State of Tennessee v. Albert Dejuan White

02/27/2026

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

February 3, 2026 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. ALBERT DEJUAN WHITE

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Tipton County

No. 11361 A. Blake Neill, Judge

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No. W2025-00253-CCA-R3-CD

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STEVEN W. SWORD, J., concurring in results.

I write separately from the well-reasoned majority opinion because I would reach a

different conclusion regarding whether law enforcement officers violated Miranda v.

Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), as explained below. In all other respects, I agree with the

opinion and concur in the results.

The majority opinion concisely and accurately delineates the law regarding

Miranda’s implications for statements made by someone in police custody, as well as the

facts found by the trial court. They need not be rehashed here in detail. My point of

difference is based on the application of the law to the facts, which we review de novo with

no presumption of correctness. State v. Tuttle, 515 S.W.3d 282, 299 (Tenn. 2017) (citing

State v. Walton, 41 S.W.3d 75, 81 (Tenn. 2001) and then citing State v. Crutcher, 989

S.W.2d 295, 299 (Tenn. 1999)). Specifically, I contend that the actions of the law

enforcement officers after the Defendant expressed his desire for his parents to be allowed

to return home and avoid the summer heat violated the Defendant’s rights under Miranda.

Both parties questioned Investigator Williams at the suppression hearing about the

exchange he had with the Defendant during the execution of the search warrant at his

parents’ home. Investigator Williams had the following exchange during his testimony:

Q. Did you ever ask him to show you where anything was located?

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A. I didn’t ask him, but he told me he would show us where everything was.

And I said, okay, point the direction. (emphasis added).

Detective Baylous testified that after Investigator Williams informed him that the

Defendant volunteered to show them where the drugs were located to speed up the process

of the search and get his parents back inside the home, he approached the Defendant to

confirm that he was going show them where the narcotics were. Detective Baylous then

had the following exchange with defense counsel:

A. I told Mr. White, I was like, are you going to show us where the drugs

were.

Q. Exactly. You asked him the question, are you going to show us where the

drugs are?

A. That was it.

From the moment law enforcement arrived to serve the search warrant, the

Defendant had been under law enforcement's control. The parties agreed that the

Defendant was in custody for Miranda purposes, was in handcuffs, and was always under

the supervision of at least one officer. As soon as he had the conversation with the officers

about showing them where the drugs would be found, he walked to the shed and pointed

to the drugs, while still in the custody of the officers. It is my opinion that the follow-up

question by Detective Baylous to the Defendant of whether he was going to show them

where the drugs were, and the action of directing him to “point the way” to the drugs by

Investigator Williams, qualify as interrogation designed to elicit an incriminating response.

See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980) (“[T]he term “interrogation” under

Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part

of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police

should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.”)

See also State v. Northern, 262 S.W.3d 741, 750 (Tenn. 2008). Since this was done without

the benefit of the Miranda warnings, law enforcement’s actions violated Miranda.

I do not disagree with the majority that the Defendant initiated the conversation that

he would show them where the drugs were located. This was a spontaneous statement by

the Defendant, not a response to interrogation, and therefore not in violation of Miranda.

See State v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d 318, 320 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983). His initial statements

neither described where the drugs were nor pointed to their location. He merely revealed

that he possessed such knowledge, which is relevant to guilt and admissible. However, it

was not until the officers asked follow-up questions and directed him to lead them to the

drugs that they gained the additional incriminating information and discovered the larger

quantity of drugs. It is irrelevant, for purposes of a Miranda analysis, who initiated the

conversation. If law enforcement conducts any interrogation designed to elicit an

incriminating response, they must first give Miranda warnings to the person in custody.

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Here, the officers went beyond receiving the Defendant’s spontaneous declaration. Once

the spontaneous declaration was made, the officers took further action to obtain additional

information from the Defendant. This amounted to custodial interrogation. Once the

Defendant stated that he would show the officers where the drugs were located, the officers

should have given the Defendant his Miranda warnings before having him lead them to the

location. I would hold that the act of the Defendant leading the officers to the drugs in the

shed and pointing to their location should have been suppressed solely on Miranda

grounds.

Although I do not agree with the majority’s opinion on this issue, I do concur with

the results. The Miranda violation would only result in the suppression of the statements,

not necessarily the fruits of the violation. See State v. Climer, 400 S.W.3d 537, 567 (Tenn.

2013). A violation of Miranda does not necessitate suppression of physical evidence

discovered as a result of the statement, as long as the statement was otherwise voluntarily

made. See U.S. v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 644 (2002) (“[A]lthough it is true that the Court

requires the exclusion of the physical fruit of actually coerced statements, it must be

remembered that statements taken without sufficient Miranda warnings are presumed to

have been coerced only for certain purposes and then only when necessary to protect the

privilege against self-incrimination. . . . [W]e decline to extend that presumption further.”).

Here, the Defendant does not argue that the officers engaged in any coercive behavior.

Although the Defendant notes that he was concerned about the welfare of his frail parents,

he made no claim in the trial court or on appeal that his statement was involuntary beyond

his Miranda argument.

Furthermore, both officers testified that the search warrant authorized the search of

all outer buildings, and they would have eventually searched the shed where the large

quantity of narcotics was found, regardless of any statements made by the Defendant.

Thus, the doctrine of inevitable discovery would likely justify admission of the narcotics

in this very unique set of circumstances, even had the statement been involuntarily made.

See State v. Cothran, 115 S.W.3d 513, 525 (Tenn. 2003) (“Under the inevitable discovery

doctrine, illegally obtained evidence is admissible if the evidence would have otherwise

been discovered by lawful means.” (first citing Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984),

and then citing State v. Ensley, 956 S.W.2d 502, 511 (Tenn.Crim.App.1996)).

For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully submit this separate opinion concurring in

the results.

s/ Steven W. Sword_________

STEVEN W. SWORD, JUDGE

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