,” the Court concluded that “the vessel and

her owners are liable, in case a seaman falls sick, or is

wounded, in the service of the ship, to the extent of his

maintenance and cure, and to his wages, at least so long

as the voyage is continued.” The Osceola, 189 U. S. 158,

175 (1903). Decisions following The Osceola have ex

plained that in addition to wages, “maintenance” includes

food and lodging at the expense of their ship, and “cure”

refers to medical treatment. Lewis, 531 U. S., at 441; see

also Gilmore & Black §6–12, at 267–268 (describing

“maintenance and cure” as including medical expenses, a

living allowance, and unearned wages).

In addition, the failure of a vessel owner to provide

proper medical care for seamen has provided the impetus

for damages awards that appear to contain at least some

punitive element. For example, in The City of Carlisle, 39

F. 807 (DC Ore. 1889), the court added $1,000 to its dam

ages award to compensate an apprentice seaman for “gross

neglect and cruel maltreatment of the [seaman] since his

injury.” Id., at 809, 817. The court reviewed the indigni

ties to which the apprentice had been subjected as he

recovered without any serious medical attention, see id.,

at 810–812, and explained that “if owners do not wish to

be mulct in damages for such misconduct, they should be

careful to select men worthy to command their vessels and

fit to be trusted with the safety and welfare of their crews,

and particularly apprentice boys.” Id., at 817; see also The

Troop, 118 F. 769, 770–771, 773 (DC Wash. 1902) (ex

plaining that $4,000 was a reasonable award because the

captain’s “failure to observe the dictates of humanity” and

obtain prompt medical care for an injured seaman consti

tuted a “monstrous wrong”).3

——————

3 Although these cases do not refer to “punitive” or “exemplary” dam

ages, scholars have characterized the awards authorized by these

Cite as: 557 U. S. ____ (2009)

9

Opinion of the Court

D

The settled legal principles discussed above establish

three points central to resolving this case. First, punitive

damages have long been available at common law. Sec

ond, the common-law tradition of punitive damages ex

tends to maritime claims.4 And third, there is no evidence

that claims for maintenance and cure were excluded from

this general admiralty rule. Instead, the pre-Jones Act

evidence indicates that punitive damages remain available

for such claims under the appropriate factual circum

stances. As a result, respondent is entitled to pursue

punitive damages unless Congress has enacted legislation

departing from this common-law understanding. As ex

plained below, it has not.

III

A

The only statute that could serve as a basis for overturn

ing the common-law rule in this case is the Jones Act.

Congress enacted the Jones Act primarily to overrule The

Osceola, supra, in which this Court prohibited a seaman or

his family from recovering for injuries or death suffered

——————

decisions as such. See Robertson 103–105; Edelman, Guevara v.

Maritime Overseas Corp.: Opposing the Decision, 20 Tulane Mar. L. J.

349, 351, and n. 22 (1996).

4 The dissent correctly notes that the handful of early cases involving

maintenance and cure, by themselves, do not definitively resolve the

question of punitive damages availability in such cases. See post, at 6–

8 (opinion of ALITO, J.). However, it neglects to acknowledge that the

general common-law rule made punitive damages available in maritime

actions. See supra, at 5–6. Nor does the dissent explain why mainte

nance and cure actions should be excepted from this general rule. It is

because of this rule, and the fact that these early cases support—rather

than refute—its application to maintenance and cure actions, see

supra, at 7–8, that the pre-Jones Act evidence supports the conclusion

that punitive damages were available at common law where the denial

of maintenance and cure involved wanton, willful, or outrageous

conduct.

10 ATLANTIC SOUNDING CO. v. TOWNSEND

Opinion of the Court

due to his employers’ negligence. To this end, the statute

provides in relevant part:

“A seaman injured in the course of employment or, if

the seaman dies from the injury, the personal repre

sentative of the seaman may elect to bring a civil ac

tion at law, with the right of trial by jury, against the

employer. Laws of the United States regulating re

covery for personal injury to, or death of, a railway

employee apply to an action under this section.” 46

U. S. C. §30104(a) (incorporating the Federal Employ

ers’ Liability Act, 45 U. S. C. §§51–60).

The Jones Act thus created a statutory cause of action

for negligence, but it did not eliminate pre-existing reme

dies available to seamen for the separate common-law

cause of action based on a seaman’s right to maintenance

and cure. Section 30104 bestows upon the injured seaman

the right to “elect” to bring a Jones Act claim, thereby

indicating a choice of actions for seamen—not an exclusive

remedy. See Funk & Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary

of the English Language 798 (1913) (defining “elect” as

“[t]o make choice of”); 1 Bouvier’s Law Dictionary 979 (8th

ed. 1914) (defining “election” as “[c]hoice; selection”).

Because the then-accepted remedies for injured seamen

arose from general maritime law, see The Osceola, supra,

at 175, it necessarily follows that Congress was envision

ing the continued availability of those common-law causes

of action. See Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U. S. 347, 354

(1995) (“Congress enacted the Jones Act in 1920 to remove

the bar to suit for negligence articulated in The Osceola,

thereby completing the trilogy of heightened legal protec

tions [including maintenance and cure] that seamen re

ceive because of their exposure to the perils of the sea”

(internal quotation marks omitted)); Stewart v. Dutra

Constr. Co., 543 U. S. 481, 487 (2005) (describing the

Jones Act as “remov[ing] this bar to negligence suits by

Cite as: 557 U. S. ____ (2009) 11

Opinion of the Court

seamen”). If the Jones Act had been the only remaining

remedy available to injured seamen, there would have

been no election to make.

In addition, the only statutory restrictions expressly

addressing general maritime claims for maintenance and

cure were enacted long after the passage of the Jones Act.

They limit its availability for two discrete classes of peo

ple: foreign workers on offshore oil and mineral production

facilities, see §503(a)(2), 96 Stat. 1955, codified at 46

U. S. C. §30105(b), and sailing school students and in

structors, §204, 96 Stat. 1589, codified at 46 U. S. C.

§50504(b). These provisions indicate that “Congress

knows how to” restrict the traditional remedy of mainte

nance and cure “when it wants to.” Omni Capital Int’l,

Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U. S. 97, 106 (1987). Thus,

nothing in the statutory scheme for maritime recovery

restricts the availability of punitive damages for mainte

nance and cure for those, like respondent, who are not

precluded from asserting the general maritime claim.

Further supporting this interpretation of the Jones Act,

this Court has consistently recognized that the Act “was

remedial, for the benefit and protection of seamen who are

peculiarly the wards of admiralty. Its purpose was to

enlarge that protection, not to narrow it.” The Arizona v.

Anelich, 298 U. S. 110, 123 (1936); see also American

Export Lines, Inc. v. Alvez, 446 U. S. 274, 282 (1980) (plu

rality opinion) (declining to “read the Jones Act as sweep

ing aside general maritime law remedies”); O’Donnell v.

Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 318 U. S. 36, 43 (1943)

(“It follows that the Jones Act, in extending a right of

recovery to the seaman injured while in the service of his

vessel by negligence, has done no more than supplement

the remedy of maintenance and cure . . .”); Pacific S. S. Co.

v. Peterson, 278 U. S. 130, 134, 138–139 (1928) (holding

that the Jones Act “was not intended to restrict in any way

the long-established right of a seaman to maintenance,

12 ATLANTIC SOUNDING CO. v. TOWNSEND

Opinion of the Court

cure and wages”).

Not only have our decisions repeatedly observed that

the Jones Act preserves common-law causes of action such

as maintenance and cure, but our case law also supports

the view that punitive damages awards, in particular,

remain available in maintenance and cure actions after

the Act’s passage. In Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U. S. 527

(1962), for example, the Court permitted the recovery of

attorney’s fees for the “callous” and “willful and persis

tent” refusal to pay maintenance and cure. Id., at 529–

531. In fact, even the Vaughan dissenters, who believed

that such fees were generally unavailable, agreed that a

seaman “would be entitled to exemplary damages in ac

cord with traditional concepts of the law of damages”

where a “shipowner’s refusal to pay maintenance stemmed

from a wanton and intentional disregard of the legal

rights of the seaman.” Id., at 540 (opinion of Stewart, J.);

see also Fiske, 3 F. Cas., at 957 (Story, J.) (arguing that

counsel fees are awardable in “[c]ourts of admiralty . . . not

technically as costs, but upon the same principles, as they

are often allowed damages in cases of torts, by courts of

common law, as a recompense for injuries sustained, as

exemplary damages, or as a remuneration for expences

incurred, or losses sustained, by the misconduct of the

other party”).5

Nothing in the text of the Jones Act or this Court’s

decisions issued in the wake of its enactment undermines

——————

5 In the wake of Vaughan, a number of lower courts expressly held

that punitive damages can be recovered for the denial of maintenance

and cure. See, e.g., Hines v. J. A. Laporte, Inc., 820 F. 2d 1187, 1189

(CA11 1987) (per curiam) (upholding punitive damages award of $5,000

for an “arbitrary and bad faith breach of the duty to furnish mainte

nance and cure”); Robinson v. Pocahontas, Inc., 477 F. 2d 1048, 1049–

1052 (CA1 1973) (affirming punitive damages award of $10,000 which

was based, in part, on the defendant’s initial withholding of mainte

nance and cure on the pretext that the seaman had been fired for

cause).

Cite as: 557 U. S. ____ (2009) 13

Opinion of the Court

the continued existence of the common-law cause of action

providing recovery for the delayed or improper provision of

maintenance and cure. Petitioners do not deny the avail

ability of punitive damages in general maritime law, or

identify any cases establishing that such damages were

historically unavailable for breach of the duty of mainte

nance and cure. The plain language of the Jones Act,

then, does not provide the punitive damages bar that

petitioners seek.

B

Petitioners nonetheless argue that the availability of

punitive damages in this case is controlled by the Jones

Act because of this Court’s decision in Miles, 498 U. S. 19;

see also post, at 5–6 (opinion of ALITO, J.). In Miles, peti

tioners argue, the Court limited recovery in maritime

cases involving death or personal injury to the remedies

available under the Jones Act and the Death on the High

Seas Act (DOHSA), 46 U. S. C. §§30301–30306.6 Petition

ers’ reading of Miles is far too broad.

Miles does not address either maintenance and cure

actions in general or the availability of punitive damages

for such actions. The decision instead grapples with the

entirely different question whether general maritime law

should provide a cause of action for wrongful death based

on unseaworthiness. By providing a remedy for wrongful

death suffered on the high seas or in territorial waters, the

Jones Act and DOHSA displaced a general maritime rule

that denied any recovery for wrongful death. See Miles,

498 U. S., at 23–34. This Court, therefore, was called

upon in Miles to decide whether these new statutes sup

ported an expansion of the relief available under pre

——————

6 DOHSA applies only to individuals killed (not merely injured) by

conduct on the high seas. See 46 U. S. C. §30302. Because this case

involves injuries to a seaman, and not death on the high seas, DOHSA

is not relevant.

14 ATLANTIC SOUNDING CO. v. TOWNSEND

Opinion of the Court

existing general maritime law to harmonize it with a

cause of action created by statute.

The Court in Miles first concluded that the “unanimous

legislative judgment behind the Jones Act, DOHSA, and

the many state statutes” authorizing maritime wrongful

death actions, supported the recognition of a general

maritime action for wrongful death of a seaman. Id., at 24

(discussing Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U. S.

375 (1970), which overruled The Harrisburg, 119 U. S. 199

(1886)). Congress had chosen to limit, however, the dam

ages available for wrongful-death actions under the Jones

Act and DOHSA, such that damages were not statutorily

available for loss of society or lost future earnings. See

Miles, 498 U. S., at 21, 31–32. The Court thus concluded

that Congress’ judgment must control the availability of

remedies for wrongful-death actions brought under gen

eral maritime law, id., at 32–36.

The reasoning of Miles remains sound. As the Court in

that case explained, “[w]e no longer live in an era when

seamen and their loved ones must look primarily to the

courts as a source of substantive legal protection from

injury and death; Congress and the States have legislated

extensively in these areas.” Id., at 27. Furthermore, it

was only because of congressional action that a general

federal cause of action for wrongful death on the high seas

and in territorial waters even existed; until then, there

was no general common-law doctrine providing for such an

action. As a result, to determine the remedies available

under the common-law wrongful-death action, “an admi

ralty court should look primarily to these legislative en

actments for policy guidance.” Ibid. It would have been

illegitimate to create common-law remedies that exceeded

those remedies statutorily available under the Jones Act

and DOHSA. See id., at 36 (“We will not create, under our

admiralty powers, a remedy . . . that goes well beyond the

limits of Congress’ ordered system of recovery for seamen’s

Cite as: 557 U. S. ____ (2009) 15

Opinion of the Court

injury and death”).

But application of that principle here does not lead to

the outcome suggested by petitioners or the dissent. See

post, at 2–3. Unlike the situation presented in Miles, both

the general maritime cause of action (maintenance and

cure) and the remedy (punitive damages) were well estab

lished before the passage of the Jones Act. See supra, at

3–8. Also unlike the facts presented by Miles, the Jones

Act does not address maintenance and cure or its remedy.7

It is therefore possible to adhere to the traditional under

standing of maritime actions and remedies without

abridging or violating the Jones Act; unlike wrongful

death actions, this traditional understanding is not a

matter to which “Congress has spoken directly.” See

Miles, supra, at 31 (citing Mobil Oil Corp. v.

Higginbotham, 436 U. S. 618, 625 (1978)). Indeed, the

Miles Court itself acknowledged that “[t]he Jones Act

evinces no general hostility to recovery under maritime

law,” 498 U. S., at 29, and noted that statutory remedy

limitations “would not necessarily deter us, if recovery . . .

were more consistent with the general principles of mari

time tort law.” Id., at 35. The availability of punitive

damages for maintenance and cure actions is entirely

faithful to these “general principles of maritime tort law,”

and no statute casts doubt on their availability under

general maritime law.

Moreover, petitioners’ contention that Miles precludes

any action or remedy for personal injury beyond that made

available under the Jones Act was directly rejected by this

Court in Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp. v. Garris,

532 U. S. 811, 818 (2001). That case involved the death of

——————

7 Respondent’s claim is not affected by the statutory amendments to

the Jones Act that limit maintenance and cure recovery in cases involv

ing foreign workers on offshore oil and mineral production facilities, see

46 U. S. C. §30105, or sailing school students and instructors, §50504.

See supra, at 11.

16 ATLANTIC SOUNDING CO. v. TOWNSEND

Opinion of the Court

a harbor worker. Ibid. There, the Court recognized a

maritime cause of action for wrongful death attributable

to negligence although neither the Jones Act (which ap

plies only to seamen) nor DOHSA (which does not cover

territorial waters) provided such a remedy. Id., at 817–

818. The Court acknowledged that “it will be the better

course, in many cases that assert new claims beyond what

those statutes have seen fit to allow, to leave further

development to Congress.” Id., at 820. But the Court

concluded that the cause of action at issue there was “new

only in the most technical sense” because “[t]he general

maritime law has recognized the tort of negligence for

more than a century, and it has been clear since Moragne

that breaches of a maritime duty are actionable when they

cause death, as when they cause injury.” Ibid. The Court

thus found that “Congress’s occupation of this field is not

yet so extensive as to preclude us from recognizing what is

already logically compelled by our precedents.” Ibid.

Because Miles presented no barrier to this endorsement

of a previously unrecognized maritime cause of action for

negligent wrongful death, we see no legitimate basis for a

contrary conclusion in the present case. Like negligence,

“[t]he general maritime law has recognized . . . for more

than a century” the duty of maintenance and cure and the

general availability of punitive damages. See Garris,

supra, at 820; see also supra, at 3–8. And because respon

dent does not ask this Court to alter statutory text or

“expand” the general principles of maritime tort law, Miles

does not require us to eliminate the general maritime

remedy of punitive damages for the willful or wanton

failure to comply with the duty to pay maintenance and

cure. “We assume that Congress is aware of existing law

when it passes legislation,” Miles, supra, at 32, and the

available history suggests that punitive damages were an

established part of the maritime law in 1920, see supra, at

Cite as: 557 U. S. ____ (2009) 17

Opinion of the Court

5–8.8

It remains true, of course, that “[a]dmiralty is not cre

ated in a vacuum; legislation has always served as an

important source of both common law and admiralty

principles.” Miles, supra, at 24. And it also is true that

the negligent denial of maintenance and cure may also be

the subject of a Jones Act claim. See Cortes v. Baltimore

Insular Line, Inc., 287 U. S. 367 (1932).9 But the fact that

seamen commonly seek to recover under the Jones Act for

the wrongful withholding of maintenance and cure does

not mean that the Jones Act provides the only remedy for

maintenance and cure claims. Indeed, contrary to peti

tioners’ view that the Jones Act replaced in their entirety

the remedies available at common law for maintenance

and cure, the Cortes decision explicitly acknowledged a

seaman’s right to choose among overlapping statutory and

common-law remedies for injuries sustained by the denial

of maintenance and cure. See 287 U. S., at 374–375 (A

seaman’s “cause of action for personal injury created by

the statute may have overlapped his cause of action for

breach of the maritime duty of maintenance and cure . . . .

In such circumstances it was his privilege, in so far as the

causes of action covered the same ground, to sue indiffer

——————

8 In light of the Court’s decision in Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock

Corp. v. Garris, 532 U. S. 811, 818 (2001), our reading of Miles cannot,

as the dissent contends, represent an “abrup[t]” change of course. See

post, at 1.

9 For those maintenance and cure claims that do not involve personal

injury (and thus cannot be asserted under the Jones Act), the dissent

argues that punitive damages should be barred because such claims are

based in contract, not tort. See post, at 8. But the right of maintenance

and cure “was firmly established in the maritime law long before

recognition of the distinction between tort and contract.” O’Donnell v.

Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 318 U. S. 36, 42 (1943). Although the

right has been described as incident to contract, it cannot be modified

or waived. See Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, Inc., 287 U. S. 367,

372 (1932).

18 ATLANTIC SOUNDING CO. v. TOWNSEND

Opinion of the Court

ently on any one of them”).10

As this Court has repeatedly explained, “remedies for

negligence, unseaworthiness, and maintenance and cure

have different origins and may on occasion call for applica

tion of slightly different principles and procedures.” Fitz

gerald v. United States Lines Co., 374 U. S. 16, 18 (1963);

see also Peterson, 278 U. S., at 138, 139 (emphasizing that

a seaman’s action for maintenance and cure is “independ

ent” and “cumulative” from other claims such as negli

gence and that the maintenance and cure right is “in no

sense inconsistent with, or an alternative of, the right to

recover compensatory damages [under the Jones Act]”).

See also Gilmore & Black §6–23, at 342 (“It is unques

tioned law that both the Jones Act and the unseaworthi

ness remedies are additional to maintenance and cure: the

seaman may have maintenance and cure and also one of

the other two”). The laudable quest for uniformity in

admiralty does not require the narrowing of available

damages to the lowest common denominator approved by

Congress for distinct causes of action.11 Although “ Con

——————

10 The fact that, in some cases, a violation of the duty of maintenance

and cure may also give rise to a Jones Act claim, see post, at 3 (opinion

of ALITO, J.), is significant only in that it requires admiralty courts to

ensure against double recovery. See Fitzgerald v. United States Lines

Co., 374 U. S. 16, 18–19 (1963) (authorizing a jury trial when a mainte

nance and cure claim is joined with a Jones Act claim because,

“[r]equiring a seaman to split up his lawsuit, submitting part of it to a

jury and part to a judge . . . can easily result in too much or too little

recovery”). Thus, a court may take steps to ensure that any award of

damages for lost wages in a Jones Act negligence claim is offset by the

amount of lost wages awarded as part of a recovery of maintenance and

cure. See, e.g., Petition of Oskar Tiedemann & Co., 367 F. 2d 498, 505,

n. 6 (CA3 1966); Crooks v. United States, 459 F. 2d 631, 633 (CA9

1972).

11 Although this Court has recognized that it may change maritime

law in its operation as an admiralty court, see Edmonds v. Compagnie

Generale Transatlantique, 443 U. S. 256, 271 (1979), petitioners have

not asked the Court to do so in this case or pointed to any serious

Cite as: 557 U. S. ____ (2009) 19

Opinion of the Court

gress . . . is free to say this much and no more,” Miles, 498

U. S., at 24 (internal quotation marks omitted), we will

not attribute words to Congress that it has not written.

IV

Because punitive damages have long been an accepted

remedy under general maritime law, and because nothing

in the Jones Act altered this understanding, such damages

for the willful and wanton disregard of the maintenance

and cure obligation should remain available in the appro

priate case as a matter of general maritime law.12 Limit

ing recovery for maintenance and cure to whatever is

permitted by the Jones Act would give greater pre-emptive

effect to the Act than is required by its text, Miles, or any

of this Court’s other decisions interpreting the statute.

For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Court of

Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

——————

anomalies, with respect to the Jones Act or otherwise, that our holding

may create. Nor have petitioners argued that the size of punitive

damages awards in maintenance and cure cases necessitates a recovery

cap, which the Court has elsewhere imposed. See Exxon Shipping Co.

v. Baker, 554 U. S. ___, ___ (2008) (slip op., at 42) (imposing a punitive

to-compensatory ratio of 1:1). We do not decide these issues.

12 Because we hold that Miles does not render the Jones Act’s dam

ages provision determinative of respondent’s remedies, we do not

address the dissent’s argument that the Jones Act, by incorporating the

provisions of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, see 46 U. S. C.

§30104(a), prohibits the recovery of punitive damages in actions under

that statute. See post, at 3–5.

Cite as: 557 U. S. ____ (2009) 1

ALITO, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 08–214

_________________

ATLANTIC SOUNDING CO., INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS

v. EDGAR L. TOWNSEND

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

[June 25, 2009]

JUSTICE ALITO, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE

SCALIA, and JUSTICE KENNEDY join, dissenting.

In Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U. S. 19 (1990), this

Court provided a workable framework for analyzing the

relief available on claims under general maritime law.

Today, the Court abruptly changes course. I would apply

the analytical framework adopted in Miles, and I therefore

respectfully dissent.

I

In order to understand our decision in Miles, it is neces

sary to appreciate the nature of the authority that the

Miles Court was exercising. The Constitution, by extend

ing the judicial power of the United States to admiralty

and maritime cases, impliedly empowered this Court to

continue the development of maritime law “in the manner

of a common law court.” Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554

U. S. ___, ___ (2008) (slip op., at 16); see also Romero v.

International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U. S. 354, 360–

361 (1959). In Miles, this Court explained how that au

thority should be exercised in an era in which statutory

law has become dominant.

2 ATLANTIC SOUNDING CO. v. TOWNSEND

ALITO, J., dissenting

Miles presented two questions regarding the scope of

relief permitted under general maritime law, the first of

which was whether damages for loss of society may be

recovered on a general maritime law wrongful-death

claim. In order to answer this question, the Court looked

to the Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U. S. C. §30301

et seq., and the Jones Act 46 U. S. C. §30101 et seq., both of

which created new statutory wrongful-death claims.

Because the relief available on these statutory claims does

not include damages for loss of society, the Court con

cluded that it should not permit such damages on a wrong

ful-death claim brought under general maritime law. The

Court explained:

“We no longer live in an era when seamen and their

loved ones must look primarily to the courts as a

source of substantive legal protection from injury and

death; Congress and the States have legislated exten

sively in these areas. In this era, an admiralty court

should look primarily to these legislative enactments

for policy guidance.” 498 U. S., at 27 (emphasis

added).

The Court took a similar approach in answering the

second question in Miles—whether damages for loss of

future income should be available in a general maritime

law survival action. The Court noted that “[t]here are

indeed strong policy arguments for allowing such recov

ery” and that “admiralty courts have always shown a

special solicitude for the welfare of seamen and their

families.” Id., at 35–36. But because the Jones Act sur

vival provision “limits recovery to losses suffered during

the decedent’s lifetime,” the Court held that a similar

limitation should apply under general maritime law. Id.,

at 36.

Miles thus instructs that, in exercising our authority to

develop general maritime law, we should be guided pri

Cite as: 557 U. S. ____ (2009) 3

ALITO, J., dissenting

marily by the policy choices reflected in statutes creating

closely related claims. Endorsing what has been termed a

principle of uniformity, Miles teaches that if a form of

relief is not available on a statutory claim, we should be

reluctant to permit such relief on a similar claim brought

under general maritime law.

II

A

The type of maintenance and cure claim that is most

likely to include a request for punitive damages is a claim

that a seaman suffered personal injury as a result of the

willful refusal to provide maintenance and cure. Such a

claim may be brought under general maritime law. See

Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, Inc., 287 U. S. 367, 374

(1932) (recognizing that a seaman may sue under general

maritime law to recover for personal injury resulting from

the denial of maintenance and cure). And a similar claim

may also be maintained under the Jones Act. See, e.g.,

Guevara v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 59 F. 3d 1496, 1499–

1500 (CA5 1995) (en banc); G. Gilmore & C. Black, Law of

Admiralty §6–13, p. 311 (2d ed. 1975). To be sure, a sea

man asserting a Jones Act claim must show that his em

ployer was negligent, ibid., while a seaman proceeding

under general maritime law may recover compensatory

damages without establishing fault, id., at 310. But be

cause the prevailing rule in American courts does not

permit punitive damages without a showing of fault, see

Exxon Shipping, supra, at 16, n. 2, it appears that any

personal injury maintenance and cure claim in which

punitive damages might be awarded could be brought

equally under either general maritime law or the Jones

Act. The Miles uniformity therefore weighs strongly in

favor of a rule that applies uniformly under general mari

time law and the Jones Act. I therefore turn to the ques

tion whether punitive damages may be awarded under the

4 ATLANTIC SOUNDING CO. v. TOWNSEND

ALITO, J., dissenting

Jones Act.

B

Enacted in 1920, the Jones Act, 46 U. S. C. §§30104–

30105(b), makes applicable to seamen the substantive

recovery provisions of the Federal Employers Liability Act

(FELA), 45 U. S. C. §51 et seq., which became law in 1908.

FELA, in turn, “recites only that employers shall be liable

in ‘damages’ for the injury or death of one protected under

the Act.” Miles, supra, at 32 (citing 45 U. S. C. §51).

Prior to the enactment of the Jones Act, however, this

Court had decided several cases that explored the dam

ages allowed under FELA. In Michigan Central R. Co. v.

Vreeland, 227 U. S. 59 (1913), the Court dealt primarily

with the damages that may be recovered under FELA’s

wrongful-death provision, but the Court also discussed the

damages available in the case of injury. The Court noted

that if the worker in that case had not died from his inju

ries, “he might have recovered such damages as would

have compensated him for his expense, loss of time, suffer

ing and diminished earning power.” Id., at 65. Two years

later, in St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Craft, 237 U. S. 648

(1915), the Court reiterated that an injured worker may

recover only compensatory damages. Addressing the

damages available to a party bringing a survival claim,

the Court explained that the party may recover only those

damages that had accrued to the worker at the time of his

death and was thus limited to “such damages as will be

reasonably compensatory for the loss and suffering of the

injured person while he lived.” Id., at 658. See also ibid.

(damages “confined to the [the worker’s] personal loss and

suffering before he died”); Miller v. American President

Lines, Ltd., 989 F. 2d 1450, 1457 (CA6), cert. denied, 510

U. S. 915 (1993) (“It has been the unanimous judgment of

the courts since before the enactment of the Jones Act that

punitive damages are not recoverable under [FELA]).”

Cite as: 557 U. S. ____ (2009) 5

ALITO, J., dissenting

When Congress incorporated FELA unaltered into the

Jones Act, Congress must have intended to incorporate

FELA’s limitation on damages as well. Miles, 498 U. S., at

32. “We assume that Congress is aware of existing law

when it passes legislation.” Ibid. (citing Cannon v. Uni

versity of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 696–697 (1979)). It is

therefore reasonable to assume that only compensatory

damages may be recovered under the Jones Act. See

Pacific S. S. Co. v. Peterson, 278 U. S. 130, 136–.139

(1928) (under the Jones Act, a seaman may “recover com

pensatory damages for injuries caused by the negligence”).

And under Miles’ reasoning—at least in the absence of

some exceptionally strong countervailing considerations—

the rule should be the same when a seaman sues under

general maritime law for personal injury resulting from

the denial of maintenance and cure.

III

In reaching the opposite conclusion, the Court reasons

that: punitive damages were available on maintenance

and cure claims prior to the enactment of the Jones Act

and that the Jones Act was not intended to trim the relief

available on such general maritime law claims. This

reasoning is flawed.

A

First, the Court proceeds as if the question here were

whether the Jones Act was meant to preclude general

maritime law claims and remedies. See ante, at 9–10

(Jones Act does not “overtur[n]” or “eliminate pre-existing

remedies available to seamen”); ante, at 11 (Jones Act

“preserves common-law causes of action”); ante, at 15

(Miles does not “preclud[e]” all claims and remedies be

yond that made available under the Jones Act). Miles

explicitly rejected that argument. See 498 U. S., at 29.

But just because the Jones Act was not meant to preclude

6 ATLANTIC SOUNDING CO. v. TOWNSEND

ALITO, J., dissenting

general maritime claims or remedies, it does not follow

that the Jones Act was meant to stop the development of

general maritime law by the courts. The Jones Act is

significant because it created a statutory claim that is

indistinguishable for present purposes from a general

maritime law maintenance and cure claim based on per

sonal injury and because this statutory claim does not

permit the recovery of punitive damages. “Congress, in

the exercise of its legislative powers, is free to say ‘this

much and no more,’ ” and “an admiralty court should look

primarily to these legislative enactments for policy guid

ance.” Miles, supra, at 24, 27. This policy embodied in the

Jones Act thus constitutes a powerful argument in favor of

the development of a similar rule under general maritime

law.

B

That brings me to the Court’s claim that the availability

of punitive damages was established before the Jones Act

was passed. If punitive damages were a widely recognized

and regularly employed feature of maintenance and cure

claims during the pre-Jones Act era, I would not rule out

the possibility that this history might be sufficient to

outweigh the Miles uniformity principle. But a search for

cases in which punitive damages were awarded for the

willful denial of maintenance of cure—in an era when

seamen were often treated with shocking callousness—

yields very little. Although American courts have enter

tained maintenance and cure suits since the early 19th

century, the Court points to only two reported cases—The

City of Carlisle, 39 F. 807 (DC Ore. 1889), and The Troop,

118 F. 769 (DC Wash. 1902)—that, as the Court carefully

puts it, “appear to contain at least some punitive element.”

Ante, at 8.

The Court’s choice of words is well advised, for it is not

even clear that punitive damages were recovered in these

Cite as: 557 U. S. ____ (2009) 7

ALITO, J., dissenting

two obscure cases. In The City of Carlisle, a 16-year-old

apprentice suffered a fractured skull. The captain refused

to put ashore. Given little care, the apprentice spent the

next six or seven weeks in his bunk, wracked with pain,

and was then compelled to work 12 hours a day for the

remaining three months of the voyage. Upon landing, the

captain made no arrangements for care and did not pay for

the apprentice’s brain surgery. The apprentice received

an award of $1,000; that may include some “punitive

element,” but it seems likely that much if not all of that

sum represented compensation for the apprentice’s

months of agony and the lingering effects of his injury.

The Court’s second case, The Troop, supra, involved

similarly brutal treatment. The seaman fell from a mast

and fractured an arm and a leg while his ship was six

miles from its port of departure. Refusing to return to

port, the captain subjected the seaman to maltreatment

for the remainder of the 36-day voyage. As a result, he

was required to undergo painful surgery, and his injuries

permanently prevented him from returning to work as a

mariner. He received an undifferentiated award of $4,000,

and while the court was sharply critical of the captain’s

conduct, it is far from clear that the award did not consist

entirely of compensatory damages for medical expenses,

lost future income, and pain and suffering.

In addition to the two cases cited by the Court, respon

dent and an amicus claim that punitive damages were

awarded in a few additional cases. See Brief for Respon

dent 13; Brief for Amicus Curiae American Assn. of Jus

tice as Amicus Curiae 10–11. Of these cases, The Mar

gharita, 140 F. 820 (CA5 1905), is perhaps the most

supportive. There, the court explained that its award of

$1,500 would not only “compensate the seaman for his

unnecessary and unmerited suffering” but would “empha

size the importance of humane and correct judgment

under the circumstances on the part of the master.” Id., at

8 ATLANTIC SOUNDING CO. v. TOWNSEND

ALITO, J., dissenting

827. While the court’s reference to the message that the

award embodied suggests that the award was in part

punitive, it is also possible that the reference simply rep

resented a restatement of one of the traditional rationales

for maintenance and cure, i.e., that it served the economic

interests of shipowners and the general interests of the

country by making service as a seaman more attractive.

See Harden v. Gordon, 11 F. Cas. 480, 485 (No. 6,047) (CC

Me. 1823).

The remaining cases contain harsh criticism of the

seamen’s treatment but do not identify any portion of the

award as punitive. See The Rolph, 293 F. 269 (ND Cal.

1923), aff’d, 299 F. 52 (CA9 1924) (undifferentiated award

of $10,000 for a seaman rendered blind in both eyes);

Tomlinson v. Hewett, 24 F. Cas. 29, 32 (No. 14,087) (DC

Cal. 1872).

In sum, the search for maintenance and cure cases in

which punitive damages were awarded yields strikingly

slim results. The cases found are insufficient in number,

clarity, and prominence to justify departure from the Miles

uniformity principle.

IV

There is one remaining question in this case, namely,

whether punitive damages are permitted when a seaman

asserts a general maritime law maintenance and cure

claim that is not based on personal injury. In Cortes, 287

U. S., at 371, the Court explained that the duty to furnish

maintenance and cure “is one annexed to the employment.

. . . Contractual it is in the sense that it has its source in a

relation which is contractual in origin, but, given the

relation, no agreement is competent to abrogate the inci

dent.” The duty is thus essentially quasicontractual, and

therefore, in those instances in which the seaman does not

suffer personal injury, recovery should be governed by the

law of quasi-contract. See Restatement (Second) of Con

Cite as: 557 U. S. ____ (2009) 9

ALITO, J., dissenting

tracts §§4b, 12f (1979); Restatement of Restitution §§113–

114 (1936); 1 D. Dobbs, Law of Remedies §4.2(3), pp 580

(2d ed. 1993). Thus, an award of punitive damages is not

appropriate. See also Guevara, 59 F. 3d, at 1513.

* * *

For these reasons, I would hold that punitive damages

are not available in a case such as this, and I would there

fore reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.