Opinion

Webb Consolidated Independent School District v. Robert Marshall and Amy Marshall

Court
Texas Supreme Court
Filed
Apr 24, 2026
Status
Published
Author
Hawkins
On the bench
Lehrmann; Hawkins; Young; Sullivan
Cited by
0 cases

The opinion

Supreme Court of Texas

══════════

No. 24-0339

══════════

Webb Consolidated Independent School District,

Petitioner,

v.

Robert Marshall and Amy Marshall,

Respondents

═══════════════════════════════════════

On Petition for Review from the

Court of Appeals for the Fourth District of Texas

═══════════════════════════════════════

JUSTICE HAWKINS, joined by Justice Young and Justice Sullivan,

concurring.

I join the Court’s opinion. I write separately to underscore the

Court’s observation that a party does not “prevail” for the purposes of

recovering attorney’s fees merely by obtaining a temporary injunction.

Temporary injunctions exist to preserve the status quo based in part on

the trial court’s prediction as to who might prevail in the future. If that

prediction does not come true for any reason, the plaintiff does not

“prevail.”

So why are the plaintiffs here entitled to prevailing-party status?

Because the so-called “temporary injunction” issued by the trial court

was not actually a temporary injunction. This case presents an unusual

statutory scheme designed to promote transparency in government by

expanding access to information. The injunctive relief this statute

authorizes functions as ultimate relief because once information is

disclosed, as the Court aptly puts it, “there is no putting the genie back

in the bottle.” Ante at 13. And a “temporary” injunction under this

statute does not preserve the status quo, but permanently alters it. See

Lackey v. Stinnie, 604 U.S. 192, 200 (2025). Accordingly, when the trial

court ordered the defendants to disclose certain information, and

defendants complied, the plaintiffs obtained ultimate relief.

Future litigants and courts should take care not to misread

today’s opinion. Other fee-shifting statutes may function very differently

from Section 11.1512 of the Texas Education Code. Nothing in today’s

opinion should be read to suggest that anything short of a final judgment

entitles a plaintiff to prevailing-party status.

Kyle D. Hawkins

Justice

OPINION FILED: April 24, 2026

2

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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