Mary Ann Moreno, Plaintiff: v. Circle K Stores, Inc. Defendant:

1

2026 CO 46

Mary Ann Moreno , Plaintiff : v. Circle K Stores, Inc. Defendant :

No. 25SA134

Supreme Court of Colorado , En Banc

June 15, 2026

Certification of Question of Law United States District Court

for the District of Colorado Case No. 22-cv-02327-NYW-STV

Attorneys for Plaintiff : Rathod Mohamedbhai LLC Virginia Hill

Butler Iris Halpern Matthew Cron Denver , Colorado

Attorneys for Defendant : Littler Mendelson, P.C. Thomas W.

Carroll Nicholas Hankins Denver , Colorado

JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER delivered the Opinion of the Court , in

which JUSTICE BOATRIGHT , JUSTICE GABRIEL , JUSTICE SAMOUR , and

JUSTICE BLANCO joined . CHIEF JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ , joined

by JUSTICE HOOD dissented.

Certified

Question Answered

OPINION

BERKENKOTTER JUSTICE

¶1

Seventy-two-year-old Mary Ann Moreno ( " Moreno " )

sued her employer, Circle K Stores, Inc. ( " Circle

K " ) , for wrongful termination. She asserted that she was

fired for lawfully exercising her right to self-defense after

she was cornered by an armed robber during one of her shifts

and that her termination violated Colorado public policy. We

accepted jurisdiction under C.A.R. 21.1 to answer the

following question of law certified to us by the United

States District Court for the District of Colorado :

Does Colorado law recognize a public-policy exception to the

at-will employment doctrine that allows an employee to bring

a wrongful termination claim in the event the employee is

terminated for actions taken in self-defense?

¶2

This court first recognized a public-policy exception to the

at-will employment doctrine in Martin Marietta Corp. v.

Lorenz , 823 P.2d 100, 109 ( Colo. 1992 ) . There, we

identified a number of circumstances under which an at-will

employee may bring a claim for wrongful discharge: if the

employee was terminated for (1) refusing to engage in an

illegal act, (2) performing a public duty, or (3) exercising

an important job-related right or privilege. Id. To

serve as the basis for such a claim, the right must be

clearly expressed, sufficiently public, and granted to

workers. Id. ; Crawford Rehab. Servs., Inc. v.

Weissman , 938 P.2d 540, 552 ( Colo. 1997 ) ( citing

Rocky Mountain Hosp. &Med. Serv. v. Mariani , 916

P.2d 519, 525 ( Colo. 1996 ) ) .

¶3

We have previously recognized, however, that

"public-policy wrongful discharge is not subject to

precise definition," Weissman , 938 P.2d at 552 ,

and that the exception is rooted in the long-standing rule

that "a contract violative of public policy should not

be enforced," Martin Marietta , 823 P.2d at 108

( citing Russell v. Courier Printing &Publ'g

Co. , 95 P. 936 , 938 ( Colo. 1908 ) ) . Based on that

long-standing rule, we have concluded that it is

"axiomatic that a contractual condition, such as the

terminability condition of an at-will employment contract,

should also be deemed unenforceable when violative of public

policy." Id. at 109 .

¶4

This case requires us to decide if the right to self-defense,

established either by section 18-1-704, C.R.S. (2025)

( " section 704 " ) , or by article II, section 3 of the

Colorado Constitution ( " article II, section 3 " ) ,

meets the test we articulated in Martin Marietta . In

answering the certified question, we first determine that

both the statute and the constitutional provision clearly

express the boundaries and extent of the right to

self-defense based on their explicit language and the

extensive and well-defined body of case law regarding

self-defense. Next, we decide that the right to self-defense

is inherently a public right, rather than an individual

proprietary right, because it is an essential, inalienable

right guaranteed to all people . Finally, we conclude that the

right to self-defense, as expressed by both the statute and

the constitutional provision, is a right that is job-related

insofar as

the need to exercise the right to defend oneself from an

unprovoked attack can occur anywhere, including at work.

¶5

While we conclude that this is a right granted to all people

that is not left at the door simply because a person enters

the workplace, we emphasize that the scope of the exception

that we recognize today is narrow. It is limited,

importantly, to self-defense as an essential, inalienable

right. And, critically, the exception applies only when an

employee lawfully exercises the right in response to an

unprovoked attack at work.

¶6

It is also important to understand what this case is not

about. The certified question asks us only to answer if an

exception exists. We are not called on to decide whether

Circle K's policy bars its employees from acting in

self-defense—as Moreno claims—or whether the

policy simply prohibits employees from confronting

shoplifters—as Circle K claims. We also need not decide

if Moreno acted in self-defense or if Circle K fired Moreno

for defending herself. We offer no opinion on any of those

matters.

¶7

Instead, we answer only the certified question. For the

reasons detailed below, we answer the question in the

affirmative and return this case to the district court for

further proceedings.

I.

Facts and Procedural History [1]

¶8

Moreno was working at Circle K one evening when Tyler Wimmer

approached the register holding several items, including two

hunting knives. He placed the knives on the U-shaped counter

that separated him from Moreno. After Wimmer told Moreno to

get him a pack of cigarettes, Moreno asked what brand he

wanted and retrieved them from the display case behind her.

When Moreno began to ring up the cigarettes, Wimmer said

something to the effect of, " [J] ust give them to me for

free." Moreno refused.

¶9

Wimmer then picked up the knives and began to walk around the

counter. Moreno twice told Wimmer, " [D] on't come

back here." Undeterred, and with knives in hand, Wimmer

continued to approach. When Moreno was within Wimmer's

reach, Moreno extended her arms. In Moreno's telling, she

instinctively did this to defend herself and to prevent

Wimmer from coming closer to her.

Wimmer grabbed a pack of cigarettes, left the store, and was

subsequently arrested for armed robbery. [2]

¶10

Circle K terminated Moreno for violating its "Don't

Chase or Confront" policy. [3] The policy instructs employees

not to "confront [,] follow, pursue, track, chase,

fight [,] or follow" any customer suspected of

shoplifting. Moreno sued Circle K in state court , claiming,

in pertinent part, that she was wrongfully discharged in

violation of Colorado public policy because she was

exercising her right to self-defense and trying to protect

herself from being attacked.

¶11

Circle K removed the case to the United States District Court

for the District of Colorado and moved for summary judgment.

It argued that (1) Moreno was not acting in self-defense; (2)

Circle K's decision to fire Moreno was based on an honest

belief that she had not acted in self-defense; and (3)

Colorado law does not recognize self-defense as a

public-policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine.

Moreno countered that (1) she was acting in self-defense and

(2) the

court should recognize self-defense as a public-policy

exception to the at-will employment doctrine.

¶12

The district court granted Circle K's summary judgment

motion . It concluded that Colorado's statutory and

constitutional right to self-defense does not give rise to a

public-policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine.

These provisions, the court explained, do not set forth a

sufficiently clear job-related right or privilege. In so

ruling, the district court highlighted its cautious approach,

noting that, as a federal court , it was "simply not in

the position to recognize, in the first instance, a new type

of public-policy exception to Colorado's at-will

employment doctrine."

¶13

Moreno appealed to the Tenth Circuit. It reversed the

district court 's order, concluding that factual

issues—regarding (1) whether Moreno had used

self-defense and (2) whether Circle K had fired her for doing

so—remained unresolved and were potentially

dispositive. The Tenth Circuit, accordingly, remanded the

case to the district court for further factual findings.

¶14

On remand, the district court found that genuine disputed

issues of material fact existed as to both questions.

Specifically, the district court determined that questions

regarding Moreno's credibility, interpretation of the

surveillance video, and Circle K's motivation in

terminating Moreno all presented genuine issues of

material fact for a jury to decide. In light of these

disputed issues of fact, the court denied the motion for

summary judgment .

¶15

Moreno then filed a motion to certify to this court the legal

question of whether Colorado recognizes self-defense as a

public-policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine.

The district court granted the motion, reasoning that the

question (1) is likely determinative of the action, (2)

presents a novel question of public policy requiring

guidance, and (3) is an important issue. The district court

noted that, because this case originated in state court , the

question was well-suited for review by this court .

¶16

We accepted review of the certified question. Applying the

factors we articulated in Martin Marietta , we now

hold that the statutory and constitutional right to

self-defense in Colorado is a clearly articulated right that

belongs to all people , including employees.

¶17

We accordingly recognize a self-defense public-policy

exception to the at-will employment doctrine.

II.

Analysis

¶18

We begin by setting forth the applicable standard of review

and the relevant case law . We then consider the language of

section 704 and article II , section 3 , each of which sets out

the right to self-defense. Next, we answer the certified

question, addressing in turn each prong of the test we

established in Martin Marietta .

¶19

We hold that both section 704 and article II , section 3

establish a public policy in favor of self-defense. First,

both clearly express the extent of a person's right to

act in reasonable self-defense when they have reasonable

grounds to believe they are in imminent danger of death or

great bodily injury, or of becoming the victim of certain

other crimes. Second, because self-defense is an essential,

inalienable right possessed by all Coloradans, it is a

public, rather than a proprietary, right. Third, we conclude

that the right to self-defense is a right guaranteed to all

people , including people in the workplace. It is a

job-related right insofar as the need to exercise the right

to lawfully defend oneself from an unprovoked attack can

occur in the workplace.

¶20

Therefore, we conclude that applying the public-policy

exception to this specific inalienable right is entirely

consistent with the rationale underlying the exception to the

at-will employment doctrine.

A.

Jurisdiction

¶21

Rule 21.1 (a) grants us jurisdiction to resolve questions of

law certified by a federal court . We exercise our

jurisdiction when a question "may be determinative of

the cause then pending in the certifying court and as to

which it appears . . . that there is no controlling precedent

in the decisions of the supreme court ." Skillett v.

Allstate Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. ,

2022 CO 12 , ¶ 8 , 505 P.3d 664 , 666 (quoting C.A.R.

21.1 (a) ) . We review such questions de novo. Id.

Similarly, we review de novo whether a constitutional,

statutory, or other source provides a sufficiently clear

expression of public policy. Jaynes v. Centura Health

Corp. , 148 P.3d 241, 244 ( Colo.App. 2006 ) ( citing

Mariani , 916 P.2d at 526 ) .

B.

The Public-Policy Exception to the At-Will Employment

Doctrine

¶22

The public-policy exception generally allows an at-will

employee to pursue a claim for wrongful termination if their

employer fires them for violating a clearly expressed public

policy. Martin Marietta , 823 P.2d at 109 . The

exception constrains employers from terminating employees

when the termination would have "a tendency to be

injurious to the public or against the public good."

Id. at 105 ( quoting Petermann v. Int'l Bhd.

of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen &Helpers of Am.,

Loc. 396 , 344 P.2d 25, 27 ( Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959 ) ) .

When a party claims a public-policy exception to the at-will

employment doctrine, we consider if "the discharge of

the employee contravenes a clear mandate of public

policy." Mariani , 916 P.2d at 523-24 ( quoting

Martin Marietta , 823 P.2d at 107 ) . Although

"public-policy wrongful discharge is not subject to

precise definition," Weissman , 938 P.2d at 552 ,

the essence of the exception is that an employee will have a

cognizable claim for wrongful discharge if the discharge of

the employee would

be "detrimental to the public good," Martin

Marietta , 823 P.2d at 108 ( quoting Russell , 95

P. at 938 ) .

¶23

We set forth a four-part test in Martin Marietta to

determine whether the termination of an at-will employee

violates public policy. An at-will employee establishes that

they were wrongfully discharged under the public-policy

exception by showing:

(1) that the employer directed the employee to perform an

illegal act as part of the employee's work related duties

or prohibited the employee from performing a public duty or

exercising an important job-related right or privilege;

(2) that the action directed by the employer would violate a

specific statute relating to the public health, safety, or

welfare, or would undermine a clearly expressed public policy

relating to the employee's basic responsibility as a

citizen or the employee's right or privilege as a worker;

. . .

(3) that the employee was terminated as the result of

refusing to perform the act directed by the employer [; and] .

. .

(4) that the employer was aware, or reasonably should have

been aware, that the employee's refusal to comply with

the employer's order or directive was based on the

employee's reasonable belief that the action ordered by

the employer was illegal, contrary to clearly expressed

statutory policy relating to the employee's duty as a

citizen, or violative of the employee's legal right or

privilege as a worker.

Id. at 109 .

¶24

Here, the first part of the test depends on the second part,

while the third and fourth parts are questions of fact beyond

the scope of the certified question.

We thus

focus on the second: whether self-defense is a clearly

expressed right or privilege that an employee holds as a

worker.

¶25

Colorado courts must be cautious in recognizing exceptions to

the at-will employment doctrine. The power to create public

policy sits squarely with the General Assembly, not the

courts . Weissman , 938 P.2d at 553 ( "The General

Assembly is the branch of government charged with creating

public policies, and the courts may only recognize and

enforce such policies." ) . As such, we only recognize a

public-policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine if

the policy has been clearly expressed. Martin

Marietta , 823 P.2d at 109 . Importantly, that expression

of public policy must also affect the public, not just an

individual. Weissman , 938 P.2d at 552 -53 .

¶26

Constitutional provisions, professional ethical codes, and

administrative regulations may also serve as a basis for a

public-policy exception. Mariani , 916 P.2d at

524 -25 ; Weissman , 938 P.2d at 553 ; Kearl v.

Portage Env't, Inc. , 205 P.3d 496, 499 ( Colo.App.

2008 ) ( deriving a public-policy exception from existing case

law ) .

¶27

We have explained that to be "clearly expressed," a

source of public policy must (1) provide a concrete, rather

than hortatory or general, statement of policy; (2) provide

employees with a clear mandate as to what constitutes

appropriate conduct; and (3) provide employers sufficient

notice of the policy. Mariani ,

916 P.2d at 525 -26 ; Lampe v. Presbyterian Med. Ctr. ,

590 P.2d 513, 515 ( Colo.App. 1978 ) ; see also Calvert v.

Mayberry , 2019 CO 23 , ¶ 26 , 440 P.3d 424, 431

( holding that professional rules, which prohibit certain

actions, provide a clear mandate) .

¶28

Because the General Assembly is typically the ultimate source

of public policy, the clearest expressions of a particular

policy occur when a statute (1) explicitly prohibits a

behavior, see Martin Marietta , 823 P.2d at 108 , 111 ;

(2) establishes a right, see Lathrop v. Entenmann's,

Inc. , 770 P.2d 1367, 1372 ( Colo.App. 1989 ) ; or (3)

creates a statutory scheme , id . Thus, if a statute

prohibits certain acts in conjunction with other indicia of

legislative intent , it may give rise to a public-policy

exception to the at-will employment doctrine. See Jones

v. Stevinson's Golden Ford , 36 P.3d 129, 133

( Colo.App. 2001 ) ( concluding that a public-policy exception

to the at-will employment doctrine exists based on

" [t] he broad legislative purpose of the Colorado

Consumer Protection Act " ) .

¶29

A statute or comparable provision, however, need not

proscribe or prescribe specific actions to give rise to a

public-policy exception. Provisions that encourage a

particular beneficial behavior without establishing specific

obligations related to employment may also be sufficient to

create a public-policy exception. See Flores v. Am.

Pharm. Servs., Inc. , 994 P.2d 455, 459 ( Colo.App. 1999 )

( "Also, while [ section ] 10-1-127 (1.5) (a) [, C.R.S.

( 2025 ) ,] does not explicitly require employees or

citizens to take an active part in ferreting out insurance

fraud, the act encourages its exposure and detection." ) .

¶30

To clearly express public policy, the statute or comparable

provision must also implicate public safety, health, or

welfare rather than an issue involving a primarily personal

or proprietary interest of an individual. Weissman ,

938 P.2d at 552-53 ( citing Gantt v. Sentry Ins. , 824

P.2d 680, 684 ( Cal. 1992 ) ) . The right must touch upon a

public health, safety, or welfare concern, or an

employee's basic rights or duties. Id. at 553 ;

see also Mariani , 916 P.2d at 524 . And the right

must broadly implicate the public as a whole to outweigh the

at-will employment doctrine. Weissman , 938 P.2d at

553 .

¶31

Finally, for a plaintiff to claim that one of their rights or

privileges was undermined, that right or privilege must be

granted to them as a worker or be related to their job.

Martin Marietta , 823 P.2d at 109 . Examples include:

a privilege or right that is connected to conduct that occurs

at work, like taking a lunch break; conduct arising from

work, such as seeking compensation for a job-related injury;

or obligations owed by the employer, such as proper

compensation. Bonidy v. Vail Valley Ctr. for Aesthetic

Dentistry, P.C. , 186 P.3d 80, 84-85 ( Colo.App. 2008 ) ;

Herrera v. San Luis Cent. R.R. Co. , 997 P.2d 1238,

1240 ( Colo.App. 1999 ) ; Hoyt v. Target Stores , 981

P.2d 188, 192 ( Colo.App. 1998 ) ; see also Frampton v.

Cent. Ind. Gas Co. ,

297 N.E.2d 425, 428 ( Ind. 1973 ) ( holding that firing a worker

for filing a workers' compensation claim violated public

policy ) .

¶32

Circle K acknowledges that the right to self-defense is a

Colorado public policy but asserts that it is not clearly

expressed by either section 704 or article II, section 3 ; is

not a right that affects the public; and does not relate to

employment. We briefly describe each provision, then discuss

these issues.

C.

Section 704

¶33

The General Assembly has statutorily recognized the right to

self-defense since the days of the Colorado territory . An

Act Concerning Criminal Jurisprudence: Division IV , Offenses

Against the Persons of Individuals , Secs. 28, 30, 1861

Colo. Territorial Sess. Laws 290, 294 ( " 1861

Self-Defense Law" ) (establishing " [j] ustifiable

homicide" as "the killing of a human being in

necessary self-defense" ) . In its modern form, a person

may justifiably use force against another to defend

themselves "from what he reasonably believes to be the

use or imminent use of unlawful physical force by that other

person, and he may use a degree of force which he reasonably

believes to be necessary for that purpose." §

18-1-704 (1) .

¶34

Self-defense, like other legal justifications, is an

affirmative defense. § 18-1-710, C.R.S. (2025) . This

court has repeatedly characterized section 704 as expressing

a right to self-defense. See, e.g. , Castillo v.

People , 2018 CO 62 , ¶ 58 , 421 P.3d 1141 , 1150 ;

People v. Toler , 9 P.3d 341, 352 ( Colo. 2000 ) ;

Beckett v. People , 800 P.2d 74, 77-78 ( Colo. 1990 ) ;

see also Galvan v. People , 2020 CO 82 , ¶ 57 ,

476 P.3d 746 , 759 (Marquez, J., dissenting) .

¶35

The statute specifically limits the right to self-defense.

First, a person must reasonably believe that they will

imminently be subject to unlawful physical force. §

18-1-704 (1) . Second, the use of force must be reasonably

necessary. Id. Third, deadly force is only

permissible under certain circumstances. § 18-1-704 (2) .

Finally, subject to limited exceptions, self-defense is

unjustified if the person asserting the defense was the

initial aggressor or if the use of force is based on the

victim's gender identity or sexual orientation. §

18-1-704 (3) .

D.

Article II, Section 3

¶36

Article II, section 3 sets out "natural, essential [,]

and inalienable" rights. Colo. Const. art. II, § 3 ;

see also Colo. Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v.

Case , 380 P.2d 34, 39-40 ( Colo. 1962 ) . These rights

include "the right of enjoying and defending

[one's life] ." Colo. Const. art. II, § 3

( emphasis added ) .

¶37

Constitutional rights are not absolute and are subject to

reasonable limitations. See , e.g. ,

People v. Brown , 485 P.2d 500, 503 ( Colo. 1971 )

( " [T] his case clearly and explicitly recognizes that

limitations may be placed upon an inalienable or inherent

right ...." ) . They are also defined, interpreted, and

bound by the jurisprudence of this court . See In re

Legis. Reapportionment , 374 P.2d 66, 68

( Colo. 1962 ) ( "The judicial branch of the government has

imposed upon it the obligation of interpreting the

[c] onstitution and of safeguarding the basic rights granted

thereby to the people ." ( quoting Asbury Park Press,

Inc. v. Woolley , 161 A.2d 705, 710 ( N.J. 1960 ) ) ) .

¶38

With both the statutory and constitutional text in mind, we

now consider whether either provision is sufficient to

establish self-defense as a public-policy exception to the

at-will employment doctrine.

E.

Section 704 and Article II , Section 3 Evince Public Policy

Favoring Self-Defense that Encompasses Self-Defense by

Employees

1.

Section 704 and Article II , Section 3 Clearly Express Public

Policy in Favor of the Right to Self-Defense

¶39

First, we consider if section 704 and article II , section 3

clearly express a public policy in favor of the right to

self-defense. Section 704 sets out by whom, when, and how the

right to self-defense may be exercised. §

18-1-704 (1) - (4) . Any person, including any employee, may

justifiably use force when they reasonably believe they face

the "use or imminent use of unlawful physical force by

[another] person." § 18-1-704 (1) . They may not use

excessive force. § 18-1-704 (2) - (3) . And with limited

exceptions, they are not justified in using force if they

were the initial aggressor. § 18-1-704 (3) (b) . In short,

the statute mandates how a person may defend themselves.

Thus, an employee would know that they could use force to

defend themself, but that using force to confront a

shoplifter, for example, would

be unlawful. An employer would similarly be on notice about

the lawful exercise of this right.

¶40

Additionally, a statute setting out a criminal right or

defense is as much an expression of the General

Assembly's intent as a statute setting out criminal or

civil liability and is no less a source of public policy. As

we observed in Martin Marietta , an employee should

not have to "choose between losing their job [] or

engaging in criminal conduct." 823 P.2d at 111 . So too

with the right to self-defense: An employee should never have

to choose between their job and their safety. Thus, section

704 is strong evidence of Colorado's public policy in

favor of self-defense.

¶41

Article II, section 3 similarly provides a clear mandate. It

concisely and unambiguously recognizes that " [a] ll

persons have . . . the right of enjoying and defending their

lives." Colo. Const. art. II, § 3 . Despite its

brevity, it provides a common understanding of when it's

appropriate to exercise the right of self-defense. Our

jurisprudence lays out the boundaries of the constitutional

right to self-defense, as we discussed in Part II.C.

¶42

The constitutional right to self-defense is further

understood through its evolution alongside Colorado's

statutory right to self-defense. The territorial statute ,

first enacted in 1861 , predates the constitutional right,

which was ratified in 1876 , nearly a decade and a half later.

See 1861 Self-Defense Law. The judicial

understanding of the inalienable right to self-defense

identified in article II, section 3 developed alongside

Colorado's self-defense statute . See ,

e.g. , Idrogo v. People , 818 P.2d 752, 754

( Colo. 1991 ) ( describing the evolution of §

18-1-704 (2) ) ; § 18-1-704 . Because the statute codifies

elements of the common law, its evolution provides guidance

as to the extent of the constitutional right. People ex

rel. Graves v. Dist. Ct. , 86 P. 87 , 89 ( Colo. 1906 )

( "The [c] onstitution of a state is not the beginning of

the law for a state. Under our system of jurisprudence it

assumes the existence of the common law from which we must

draw in interpreting its provisions." ) . Accordingly, the

expression of the right to self-defense set out in the

Colorado Constitution draws on the expression of the right

set out by statute .

¶43

The combination of precedent and statutory language clearly

defines the permissible boundaries of the constitutional

right to self-defense in Colorado. Thus, though the language

of article II, section 3 extends broadly—as it must to

protect the inalienable rights of Coloradans—it is not

a purely hortatory provision. See Mariani , 916 P.2d

at 525 . It identifies a "clear mandate,"

id. at 526 , bound by our case law , giving notice to

employees and employers as to what conduct is permissible and

what is not. Accordingly, we conclude that it too presents a

clear public policy in favor of self-defense.

2.

Self-Defense Impacts the Public and Is a Public

Right

¶44

Next, we consider whether the right to self-defense is a

public right. We first explained the distinction between

public rights and rights that do not "truly impact [] the

public" in Weissman . 938 P.2d at 552 . There, a

typist claimed that she was wrongfully discharged for taking

rest breaks she had a right to take pursuant to Colorado

Minimum Wage Order No. 19 , Dep't of Lab. &Emp. , 7

Colo. Code Regs. 1103-3 ( 1983 ) . Weissman , 938 P.2d

at 552 -53 . We held that the rights she relied on were not

significant enough to implicate a "fundamental,

substantial public policy." Id. [4]

¶45

Here, by contrast, the right to self-defense is an essential,

inalienable right expressed in this state's

constitution —one that has been statutorily recognized

for longer than Colorado has been a state. See 1861

Self-Defense Law. Though this essential, inalienable right is

possessed and exercised by individuals, its impact is

necessarily public. See Semore v. Pool , 266

Cal.Rptr. 280, 285 ( Cal.Ct.App. 1990 ) ( "While rights are

won and lost by the individual actions of people , the

assertion

of the right establishes it and benefits all [ people ]

...." ) . Furthermore, consideration of a right's

public impact should not be examined through too narrow a

lens. Otherwise, this element would swallow the entire

public-policy exception, as any right guaranteed to the

public could also be characterized as an individual matter.

For instance, the right to file for workers' compensation

could be cast as the right of an individual worker, not the

general public; the right to be paid for work is the right of

the individual worker who performed the work, not the general

public; and the right to take lunch breaks is the right of an

individual worker, not the general public. Yet all these

rights have given rise to public-policy exceptions.

¶46

Cases from other jurisdictions have similarly concluded that

self-defense is a public right. See, e.g. , State

v. Merk , 164 P. 655, 657 ( Mont. 1917 ) ( " [T] he

possession and exercise of the right of self-defense by the

individual are still deemed to be necessary to personal

safety and security and not incompatible with the public

good." ) . As the Utah Supreme Court noted in a case

similar to this one, "A policy favoring the right of

self-defense preserves and protects human life .... [Such a

policy] protects individuals from serious injuries and deters

the completion of crime." Ray v. Wal-Mart Stores,

Inc. , 359 P.3d 614, 627 ( Utah 2015 ) ( footnotes omitted ) .

Similarly, the West Virgina Supreme Court has recognized that

the right to self-defense affects the safety of the public.

Feliciano v. 7-Eleven, Inc. ,

559 S.E.2d 713, 750 ( W.Va. 2001 ) . These cases support our

conclusion that section 704 and article II , section 3 both

set forth a sufficiently public right affecting the safety of

the broader public.

¶47

Circle K relies on Hoven v. Walgreen Co. , 751 F.3d

778 ( 6th Cir. 2014 ) , to advance its position that

self-defense is not a public right. There, the Sixth Circuit

considered a pharmacist's claim that he was terminated

for exercising his right to self-defense. Id. at

784 . The court analyzed multiple potential sources of public

policy: the United States and Michigan Constitutions,

Michigan's self-defense and concealed-carry statutes , and

a jury instruction. Id. at 785-86 . It concluded that

these sources were insufficient under Michigan law to create

an exception to at-will employment because only statutes that

directly "confer [red] a right on the public" could

support a claim of termination in violation of public policy.

Id.

¶48

Analogizing to Hoven , Circle K argues that section

704 creates only an individually applicable exemption from

liability. This reliance is misplaced. Notably, the statute

interpreted in Hoven provides that

it is a rebuttable presumption in a civil or

criminal case that an individual who uses deadly force or

force other than deadly force under section 2 of the

self-defense act has an honest and reasonable belief that

imminent death of, sexual assault of, or great bodily harm to

himself or herself or another individual will occur ....

Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 780.951 (1) (West 2026 ) ( emphasis

added ) ( footnote omitted ) .

¶49

The holding in Hoven is inapplicable here, however,

given the limited extent of the Michigan statute and

Michigan's prohibition on using constitutional provisions

as a source of public policy. 751 F.3d at 784-85 ( "The

right, if any, that is conferred is simply the right to

present a defense in a criminal case." ) . Even if our

court 's repeated references to the "right of

self-defense," see Part II.C , supra ,

were set aside, the plain language of section 704 sets out a

legal justification for the use of force, not simply

a right to present a defense, see §

18-1-704 (1) . In sum, the statutory and constitutional right

to self-defense is a generally applicable public right.

3. The

Public-Policy Exception Protects Employees from Being Forced

to Choose Between Their Safety and Their Employment

¶50

Finally, we consider whether an employer's firing of an

at-will employee for exercising their right to self-defense

constitutes termination based on the employee's exercise

of a job-related right. In Martin Marietta , we

explained that one of the elements to consider in determining

if the termination of an at-will employee violates public

policy is whether the action directed by the employer would

undermine a clearly expressed public policy relating to the

employee's right or privilege as a worker. 823 P.2d at

109 . Historically, the rights and privileges that Colorado

courts have found to fit this description largely concerned

worker conditions and compensation. See Bonidy , 186

P.3d at 85 . Courts have

deemed these rights and privileges to be job-related insofar

as they occur at work or arise from work. Id.

¶51

But a provision need not specifically regulate or even

mention employment to give rise to an employee's rights

or privileges as a worker. See Martin Marietta , 823

P.2d at 110-11 ( concluding that 18 U.S.C. § 1001 , which

broadly prohibits making false representations to the federal

government, was related to a plaintiff 's job ) . As we have

recognized, "public-policy wrongful discharge is not

subject to precise definition." Weissman , 938

P.2d at 552 . The exception itself is rooted in a broader

principle: the long-standing rule that "a contract

violative of public policy should not be enforced."

Martin Marietta , 823 P.2d at 108 ( citing

Russell , 95 P. at 938 ) . Based on that fundamental

concept, we have recognized that the essence of the exception

is that an employee will have a cognizable claim for wrongful

discharge if their discharge would be "detrimental to

the public good." Id. ( quoting

Russell , 95 P. at 938 ) .

¶52

To be sure, at-will employment gives employers broad

discretion over the terms of employment. It does not,

however, allow employers to require employees to commit

illegal acts. Id. at 108, 113 . Nor does it allow

employers to prevent employees from reporting legal

violations or from performing legal duties, Mariani ,

916 P.2d at 526 , or from exercising important job-related

rights, Lathrop , 770 P.2d at 1375 . One broad,

unifying principle in cases analyzing the

public-policy exception—here and across the

country—is that an employer may not use termination to

penalize an employee for exercising a constitutional or

statutory right that reflects an important, clearly expressed

public policy that affects the public. See id. ;

Bonidy , 186 P.3d at 84 -85 ; Herrera , 997

P.2d at 1240 ; see also Frampton , 297 N.E.2d at 427

( holding that a worker was wrongfully terminated for filing a

workers' compensation claim authorized by Indiana

statute ) . Applying these principles here, we conclude that an

employer may not lawfully terminate an employee for properly

exercising their essential, inalienable right to self-defense

if the employee suffers an unprovoked attack at work.

¶53

The employment relationship should not be used to strip

workers of the ordinary legal privileges every

person possesses. The right to self-defense has never been

cabined by role or location. See Colo. Const. art.

II, § 3 . It is a unique, essential, and inalienable

right that exists for workers, students, retirees, and the

unemployed alike. It allows people to protect themselves in

their homes, schools, houses of worship, and workplaces under

very specifically defined circumstances. Here, it is the very

breadth of the right—of the policy—that informs

the analysis. It makes no sense to suggest that everyone has

an inalienable right to defend themselves if faced with

imminent danger, unless they are at work. Rather, the right

follows the employee from home to work and back and

everywhere in between.

¶54

Put another way, the right to self-defense is job-related

insofar as the need to lawfully defend oneself from an

unprovoked attack can occur at work. Thus, even though the

right to self-defense—constitutional and

statutory—does not explicitly mention workers, it is

nonetheless a right guaranteed to workers within the meaning

of Martin Marietta . Under the law, it is an

essential, inalienable right guaranteed to everyone,

including people at work. It is not a right that is left at

the door when a person enters the workplace.

¶55

A central question in the public-policy-exception analysis is

whether an employee is "put to the choice of either

obeying an employer's order [in contravention of public

policy] or losing his or her job." Martin

Marietta , 823 P.2d at 109 . The exception aims to prevent

an employer from leveraging the threat of retaliatory

discharge to compel employees into either illegal conduct or

into giving up their rights or privileges. See id.

at 110 ; see also Frampton , 297 N.E.2d at 427-28

(analogizing wrongful termination in violation of public

policy to retaliatory eviction) .

¶56

Self-defense is certainly no less important a right to a

worker than workers' compensation, which is not a

"right" at all but which our court of appeals and

other jurisdictions have recognized as giving rise to a

public-policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine.

Just as permitting employers to discharge employees for

filing workers' compensation claims would undermine the

workers' compensation system, so too would permitting

discharge on the basis of self-defense undermine the right to

self-defense. The choice between a loss of income —a

rippling instability that in some cases may upend a

person's entire life—or enduring a physical attack

is exactly the choice of evils the public-policy exception

was meant to prevent. Plus, it is illogical to conclude that

an employee may not be fired for seeking workers'

compensation benefits if physically attacked and injured at

work, but the same employee may be fired for defending

themselves from being punched, stabbed, or sexually

assaulted. Notably, however, this does not mean that an

employer may not place reasonable limitations on these

broader, societal rights to maintain the efficiency, safety,

and stability of a workplace.

4.

Colorado Recognizes Constitutional Provisions as a Source of

Public-Policy Exceptions to At-Will Employment

¶57

Finally, we address Circle K's argument that article II,

section 3 cannot be a source of a public-policy exception

because the section only protects against

governmental , rather than private, actions. We

disagree.

¶58

Circle K's logic suggests that no provision in

Colorado's bill of rights, or perhaps in the whole

constitution , can ever give rise to a public-policy exception

to at-will employment. True, constitutions are, by

definition, restraints on governmental, rather than private,

power. People v. Rodriguez , 112 P.3d 693, 695

( Colo. 2005 ) ( "Colorado's Constitution . . .

'does not comprise a grant of but rather, a limitation on

power.' " ( quoting Reale v. Bd of Real Est

Appraiser s , 880 P.2d 1205, 1208 ( Colo 1994 ) ) ) ; People ex

rel Elder v Sours , 74 P 167 , 186 ( Colo 1903 ) ( "The

[c] onstitution of a state is an instrument of restraints or

limitations on legislative power" ) ; see also United

States v Nicholls , 4 Yeates 251, 260 ( Pa 1805 )

(Brackenridge, J, concurring) ; Baker v. City of

Fairbanks , 471 P.2d 386, 394 ( Alaska 1970 ) . But this

conclusion—i.e., limiting sources of public policy in

this specific context to only those that restrain private,

rather than public, action—would effectively abrogate

long-established precedent. See Mariani , 916 P.2d at

524 ( identifying sources of public policy including

constitutional provisions, ethical codes, statutes , and

administrative regulations ) .

¶59

We also decline to follow the analysis in Slaughter v.

John Elway Dodge Southwest/AutoNation , 107 P.3d 1165,

1170 ( Colo.App. 2005 ) , where a division of the court of

appeals noted that the plain text of article II, section 3

does not clearly express a right to refuse drug

testing—or indeed even a right to privacy. The question

in Slaughter is a far cry from the question here,

particularly given that the plain text of article II, section

3 explicitly grants "the right of enjoying and defending

[one's life] ." Colo. Const. art. II, § 3 . And

while Slaughter holds that the Fourth Amendment

binds only governmental actors, it draws no analogy between

the Fourth Amendment and article II, section 3 . 107 P.3d at

1169 -70 .

¶60

As we have already observed, the Sixth Circuit's decision

in Hoven does not change our analysis. Michigan law

does not recognize any constitutional provision as

the source of a public-policy exception to the at-will

employment doctrine. Hoven , 751 F.3d at 784

( " [U] nder Michigan law, constitutional provisions may

not be the source of a claim for termination in violation of

public policy against a private employer." ) . Because

Colorado law recognizes that constitutional provisions may

serve as the basis of public-policy exceptions to the at-will

employment doctrine, the Sixth Circuit's analysis is

inapplicable here.

III.

Conclusion

¶61

For these reasons, we answer the certified question by

concluding that yes, both section 704 and article II , section

3 can serve as the basis for a claim of wrongful termination

contrary to public policy. [5] To hold otherwise would fatally

undermine that right.

CHIEF

JUSTICE MARQUEZ , joined by JUSTICE HOOD , dissenting.

¶62

Today the majority establishes a new public-policy exception

to the at-will employment doctrine grounded in the right to

self-defense found in article II, section 3 of the Colorado

Constitution and the justification of self-defense found in

Colorado's Criminal Code in section 18-1-704, C.R.S.

(2025) . In doing so, the majority misapplies (and effectively

rewrites) our test for public-policy exceptions established

in Martin Marietta Corp. v. Lorenz , 823 P.2d 100,

109 ( Colo. 1992 ) .

¶63

First, by answering the certified question in the abstract,

the majority's analysis is largely divorced from the

underlying facts of this case . The majority's holding

appears to be grounded in its concern that no person should

be forced to choose between their job and their personal

safety. Maj. op. ¶ 40 . Yet Circle K Stores, Inc. 's

"Don't Chase or Confront Policy" demands no

such choice. Because the majority answers the legal question

without wrestling with important underlying facts, including

the purpose and narrow scope of the employer policy at issue

here, the majority's opinion makes broad pronouncements

with implications for the at-will employment doctrine that

reach well beyond this case .

¶64

The majority reasons that any individual constitutional right

is a "public" right merely because it is an

"essential, inalienable right" held by all

individuals. Id. at ¶¶ 4, 45 . Moreover, it

concludes that a constitutional right held by all

individuals meets the job-related requirement of our

Martin Marietta test simply because a right

guaranteed to "everyone" includes " people at

work." Id. at ¶ 54 .

¶65

Taken together, the majority's reasoning has startling

implications. Although the majority acknowledges that rights

conferred by the constitution constrain only state

action, id. at ¶ 58 , its reasoning means that

after today, a private employer may not lawfully

terminate an at-will employee for conduct related to the

exercise of any inalienable constitutional right—even

if the employee's conduct plainly violates the

employer's policies.

¶66

I not only disagree with the majority's reasoning that a

constitutional provision can be the source of a claim for

termination in violation of public policy against a

private employer , but I also fear that the practical

implications of today's ruling will tie employers'

hands and ultimately undermine workplace safety. Accordingly,

I respectfully dissent.

I.

Summary of the Facts

¶67

Although we have been asked to address an issue of law, the

factual context giving rise to the certified question here

remains important. See In re Phillips , 139 P.3d 639,

647 ( Colo. 2006 ) (Eid, J., dissenting) ( emphasizing that a

full picture of the facts can be important context, even when

answering a certified question, because " [f] acts enable

the [c] ourt to consider how the doctrine works in context,

rather than in isolation" ) . On its face, Circle K's

"Don't Chase or Confront Policy"

does not prohibit an employee from acting in

self-defense in response to an assault or the imminent use of

unlawful physical force against that employee. Rather, as its

title makes clear, the policy prohibits employees from

actively pursuing or confronting suspected shoplifters.

Specifically, the policy instructs employees not to

"confront [,] follow, pursue, track, chase, [or]

fight" persons suspected of theft, but instead to

"maintain [] a safe position behind the sales

counter" or "go to a safer area in the back of the

store" :

CONFRONT & CHASE POLICY

We want you to always have a safe and enjoyable working

experience with Circle K and especially during any special

events and holiday weekends.

So please remember the

"Don't Chase or Confront Policy"

Do not confront follow, pursue, track, chase, fight or follow

[inside and/or outside] any person [s] suspected of

shoplifting products and/or cash from the site, beer runs or

any other confrontational situation.

If you observe theft at the site, wait until the person (s)

leave the site and call the police immediately. Remember to

try to obtain as much information about the person (s) as

possible while maintaining a safe position behind the sales

counter. Do not go outside after the person (s) , if there is

any reason you need to go outside for you are to wait at

least 5 minutes and have called the police department and

verbally spoke to the Store Manager or Market Manager.

At no time do you come from behind the counter, go to or out

the doors to attempt to get additional information. If you

can safely obtain information from where you are standing

that will be sufficient. Stay where you are or go to a safer

area in the back of the store. Do not approach the front

doors or go out them. Call 9-1-1 immediately.

At no time do you stop, question or accuse a person (s) of

theft.

At no time do you get into a verbal altercation with any

customer and/or person (s) you suspect of theft. At no time

are you to go outside after dark! Sun down to sun up!

This policy Is for your protection and for the

safety of everyone i

If you have any questions or issues, please refer to the

5-Minute Rule of communication or your MM. Never talk to the

media or answer any questions on the immediate situation or

any others.

FAILURE TO FOLLOW THE "DON'T CHASE or CONFRONT

POLICY" WILL RESULT IN IMMEDIATE TERMINATION Q

¶68

In sum, the policy aims to prevent employees from provoking

encounters or escalating situations with would-be thieves

that might increase the risk of harm to both employees and

customers. As Circle K points out, the Occupational Safety

and Health Administration ( "OSHA" ) specifically

recommends that employers maintain de-escalation policies

such as this to guard against workplace violence. OSHA,

OSHA FactSheet: Workplace Violence ( 2024 ) ,

https://www.osha.gov/sites/

default/files/publications/FACTSHEET-WORKPLACE-VIOLENCE.pdf

[https://perma.cc/44SZ-XK3D] . Nothing about Circle K's

policy suggests that an employee would be "fired for

defending themselves from being punched, stabbed, or sexually

assaulted." Maj. op. ¶ 56 .

¶69

Although the majority sets forth Mary Ann Moreno 's

version of events, id. at ¶¶ 8-9 , Circle K

views the surveillance video of the incident differently.

Circle K contends it did not terminate Moreno for acting in

self-defense but rather, because she violated the

"Don't Chase or Confront Policy" by

unnecessarily confronting Tyler Wimmer , the shoplifter, to

try to prevent him from stealing cigarettes.

¶70

According to Circle K, as Wimmer walked toward the cigarette

display case, Moreno did not move out of the way, but stood

her ground, and in violation of the policy, confronted

Wimmer, saying, "Don't come back here." As

Wimmer came around the counter to take the cigarettes, he

moved a knife he was carrying into

his right hand, away from Moreno. At that point, Moreno took

a step toward Wimmer and positioned herself between

him and the cigarettes, while extending her left arm toward

him. Wimmer turned his back to Moreno to reach past her with

his left hand to get to the cigarettes. Moreno then grabbed

Wimmer by the back of the shirt and pulled on his left sleeve

and left elbow, trying to pull him away from the cigarettes

and telling him she would call the cops. Wimmer was quickly

able to grab the cigarettes and pull free of Moreno before

walking away from her and leaving the store.

¶71

In Circle K's view, Moreno had the opportunity to

cooperate and limit the possibility of violence. Instead, in

violation of the "Don't Chase or Confront

Policy," Moreno chose to verbally confront and

physically engage Wimmer, elevating the risk of harm to

herself and others.

¶72

These disputed facts will ultimately have to be resolved by a

jury, but I note them because they reveal important context

overlooked by the majority when answering the certified

question in the abstract. It is possible that a jury could

find that Moreno was not acting in self-defense during her

encounter with Wimmer. And yet, the majority's decision

today broadly nullifies policies like Circle K's by

preventing employers from terminating employees who choose to

confront would-be shoplifters—arguably even when doing

so only to defend property and

not themselves. I fear that employers' inability to

enforce such de-escalation policies will undermine workplace

safety.

II.

Analysis

¶73

In general, employment contracts in Colorado are at-will,

meaning that either the employer or the employee may

terminate the relationship at any time. Cont'l Air

Lines, Inc. v. Keenan , 731 P.2d 708, 711 ( Colo. 1987 ) .

In Martin Marietta , we recognized an exception to

this general rule in situations where an employer terminates

an employment contract in violation of public policy. 823

P.2d at 109 . Under the public-policy exception to the at-will

employment doctrine, an employee has a cognizable claim for

wrongful discharge if the discharge contravenes a "clear

mandate of public policy." Id. at 107 ( quoting

Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co. , 685 P.2d 1081, 1089

( Wash. 1984 ) ) .

¶74

We have traditionally taken a cautious approach to announcing

publicpolicy exceptions to at-will employment because

"expansive definition [s] of public policy would be both

unwieldy and unpredictable leaving employers and employees

alike without direction as to the contours of the public

policy exception." Rocky Mountain Hosp. &Med.

Serv. v. Mariani , 916 P.2d 519, 524 ( Colo. 1996 ) . We

have emphasized that " [w] e must develop the common law

in this area with care." Crawford Rehab. Servs.,

Inc. v. Weissman , 938 P.2d 540, 553 ( Colo. 1997 ) .

Accordingly,

we require parties seeking a public-policy exception to meet

four requirements. Martin Marietta , 823 P.2d at 109 ;

Mariani , 916 P.2d at 527 .

¶75

Specifically, an at-will employee has a prima facie case for

wrongful discharge under the public-policy exception if the

employee presents evidence that the employer's action

interfered with or undermined the employee's

job-related right or privilege as a worker by

establishing the following four elements:

(1) the employer directed the employee to perform an illegal

act as part of the employee's work related

duties or prohibited the employee from performing a

public duty or exercising an important job-related right

or privilege ; . . .

(2) the action directed by the employer would violate a

specific statute relating to the public health, safety, or

welfare, or would undermine a clearly expressed public policy

relating to the employee's basic responsibility as a

citizen or the employee's right or privilege as a

worker ; . . .

(3) the employee was terminated as the result of refusing to

perform the act directed by the employer [; and] . . .

(4) the employee present [s] evidence showing that the

employer was aware, or reasonably should have been aware,

that the employee's refusal to comply with the

employer's order or directive was based on the

employee's reasonable belief that the action ordered by

the employer was illegal, contrary to clearly expressed

statutory policy relating to the employee's duty as a

citizen, or violative of the employee's legal right

or privilege as a worker .

Martin Marietta , 823 P.2d at 109 ( emphases added ) .

¶76

Our test plainly focuses on the infringement of an

employee's job-related right or privilege as a

worker . Our case law applying the test confirms this.

Id. at

111 ; Mariani , 916 P.2d at 526 . Moreover, the public

policy must be clearly expressed so it provides

" employers and employees" sufficient

notice of "the behavior it requires."

Mariani , 916 P.2d at 524 -25 ; see also Calvert v.

Mayberry , 2019 CO 23 , ¶¶ 20-27 , 440 P.3d 424,

430-32 ( requiring the public policy to offer a "clear

mandate to act (or not act) in a certain way" ) .

¶77

In addition, the clearly expressed policy must "concern

behavior that truly impacts the public,"

Mariani , 916 P.2d at 525 , rather than an

individual's "purely personal or proprietary

interest," Weissman , 938 P.2d at 552 . See

also Maj. op. ¶ 30 .

¶78

In sum, to find a public-policy exception to at-will

employment, our test requires a clearly expressed public

policy that (1) relates to the employee's rights or

privileges as a worker, and (2) truly impacts the public.

¶79

The majority correctly recites the test and its factors,

id. at ¶¶ 22-23 , but then proceeds to

misapply the test to this case , and in doing so, effectively

rewrites part of it. Specifically, the majority holds that

article II, section 3 of the Colorado Constitution and

section 18-1-704 clearly express a general right to

self-defense that is sufficiently public and related to an

employee's rights or privileges as a worker. Maj. op.

¶¶ 16-17, 44-56 . I disagree.

A.

Colorado 's Right to Self-Defense Is Not Related to an

Employee's Rights or Privileges as a Worker

¶80

Even assuming for the sake of argument that article II,

section 3 of the Colorado Constitution and section 18-1-704

"clearly express" a right to self-Q

defense, neither provision relates to an employee's

rights or privileges as a worker. Article II, section 3

provides that " [a] ll persons have certain natural,

essential and inalienable rights, among which may be reckoned

the right of enjoying and defending their lives and

liberties; of acquiring, possessing and protecting property;

and of seeking and obtaining their safety and

happiness." These broad, general rights, which have been

part of our constitution since statehood, have no specific

connection to employment. Like other individual

constitutional rights, these rights reflect limitations on

government power, not restrictions on private

employers. City of Longmont v. Colo. Oil &Gas

Ass'n , 2016 CO 29 , ¶ 58 , 369 P.3d 573, 585-86

( " [ Article II, section 3 ] protects fundamental rights

from abridgment by the state absent a compelling government

interest." ) .

¶81

In turn, section 18-1-704 codifies the right to defend

one's life against government intrusion by prohibiting

the state from holding a person criminally liable for acting

in self-defense. [1] Similarly, section 18-1-706, C.R.S.

(2025) , creates a defense to criminal liability for using

force in defense of property "to prevent what [an

individual] reasonably believes to be an attempt by the other

person to commit theft, criminal mischief, or criminal

tampering involving property." And

section 18-1-704.5 (4) , C.R.S. (2025) , shields

"occupant [s] of a dwelling" from civil liability

for acting in self-defense under certain circumstances.

¶82

Our previous cases finding public-policy exceptions to

at-will employment concerned clearly expressed public

policies directly related to rights or privileges associated

with the employee's work. In Martin Marietta ,

the employee "had a duty as principal investigator of

several NASA projects" to report and control

deficiencies, and the employer's insistence that the

employee contravene this duty was directly related to the

employee's job duties. 823 P.2d at 111 . The same was true

in Mariani . There, the employer allegedly pressured

the employee to violate a professional ethics rule requiring

the employee to "report financial information fairly and

accurately" —a duty directly connected to the

employee's work as an accountant. Mariani , 916

P.2d at 526 .

¶83

Here, the right to be free from criminal liability for acting

in self-defense has no inherent connection to work, and the

majority's attempt to argue that it does has dangerously

broad implications.

¶84

Per the majority, the right to self-defense is job-related

because the need to defend oneself "can occur at

work." Maj. op. ¶ 54 . The majority reasons that the

right "has never been cabined by role or location"

and "allows people to protect themselves in their homes,

schools, houses of worship, and workplaces."

Id. at 1 n

¶ 53 . Therefore, the majority argues, the right is

necessarily job-related. Id. at ¶¶ 53-54 .

¶85

I agree that the right to be free from criminal liability for

actions taken in self-defense does apply to everyone,

everywhere in Colorado. But a constraint on governmental

prosecutorial power does not make the right to self-defense

job -related, nor does it somehow impose constraints

on employers in the context of an at-will employment

relationship. The majority argues that it would be illogical

to allow a public-policy exception for seeking workers'

compensation benefits but not to allow one for acting in

self-defense at work. Id. at ¶ 56 . Yet

workers' compensation benefits are inherently connected

to work and are directly job-related. Indeed, such benefits

arise only in the context of employment.

¶86

Nothing about a general right applicable to everyone

everywhere renders that right inherently job-related. In

concluding otherwise, the majority misapplies our test and

our precedent.

B.

Article II, Section 3 of the Colorado Constitution and

Section 18-1-704 Do Not Establish a "Public"

Right

¶87

Contrary to the majority's insistence, an individual

right is not a "public" right simply because the

constitution labels it "inalienable." Id.

at ¶ 45 . Our previous cases on public-policy exceptions

to at-will employment have emphasized that "public"

rights are those that "affect [] society at large"

and "truly

impact [] the public." Weissman , 938 P.2d at

552 . Rights that affect only "purely personal"

interests cannot justify a public-policy exception.

Id.

¶88

We have recognized public-policy exceptions where employers

have allegedly pressured employees to violate the law and

thereby endanger the public. As mentioned above, in

Martin Marietta , a government contractor allegedly

asked an employee to commit fraud on NASA in direct violation

of a federal statute . 823 P.2d at 102-04 , 110-11 . The public

impact was plain because lying to government agencies like

NASA could endanger the public and cost taxpayer dollars.

Similarly, in Mariani , a health insurance company

allegedly fired one of its accountants for refusing to make

knowing misrepresentations in violation of professional

ethics rules. 916 P.2d at 521 -23 . There again, the public

policy at issue was both clear and sufficiently public

because the ethics rule "ensure [d] the accurate

reporting of financial information to the public" and

thereby "allow [ed] the public and the business community

to rely . . . on financial reporting." Id. at

526 . In contrast, we rejected the employee's claim in

Weissman that a public-policy exception existed

based on the right to take a certain number of rest breaks

from her job as a typist, reasoning that such rest breaks

amounted to a personal interest and did not "truly

impact [] the public." 938 P.2d at 552 -53 .

¶89

Here, the right to self-defense is similarly personal in that

it absolves an individual from criminal liability in certain

circumstances for using force against 1 9

another to defend themselves. This protection against

criminal liability solely benefits the individual; it does

not impact the public at large.

¶90

The majority asserts that the right to self-defense in the

Colorado Constitution is a public right because it is an

"inalienable" right. Maj. op. ¶ 45 . It insists

that while an "inalienable right is possessed and

exercised by individuals, its impact is necessarily

public." Id. But it fails to explain how. An

"inalienable" right is simply an inherent right

that "cannot be transferred or surrendered."

Right , Black's Law Dictionary ( 12th ed. 2024 ) .

That such rights are guaranteed to all individuals does not,

ipso facto , make them "public" rights.

Again, our constitution preserves certain fundamental rights

from infringement by the government, not private actors.

¶91

According to the majority, examining whether a right is

public "through too narrow a lens" would

"swallow the entire public-policy exception"

because any right can be "characterized as an individual

matter." Maj. op. ¶ 45 . But the majority

has it backwards. It is the majority's new broad rule

that not only rewrites our test but effectively swallows the

public-policy exception entirely.

¶92

If a right need only be held by everyone to qualify as a

"public" right, then virtually all rights under the

law, not just "inalienable" constitutional rights,

would qualify. Perhaps the majority's reasoning rests on

some other special quality of inalienable rights. But without

further explanation, we are left to guess.

¶93

Finally, although the majority states that "Colorado law

recognizes that constitutional provisions may serve as the

basis of public-policy exceptions," id. at

¶ 60 , none of our cases have expressly held this,

id. at ¶ 26 ( first citing Mariani , 916

P.2d at 524 -25 ; then citing Weissman , 938 P.2d at

553 ) . In Mariani , we discussed other jurisdictions

that rely on constitutional provisions, but we did not adopt

any rule indicating that constitutional provisions may serve

as sources of public-policy exceptions. 916 P.2d at 524 -26 .

In our other two cases on this subject, we never even

discussed constitutional provisions. See Martin

Marietta , 823 P.2d at 104 -11 ; Weissman , 938

P.2d at 551 -53 . I cannot agree that a right stemming from the

constitution that limits state action necessarily constrains

private employers to the degree that it may serve as

an exception to our doctrine of at-will employment.

C.

The Majority's Reasoning Raises Troubling Legal and

Practical Questions

¶94

Per the majority, section 18-1-704 and our case law

collectively define the contours of the majority's newly

recognized public-policy exception to at-will employment.

Maj. op. ¶¶ 35, 39 . But despite the majority's

insistence that its holding is narrow, id. at ¶

5 , it cannot escape the breadth of its reasoning, which gives

rise to a number of troubling legal and practical questions.

¶95

Does the public-policy exception protect employees who act in

defense of third parties ? See § 18-1-704 (1)

( " [A] person is justified in using physical force 1

A

upon another person in order to defend himself or a third

person ...." ( emphasis added ) ) . Presumably so.

¶96

Does it include a "no duty to retreat" doctrine

like that recognized in our case law ? See People v.

Toler , 9 P.3d 341, 348 ( Colo. 2000 ) . Presumably so.

¶97

Does it encompass the similarly "inalienable" right

to "protect [] property" also found in article II,

section 3 of the Colorado Constitution and codified at

section 18-1-706 ? Presumably so. After all, it shares all the

same qualities the majority relies on to justify importing

section 18-1-704 's criminal right to selfdefense, with

both an expansive constitutional provision and a more

detailed criminal statute supporting it.

¶98

Taken together, after today, a private employer may no longer

terminate an employee who violates a "Don't Chase or

Confront Policy" like Circle K's. And despite the

majority's suggestion that its opinion does not address

the ongoing viability of such de-escalation policies,

see Maj. op. ¶ 10 n.3 , today's opinion

effectively nullifies them. The consequence, I fear, will be

workplaces that are less safe. Equally concerning is how the

majority's reformulation of the Martin Marietta

test will impact future cases .

¶99

For example, after today, an employee who is fired for

sharing sensitive business information online about their

private employer would presumably have 1 E

a basis for a wrongful termination suit on grounds that the

employee was exercising an "essential, inalienable"

right to free speech.

¶100

Similarly, an employee who is fired for pulling a concealed

weapon on a suspected shoplifter in the workplace would

presumably have a basis for a wrongful termination suit on

grounds that the employee was exercising their right to bear

arms under article II, section 13 of the Colorado

Constitution and Colorado's Concealed Carry Act,

§§ 18-12-201 to -214, C.R.S. ( 2025 ) .

¶101

At a minimum, an employee who confronts and tackles a

suspected shoplifter to prevent them from stealing (risking

injuries to the shoplifter, the employee, and other

customers) may not be fired for such behavior. Under the

majority's reasoning, the employee now has a plausible

argument that the "inalienable" right to

"protect [] property," Colo. Const. art. II, §

3 , coupled with the right to act in defense of property under

section 18-1-706 , establishes a publicpolicy exception to the

doctrine of at-will employment.

¶102

Before today, our case law would have indicated that the

right to defend property is a purely personal interest and

not one that "affect [s] society at large."

Weissman , 938 P.2d at 552 . It would have made clear

that public-policy exceptions must have some direct

connection to "right [s] or privilege [s] as a

worker." Martin Marietta , 823 P.2d at 109 . But

after today, a right need only be "inalienable" to

impact the public and need only be able to "occur at

work" to be related to rights

and privileges as a worker. Maj. op. ¶¶ 45, 54 . I

worry where this new version of the public-policy exception

doctrine will lead us .

III.

Conclusion

¶103

Today the majority departs from our previously cautious

approach to public-policy exceptions to at-will employment.

Along the way, it dismantles the important guardrails we

placed on this doctrine in Martin Marietta and opens

the door to far more public-policy exceptions, many of which

could leave workplaces less safe. In short, the majority has

left the doctrine in precisely the "unwieldy and

unpredictable" place we warned against thirty years ago

in Mariani . 916 P.2d at 524 . For all these reasons,

I respectfully dissent.

---------

[1] Circle K's description of these

events differs significantly from Moreno's. It contends

that Moreno was trying to stop Tyler Wimmer from stealing

cigarettes. While we accept the facts as set out in the

complaint and the opinions of the federal court (s) below to

provide some background on the way to answering the certified

question, we note that the issue presented is one of law. Our

decision does not turn on either party 's version of the

facts. See In re Phillips , 139 P.3d 639, 642 ( Colo.

2006 ) ( " We recite these facts [from the district court ]

to give context for the certified question." ) ;

Klabon v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am. , 2024 CO

66 , ¶ 3 n.1, 556 P.3d 793 , 798 n.1 ( " We derive the

following facts from Klabon's complaint and the district

court 's certification order." ) . And, as we have

already explained, we express no opinion as to whether Moreno

acted to defend herself or the cigarettes.

[2] Later, Wimmer pleaded guilty to

menacing with a deadly weapon.

[3] As previously noted, the only issue

before us is the purely legal one set forth in the certified

question. Moreno contends that Circle K's "Don't

Chase or Confront" policy prohibits its employees from

exercising their right to self-defense. Circle K contends it

does not. It asserts that the company's policy aims to

prevent employees from provoking encounters with

shoplifters and placing themselves in situations where

self-defense is necessary. For the reasons we have already

explained, we express no opinion on this dispute.

[4] However, a division applying a similar

wage order in slightly different circumstances concluded that

the order did create "clearly expressed public

policy." Bonidy , 186 P.3d at 85 . The division

distinguished the case from Weissman , noting that

Bonidy had presented evidence that, as a dental assistant, a

lack of rest and lunch breaks could adversely affect the

safety of patients, and thus, the public. Id. So, a

source may express a public policy "relating to

certain employees' basic rights,"

id. , so long as denying an employee those rights

would increase the risk of their customers and, by extension,

the public.

[5] We cabin our holding today to

exercises of self -defense, as the Colorado

Constitution only establishes self -defense as an

inalienable right. See Colo. Const. art. II, §

3 .

[1] Section 18-1-704 is codified in

article 1, part 7 of the Colorado Criminal Code , entitled

"Justification and Exemptions from Criminal

Responsibility."

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