State of Tennessee v. Albert Dejuan White

02/27/2026

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

February 3, 2026 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. ALBERT DEJUAN WHITE

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Tipton County

No. 11361 A. Blake Neill, Judge

___________________________________

No. W2025-00253-CCA-R3-CD

___________________________________

Defendant, Albert Dejuan White, appeals his Tipton County Circuit Court trial convictions

of possession with intent to deliver twenty-six grams or more of cocaine, possession of a

firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and possession of drug

paraphernalia, arguing that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence

and statements obtained during the search of his residence and that the evidence was

insufficient to support his convictions. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the

judgments of the trial court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Circuit Court Affirmed

MATTHEW J. WILSON, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which KYLE A. HIXSON, J.,

joined. STEVEN W. SWORD, J., concurring in part and concurring in the results.

Josie Holland, Memphis, Tennessee (on appeal); and J. Barney Witherington, IV (at trial),

for the appellant, Albert Dejuan White.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; G. Kirby May, Assistant Attorney

General; Mark Davidson, District Attorney General; and Sean Hord and Jason Poyner,

Assistant District Attorneys General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

Defendant’s convictions for possession of cocaine with the intent to deliver,

possession a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and possession of drug

paraphernalia arose from the July 11, 2023, execution of a search warrant at the residence

Defendant shared with his elderly parents.

1

Factual and Procedural Background

On March 4, 2024, the Tipton County Grand Jury charged Defendant with one count

of possession with intent to deliver twenty-six grams or more of cocaine, see Tenn. Code

Ann. § 39-17-417, one count of possession with intent to deliver one-half ounce or more

of marijuana, see id., one count of possession of a firearm during the commission of or

attempt to commit the dangerous felony of cocaine possession after having previously been

convicted of two felony offenses, see id. § 39-17-1324, and one count of possession of drug

paraphernalia, see id. § 39-17-425.

I. Motion to Suppress

Following his indictment, Defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained

during the search of the residence he shared with his parents (“the residence”), arguing that

the affidavit in support of the search warrant did not contain facts sufficient to establish a

nexus between the alleged criminal conduct and the residence, and the statements he made

to law enforcement officers during the execution of the warrant, arguing that the statements

were taken in the absence of Miranda1 warnings.

At the hearing on the motion, Tipton County Sheriff’s Office (“TCSO”) Investigator

Christopher Baylous testified that he led an investigation into Defendant’s alleged drug

activity and that, as part of his investigation, he obtained and executed a search warrant at

the address listed on Defendant’s driver’s license, car registration, and cell phone account.

The investigator testified that before obtaining the search warrant, he and other officers

monitored a series of three completed controlled buys between Defendant and a

confidential informant2 in front of the residence using GPS-equipped recording equipment

and a camera-equipped drone. Additionally, a fourth controlled buy was scheduled to occur

at the residence on the day the warrant was executed. The investigator applied for a warrant

to search the residence and premises where the controlled buys occurred for: “Any

evidence which could have been used to facilitate or otherwise contribute to the possession,

sale, manufacture, or delivery of Schedule II narcotics, including but not limited to

narcotics, ledgers, cellular telephones, paraphernalia, and or proceeds gained or comingled

with proceeds obtained through the illegal trafficking of narcotics.” The affidavit in

support of the search warrant, which was also exhibited to the investigator’s testimony,

contained the following factual basis:

1

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

2

The informant also testified at the hearing, but we have not included her testimony because our

review of the validity of the search warrant is confined to the information included in the affidavit.

2

Statement of Facts and Circumstances In Support of

Probable Cause

Investigator Chris Baylous states the following under oath:

(Background of Investigation) After several months of

receiving intel that [Defendant]3 was conducting narcotics

transactions at multiple locations throughout Tipton County,

Tennessee, as well as, his residence of 356 Walton Loop,

Covington, Tipton County, Tennessee 38019, Investigators

began attempting to acquire a confidential informant to utilize

for the purpose of purchasing illegal narcotics from

[Defendant]. On multiple occasions, Tipton County Sheriff’s

Office Narcotics Investigators spoke with undercover agent

00420, about [Defendant]. Undercover agent 00420 advised

that they were very aware of [Defendant], and he is most

commonly known as “Big Juan.” When asked if whether or

not they could purchase narcotics from [Defendant],

undercover agent 00420 stated “yes, that when they were

previously a drug user, they purchased cocaine from

[Defendant]. Undercover Agent 00420 then spoke with

[Defendant], and arranged a narcotics transaction for $100.00

worth of powder cocaine.

(Incident # 2307051710) On 05 July 2023, Tipton County

Sheriff’s Office Narcotics Investigators met with Undercover

Agent 00420 in reference to a prearranged deal to purchase 1.5

grams of Cocaine for $100.00 from [Defendant]. The agent

was provided $100.00 in TCSO Drug Fund currency to conduct

the narcotics transaction. The UA was also equipped with

audio and surveillance equipment to observe and live time

monitor the transaction. The Undercover Agent met

[Defendant] at his residence located at 356 Walton Loop in

Covington, TN and purchased 1.5 grams of a white powdery

substance for $100.00. Investigators remained in the area

conducting surveillance until the transaction was completed.

After making the purchase, the UA returned to a predetermined

location and Investigator Baylous took possession of the 1.5

grams of white powdery substance and placed it into evidence.

Prior to the 1.5 grams of powdery substance being placed into

evidence it was field tested. The result of the field test

3

We have omitted Defendant’s date of birth and social security number.

3

indicated a positive result for the presence of cocaine. The 1 5

grams will be submitted for testing and this incident will be

forwarded to the District Attorney for consideration of

prosecution for Delivery of Schedule II. This incident occurred

at approximately 1710 hours. Prior to and upon completion of

the operation both the Undercover Agent and Undercover

Agent’s vehicle were searched. This transaction was also

observed by Investigator Brandon Williams.

(Incident # 2307061800) On 06 July 2023, Tipton County

Sheriff’s Office Narcotics Investigators met with UA 00420 in

reference to a prearranged deal to purchase 1.5 grams of

Cocaine (powder) and 1.5 grams of Cocaine (rock) for $200,00

from [Defendant]. The agent was provided $200.00 in TCSO

Drug Fund currency to conduct the narcotics transaction. The

UA was also equipped with audio and surveillance equipment

to observe and live time monitor the transaction. The

Undercover Agent met [Defendant] at his residence located at

356 Walton Loop in Covington, TN and purchased 1.5 grams

of a white powdery substance and 1.5 grams of a white rock

substance for $200.00. Investigators remained in the area

conducting surveillance until the transaction was completed.

After making the purchase, the UA returned to a predetermined

location and Investigator Baylous took possession of the 1.5

grams of white powdery substance along with the 1.5 grams of

white rock substance and placed it into evidence. The 1.5

grams of powder and 1.5 grams of rock will be submitted for

testing and this incident will be forwarded to the District

Attorney for consideration of prosecution for Delivery of

Schedule II. This incident occurred at approximately 1800

hours. Prior to and upon completion of the operation both the

UA and UA’s vehicle were searched. This transaction was also

observed by Investigator Brandon Williams.

(Incident # 2307072000) On 07 July 2023, Tipton County

Sheriff’s Office Narcotics Investigators met with UA 00420 in

reference to a prearranged deal to purchase 4 grams of Cocaine

(powder) and 4 grams of Cocaine (rock) for $400.00 from

[Defendant]. The agent was provided $400.00 in TCSO Drug

Fund currency to conduct the narcotics transaction. The UA

was also equipped with audio and surveillance equipment to

observe and live time monitor the transaction. The Undercover

Agent met [Defendant] at his residence located at 356 Walton

4

Loop in Covington, TN and purchased 4 grams of a white

powdery substance and 4 grams of a white rock substance for

$400.00. Investigators remained in the area conducting

surveillance until the transaction was completed. After making

the purchase, the UA returned to a predetermined location and

Investigator Baylous took possession of the 4 grams of white

powdery substance along with the 4 grams of white rock

substance and placed it into evidence. The 4 grams of powder

and 4 grams of rock will be submitted for testing and this

incident will be forwarded to the District Attorney for

consideration of prosecution for Delivery of Schedule II. This

incident occurred at approximately 2000 hours. Prior to and

upon completion of the operation both the UA and UA’s

vehicle were searched. This transaction was also observed by

Investigator Brandon Williams.

(Continuation of Investigation) Due to the fact that multiple

transactions between Undercover Agent 00420 and

[Defendant], have occurred, I believe that [Defendant] is in

possession of a large quantity of illegal narcotics and has been

known to hide large quantities of narcotics, proceeds from

narcotics transactions and/or other evidence throughout his

property in locations not commonly located or accessed by law

enforcement. Furthermore on 7-11-2023 UA 00420 advised

that another transaction was scheduled for 7-11-2023.

(Undercover Agent Reliability) Undercover Agent 00420, has

been a paid Informant with the Tipton County Sheriff’s Office

since June of 2022 Undercover Agent 00420 has conducted no

less than twenty (20) undercover operations with the Tipton

County Sheriff’s Office involving the purchasing and

intelligence gathering of multiple narcotics traffickers within

Tipton County. Tennessee. The Undercover Agent began their

assistance with providing names of known narcotics traffickers

within Tipton County, Tennessee, fo11owed by: purchasing

narcotics from those narcotics traffickers for Investigators to

present to the District Attorney for consideration of

prosecution. Many of those transactions are set to be presented

to the Tipton County Grand Jury in upcoming term(s). On

every undercover operation conducted utilizing Undercover

Agent 00420 as a purchaser of narcotics and/or intelligence

gathering, they have been successful on both segments. In all

5

accounts, the Undercover Agent has been determined to be

extremely reliable and trustworthy.

Experience and Basis of Knowledge of Affiant

Investigator Chris Baylous, with the Tipton County Sheriff’s

Office since August 2017, having the authority as an active

sworn law enforcement officer by statute from Tennessee Code

Annotated 38-08-107 et. seq. I graduated from the Tennessee

Law Enforcement Training Academy (TLETA) in March of

2018 and am currently assigned to the Criminal Investigations

Division. I have six years of service in law enforcement, all of

which have been with the Tipton County Sheriff’s Office. My

law enforcement experience includes specialized training in

the areas of patrol techniques, firearms training, special

weapons and tactics, police supervisor course, crime scene

management and processing, case file documentation,

interview and interrogation techniques, evidence processing,

and courtroom procedures and testimony. I have been assigned

to the Criminal Investigation Division of the Tipton County

Sheriff’s Office holding the rank of Investigator since May

2023. I have also previously served in the United States Armed

Forces both in the United States Marine Corps as well as the

United States Army where I was Honorably Discharged

achieving the rank of Staff Sergeant. I have been a P.O.S.T

certified law enforcement officer since graduating the academy

and have maintained my certification with a minimum of forty

hours of in service training each year.

CONCLUSION

Therefore, considering the foregoing, your Affiant believes

based on his knowledge, training and experience that evidence

of violations of Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-17-417,

Possession of Schedule II narcotics with the intent to

manufacture, sell and/or deliver will be located at the

residence.

Based on the information contained in the affidavit, the trial court issued a warrant to

search: the residence, “[a]ll outer buildings located on the premises,” “[a]ll vehicles located

on the premises,” “[a]ll open areas or property grounds located on the premises,” “[a]ll

locked and unlocked compartments/safes and bedrooms within” the residence, and “[a]ny

attic spaces or other spaces within” the residence.

6

Investigator Baylous testified that SWAT officers arrived at the residence before he

did and placed Defendant in handcuffs. When he arrived, the investigator told Defendant

that they were there to execute a search warrant and provided him with a copy of the

warrant. Investigator Baylous said he did not provide Defendant with Miranda warnings

because he did not intend to ask Defendant any questions.

At some point, Investigator Brandon Williams told Investigator Baylous that

Defendant “was going to show us where the narcotics were located on the property.”

Investigator Baylous asked Defendant whether he was “going to show us where the drugs

are,” and Defendant told officers that “they were out towards the shed, and he started

walking that direction.” Officers found the narcotics in a shed behind the house.

Investigator Baylous stated that Defendant made no other statements at the scene.

Investigator Baylous said that because the search warrant was for the residence, grounds,

any outbuildings or vehicles on the premises, officers would have searched the shed

regardless of what Defendant told them.

Investigator Williams testified that he monitored each of the controlled transactions

between Defendant and the confidential informant, all of which occurred in the road in

front of the residence or in its driveway. Investigator Williams recalled speaking to

Defendant on the day of the search but said that he did not provide Miranda warnings to

Defendant because he “didn’t ask him any questions” related to the investigation. He stated

that although he could not recall how their conversation began, Defendant asked him to

take his elderly parents back into the house. Investigator Williams told Defendant that he

knew that the officers were there to execute a search warrant and that he would be glad to

“speed up the process.” At that point, Defendant said that he would “show [officers] where

everything is if we can get my mama and daddy back in the house out of the weather.”

Investigator Williams denied telling Defendant directly that they would allow his parents

to go inside more quickly if Defendant told them where the drugs were located.

TCSO Deputy Zach Wallace, who was one of the first officers to arrive to help

execute the search warrant, recalled that when the officers began to arrive, Defendant was

standing in the driveway of the residence. As soon as he saw the officers, Defendant “threw

two small bags with a white substance into the ditch across the street.” Defendant was

placed in handcuffs immediately thereafter.

Defendant testified that at the time of the search of the residence, he lived there with

his parents because his mother was sick and he had temporarily separated from his wife.

Defendant said that he kept all his possessions in a single room at the residence and that he

was free to come and go as he wished from that room.

Defendant argued that the facts as alleged in the affidavit in support of the search

warrant were insufficient to establish a nexus between the controlled buys and the residence

itself because it did not contain any information to establish that Defendant resided there.

7

In a written order denying the motion, the trial court described the issue as “a close

call” but concluded that the affidavit contained sufficient facts to support the finding of

probable cause to search the residence. The court observed that (1) all three controlled

buys occurred at the residence, (2) the controlled buys occurred on consecutive days, and

(3) the affidavit explicitly provided that the transactions occurred at Defendant’s residence.

II. Bench Trial

Immediately prior to trial, the State dismissed Count 4 of the indictment, which

charged Defendant with possession with intent to deliver marijuana, and proceeded to a

bench trial on the remaining charges.

Investigator Baylous testified that after arranging multiple controlled buys between

Defendant and a confidential informant at Defendant’s residence, he obtained and executed

a search warrant at Defendant’s residence on July 11, 2023. He said that members of the

SWAT team “intercepted” Defendant “during the exchange or just prior to when the

[fourth] exchange was supposed to happen.” Defendant was detained in handcuffs, and his

family members were escorted outside to wait.

During the search, officers found a 12-gauge shotgun “propped up in the corner” of

a bedroom that contained numerous personal items belonging to Defendant, including

copies of his driver’s license bearing the address of the residence, bank deposit slips with

that same address, a police report from an accident listing Defendant’s address as the

residence, Defendant’s social security card, and clothing and shoes consistent with

Defendant’s size. A personal safe found in the room contained $8,022 in cash.

Officers discovered “a prepackage of green plant-like material believed to be

marijuana” and a bag containing 80.5 grams of “a white powder substance” “located in an

outbuilding behind the primary residence.” Investigator Baylous said that while he was

searching another part of the property, Investigator Williams approached him and said that

Defendant had agreed to tell them where the narcotics were located. He stated that he then

asked Defendant “to confirm that he was going to show us where the narcotics were” and

that Defendant “walked us to a shed that was behind the residence.” Investigator Baylous

said that the shed was listed in the search warrant as part of the property to be searched and

that officers would have searched the shed even if Defendant had not led them to it.

During cross-examination, Investigator Baylous agreed that in his type-written

report, he stated that he had asked Defendant to show them where the drugs were located.

Investigator Baylous said that he conducted surveillance on the residence at times other

than the controlled buys and observed Defendant coming and going from the residence.

Investigator Baylous stated that Defendant selected the location where the controlled buys

were to occur. Investigator Baylous said that Investigator Williams observed Defendant

on the property during each transaction. He stated that “at least two” of the transactions

occurred “directly in front of the residence at the end of the driveway.”

8

During redirect examination, Investigator Baylous testified that he considered the

driveway to be a part of the residence. He also stated that officers did not discover any

documents that listed a different address for Defendant. Investigator Baylous recalled that

Defendant testified at the suppression hearing that he was living at the residence at the time

of the controlled buys and the search. He testified that he discovered that Defendant had a

prior conviction for felony evading arrest.

Deputy Wallace testified consistently with his testimony at the suppression hearing

during direct examination, and we will not repeat it here. During cross-examination, the

deputy confirmed that he observed Defendant standing either in the driveway or in the

roadway just at the edge of the driveway and that he saw two “items fly through the air”

from the area where Defendant stood alone into the ditch across the road.

TCSO Deputy Bryan Lavery arrived at Defendant’s residence just after the SWAT

team and was asked to deploy his narcotics-trained canine to the area of the ditch where

the two items landed. When the canine indicated the presence of narcotics, Deputy Lavery

advised other officers on the scene but did not collect the items himself.

TCSO Detective Javier Rodriguez took photographs and collected evidence during

the execution of the search warrant at Defendant’s residence. After Deputy Lavery told

him that the canine had located items in the ditch, Detective Rodriguez photographed and

collected the two plastic bags containing a white powdery substance. Detective Rodriguez

also photographed and collected items from inside a shed on the property, including: “a red

bag with green leafy substance in a vacuum sealed bag” and a scale. A USB flash drive

containing 172 photographs and one video recording taken during the execution of the

search warrant was exhibited to the detective’s testimony. Detective Rodriguez testified

that he obtained a key to a safe inside the residence from “either [Defendant’s] sister or off

a key chain” at the residence and gave it to Investigator Baylous.

Investigator Williams testified that when he arrived at the residence, the SWAT team

had Defendant and his parents outside. Investigator Williams said that he did not ask

Defendant any questions and that, instead, Defendant asked the investigator “if we could

get his mama and his daddy back in the house” given that “it was hot outside and they are

elderly.” Investigator Williams told Defendant that as soon as the police were done with

the search, “we’ll get them back in the house as soon as we can. The quicker we find the

drugs or contraband, we can get them back inside.” At that point, Defendant said, “if we

can get them back inside, I’ll take you to them. I’ll show you where they’re at.”

During cross-examination, Investigator Williams testified that he conducted

surveillance of the three completed controlled buys that precipitated the search in this case

and that on each occasion, he observed Defendant “coming from the house, from the side

of the house” to the edge of the road to meet the confidential informant, who “would pull

up to the residence.”

9

TCSO Deputy and Evidence Technician Andrew Harrington testified that he

received the items collected during the search, including “a 12 gauge semiautomatic

shotgun” along with three magazines and ammunition and three bags containing white

powder. Deputy Harrington sent the three bags—one weighing 80 grams, one weighing

3.6 grams, and one weighing 2.6 grams—of white powder to the Tennessee Bureau of

Investigation (“TBI”) for testing. Deputy Harrington also identified a scale and two boxes

of “fold top baggies” collected during the search. Finally, Deputy Harrington testified that

he placed the $8,022 in cash that was collected during the search into a bank account.

TBI Special Agent and Forensic Scientist Rachel Strandquist performed forensic

testing on the white powdery substance discovered in a shed in Defendant’s backyard and

determined that it was 79.31 grams of cocaine. Testing of “white compressed powder”

found in the ditch established that it was 3.39 grams of cocaine, and testing of “an off-

white, rock-like substance” found in the same ditch established that it was 3.13 grams of

cocaine.

Based upon this evidence, the trial court convicted Defendant of possession with

intent to deliver twenty-six grams or more of cocaine and possession of drug paraphernalia.

The court reserved ruling on the remaining count charging possession of a firearm with the

intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony and invited the parties to

submit supplemental briefing and argument on the issue. After listening to supplemental

arguments at the sentencing hearing, the trial court convicted Defendant of the remaining

charge.

Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a Range I sentence of ten

years’ incarceration for Defendant’s conviction of possession with intent to deliver twenty-

six grams or more of cocaine, a concurrent sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine

days for his conviction of possession of drug paraphernalia, and a consecutive sentence of

five years to be served at 100 percent by operation of law for his conviction of possession

of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony.

Defendant filed a timely but unsuccessful motion for new trial in which he

challenged the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress and the sufficiency of the

evidence supporting his conviction of possession of a firearm during the commission of a

dangerous felony. This timely appeal followed.

Analysis

On appeal, Defendant asserts that the trial court erred by denying his motion to

suppress the evidence and statements obtained during the search of the residence he shared

with his parents and the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. We consider each claim in

turn.

10

I. Motion to Suppress

Defendant argues that the trial court should have suppressed the evidence obtained

during the execution of the search warrant because the information in the warrant affidavit

was insufficient to establish a nexus between the controlled buys and the residence, because

the warrant failed to describe the place to be searched with constitutionally sufficient

particularity, and because the warrant affidavit failed to establish the reliability of the

confidential informant. The State contends that the trial court did not err by concluding

that the warrant satisfied the nexus requirement and that Defendant waived plenary review

of the remaining claims. We agree with the State.

A. Standard of Review

A trial court’s factual findings on a motion to suppress are conclusive on appeal

unless the evidence preponderates against them. State v. Binette, 33 S.W.3d 215, 217

(Tenn. 2000); State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996). Thus, questions of

credibility, the weight and value of the evidence, and the resolution of conflicting evidence

are matters entrusted to the trial judge as the trier of fact. Odom, 928 S.W.2d at 23; see

also Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d). “The party prevailing in the trial court ‘is entitled to the

strongest legitimate view of the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing as well as all

reasonable and legitimate inferences that may be drawn from [the] evidence.’” State v.

Tuttle, 515 S.W.3d 282, 299 (Tenn. 2017) (quoting State v. Bell, 429 S.W.3d 524, 529 (Tenn.

2014). We review the trial court’s application of the law to the facts de novo, “and the

appellate court is not obliged to afford a presumption of correctness to the lower court’s

conclusions of law.” Id. (citing State v. Walton, 41 S.W.3d 75, 81 (Tenn. 2001)).

B. General Principles

Both the state and federal constitutions offer protection from unreasonable searches

and seizures; the general rule is that a warrantless search or seizure is presumed

unreasonable, and any evidence discovered is subject to suppression. See U.S. Const.

amend. IV; Tenn. Const. art. I, § 7. Conversely, “in a doubtful or marginal case a search

under a warrant may be sustainable where without one it would fall.” Tuttle, 515 S.W.3d

at 300 (quoting United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 106 (1965)).

To be valid, a search warrant must be issued by a neutral and detached magistrate

based upon probable cause supplied by affidavit that particularly describes the person,

place, or property to be searched. See U.S. Const. amend. IV; Tenn. Const. art. I, § 7; Tenn.

Code Ann. § 40-6-103; see also Tenn. R. Crim. P. 41(c); State v. Davidson, 509 S.W.3d

156, 182 (Tenn. 2016). “Probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant exists when,

‘given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit . . . there is a fair probability that

contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place,’ which in this instance

was the defendant’s residence.” State v. Aguilar, 437 S.W.3d 889, 899 (Tenn. Crim. App.

2013) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)). Because the probabilities

11

involved “are not technical” but are, instead, “the factual and practical considerations of

everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act,” the

determinations “are extremely fact-dependent.” Tuttle, 515 S.W.3d at 300 (first quoting

Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949); and then Bell, 429 S.W.3d at 534).

When “considering whether probable cause supported issuance of a search warrant,” this

court “may consider only the affidavit and may not consider other evidence provided to or

known by the issuing magistrate or possessed by the affiant.” Id. at 299 (quoting State v.

Henning, 975 S.W.2d 290, 295 (Tenn. 1998); and then citing State v. Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d

430, 432 (1989)). We examine the information in the affidavit to determine whether, “as a

whole,” the information therein “provided the magistrate with ‘a substantial basis for

concluding that a search warrant would uncover evidence of wrongdoing.’” Id. (quoting

Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d at 432). Given the fact-driven nature of the probable cause

determination, we “afford ‘great deference’ to a magistrate’s determination that probable

cause exists.” Id. at 300 (quoting Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d at 431-32; and citing State v. Saine,

297 S.W.3d 199, 207 (Tenn. 2009)).

“When the affidavit seeks to establish probable cause for a search warrant, it must

‘set forth facts from which a reasonable conclusion might be drawn that the evidence is in

the place to be searched.’” Id. (quoting State v. Smith, 868 S.W.2d 561, 572 (Tenn. 1993)).

“In other words, the affidavit must demonstrate a nexus between the criminal activity, the

place to be searched, and the items to be seized.” Id. (citing Saine, 297 S.W.3d at 206).

“The nexus between the place to be searched and the items to be seized may be established

by the type of crime, the nature of the items, and the normal inferences where a criminal

would hide the evidence.” Smith, 868 S.W.2d at 572. The court may also “consider

whether the criminal activity under investigation was an isolated event or a protracted

pattern of conduct.” Tuttle, 515 S.W.3d at 301 (quoting Saine, 297 S.W.3d at 206).

Notably, although the affidavit must establish a nexus between the place to be searched and

the evidence to be seized, it “need not implicate a particular person in the crime under

investigation.” Id. (first citing Zurcher v. The Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 556 (1978);

and then United States v. Burney, 778 F.3d 536, 540 (6th Cir. 2015)).

C. The Affidavit

Here, the affidavit established that officers had gathered information that Defendant

“was conducting narcotics transactions” at his residence, that they confirmed this

information by arranging four controlled drug transactions between Defendant and an

“undercover agent,” and that three of the transactions were completed before the

application for the search warrant. The affidavit provided that on July 5, 6, and 7, 2023,

the undercover agent met Defendant at the residence and that on each occasion the

undercover agent exchanged cash for a white substance that field tested positive for

cocaine. The affidavit also provided that officers surveilled the area both before and after

each transaction, that the undercover agent was equipped to allow officers to monitor the

transaction in real time, and that Investigator Williams observed each transaction. Finally,

12

the affidavit included Investigator Baylous’ assertion that, given the number of

transactions, it was his belief that Defendant was in possession of “a large quantity of illegal

narcotics” and that he “has been known to hide large quantities of narcotics, proceeds from

narcotics transactions and/or other evidence throughout his property in locations not

commonly located or accessed by law enforcement.”

Although Defendant cites State v. Nightwine in support of his claim that the nexus

requirement was not met, as the trial court correctly concluded, that case is easily

distinguishable from this one. First, and perhaps most important given our standard of

review, the trial court granted the motion to suppress in Nightwine after concluding that

the State had failed to establish a nexus requirement. State v. Nightwine, No. M2013-

00609-CCA-R3CD, 2013 WL 6669393, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 17, 2013). This

distinction is important because, on appeal, we “afford ‘great deference’ to a magistrate’s

determination.” Tuttle, 515 S.W.3d at 300 (quoting Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d at 431-32; and

citing Saine, 297 S.W.3d at 207). Second, unlike the affidavit in this case, which states that

each of the controlled buys took place at Defendant’s residence, the affidavit in Nightwine

listed two separate addresses where controlled purchases took place and did not state “that

the sales took place at Mr. Nightwine’s residence located at 115 Emory Street. Rather, the

affidavit asserts only that the sales took place ‘at 115 Emory Street’ without any further

specificity as to the location of the sales or reference to the residence.” Nightwine, 2013

WL 6669393, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 17, 2013). Third, unlike the officers in this

case, who “observe[d] and live time monitor[ed]” each transaction via recording equipment

and surveillance at the same location, the officers in Nightwine “listened to” transactions

that took place at two different locations. Id., at *1-2. Fourth, unlike the transactions in

this case, which took place within days of each other and involved a single confidential

informant, the four transactions in Nightwine took place over the course of five months and

involved at least two different undercover purchasers. Id.

In our view, the information in the affidavit was sufficient to establish probable

cause and, specifically, to satisfy the nexus requirement. The affidavit need not contain

“definite proof that the seller keeps his supply at his residence,” instead, the nexus

requirement is met “if there are some additional facts, (such as that . . . the seller or buyer

went to his home prior to the sale or after the sale . . .) which would support the inference

that the supply is probably located there.” See Saine, 297 S.W.3d at 206 (quoting 2 Wayne

R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 3.7(d) (4th ed. 2004

& Supp. 2008-09)). The affidavit in this case supplies just that. Throughout the affidavit,

the place to be searched is referred to as Defendant’s residence, and the affidavit provided

that successive controlled buys between the confidential informant and Defendant were

completed at that residence only days before the warrant was issued. Id. (finding that

warrant met the nexus requirement even though “[t]he affidavit did not state, for example,

that criminal activity occurred at Mr. Saine’s residence or that the fruits of the search were

observed there”). The affidavit also contained information about Investigator Baylous’

experience in law enforcement and his statement that, “based on his knowledge, training

13

and experience,” he believed that evidence of Defendant’s possession of “Schedule II

narcotics with the intent to manufacture, sell and/or deliver will be located at the

residence.”

In three related issues, Defendant contends that the warrant failed to particularly

describe the place to be searched or the evidence to be seized, that the scope of the search

was too broad, and that the knowledge base for the confidential informant was insufficient

to establish that the informant was reliable. The State asserts that Defendant has waived

our consideration of these claims because he raises them for the first time on appeal. We

agree with the State.

Defendant insists in his reply brief that these new challenges are merely “additional

reasons” supporting his argument that the affidavit failed to establish probable cause.

Although it is true that all these factors are part of the overall probable cause determination,

they are separate issues that require distinct inquiries. Here, Defendant specifically

asserted in the trial court that “[t]here is not a sufficient nexus between the location where

the alleged undercover purchases occurred and the place to be searched.” Yet a “motion to

suppress, like any other motion, is required to state the grounds upon which it is predicated

with particularity.” State v. Burton, 751 S.W.2d 440, 445 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988) (citing

Tenn. R. Crim. P. 47). The failure to include an issue in a motion to suppress results in

waiver of that issue. State v. Stanhope, 476 S.W.3d 382, 396 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2013)

(concluding that the defendant waived issue of whether officers violated his privilege

against self-incrimination by asking for consent to submit to gunshot residue testing

because he failed to include that issue in his motion to suppress the statements he provided

to police (first citing Tenn. R. Crim. P. 12(f)(1); and then State v. Burtis, 664 S.W.2d 305,

310 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983)).

Furthermore, Defendant failed to include these “additional” theories in his motion

for new trial. “In a motion for new trial, the defendant must set forth the factual grounds

on which he relies, the legal grounds for the trial court’s ruling, and a concise statement as

to why the trial court’s decision was in error.” Id. (quoting State v. Harbison, 539 S.W.3d

149, 164-65 (Tenn. 2018)). When crafting argument in a motion for new trial, a defendant

should not “simply allege, in general terms, that the trial court committed error, either by

taking some action or by admitting or excluding evidence” but should “identify the specific

circumstances giving rise to the alleged error so that it may be reasonably identified in the

context of the entire trial.” Fahey v. Eldridge, 46 S.W.3d 138, 142-43 (Tenn. 2001) (citing

State v. Ashburn, 914 S.W.2d 108, 114 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995)). “Grounds not raised in

a motion for new trial are waived for purposes of appeal.” Harbison, 539 S.W.3d at 164.

Because Defendant did not include these specific issues in either his motion to

suppress or motion for new trial, they are waived. Defendant has not asked this court to

review the issue for plain error, and, accordingly, we decline to do so. The first and best

way to obtain plain error review is to ask for it. See State v. Thompson, No. W2022-01535-

14

CCA-R3-CD, 2023 WL 4552193, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 14, 2023) (“Because the

‘[d]efendant bears the burden of persuasion to show that he is entitled to plain error relief,’

a defendant’s failure to request this relief weighs against any such consideration on our

own.” (first quoting State v. Dixon, No. M2021-01326-CCA-R3-CD, 2022 WL 5239289,

at *21 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 6, 2022); and then citing State v. Cornwell, No. E2011-

00248-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 5304149, at *18 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 25, 2012)))

(alteration in Thompson).

In sum, under our deferential standard of review, we conclude the trial court did not

err by denying Defendant’s motion to suppress.

D. Fruit of the Poisonous Tree

Defendant claims that the trial court should have suppressed the statements he

provided to the police directing them to the drugs stashed at his residence as fruit of the

illegal search of his property. We note that although Defendant’s suppression motion stated

in conclusory fashion that “[a]ll evidence seized and statements made are fruit of the

poisonous tree and must be suppressed,” he did not specifically argue that the statements

he made to law enforcement were the fruit of what he claimed was an illegal search.

Additionally, Defendant did not raise this argument in the hearing on the motion to suppress

or in his motion for new trial. Accordingly, it is waived. Moreover, because we have

concluded that the warrant was valid and the search legal, Defendant is not entitled to relief

on this issue.

E. Miranda

Defendant asserts that the trial court should have suppressed the statements that he

gave to law enforcement because they were given during a custodial interrogation without

the benefit of Miranda warnings. The State concedes that Defendant was in custody when

he made the statements and that he was not provided with Miranda warnings but argues

that the statements were spontaneous and not made in response to interrogation. The State

also argues, in the alternative, that the admission of the statements was harmless.

Both the state and federal constitutions provide all persons with a privilege against

compulsory self-incrimination. U.S. Const. amend. V (“[N]o person . . . shall be compelled

in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”); Tenn. Const. art. I, § 9 (“[I]n all

criminal prosecutions, the accused . . . shall not be compelled to give evidence against

himself.”) In Miranda, the United States Supreme Court held that “the prosecution may

not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial

interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards

effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.

The Court defined “custodial interrogation” as “questioning initiated by law enforcement

officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of

action in any significant way.” Id. To safeguard the privilege against self-incrimination,

15

“[p]rior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent,

that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a

right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.” Id. Miranda warnings

are required only “when a suspect is (1) in custody and (2) subjected to questioning or its

functional equivalent.” State v. Moran, 621 S.W.3d 249, 257 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2020)

(citing Walton, 41 S.W.3d at 83).

The parties agree and the trial court concluded that Defendant was in custody when

he interacted with Investigators Williams and Baylous. Although we need not accept the

parties’ agreement, it is our view that the evidence supports the conclusion that Defendant

was in custody. He was handcuffed by members of the SWAT team just before officers

started executing the search warrant and remained handcuffed and under the watchful eye

of other officers throughout the search. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. We turn next to the

question whether Defendant was subjected to interrogation. See id. at 478 (“The

fundamental import of the privilege while an individual is in custody is not whether he is

allowed to talk to the police without the benefit of warnings and counsel, but whether he

can be interrogated.”).

“‘Interrogation’ for purposes of Miranda includes ‘express questioning or its

functional equivalent.’” State v. Northern, 262 S.W.3d 741, 750 (Tenn. 2008) (quoting

Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980). The Supreme Court defined the

“functional equivalent” of express questioning as “any words or actions on the part of the

police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should

know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.” Innis,

446 U.S. at 301 (footnotes omitted); see also Northern, 262 S.W.3d. at 750. The

determination whether the defendant has been subjected to the functional equivalent of

interrogation “focuses primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather than the intent

of the police,” but recognizing that “the police surely cannot be held accountable for the

unforeseeable results of their words or actions,” the Court held that “the definition of

interrogation can extend only to words or actions on the part of police officers that they

should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.” Innis, 446

U.S. at 301-02 (footnotes omitted). “Any statement given freely and voluntarily without

any compelling influences is, of course, admissible in evidence.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at

478.

Here, Investigator Williams’ accredited testimony established that he spoke to

Defendant while the search was ongoing but did not ask him any direct questions. During

their interaction, which began with small talk between the two, Defendant asked if they

could accelerate the search so that his elderly parents could go back inside the house.

Investigator Williams told Defendant that he knew that the officers were there to execute a

search warrant and that he would be glad to “speed up the process.” Investigator Williams

told Defendant that as soon as the police were done with the search, “we’ll get them back

in the house as soon as we can. The quicker we find the drugs or contraband, we can get

16

them back inside.” Defendant then said that he would “show [officers] where everything

is if we can get my mama and daddy back in the house out of the weather.” Investigator

Williams insisted that he did not promise to allow Defendant’s parents to go back inside in

exchange for Defendant’s directing them to the drugs. Investigator Baylous’ questioning

of Defendant was confined to his confirming what Defendant had said to Investigator

Williams. The trial court concluded that the officers’ interaction with Defendant was not

the functional equivalent of interrogation. We agree.

Defendant, and not the officers, was the first to inquire about speeding up the search

process so that his parents could go back inside. Cf. State v. Hubbard, No. W2016-01521-

CCA-R3-CD, 2017 WL 2472372, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 7, 2017) (holding that

defendant had been subjected to the “functional equivalent” of interrogation when “the

defendant in this case did not engage the officer in conversation regarding his case; the

officer engaged the defendant in conversation, and this conversation went beyond simply

asking for the personal information needed to facilitate the arrest”); State v. Brown, No.

M2013-02327-CCA-R3-CD, 2015 WL 445542, at *12 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 3, 2015)

(concluding that “asking a suspect why he was at a particular location when investigating

an attempted aggravated burglary is a question that a police officer should have known was

reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response”). In response, Investigator Williams

told Defendant that the investigator knew why the other officers were there and that the

more quickly they discovered contraband, the more quickly Defendant’s parents would be

allowed to go back inside. Defendant then told Investigator Williams he would direct them

to the drugs. Investigator Baylous’ only question to Defendant was posed to confirm the

earlier statement. Even if Investigator Williams’ telling Defendant that his parents would

be allowed inside as soon as officers found what they were looking for could be seen as

“reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the defendant,” it could not be

deemed a “psychological ploy[]” of the type that “amount[s] to interrogation.” Northern,

262 S.W.3d at 753 (first quoting Innis, 446 U.S. at 299; and then citing Miranda, 384 U.S.

at 450). Additionally, “the record reflects that the police were ‘engaged in activity

calculated to produce evidence against the defendant by other means’” when the

conversation took place between Defendant and Investigator Williams. State v.

Maraschiello, 88 S.W.3d 586, 603 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000) (citation omitted). We

conclude that the record does not establish that Defendant was interrogated and,

consequently, Miranda warnings were not required.

Furthermore, the sole remedy for a Miranda violation is the suppression of any

statements made during a custodial interrogation. See State v. Climer, 400 S.W.3d 537,

567 (Tenn. 2013) (citing United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 642-43 (2004)). A Miranda

violation “does not categorically prohibit the government from using nontestimonial

evidence derived from such statements.” State v. Washington, No. W2022-01201-SC-R11-

CD, 2025 WL 2847585, at *6 (Tenn. Oct. 8, 2025) (citing Climer, 400 S.W.3d at 567),

petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Jan. 5, 2026) (No. 25-6564). Suppression of physical

evidence, even if it could be considered as “fruits” of the Miranda violation, is not required.

17

Climer, 400 S.W.3d at 567. “The Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination

is not implicated by the introduction at trial of physical evidence resulting from voluntary

statements.” Id. Instead, courts need not suppress physical evidence “discovered as a result

of a statement elicited in violation of Miranda” unless the statements were obtained

through “actual coercion in obtaining the statement . . . or when the invocation of the right

to remain silent or to have counsel present is not scrupulously honored.” Id. (quoting

Walton, 41 S.W.3d at 92). “When a defendant’s will is overcome so that the statement is a

‘product of coercion,’ the statement is not voluntary, and it would violate the Self-

Incrimination Clause to use the statement or any resulting evidence in a criminal trial.”

Washington, 2025 WL 2847585, at *6 (quoting Climer, 400 S.W.3d at 567-68). Because

Defendant does not argue that his statements were not voluntary, their exclusion would not

lead to the exclusion of the drugs that he led the officers to discover.

Although Defendant does not specify which statements he wanted suppressed, the

only statements of Defendant admitted at trial were those indicating he would show the

officers where the drugs were located. Even if we had concluded that these statements

should have been suppressed, we would have no trouble concluding that their admission

was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt considering the other overwhelming evidence of

Defendant’s guilt. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 296 (1991) (applying

constitutional harmless error analysis to erroneous admission of confession); see also State

v. Koffman, 207 S.W.3d 309, 320 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2006); State v. Dean, 76 S.W.3d 352,

371 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001).

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, arguing that the State failed

to establish that he knowingly possessed the cocaine, drug paraphernalia, and firearm

seized during the search of his residence. The State asserts that the evidence was sufficient

to support each of Defendant’s convictions. We agree with the State.

We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the convicting evidence to determine

whether, “after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution” and

providing the State with “the strongest legitimate view of the evidence as well as all

reasonable and legitimate inferences which may be drawn therefrom,” “any rational trier

of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (citations omitted); State v. Davis, 354

S.W.3d 718, 729 (Tenn. 2011) (citations omitted); Tenn. R. App. P. 13. Our review “is

identical whether the conviction is predicated on direct or circumstantial evidence, or a

combination of both.” State v. Williams, 558 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tenn. 2018) (citing State v.

Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d 370, 379 (Tenn. 2011)). Importantly, a guilty verdict removes the

presumption of innocence and replaces it with one of guilt on appeal, shifting the burden

to the defendant to demonstrate why the evidence is legally insufficient to support the

conviction. Davis, 354 S.W.3d at 729 (citing State v. Sisk, 343 S.W.3d 60, 65 (Tenn. 2011)).

18

We must decline any invitation to revisit witness credibility or any purported

discrepancies in the evidence because the factfinder, not this court, resolves all questions

involving the credibility of the witnesses, the weight and value to be given to evidence, and

the factual disputes raised by such evidence. See Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d at 379 (citing State

v. Campbell, 245 S.W.3d 331, 335 (Tenn. 2008)). Accordingly, this court will neither re-

weigh nor reconsider the evidence when evaluating the sufficiency of the convicting proof.

State v. Stephens, 521 S.W.3d 718, 724 (Tenn. 2017).

A. Conviction Offenses

1. Possession of Cocaine with Intent to Deliver

Defendant was convicted of possession with intent to deliver 26 grams or more of

cocaine. “It is an offense for a defendant to knowingly . . . [p]ossess a controlled substance

with intent to . . . deliver . . . the controlled substance.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-417(a)(4).

A person “acts knowingly with respect to the conduct or to circumstances surrounding the

conduct when the person is aware of the nature of the conduct or that the circumstances

exist.” Id. § 39-11-302(b). Cocaine is a controlled substance. See id. § 39-17-408(b)(4).

The trier of fact may infer “from the amount of a controlled substance or substances

possessed by an offender, along with other relevant facts surrounding the arrest, that the

controlled substance or substances were possessed with the purpose of selling or otherwise

dispensing.” Id. § 39-17-419. “Other relevant facts” include the weight and street value

of the drugs, the packaging of the drugs, the presence of a large amount of cash, and the

presence of weapons. See, e.g., State v. Nelson, 275 S.W.3d 851, 867 (Tenn. Crim. App.

2008); State v. Brown, 915 S.W.2d 3, 8 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995); State v. Matthews, 805

S.W.2d 776, 782 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990). When, as here, an “accused is not in exclusive

possession of the place where the controlled substance is found, additional incriminating

facts and circumstances must be presented” that “affirmatively link the accused to the

controlled substance.” Id. These include:

(1) whether the drugs were in plain view[;] (2) whether

contraband was in close proximity to the defendant[;] (3)

conduct on the part of the defendant indicative of guilt,

including furtive gestures and flight; (4) the quantity of drugs

present; (5) the proximity of the defendant’s effects to the

contraband; (6) the presence of drug paraphernalia; (7) whether

the defendant was under the influence of or possessed

additional narcotics; (8) the defendant’s relationship to the

premises; and (9) incriminating statements made by the

defendant.

State v. Richards, 286 S.W.3d 873, 885-6 (Tenn. 2009) (footnotes omitted).

19

2. Possession of a Firearm

Defendant was also convicted of possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed

during the commission of a dangerous felony after having been previously convicted of a

dangerous felony. Code section 39-17-1324 provides that “[i]t is an offense to possess a

firearm or antique firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of or attempt

to commit a dangerous felony.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1324(a). Possession with intent

to deliver cocaine is listed as a dangerous felony. Id. § 39-17-1324(i)(1)(AA). The statute

provides for enhanced penalties “if the defendant, at the time of the offense, had a prior

felony conviction,” which “means that the person serves and is released or discharged from,

or is serving, a separate period of incarceration or supervision for the commission of a

dangerous felony prior to or at the time of committing a dangerous felony on or after

January 1, 2008.” Id. § 39-17-1324(g)(2).

3. Possession of Drug Paraphernalia

Finally, Defendant was convicted of possession of drug paraphernalia. Tenn. Code

Ann. § 39-17-425(a)(1). The Code defines drug paraphernalia as the “equipment, products

and materials of any kind which are used, intended for use, or designed for use in planting,

propagating, cultivating, growing, harvesting, manufacturing, compounding, converting,

producing, processing, preparing, testing, analyzing, packaging, repackaging, storing,

containing, concealing, injecting, ingesting, inhaling or otherwise introducing into the

human body, a controlled substance.” Id. § 39-17-402(12). When determining “whether a

particular object is drug paraphernalia,” the trier of fact “shall, in addition to all other

logically relevant factors, consider”:

(1) Statements by the owner or anyone in control of the object

concerning its use;

(2) Prior convictions, if any, of the owner or of anyone in

control of the object for violation of any state or federal law

relating to controlled substances or controlled substance

analogues;

(3) The existence of any residue of controlled substances or

controlled substance analogues on the object;

(4) Instructions, oral or written, provided with the object

concerning its use;

(5) Descriptive materials accompanying the object that explain

or depict its use;

(6) The manner in which the object is displayed for sale;

20

(7) The existence and scope of legitimate uses for the object in

the community; and

(8) Expert testimony concerning its use.

Id. § 39-17-424.

B. Possession Generally

Defendant stands convicted of three possession offenses. Tennessee courts

recognize that possession may be either actual or constructive. State v. Shaw, 37 S.W.3d

900, 903 (Tenn. 2001). A person constructively possesses a controlled substance when he

or she has “the power and intention at a given time to exercise dominion and control over

[the contraband] either directly or through others.” Id. at 903 (quoting State v. Patterson,

966 S.W.2d 435, 445 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997)). In other words, constructive possession is

the “ability to reduce an object to actual possession.” State v. Cooper, 736 S.W.2d 125,

129 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987). However, “[t]he mere presence of a person in an area where

[contraband is] discovered is not, alone, sufficient.” State v. Bigsby, 40 S.W.3d 87, 90

(Tenn. Crim. App. 2000) (citing Cooper, 736 S.W.2d at 129). “Likewise, mere association

with a person who does in fact control the drugs or property where the drugs are discovered

is insufficient to support a finding that the person possessed the drugs.” Cooper, 736

S.W.2d at 129. “Possession need not be exclusive and may be exercised jointly with more

than one person.” Richards, 286 S.W.3d at 885 (citations omitted).

C. Evidence in this Case

Here, the evidence established that Investigator Baylous learned that Defendant had

been selling drugs out of his residence. To confirm his suspicions, Investigator Baylous

contacted a confidential informant who then arranged to purchase cocaine from Defendant

on three occasions. Defendant chose his residence to be the location for each transaction,

and all three transactions took place within a week prior to the execution of the search

warrant. Investigator Williams observed each transaction and saw Defendant coming from

the side of the house to deliver the drugs to the confidential informant, who sat in a vehicle

parked at the end of the driveway. When officers went to execute the search warrant at

Defendant’s residence, Defendant was standing at the end of the driveway. Deputy Wallace

saw Defendant throw two items that turned out to be baggies containing cocaine across the

road and into the ditch. While executing the warrant, officers found a firearm and a set of

scales in a bedroom that also contained copies of Defendant’s driver’s license and social

security card, mail bearing Defendant’s name, and clothing and shoes consistent with a

man of Defendant’s size. A safe in the room contained $8,022. A shed on the property

contained more than eighty grams of cocaine and baggies.

In our view, the seizure of more than eighty grams of cocaine, scales, baggies, a

loaded gun, and a large amount of cash from the residence Defendant shared with his

21

elderly parents, particularly when coupled with Defendant’s recent drug sales at the

residence to a confidential informant on three separate occasions and his leading officers

directly to some of the seized drugs, was sufficient to support all his convictions. Although

Defendant suggests that we should exclude his statements that he would show officers to

the drugs from our analysis of the sufficiency of the evidence, the law is clear that “we

evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence in light of all of the evidence presented to the jury,

including the improperly admitted evidence.” State v. McLawhorn, 636 S.W.3d 210, 237

(Tenn. Crim. App. 2020) (first citing State v. Longstreet, 619 S.W.2d 97, 99-101 (Tenn.

1981); and then State v. Gilley, 297 S.W.3d 739, 763 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2008)). Even if

Defendant did not have exclusive control over any of these items, he certainly had “the

ability to reduce [these items] to actual possession.” Cooper, 736 S.W.2d at 129. Clearly,

the evidence established that Defendant had the ability to reduce the drugs to actual

possession given that he did so during each controlled buy and when he threw two baggies

of cocaine across the road in full view of Deputy Wallace. As to the firearm, “the State

was not required to prove that the Defendant wielded or used the weapon for the jury to

find all of the necessary elements of possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed

during the commission of a dangerous felony.” State v. Watkins, No. W2020-01006-CCA-

R3-CD, 2021 WL 5919119, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 15, 2021) (citations omitted). In

our view, it was enough that the firearm was found in Defendant’s bedroom among

Defendant’s other possessions. Furthermore, the discovery of all these items together

supports the inference that Defendant possessed the cocaine with intent to deliver it.

Conclusion

Based upon the foregoing analysis, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

s/ Matthew J. Wilson

MATTHEW J. WILSON, JUDGE

22