The opinion
In the Court of Criminal Appeals of
Texas
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No. WR-96,666-01
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EX PARTE DELFINO ALEJANDREZ, Applicant
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On Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus
In Cause No. 916298-A
In the 339th District Court
Harris County
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YEARY, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which FINLEY and
PARKER, JJ., joined.
Twenty-two years after the judgment of the trial court in this
case, and eight years after he completed his sentence, Applicant seeks
the assistance of the writ of habeas corpus from this Court. Specifically,
he hopes to secure relief from his sentence in this case on the ground
that his trial attorney provided constitutionally ineffective assistance.
He seeks the aid of this Court in the hope of mitigating his impending
ALEJANDREZ – 2
punishment in a more recent criminal case brought against him in
federal court.
The equities do not favor Applicant’s request. His application for
habeas relief should be denied under the doctrine of laches. Because the
Court, instead, grants him relief, I respectfully dissent.
I. BACKGROUND
On July 11, 2002, Applicant was found guilty of aggravated
robbery by a jury. At trial, Applicant submitted a motion for probation
and a sworn application for community supervision. He also sought to
be sentenced by the trial court instead of by the jury. Applicant now
claims to have waived jury punishment in this case based on his trial
counsel’s erroneous belief that a judge could grant probation or
community supervision.1 At the punishment phase, the trial judge
sentenced Applicant to a term of confinement for sixteen years.
Applicant timely pursued a direct appeal. Alejandres v. State, No.
01-02-01029-CR, 2004 WL 36772 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
Jan. 8, 2004, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). The
court of appeals overruled his single point of error, complaining about
the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence. It then affirmed the
judgment of the trial court. Id. at *5.
1
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 42.12, repealed by, Acts 2015, 84th Leg., ch.
770 (H.B. 2299), § 3.01, effective January 1, 2017.
ALEJANDREZ – 3
Now, all these years later, and after his sentence of imprisonment
in this case has discharged, Applicant is seeking habeas relief from this
Court. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 11.07. In an unrelated and more
recent federal criminal case filed against him, Applicant has now
received a federal presentencing investigation report that revealed it
was legally impermissible for the trial judge who sentenced him in this
case to have placed him on probation or community supervision in
2002. 2 Applicant is not complaining about the process that led to his
judgment of guilt in this case. He seeks only a new opportunity to face
punishment from a jury instead of the trial court judge.
Applicant has apparently become concerned about his sentence
only now that he has learned that his 2002 sentence that has already
discharged will result in his receiving three points added for purposes
of sentencing in the more recent criminal case brought against him in
federal court.3 Applicant seeks our aid in attempting to create a more
2
A Presentencing Report follows an investigation and summarizes
information such as criminal history, social history, and applicable Federal
Sentencing Guidelines. UNITED STATES COURTS, Presentencing Investigations, THE
PRESENTENCE REPORT, https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-
courts/probation-and-pretrial-services/presentence-investigations (last visited
September 1, 2026); see 18 U.S. Code § 3552.
3
Three points are added for each prior sentence of imprisonment exceeding
one year and one month (13 months). 8 USCS Appx § 4A1.1(a). Had Applicant
received probation or community supervision, he would not have received the three
points for purposes of federal sentencing.
ALEJANDREZ – 4
favorable set of circumstances in which to face sentencing in his new
federal case. But he has waited a very long time to do so, and the
circumstances have now changed in ways that have compromised the
State’s ability to obtain a just punishment in this case.
II. LACHES BARS RELIEF
In the past, we have found it appropriate to apply the doctrine of
laches in the post-conviction context because “equity aids the diligent
and not those who slumber on their rights.” Ex parte Moreno, 245
S.W.3d 419, 428–29 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); see Ex parte Carrio, 992
S.W.2d 486, 487 n.2 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). When determining
whether to apply laches to a particular case, factors such as the length
of the applicant’s delay in filing the application, the reasons for the
delay, and the degree and type of prejudice resulting from the delay are
relevant. Dragoo v. State, 96 S.W.3d 308, 314 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
Because we are determining whether fairness and equity weigh in favor
of granting relief, no single factor is dispositive. Id.
This Court has adopted a “sliding scale” approach when
weighing delay against prejudice suffered by the State. Ex parte Perez,
398 S.W.3d 206, 218 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). This means the longer an
applicant delays in filing his habeas corpus application, the less evidence
the State must put forth to demonstrate that it has been prejudiced. Id.
A. Unreasonable Delay
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The doctrine of laches becomes relevant when an application for
writ of habeas corpus is filed five or more years after judgment is
entered in a criminal case. Perez, 398 S.W.3d at 216 & n.12 (generally
accepting that an unexplained five-year delay will usually be considered
unreasonable). This is because applicants have a duty to pursue their
claims with diligence. Id. at 217.
Applicant argues that laches should not prevent his twenty-two-
year late application because he only recently discovered the ineffective
assistance of his counsel in his 2002 trial. He argues that his prompt
filing of the writ upon discovery makes laches inapplicable. However,
this Court has, in other cases, determined that delays of durations
similar to Applicant’s were unreasonable. Ex parte Hill, 711 S.W.3d 221,
225 (Tex. Crim. App. 2025) (holding that laches applied in a twenty-
three-year delay); Ex parte Wells, 730 S.W.3d 419 (Tex. Crim. App.
2026) (holding that laches applied for an unexplained fourteen-year
delay).
Applicant also does not present a reasonable excuse for his delay.
There is nothing in the record to indicate, nor did the trial court find,
that Applicant could not have pursued this claim earlier had he more
timely examined the record. Applicant has already completed serving
his original sentence in this case. And the circumstances affecting the
State’s ability to seek a just sentence in this case have changed
dramatically.
ALEJANDREZ – 6
Applicant’s delay is not automatically justified by the fact that his
trial counsel’s error was only made known to him after the federal
government prepared a presentencing investigation report in a more
recent criminal case. Neither does Applicant make any good argument
or cite any compelling authority as to why we should ignore his lack of
diligence in pursuing post-conviction relief.
B. Prejudice to the State
Applying the sliding-scale approach, it is clear to me that the
State’s prejudice weighs in favor of denying Applicant’s writ
application. The longer the delay of an applicant in filing a writ, the less
prejudice the State must show. Since Applicant waited twenty-two
years to apply for a writ, the State’s burden to show prejudice is low.
See Hill, 711 S.W.3d at 225 (explaining that a twenty-three-year delay
resulted in the State’s burden of prejudice being low).
Based on the record in this case, the State meets its burden. The
complainant in this case is incarcerated in another state and is
potentially unavailable to testify. The State argues that the
complainant’s incarceration could impact the jury’s perception of his
credibility. Also, the State is concerned that the new jury’s perceptions
of the crime and the victim would not be the same as they were over
twenty years ago, as the complainant is no longer a young teen.
Furthermore, other witnesses have been impacted by the passage of
time. One of the eyewitnesses is now deceased. The investigator, who
ALEJANDREZ – 7
originally interviewed the complainant after he was shot by Applicant,
has not been located by the State.
While it is true, as the trial court stated in its findings, that the
State has access to the transcripts of the witnesses’ previous testimony,
transcripts are not the same as in-person testimony given directly by
witnesses. As observed in another case, the availability of transcripts
does not eliminate all prejudice suffered by the State. Wells, 730 S.W.3d
at 421 (Parker, J., concurring). This is because a jury will not be able to
observe a witness’s demeanor and tone. Id. at 422.
Finally, there is an increased chance that anyone called upon to
impose a new sentence against Applicant now, at least twenty-two years
after the crime and judgment of guilt in this case, will consider
probation to be a more reasonable option than they may have believed
nearer in time to the crime and his trial. This risk, due to Applicant’s
long-time delay, is not insubstantial. Even if the sentencer is not made
aware of the full sentence of incarceration that Applicant has already
served for his crime in this case, there may be a tendency in any new
sentencer to think that, if no sentence has been imposed for the crime
until now, there might be little risk in granting him probation.
C. Interest in Finality
The State also has a legitimate interest in finality. Perez, 398
S.W.3d at 208. This is especially true in cases like this where an
applicant is seeking to undo a sentence only to leverage a potentially
ALEJANDREZ – 8
new sentencing outcome in his case against his yet-to-be-determined
sentence in a new criminal case pending against him. Hill, 711 S.W.3d
at 226–27. Here, Applicant has completed his sentence and only now
pursues a remedy because he faces heightened punishment from the
federal government in a more recent criminal case. In these
circumstances, equity does not favor Applicant’s late request for relief.
III. CONCLUSION
Laches is an equitable doctrine that exists to prevent individuals
from sleeping on their rights, to prevent prejudice to a party, and to
encourage finality. An applicant should not be permitted to sleep on his
rights for years and years and then ask this Court to allow him to
relitigate an issue—in this case fully two-decades later—once time
fades the memory of witnesses and creates the potential for a new
sentencer to draw a conclusion that Applicant presents no risks if
probation is granted.4 The doctrine of laches should bar the application
for writ of habeas corpus relief in this case.
4
When adopting the doctrine of laches in Carrio, we reasoned that when
“claims are asserted after the passage of many years, attorneys for the defendant …
[have] little or no recollection about what took place[.]” 992 S.W.2d at 487. Here,
trial counsel for Applicant explained while testifying as a witness at the habeas
hearing that he does not have any independent recollection of the trial, trial strategy,
or client.
ALEJANDREZ – 9
The Court should deny relief. Because it refuses to do so and instead
grants Applicant the relief he requests where equity clearly favors
denial, I respectfully dissent.
FILED: September 3, 2026
PUBLISH