Darcy Weidman v. Home-Owners Insurance Company

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

DARCY WEIDMAN, UNPUBLISHED

April 13, 2026

Plaintiff-Appellant, 11:06 AM

V No. 371332

Genesee Circuit Court

HOME-OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY and LC No. 22-117836-NI

ANGELIA JULIANA BARDO,

Defendants-Appellees.

Before: SWARTZLE, P.J., and O’BRIEN and BAZZI, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff appeals as of right the trial court’s stipulated order of dismissal in which plaintiff

reserved the right to appeal the court’s earlier orders granting summary disposition in favor of

defendants Angelia Juliana Bardo and Home-Owners Insurance Company under MCR

2.116(C)(10). Plaintiff challenges those earlier orders on appeal. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

This case arises out of a motor-vehicle collision that occurred on September 3, 2021, at

approximately 9:00 a.m. On that day, plaintiff and Bardo were driving their vehicles westbound

on Crosby Road—a straight, two-lane road with no middle turn lane—when plaintiff rear-ended

Bardo.

Bardo testified that the collision occurred while she was turning into her driveway on

Crosby. Bardo’s home was a few houses down from where Crosby intersects with Genesee Road.

According to Bardo, she was driving on Genesee before turning onto Crosby. As Bardo

approached the intersection of Genesee and Crosby, she looked in her rearview mirror and did not

see a vehicle behind her, turned left onto the westbound lane of Crosby, and proceeded toward her

house. She said that, because her house was close to the Crosby-Genesee intersection, she did not

“have to speed up or slow down very much to start turning” into her driveway. Plaintiff rear-ended

Bardo as she was starting to turn into her driveway.

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Plaintiff testified that the collision occurred while she was on her way to work. According

to plaintiff, she also turned left onto Crosby from Genesee. Plaintiff said that she had “no idea”

how far away she was from Bardo’s vehicle when she first saw it, but “we were close.” Asked to

describe the collision, plaintiff testified, “So I turned on Crosby, started to accelerate, noticed that

[Bardo] was at a stop and tried to swerve to avoid her. I swerved left, so my right headlight area

got the most damage and hit her driver’s side.” When asked if she braked “when [she] saw”

Bardo’s vehicle, plaintiff replied in the affirmative. Plaintiff described the conditions at the time

of the accident as “clear and sunny,” not “raining or nothing,” and opined that weather did not play

a role in the collision. She also confirmed that nothing was obstructing her view of Bardo’s

vehicle. Plaintiff testified that she was not using or looking at her phone before the collision—she

was “looking down the road” with both hands on the steering wheel. The posted speed limit on

Crosby was 45 miles per hour, and plaintiff testified that she remained below that speed limit at

all times. When asked why she was “not able to slow [her] vehicle to a stop” before hitting Bardo,

plaintiff said that it was because she “didn’t know [Bardo] was stopped,” and she hit her brakes

“as soon as [she] noticed.”

The parties disputed whether Bardo’s brake lights and turn signal were working before the

collision. Bardo said that they were, while plaintiff said that they were not. The collision so

damaged Bardo’s vehicle that the turn signal and brake lights could not be tested. The officer who

responded to the scene did not issue a ticket to either driver because he “couldn’t determine if the

brake lights were actually out” on Bardo’s damaged vehicle. That officer also testified that the

collision occurred 412 feet from the intersection of Crosby and Genesee, and no one disputes this.

Neither the responding officer nor plaintiff observed any skid marks on the road following the

collision.

Plaintiff sustained injuries in the collision, and she commenced a lawsuit in which she

alleged claims against Bardo and Home-Owners that, as relevant to this appeal, hinged on

plaintiff’s claim that Bardo was negligent, and that Bardo’ negligence caused plaintiff’s injuries.

Bardo moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), arguing that plaintiff’s

negligence caused the collision, and even if Bardo was also negligent, no reasonable juror could

conclude that Bardo was more than 50% at-fault for the collision. Bardo elaborated that, because

plaintiff rear-ended Bardo’s vehicle, plaintiff was presumed negligent under MCL 257.402(a).

Plaintiff could not rebut this negligence by invoking the sudden-emergency doctrine, contended

Bardo, because confronting Bardo’s stopped vehicle in a residential area was not a sudden

emergency, regardless of the operability of Bardo’s brake lights or turn signal. This was especially

so, Bardo argued, because her vehicle would have been clearly visible to plaintiff for a significant

length of time before the collision—it was undisputed that, on the day of the collision, it was clear

and sunny, plaintiff had an unobstructed view of the road, the collision occurred 412 feet from

where plaintiff turned onto Crosby, and there was no evidence that Bardo had stopped suddenly.

Bardo argued that, given these facts, no reasonable juror could find that Bardo was more than 50%

at fault for the accident, so any recovery by plaintiff was precluded by MCL 500.3135(2)(b).

Home-Owners concurred with Bardo’s motion.

In response, plaintiff argued that Bardo was presumptively negligent because, viewing the

facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff, Bardo violated six statutes by driving a vehicle without

an operating turn signal or brake lights. Plaintiff also disagreed with Bardo’s assertion that plaintiff

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could not invoke the sudden-emergency doctrine because, according to plaintiff, she “found herself

in a sudden emergency” when she “did not see Defendant Bardo’s vehicle until moments before

impact and it was completely unusual and unsuspected that Defendant Bardo would be stopped in

the middle of the roadway.” That Bardo’s vehicle did not have working brake lights or a working

turn signal added to this emergency because it meant that plaintiff had no warning that “Bardo was

turning,” plaintiff contended.

At a hearing, the trial court agreed with Bardo’s argument, reasoning that plaintiff was

negligent in causing the accident, there was no sudden emergency, and a reasonable juror could

only conclude that plaintiff was more than 50% at fault for the accident. The court explained its

ruling as follows:

I think that the sudden emergency doctrine does not apply in this situation

because there is no indication that there was any sudden emergency. Obviously,

based on the case law that has been identified and the circumstances that follow,

the plaintiff in this matter turned the corner, had 412 feet to see any obstruction in

the roadway, and failed to adjust her car accordingly.

Going further, the question becomes whether or not, as part of this

discussion, is whether or not defendant Bardo was more than 51% at fault and—or

less than 51% at fault? Taking that—phrasing it the other way, with regard to

plaintiff, plaintiff, I believe, was more than 51% at fault. And think about it—the

Court views it like this. If defendant Bardo had parked her car there and walked

inside the house, obviously, plaintiff could not hit the car. Plaintiff would have a

duty to see the car and go around the car.

So and there is every indication that the weather was not a factor. If the car

was parked, then there would be no turn signal, there would be no break [sic] light

issue. You still could not go hit that car. So for those reasons, I am granting the

[motion for summary disposition].

The court entered separate orders granting summary disposition in favor of Bardo and Home-

Owners.1 This appeal followed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary disposition is reviewed de novo. Girimonte

v Liberty Mut Ins Co, 348 Mich App 768, 773; 19 NW3d 921 (2023). The trial court granted

summary disposition to Bardo and Home-Owners under MCR 2.116(C)(10). That subrule tests

the factual sufficiency of a claim. Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 120; 597 NW2d 817 (1999).

When reviewing a (C)(10) motion, courts must consider the evidence in the light most favorable

to the nonmoving party. Quinto v Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich 358, 362; 547 NW2d 314 (1996).

1

The order at issue on appeal with respect to Home-Owners was a partial grant of summary

disposition because plaintiff brought other claims against Home-Owners. The order resolving

those other claims is not at issue in this appeal.

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The moving party bears the initial burden of proving either that evidence affirmatively negates an

essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim, or that there is insufficient evidence in the record

to establish an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim. Id. If the moving party meets

this burden, then the burden “shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine issue of

disputed fact exists.” Id. A genuine issue of material fact exists when the record leaves open an

issue upon which reasonable minds could differ. West v Gen Motors Corp, 469 Mich 177, 183;

665 NW2d 468 (2003). If there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law, then the motion is properly granted. MCR 2.116(C)(10);

Quinto, 451 Mich at 363.

III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by granting summary disposition to Bardo and

Home-Owners under MCR 2.116(C)(10). We disagree.

For purposes of this appeal, we will assume that Bardo was negligent because, when

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, Bardo was driving a vehicle that did

not have working brake lights or a working turn single. We will further assume that Bardo’s

negligence was a proximate cause of the collision.2

Pursuant to statute, if one vehicle rear-ends another vehicle, the driver of the offending

“vehicle shall be deemed prima facie guilty of negligence.” MCL 257.402(a). This presumption

of negligence “may be rebutted by showing the existence of a sudden emergency.” White v Taylor

Distrib Co, Inc, 482 Mich 136, 139; 753 NW2d 591 (2008).3 For a sudden emergency to exist,

“the circumstances attending the accident must present a situation that is ‘unusual or

unsuspected.’ ” Vander Laan v Miedema, 385 Mich 226, 232; 188 NW2d 564 (1971) (quotation

marks and citation omitted). A situation is “unusual” in this context if it varies from a motorist’s

“everyday traffic routine.” Id. “Such an event is typically associated with a phenomenon of

nature.” Id. An “unsuspected” situation under the sudden-emergency doctrine refers to “a

potential peril within the everyday movement of traffic.” Id. “To come within the narrow confines

of the emergency doctrine as ‘unsuspected’ it is essential that the potential peril had not been in

clear view for any significant length of time, and was totally unexpected.” Id.

It is undisputed that plaintiff was driving her vehicle when it rear-ended Bardo’s vehicle,

so plaintiff is “deemed prima facie guilty of negligence.” MCL 257.402(a). Plaintiff contends

that she presented evidence to rebut this presumption of negligence because plaintiff confronting

2

Home-Owners argues in its brief on appeal that even if Bardo was negligent by operating a motor

vehicle without working brake lights and a working turn signal, she could still not be found liable

to plaintiff because Bardo’s presumed negligence did not proximately cause plaintiff to rear-end

Bardo. This issue was not raised in (let alone addressed by) the trial court.

3

The sudden-emergency doctrine is not an affirmative defense but an extension of the reasonably-

prudent-person rule. Szymborski v Slatina, 386 Mich 339, 341; 192 NW2d 213 (1971). It does

not negate a person’s negligence but places the person’s allegedly negligent conduct in context,

asking whether the person acted reasonably when confronted by a sudden emergency. Id.

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Bardo’s nonmoving (or slow-moving) vehicle—which did not have working brake lights or a

working turn signal—in the lane of travel constituted a sudden emergency.

A reasonable juror could not conclude this constituted sudden emergency, even when

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff. There was nothing “unusual” about

the situation plaintiff faced. Especially in residential areas, confronting nonmoving or slow-

moving vehicles—even ones that do not have their brake lights or turn signals lit up—is not

unexpected. Navigating around such vehicles is a typical part of any motorist’s “everyday traffic

routine,” and it is certainly not the type of natural phenomenon “typically associated” with

“unusual” situations that the sudden-emergency doctrine is intended to address. Id.

We also reject plaintiff’s argument that confronting Bardo’s vehicle may have been an

“unsuspected” situation under the sudden-emergency doctrine. Again, “[t]o come within the

narrow confines of the emergency doctrine as ‘unsuspected’ it is essential that the potential peril

had not been in clear view for any significant length of time, and was totally unexpected.” Id. On

this point, Vander Laan is instructive. There, the defendant was driving a truck behind the

plaintiff’s vehicle. Id. at 229. The plaintiff started to brake when the vehicle in front of her did

the same, and “[a]t about the same time,” the defendant went over a bump and looked in his

rearview mirror for “just a second or so” to make sure his load was still secure. Id. When the

defendant looked back, the plaintiff’s “car was stopped (or virtually so) in front of” the defendant,

and the defendant’s vehicle rear-ended the plaintiff’s. Id. The Vander Laan Court held that, on

these facts, there was no “emergency confronting” the defendant because, even if the defendant

was not always looking forward, he always had a clear view of what was in front of him:

Just prior to the accident [the defendant] had been travelling only “two or three car

lengths, maybe four” behind the plaintiff, “probably” at a speed of 20-25 m.p.h.

[The defendant] had just turned onto Aberdeen Street, and as indicated by his own

testimony, the entire pre-accident setting was in his clear view. This included the

hill, the [truck in front of plaintiff], which he knew was loaded, and the [plaintiff’s]

vehicle.

This whole scene continued to be in actual view at all times except for a

“second or so” when [the defendant] glanced in his rearview mirror after hitting a

bump in the road. While the process of looking in the rear-view mirror may have

interrupted defendant’s actual view of the scene, he is still held to have had clear

view. [Id. at 233.]

Like the defendant in Vander Laan, plaintiff here always had a clear view of what was in

front of her. The conditions were clear, and nothing was obstructing plaintiff’s view. Yet, for

whatever reason, plaintiff did not see Bardo’s vehicle until they “were close.” This was despite

the fact that the collision occurred 412 feet from where plaintiff turned onto Crosby, and Bardo’s

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vehicle was in front of plaintiff the entire time she was on Crosby.4 While it is unclear why plaintiff

did not see Bardo’s vehicle until they “were close,” she “is still held to have had clear view” of the

potential peril the entire time she was on Crosby. Id. See also Moore v Spangler, 401 Mich 360,

383; 258 NW2d 34 (1977) (relying on Vander Laan to conclude that a vehicle suddenly stopping

in front of the defendant did not constitute a sudden emergency because the defendant had an

uninterrupted view of what was in front of him). And given how far away from the intersection

of Crosby and Genesee that the collision occurred and the relatively slow speed that plaintiff

claimed to be traveling, plaintiff’s clear view of the potential peril lasted for a not-insignificant

length of time. Accordingly, on this record, confronting Bardo’s vehicle was not an “unsuspected”

situation “within the narrow confines of the emergency doctrine.” Vander Laan, 385 Mich at 232.

And because the record does not support that plaintiff was confronted with an “unusual” or

“unsuspected” situation before rear-ending Bardo, she cannot avail herself of the sudden-

emergency doctrine to rebut her presumed negligence.

This conclusion means that plaintiff’s prima facie negligence is unrebutted. But, as stated

above, we are assuming for purposes of this opinion that Bardo was also negligent because,

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, Bardo was operating a vehicle without

working brake lights or a working turn signal. The trial court concluded that plaintiff was

precluded from recovering damages against Bardo under MCL 500.3135(2)(b) because no

reasonable juror could find that Bardo was 50% or more at fault for the accident. MCL

500.3135(2)(b) provides that, for a cause of action in tort, “[d]amages must be assessed on the

basis of comparative fault, except that damages must not be assessed in favor of a party who is

more than 50% at fault.” Under this rule, even if a defendant was negligent, if “no reasonable

juror could find that [the] defendant was more at fault than the [other party involved] in the

accident,” then summary disposition should be granted in favor of the defendant as a matter of

law. Huggins v Scripter, 469 Mich 898, 898; 669 NW2d 813 (2003). See also Rowland v City of

Detroit, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2025) (Docket No. 372120); slip op at 8 (holding

that the “plaintiff’s own conduct so plainly exceeded any arguable negligence by defendants that

the case cannot proceed to a jury under MCL 500.3135(2)(b)”).

To address this argument, we begin by revisiting the parties’ testimony about the

circumstances of the collision. The collision occurred on Crosby Road, 412 feet away from where

Crosby intersects with Genesee Road. Plaintiff turned onto Crosby from Genesee just before the

collision. The conditions at the time were clear, and there was nothing obstructing plaintiff’s view.

Bardo also turned onto Crosby from Genesee, and she must have done so before plaintiff because

plaintiff rear-ended Bardo, and no evidence suggests that Bardo overtook plaintiff on Crosby. Yet,

despite Bardo being in front of plaintiff the entire time plaintiff was traveling on Crosby, plaintiff

said that she did not see Bardo’s vehicle until they “were close.” More notably, plaintiff never

said that she saw Bardo’s vehicle moving while traveling behind it and could not perceive that

Bardo was slowing down or stopping before the collision. Instead, plaintiff repeatedly testified

that, when she saw Bardo’s vehicle, it was stopped. Asked to describe the accident, plaintiff

4

Both Bardo and plaintiff testified that they turned left onto Crosby from Genesee, and Bardo

must have done so before plaintiff because plaintiff rear-ended Bardo, and nothing suggests (and

no one contends) that Bardo overtook plaintiff on Crosby.

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testified, “So I turned on Crosby, started to accelerate, noticed that [Bardo] was at a stop and tried

to swerve to avoid her.” Plaintiff was then asked if she braked “when [she] saw” Bardo’s vehicle,

and she replied in the affirmative. And when asked why she was “not able to slow [her] vehicle

to a stop” to avoid hitting Bardo, plaintiff said that she “didn’t know [Bardo] was stopped,” and

“as soon as [she] noticed [Bardo] stopped, [she] swerved and hit the brake[s].” Only plaintiff

knows what she perceived before the collision, see Price v Austin, 509 Mich 938, 938 (2022)

(explaining that “only [the driver] could know what happened inside his truck that day”), and

plaintiff never testified that she was trailing Bardo’s moving vehicle and did not perceive that

Bardo was slowing down or stopping before the collision. Plaintiff only testified that she saw

Bardo’s car when it was “stopped,” but did not see the car until they “were close,” and despite

immediately applying the brakes, she did not have time to avoid the collision. No one observed

any skid marks on the road following the collision, and Bardo’s vehicle was so damaged by the

collision that neither its brake lights nor turn signals could be tested to see if they were working.

On this record, no reasonable juror could conclude that Bardo was more at fault for the

collision than plaintiff. Bardo was purportedly negligent by operating a vehicle without working

brake lights and a working turn signal. Plaintiff, on the other hand, was negligent because, despite

it being a clear and sunny day with nothing obstructing her view, she did not see Bardo’s “stopped”

car in front of her until they “were close,” at which point it was too late to avoid a collision, so

plaintiff rear-ended Bardo. Based on plaintiff’s testimony about what she perceived before the

accident, it is clear that even if Bardo was merely driving very slowly in the lane of travel—or, as

the trial court noted, if Bardo’s vehicle was parked in the road—plaintiff would have still rear-

ended Bardo’s vehicle. On such a record, a reasonable juror could only conclude that plaintiff was

more at-fault for the collision than Bardo, so MCL 500.3135(2)(b) precludes plaintiff from

recovering damages, and her negligence claim against Bardo fails as a matter of law. 5 See

Huggins, 469 Mich at 898.

5

Even if plaintiff did observe Bardo’s vehicle moving while plaintiff was traveling behind it, we

would still conclude that no reasonable juror could conclude that Bardo was more at fault for the

collision than plaintiff. The collision occurred 412 feet from where plaintiff turned onto Crosby.

Crosby is a straight, two-lane road, the conditions at the time were clear, and nothing obstructed

plaintiff’s view. This means that Bardo’s vehicle would have been visible to plaintiff the entire

time she was on Crosby. Plaintiff clearly would have been able to perceive that she was gaining

on Bardo’s vehicle as she drove along Crosby, yet she failed to adjust her speed or apply her brakes

in time to avoid colliding with Bardo’s vehicle. This was despite the fact that there is no evidence

that Bardo’s speed changed abruptly, such as if she slammed on her brakes. Indeed, the only

evidence in the record about how Bardo was driving before the collision is Bardo’s testimony that

she did not “have to speed up or slow down very much to start turning” into her driveway because

it was so close to the intersection from where Bardo had just turned. Additionally, no skid marks

were observed at the scene, and the collision so damaged Bardo’s vehicle that its brake lights and

turn signal could not be tested afterwards. On this record, even viewing this evidence in the light

most favorable to plaintiff and accounting for the fact that the lack of brake lights or a turn signal

on Bardo’s vehicle would have made it more difficult for plaintiff to perceive that Bardo may have

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The trial court therefore properly granted summary disposition (1) in favor of Bardo on

plaintiff’s claim of negligence against her, and (2) in favor of Home-Owners on plaintiff’s claim

against Home-Owners that hinged on plaintiff’s negligence claim against Bardo.

Affirmed.

/s/ Brock A. Swartzle

/s/ Colleen A. O’Brien

been slowing down to turn into her driveway, no reasonable juror could conclude that Bardo was

more at fault for the collision than plaintiff.

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