Webb Consolidated Independent School District v. Robert Marshall and Amy Marshall

Supreme Court of Texas

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No. 24-0339

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Webb Consolidated Independent School District,

Petitioner,

v.

Robert Marshall and Amy Marshall,

Respondents

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On Petition for Review from the

Court of Appeals for the Fourth District of Texas

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Argued October 8, 2025

JUSTICE LEHRMANN delivered the opinion of the Court.

JUSTICE HAWKINS filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice

Young and Justice Sullivan joined.

The Texas Education Code recognizes that school-board members

acting in their official capacities have “an inherent right of access to

information, documents, and records maintained by the [school]

district.” TEX. EDUC. CODE § 11.1512(c). The Code provides those board

members with the opportunity to sue for injunctive relief when the

district does not provide them with requested information and to recover

attorney’s fees if they “prevail[]” in such a suit. Id. § 11.1512(c-2). In

this case, two school-board members sued Webb Consolidated

Independent School District under Section 11.1512 and obtained a

temporary injunction ordering the District to produce some of the

requested information and documents. Before the case proceeded to

trial, however, the members’ terms on the board expired. The primary

issue here is whether the board members nevertheless prevailed under

the statute by obtaining injunctive relief, thereby entitling them to

recover attorney’s fees.

We hold that they did. Although a party generally does not

“prevail” for fee purposes by obtaining a temporary injunction, the trial

court’s order effectively granted the board members the final relief

Section 11.1512 authorizes: an injunction requiring the District to

timely produce requested information to which the members have an

inherent right of access. Additionally, we hold that the board members

were not required to exhaust their administrative remedies before filing

suit because Section 11.1512(c-2) creates an exception to the general

exhaustion requirement. We therefore affirm the court of appeals’

judgment.

I. Background

Robert and Amy Marshall were members of the board of trustees

of Webb Consolidated Independent School District. On May 16, 2020,

the Marshalls requested information from the District regarding agenda

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items for an upcoming board meeting.1 The following month, the

Marshalls sued the District for injunctive relief under Texas Education

1 In the May 16 request, quoted below, the Marshalls sought

information and documents regarding six items:

1. Who is the architect for projects [sic] and why is he not

signing certificates for payment AIA Document G702-1992?

2. Agenda item #7. Discussion regarding 2020-2021 District

Calendar and Master Schedule.

A. Where are the Wind Tech Training Classes?

3. Agenda Item #12. Discussion and Possible action to approve

_______ as Construction Management Consultants for

building Elementary School to increase enrollment.

A. Is the board planning on building a new Elementary

School?

B. Where is this school going to be built?

C. How is building a new school going to increase

enrollment?

4. Agenda Item #13. Presentation by Financial advisor to

discuss a Cash Defeasance scenario.

A. Who is the Financial advisor you are referring to?

B. What is the Cash Defeasance scenario?

5. Agenda Item #15. Discussion and possible action to accept

the recommendation of the Superintendent to hire the

following Classroom Teachers for 2020-2021. Secondary

Teacher, Elementary Teacher, and Middle School Teacher.

A. We would like to know who you are recommending?

B. What are their credentials?

C. How much experience do they have as an educator?

D. Are their certifications current with all state

requirements?

E. Do they have emergency permit or a standard

certification?

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Code Section 11.1512(c-2), alleging that the District had failed to turn

over the information. The Marshalls also sought an award of costs and

attorney’s fees. See id. § 11.1512(c-2) (“A member who prevails in a suit

under this subsection is entitled to recover court costs and reasonable

attorney’s fees.”).

On September 15, 2020, the trial court issued a “Temporary

Injunction Order” finding, among other things, that the Marshalls “have

made . . . a proper request pursuant to” Section 11.1512, that “harm is

imminent because [the Marshalls] will be unable to properly address the

issues before the Board,” and that injunctive relief “is specifically

authorized by” Section 11.1512(c-2). The court ordered the District to

produce to the [Marshalls] the following documents and

information pertaining to the May 19, 2020 Board Meeting:

1. Information and documentation regarding the

contractor’s application for payment as to [five specific

construction] projects[;]

....

2. Construction Management Consultants for building

Elementary School;

3. Certification information on the Superintendent

recommended Classroom Teachers;

4. Extension of Administrator(s) Term Contracts

including [the] Superintendent . . . i.e. 2019 evaluation.

6. Agenda Item 17. Discussion and possible action regarding

the extension of Administrator(s) Term Contracts.

A. Why are we extending the Superintendent Heriberto

Gonzalez [contract] without his evaluation in the last

15 months?

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The order concluded by requiring the District to produce the information

within twenty days of the order’s execution. The District did not appeal

the order.

Amy Marshall’s term on the board expired in November 2020.

The following month, the Marshalls amended their petition to seek

injunctive relief regarding the District’s alleged failure to comply with

five additional requests for documents and information that Robert

Marshall had made in 2019 and 2020 in his capacity as a board member.

They later filed a supplemental petition to add claims related to four

other requests from 2019.

Meanwhile, the Marshalls were pursuing a separate

administrative proceeding against the District stemming from the

board’s vote to censure them at a September 2019 board meeting. One

of the claims asserted in that proceeding was that the Marshalls had

requested documents supporting their censure on multiple occasions

and that the District violated Section 11.1512 by failing to provide them.

In May 2021, the Commissioner of Education dismissed that claim for

lack of jurisdiction.2 The Marshalls did not seek review of the

Commissioner’s decision but instead added the claim to their pending

suit as part of the above-referenced supplemental petition.3

2 The Commissioner specifically determined that (1) the Marshalls

“failed to exhaust this issue” because they did not include it in their grievance

against the District and (2) their pleadings affirmatively negated the claim by

asserting that the District had no documents supporting their censure.

3 The Marshalls filed their supplemental petition in April 2021, after

the administrative law judge issued a proposal for decision in the

administrative proceeding but before the Commissioner issued a final decision.

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The Marshalls then filed a motion to compel, complaining about

the District’s responses to numerous discovery requests. The District

filed a plea to the jurisdiction and motion for summary judgment,

arguing that (1) the Marshalls failed to exhaust their administrative

remedies, (2) Amy Marshall’s claims were moot because she was no

longer a school-board member, and (3) the District had already provided

the Marshalls with all responsive documents that it maintained.4 The

trial court denied the District’s motions, and the District appealed that

order. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(a)(8) (authorizing an

interlocutory appeal of an order that grants or denies a plea to the

jurisdiction by a governmental unit).

The same day the District filed its notice of appeal, the trial court

signed an order granting the Marshalls’ motion to compel. The appeal

stayed all further proceedings in the trial court pending its resolution.

Id. § 51.014(b).

While the appeal was pending, Robert Marshall’s term on the

board expired, and the District therefore urged the court of appeals to

dismiss the suit as moot. The District also continued to argue that the

Marshalls’ failure to exhaust their administrative remedies deprived the

courts of jurisdiction. The court of appeals agreed that any outstanding

requests for information and pending requests for injunctive relief were

moot because the Marshalls were no longer board members and thus no

longer had a statutory right to the requested information. 690 S.W.3d

4 The District also moved for no-evidence summary judgment on the

ground that there was no evidence the Marshalls were not provided the

requested documents.

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698, 704 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2023). However, the court of appeals

concluded that the Marshalls’ request for attorney’s fees and court costs

“presents an issue that is separate from the request for information.”

Id. The court further held that the claim for attorney’s fees remained

live because the Marshalls “prevailed,” at least in part, by obtaining the

temporary injunction before their terms expired. Id. at 704–05.

II. Prevailing-Party Status

As noted, a school-board member acting in an official capacity has

“an inherent right of access to information, documents, and records

maintained by the [school] district.” TEX. EDUC. CODE § 11.1512(c). For

that reason, a board member may request such information from the

district without filing a public information request. Id. If the district

fails to timely deliver the requested information, the board member may

seek “appropriate injunctive relief” and, if he “prevails,” may recover

court costs and reasonable attorney’s fees. Id. § 11.1512(c-2).

Specifically, the statute provides:

If a district does not provide the requested information to

a member of the board of trustees in the time required

under Subsection (c-1), the member may bring suit against

the district for appropriate injunctive relief. A member

who prevails in a suit under this subsection is entitled to

recover court costs and reasonable attorney’s fees. . . .

Id.

It is undisputed that the Marshalls can obtain no further

substantive relief under Section 11.1512(c-2) because they are no longer

school-board members. In that sense, their pending claims have become

moot. See Heckman v. Williamson County, 369 S.W.3d 137, 162 (Tex.

2012) (“A case becomes moot if, since the time of filing, there has ceased

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to exist a justiciable controversy between the parties—that is, if the

issues presented are no longer live . . . .”). Amy Marshall’s term expired

in November 2020, and Robert Marshall’s term expired in November

2022 while the District’s appeal of the order denying its plea to the

jurisdiction was pending in the court of appeals. Because the Marshalls

are no longer school-board members, they no longer have an inherent

right to the documents and information at issue. See TEX. EDUC. CODE

§ 11.1512(c). They already obtained some of that information, however,

by virtue of the temporary injunction. On that basis, the Marshalls

contend they may recover attorney’s fees as prevailing parties.

The District responds that for a party to prevail, it must prevail

on the merits, and temporary injunctions do not resolve the merits of a

claim. Instead, temporary injunctions merely maintain the status quo

during the course of the proceedings and do not materially alter the

parties’ legal relationship. Further, the District asserts, the temporary

injunction did not provide full relief because the District had already

turned over the information in the order. Therefore, the Marshalls did

not prevail before their claims were mooted, so they cannot recover

attorney’s fees under the statute.

The Marshalls reply that the trial court’s temporary injunction

provided them with the ultimate goal of their lawsuit—the production

of the documents they requested. In that way, the temporary injunction

did not merely maintain the status quo; it granted the Marshalls

permanent relief because it compelled the production of information and

documents. There was no additional, substantive relief that the

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Marshalls could have received, at least regarding the information

covered by the injunction.

The United States Supreme Court recently opined on the very

issue now before us: whether a preliminary injunction confers

prevailing-party status for attorney’s-fees purposes in an otherwise

moot case. See Lackey v. Stinnie, 604 U.S. 192 (2025). In Lackey, drivers

whose licenses were suspended under a Virginia statute for failure to

pay certain fines challenged the statute’s constitutionality and obtained

a preliminary injunction enjoining the Commissioner of the Virginia

Department of Motor Vehicles from enforcing the statute. Id. at 196.

The statute was repealed while the case was pending, mooting the claim,

but the plaintiffs argued that they had prevailed by obtaining the

preliminary injunction and were therefore entitled to attorney’s fees. Id.

at 196–98. The Supreme Court rejected that argument and held that

“[a] party ‘prevails’ when a court conclusively resolves his claim by

granting enduring relief on the merits that alters the legal relationship

between the parties.” Id. at 207. The Court further explained that

“external events that render a dispute moot do not convert a temporary

order designed to preserve the status of the parties into a conclusive

adjudication of their rights.” Id. at 201.

We agree with this analysis, which properly interprets the

statutory term “prevail.” Id. at 199–201. “For more than a century,”

Texas has followed the “American Rule” requiring parties to bear their

own attorney’s fees and precluding recovery of fees from an opposing

party unless authorized by contract or statute. Tony Gullo Motors I,

L.P. v. Chapa, 212 S.W.3d 299, 310–11 (Tex. 2006) (citing Buckhannon

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Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Res., 532 U.S.

598, 603 (2001)). As a result, our fee-shifting jurisprudence largely

tracks that of our federal counterpart. See Epps v. Fowler, 351 S.W.3d

862, 866–68 (Tex. 2011) (“[W]e find federal cases focusing on the

meaning of prevailing party instructive.”).

Lackey properly recognizes that “prevailing party” is “a ‘legal

term of art.’” 604 U.S. at 199 (quoting Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603).

As the U.S. Supreme Court does when it construes acts of Congress, we

presume that when our Legislature “borrows terms of art in which are

accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it

presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to

each borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken and

the meaning its use will convey to the judicial mind unless otherwise

instructed.” Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952). “We

presume the Legislature enacted the statute ‘with complete knowledge

of the existing law and with reference to it.’” In re Bridgestone Ams. Tire

Operations, LLC, 459 S.W.3d 565, 572 (Tex. 2015) (quoting Acker v. Tex.

Water Comm’n, 790 S.W.2d 299, 301 (Tex. 1990)).

Our previous decisions discussing the meaning of “prevailing

party” comport with the longstanding approach to this term of art. We

have explained that “to prevail means to ‘obtain actual and meaningful

relief, something that materially alters the parties’ legal relationship.’”

Rohrmoos Venture v. UTSW DVA Healthcare, LLP, 578 S.W.3d 469,

485–86 (Tex. 2019) (quoting Intercontinental Grp. P’ship v. KB Home

Lone Star L.P., 295 S.W.3d 650, 652 (Tex. 2009)). Moreover, we have

stated that “[w]hether a party prevails turns on whether the party

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prevails upon the court to award it something, either monetary or

equitable.” KB Home, 295 S.W.3d at 655.

A temporary injunction typically does not confer prevailing-party

status because it does not conclusively adjudicate the legal dispute.

Rather, a temporary injunction is an “extraordinary remedy” that is

generally “intended to preserve the status quo until final judgment.”

Harley Channelview Props., LLC v. Harley Marine Gulf, LLC, 690

S.W.3d 32, 37 (Tex. 2024); see also Lackey, 604 U.S. at 200 (“‘The purpose

of a preliminary injunction is merely to preserve the relative positions

of the parties until a trial on the merits can be held,’ and ‘to balance the

equities as the litigation moves forward.’” (first quoting Univ. of Tex. v.

Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981); then quoting Trump v. Int’l

Refugee Assistance Project, 582 U.S. 571, 580 (2017))). To obtain a

temporary injunction, a party must show “(1) a cause of action against

the party to be enjoined; (2) a probable right to recover on that claim

after a trial on the merits; and (3) a probable, imminent, and irreparable

injury absent the temporary injunction.” Harley Channelview, 690

S.W.3d at 37; see also Kinney v. Barnes, 443 S.W.3d 87, 94 n.9 (Tex.

2014) (“Absent a showing of a likelihood of success on the merits, a

temporary injunction may not issue.”). But a probable right to recover

is not a right to recover, and temporary injunctions are not “tantamount

to decisions on the underlying merits.” Lackey, 604 U.S. at 200 (quoting

Camenisch, 451 U.S. at 395); see also Sw. Weather Rsch., Inc. v. Jones,

327 S.W.2d 417, 422 (Tex. 1959) (“Generally the most expeditious way

of obviating the hardship and discomforture of an unfavorable

preliminary order is to try the case on its merits and thus secure a

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hearing wherein the case may be fully developed and the courts, both

trial and appellate, may render judgments finally disposing of

controversies.”).

The “Temporary Injunction Order” issued by the trial court in this

case constituted a temporary injunction because it took “immediate

effect, before final judgment,” and it “(1) require[d] the enjoined party to

perform; (2) [was] made effective and operate[d] while suit remain[ed]

pending; and (3) compel[led] performance based on a determination that

the opposing party’s claim ha[d] merit.”5 Harley Channelview, 690

S.W.3d at 40. Importantly, however, the order did not merely preserve

the status quo or award provisional relief; instead, it granted the

Marshalls the complete relief sought under Section 11.1512, ordering

the District to produce documents and information to which the

Marshalls claimed they were entitled. See TEX. EDUC. CODE

§ 11.1512(c-2). And the District chose to comply with the order rather

than appeal it. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(a)(4)

(authorizing an interlocutory appeal from an order that grants or

refuses a temporary injunction).

Under the particular circumstances of this case and this statute

(Section 11.1512), the order was effectively dispositive as to the four

items identified in it. Thus, as to those four items, the reason the

Marshalls’ claims are no longer “live” is that the Marshalls have

prevailed on the merits of the claims—not that later mootness made the

5 The order so qualified even though it did not contain other “required

safeguards for a temporary injunction,” like requiring a bond or setting a trial

date. Harley Channelview, 690 S.W.3d at 40.

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claims nonjusticiable. For all practical purposes, the claims had already

been adjudicated on their merits. When a court orders a party to turn

over requested information and the receiving party obtains knowledge

of that information, there is no putting the genie back in the bottle.

Indeed, at least as to the categories of information in the trial

court’s order, the Marshalls “prevailed” in the only way they could have

under Section 11.1512(c-2): they obtained injunctive relief requiring

production of the information. See TEX. EDUC. CODE § 11.1512(c-2). The

statute did not authorize the Marshalls to seek or obtain any other kind

of relief. When the trial court ordered the District to turn over

information and documents and the District did not appeal the order,

the Marshalls received “appropriate injunctive relief” and “prevail[ed]

in a suit under this subsection.” See id. Although the temporary

injunction was not final as a procedural matter, the Marshalls

nevertheless “prevailed” by means of the temporary injunction just as

fully as they would have prevailed by means of a final judgment covering

the information at issue. The Marshalls therefore “prevail[ed],” under

this particular statutory scheme, with respect to the information

covered by the temporary injunction. See id.

As noted, the District contends that it gave the Marshalls

responsive documents before the temporary injunction issued, so the

order did not provide the Marshalls with any meaningful relief.

However, the trial court held a hearing on the Marshalls’ request for

injunctive relief and, after considering the evidence, at least impliedly

found otherwise in concluding that harm to the Marshalls was imminent

and ordering the District to produce the information. The District did

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not provide a reporter’s record of the temporary-injunction hearing, and

we therefore presume the evidence was sufficient to support the trial

court’s findings. See In re G.X.H., 627 S.W.3d 288, 300 (Tex. 2021); see

also Michiana Easy Livin’ Country, Inc. v. Holten, 168 S.W.3d 777, 783

(Tex. 2005) (“If the proceeding’s nature, the trial court’s order, the

party’s briefs, or other indications show that an evidentiary hearing took

place in open court, then a complaining party must present a record of

that hearing to establish harmful error.”).

Finally, we note that our holding does not entitle the Marshalls

to recover attorney’s fees incurred throughout the pendency of the case.

On the record before us, the Marshalls “prevailed” by obtaining the

“Temporary Injunction Order” issued in September 2020, but only as to

the documents covered by that order. It follows that the only attorney’s

fees recoverable are those incurred in connection with the claim to

information that was the subject of the temporary injunction. See

Chapa, 212 S.W.3d at 313 (requiring a fee claimant to segregate

recoverable and unrecoverable fees). The order was issued early in the

case, which continued for two years and involved many additional claims

and requests for information that were rendered moot by the Marshalls’

departure from the school board before the trial court granted any relief.

Accordingly, the trial court must take that into account in determining

the amount of a reasonable, recoverable fee.

III. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

We next address the District’s argument that the trial court

lacked jurisdiction over the action because the Marshalls were required,

and failed, to exhaust their administrative remedies before filing suit.

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The Legislature may expressly or impliedly grant an agency exclusive

jurisdiction to resolve disputes “within the agency’s regulatory arena.”

Clint Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Marquez, 487 S.W.3d 538, 544 (Tex. 2016).

With respect to such disputes, “[i]f [a] party files suit before exhausting

exclusive administrative remedies, the courts lack jurisdiction and must

dismiss the case.” Id. (further explaining that requiring exhaustion

“honors the Legislature’s intent that ‘the appropriate body adjudicates

the dispute’ first” (quoting Essenburg v. Dallas County, 988 S.W.2d 188,

189 (Tex. 1998))).

In the context of “disputes that arise within the education

system,” parties are generally required to exhaust their administrative

remedies before filing suit. Id. at 545–46. “For well over one hundred

years, we have held that persons complaining about the ‘management of

the school system’ or the ‘administration of school laws’ must exhaust

their administrative remedies before courts can exercise jurisdiction.”

Id. at 546. That requirement follows from Section 7.057(a) of the Texas

Education Code, which provides that if a “person [is] aggrieved

by . . . the school laws of this state,”6 she “may appeal in writing to the

commissioner.” TEX. EDUC. CODE § 7.057(a). We have interpreted

Section 7.057(a) “to require a person who chooses to appeal to first seek

relief through the administrative process.” Marquez, 487 S.W.3d at 545

(emphases omitted).

6 “‘School laws of this state’ means Title 1 and [Title 2] and rules

adopted under those titles.” TEX. EDUC. CODE § 7.057(f)(2). Section 11.1512

falls within Title 2 and is therefore a school law of this state.

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However, the administrative-exhaustion requirement is subject

to “limited statutory exceptions.”7 Id. We agree with the court of

appeals that Section 11.1512 creates such an exception. “When

construing a statute, our primary objective is to determine the

Legislature’s intent which, when possible, we discern from the plain

meaning of the words chosen.” In re Est. of Nash, 220 S.W.3d 914, 917

(Tex. 2007). Section 11.1512(c-2) straightforwardly provides that a

school-board member “may bring suit” when the school district has

missed its deadline to turn over information. TEX. EDUC.

CODE § 11.1512(c-2). The use of the word “suit” contrasts with the

general exhaustion requirement in Section 7.057, where the Legislature

provides for an “appeal” to the Commissioner by the aggrieved party

followed by another “appeal” to the district court.8 Id. § 7.057(a), (c), (d).

Moreover, Section 11.1512 provides for “appropriate injunctive relief,”

id. § 11.1512(c-2), which the Commissioner cannot provide, see Hou.

Fed’n of Tchrs., Loc. 2415 v. Hou. Indep. Sch. Dist., 730 S.W.2d 644, 646

(Tex. 1987) (“The Commissioner of Education is not authorized to order

immediate injunctive relief.”). Instead, the express mechanism by

7 For example, a party is not required to exhaust administrative

remedies when an administrative agency acts without authority or raises

certain questions of law. Jones v. Clarksville Indep. Sch. Dist., 46 S.W.3d 467,

471 n.3 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2001, no pet.) (collecting cases).

8 Indeed, as the court of appeals noted, “[w]hen the Legislature refers

to a dispute being brought before the Commissioner of Education—or the

dispute is otherwise subject to the exhaustion of administrative remedies—it

has consistently used the word ‘appeal’ rather than the word ‘suit.’” 690

S.W.3d at 708 (collecting examples).

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which a party may obtain injunctive relief under Subsection (c-2) is by

filing a suit in court.

Further, “[t]he statutory words must be determined considering

the context in which they are used, not in isolation.” Silguero v. CSL

Plasma, Inc., 579 S.W.3d 53, 59 (Tex. 2019). Section 11.1512 permits

school-board members to request information to which they have an

inherent right of access without submitting a public information

request. TEX. EDUC. CODE § 11.1512(c). When a board member

requests information, the school district has only twenty business days

to turn over that information. Id. § 11.1512(c-1). If the district must

delay its response because compliance would be unduly burdensome,

then it may take “a reasonable additional period of time, not to exceed

[thirty business days],” and it must “inform the [board member] of the

reason for the delay . . . and the date by which the information will be

provided.” Id. These provisions demonstrate the Legislature’s intent

for pertinent information to be placed into the hands of requesting board

members quickly.

Yet, if board members must exhaust their administrative

remedies by appealing to the Commissioner before seeking relief under

Section 11.1512, the Commissioner has until the 240th day after the

appeal is filed to issue a decision, after which the aggrieved person may

appeal to district court. Id. § 7.057(c). The lengthy exhaustion process

is incompatible with the speedy procedure envisioned by the Legislature

for ensuring board members obtain information to which they have an

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“inherent right of access.”9 Id. § 11.1512(c). Therefore, because Section

11.1512 creates an exception to the general exhaustion requirement, the

Marshalls were not required to appeal to the Commissioner before

pursuing injunctive relief.10

IV. Conclusion

As a general matter, a party does not “prevail” for attorney’s-fees

purposes by obtaining a temporary injunction during the pendency of

litigation. And when the substantive claims in a case are rendered moot

before final judgment, a corresponding claim for attorney’s fees based on

prevailing-party status is not kept alive by virtue of the prior issuance

of such an injunction. However, Section 11.1512 presents an unusual

statutory scheme, and this case presents an unusual set of

circumstances. We therefore hold that when a school-board member

obtains an injunction under Section 11.1512 ordering a school district to

9 To be sure, delay does not by itself create an exception to the general

exhaustion requirement. Indeed, the administrative process can often be a

more efficient method of resolving disputes than litigation. See Marquez, 487

S.W.3d at 544 (“A party who obtains relief through the administrative process

avoids the expense and delay of litigation.”). But the statute here provides a

limited exception to the exhaustion requirement to facilitate prompt access to

information that a school-board member needs and that a school district has

withheld. The only way to do that, as the plain language of the statute makes

clear, is to obtain injunctive relief from the courts. See TEX. EDUC. CODE

§ 11.1512(c-2) (“[A school-board] member may bring suit against the district

for appropriate injunctive relief.”).

10 We have also recognized a limited exception to the exhaustion

requirement in certain circumstances involving requests for temporary

injunctions. See Marquez, 487 S.W.3d at 555 (citing Hou. Fed’n of Tchrs., 730

S.W.2d at 646). Because we hold that exhaustion of administrative remedies

is not required under Section 11.1512’s plain language, we need not address

that exception.

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immediately turn over requested information and documents, the

district complies with that order, and the case becomes moot before final

judgment, the board member’s claim for attorney’s fees as a prevailing

party remains live. We also hold that a board member need not exhaust

administrative remedies by appealing to the Commissioner before filing

suit for injunctive relief under Section 11.1512. Accordingly, we affirm

the court of appeals’ judgment and remand the case to the trial court for

a determination of the Marshalls’ reasonable and recoverable attorney’s

fees.

Debra H. Lehrmann

Justice

OPINION DELIVERED: April 24, 2026

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