The opinion
In the United States Court of Federal Claims
No. 25-1456
Filed: February 23, 2026
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LISA S. COLLINS, )
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Plaintiff, )
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v. )
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THE UNITED STATES, )
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Defendant. )
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Lisa S. Collins, pro se, Raleigh, North Carolina, for plaintiff.
Delisa M. Sánchez, United States Department of Justice, Civil Division, Washington, D.C., for the
defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
SMITH, Senior Judge
Before the Court is the complaint filed by Lisa S. Collins, proceeding pro se, and the
government’s motion to dismiss, ECF No. 11. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the
government’s motion to dismiss and DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE the plaintiff’s
complaint under Rule 12(h)(3) of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims
(“RCFC”).
BACKGROUND
On August 29, 2025, Ms. Collins filed her complaint in this Court, alleging “lost or stolen
[sic] VA Benefit income” by the “Lockport Bank of Lockport New York.” See Compl. 1-2, ECF
No. 1. This case seemingly involves two separate issues: (1) the Department of Veterans Affairs’
(“VA”) alleged failure to re-issue Ms. Collin’s $291,681.00 in military and disability benefits; and
(2) the allegedly mistaken liquidation of $20,000 from Ms. Collins’ J.P. Morgan Chase (“Chase
Bank”) account by the VA-appointed fiduciary. The identity (or identities) of the defendants
named as parties in this case is not clear on the face of the complaint. However, the Court notes
that Ms. Collins raises allegations against various financial institutions—the “Lockport Bank of
Lockport New York,” “the Bank,” and “Cornerstone Community Federal Credit Union”—all of
which are non-governmental private entities. See, e.g., id. at 1, 13.
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The following allegations taken from Ms. Collins’ complaint are presumed to be true at
this stage in the proceedings. Ms. Collins alleges that she was receiving monthly military and
disability benefits payments of approximately $2,600 from the VA over a certain period of time.
Id. at 1. On July 26, 2007, the VA deposited $291,681.00 into Ms. Collins’ Cornerstone
Community Federal Credit Union account via direct deposit. Id. at 1, 13. Shortly after the July
2007 deposit, Cornerstone Community Federal Credit Union returned the payment to the VA. See
generally VA Ltr., ECF No. 1-1 at 3–4. In November 2007, the VA communicated to Ms. Collins
that it claimed to have re-issued the July payment to her in the amount of $343,353.00. Id. at 3.
The VA noted in its correspondence that “all payments returned to VA have been reissued to you
[Ms. Collins] and accounted for.” Id. As best as the Court can ascertain, Ms. Collins alleges that
the VA never re-issued the money and therefore she did not receive the $291,687.00 payment in
November 2007. See, e.g., Compl. at 15.
Ms. Collins also alleges that $20,000 of her military disability benefits were “liquidated”
from her Chase Bank account on April 10, 2025. Id. at 1. Based on Ms. Collins’ checking account
summary, Chase Bank seemingly reissued the $20,000 back to Ms. Collins’ account in May 2025.
See Pl’s. Chase Bank Statements, ECF No. 1-1 at 1–2. Ms. Collins asserts that this initial
withdrawal is due to an error made by her VA-appointed fiduciary, whom she does not
identify. See Compl. 1, ECF No. 1. While Ms. Collins alleges fiduciary error in her complaint,
she neither identifies the assigned fiduciary nor what remedy or relief she seeks for this second
cause of action. Ultimately, as best as the Court can determine, Ms. Collins seeks to recover the
amount that Cornerstone Community Federal Credit Union allegedly lost. See Id. at 15-16, ECF
No. 1.
In August 2025, Ms. Collins requested information from the Court regarding bank deposits
from the VA. See Office of the Clerk of Court Ltr., ECF No. 1-1 at 17. The Court responded,
emphasizing that it is not an investigative agency, does not process submissions or records from
the VA, and cannot provide litigants before it with legal advice. Id.
On December 23, 2025, the government filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing
that this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Ms. Collins’ claims under RCFC 12(b)(1)
and, in the alternative, Ms. Collins has otherwise failed to state a claim under RCFC 12(b)(6). See
generally Government’s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 11. Specifically, the government argues that a
jurisdictional predicate does not exist in this Court—where the only proper defendant is the United
States of America—because Ms. Collins appears to raise claims against state and private
actors. See Compl. 3, 13, ECF No. 1; Government’s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 11. The
government further argues that jurisdiction is lacking in this Court because a comprehensive
statutory scheme governing disputes over veterans’ benefits preempts the Court’s Tucker Act
jurisdiction. Id. Finally, the government argues that Ms. Collins’ complaint is bereft of substance
and cannot be understood to state a claim against the United States. Id. Ms. Collins never filed a
response in opposition to the government’s motion to dismiss.
LEGAL STANDARD
When considering a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, the Court
must presume all undisputed factual allegations are true and construe all reasonable inferences in
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favor of the plaintiff. Reynolds v. Army and Air Force Exchange, 846 F.2d 746, 747 (Fed. Cir.
1988). The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing subject-matter jurisdiction by a
preponderance of the evidence. Id. Further, when a defendant challenges jurisdiction, the plaintiff
bears the burden of presenting evidence that establishes the Court’s jurisdiction. Id at 748.
While pro se litigants, are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
represented parties, all litigants—represented or appearing pro se—must satisfy the Court’s
jurisdictional requirements. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 521 (1972); Henke v. United States.
60 F.3d 795, 799 (Fed. Cir. 1995). If the Court finds that it lacks jurisdiction, then it must dismiss
the action under RCFC 12(h)(3).
The Tucker Act confers jurisdiction upon the Court to hear claims on monetary relief
against the United States founded upon the Constitution, statutes, regulations, or contracts. 28
U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). The Tucker Act itself does not create a cause of action, therefore the plaintiff
must still identify a separate source of money-mandating law that creates the right to monetary
damages. See Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
DISCUSSION
After careful review, the Court finds that it lacks jurisdiction over the claims set forth in
Ms. Collins’ complaint. Critically, Ms. Collins’ fails to state a money-mandating claim against
the United States—the only party that can be named as a defendant in this Court—under an express
or implied-in-fact contract, statute, regulation, or constitutional provision. United States v. Navajo
Nation, 556 U.S. 287, 289-90 (2009); Collins v. United States, 101 Fed. Cl. 435, 440 (Fed. Cl.
2011) (quoting Fisher, 402 F.3d at 1172) (“[A] plaintiff must identify a separate source of
substantive law that creates the right to money damages” to fall within the jurisdictional ambit of
Court)). To the extent that Ms. Collins’ allegations are directed at non-governmental private
actors—including the J.P. Morgan Chase, the Lockport Bank, or Cornerstone Community Federal
Credit Union—the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear claims against these private actors. Capelouto
v. United States, 99 Fed. Cl. 682, 688 (Fed. Cl. 2011) (dismissing plaintiff’s complaint because
the Court does not have jurisdiction to decide wrongdoings by private actors); Nat’l City Bank of
Evansville v. United States, 163 F. Supp. 846, 852 (Ct. Cl. 1958) (“It is well established that the
jurisdiction of this court extends only to claims against the United States, and obviously a
controversy between private parties cannot be entertained.”).
The Court lacks jurisdiction over Ms. Collins’ claim alleging the denial of veterans benefits
for other independent reasons. For instance, the Veterans’ Judicial Review Act of 1988 (“VJRA”)
preempts this Court’s Tucker Act jurisdiction by establishing a comprehensive scheme for
reviewing the denial of veteran benefits. Tyson v. United States, 174 Fed. Cl. 205, 210 (Fed. Cl.
2024) (quoting Prestidge v. United States, 611 F. App’x 979, 982 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“Congress
created an elaborate, special remedial scheme to handle claims regarding veterans benefits.”). The
VRJA provides that an individual challenging an initial benefits determination by the VA must
first file a notice of disagreement with the Board of Veterans Appeals (“BVA”). 38 U.S.C. §§
7104(a), 7105(a). After the BVA renders a decision on the benefits determination, the individual
may then seek judicial review of that decision in the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims—not
in this Court. 38 U.S.C. § 7266(a); See Judkins v. Veterans Admin., 415 F.Supp.2d 613, 617-19
(E.D.N.C. 2005) (holding that the supervision of VA-appointed fiduciaries are conducted “under
a law that affects the provision of benefits” and should be resolved by the proper administrative
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channels, like the Board of Veterans’ Appeals, not the district court); Whitemire v. United States
Veterans Administration, 661 F. Supp. 720, 722 (W.D. Wash. 1986) (holding that the plaintiff’
must first exhaust the appropriate administrative remedies before bringing due process claims
about the incompetence and appointment of his VA fiduciary). There is no evidence that Ms.
Collins has challenged the alleged denial of veterans’ benefits at the agency level. More
importantly, the law is clear that any judicial remedy Ms. Collins possesses can only be pursued
at the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims rather than this Court.
Therefore, even if Ms. Collins’ claims were understood to be asserted against the VA for
failing to re-issue payments or for fiduciary error, it is well-settled that such a challenge must
comply with the statutory scheme set out in §§ 7105 and 7266. These provisions first require an
administrative determination at the VA and then judicial review by the Court of Appeals for
Veterans Claims. 38 U.S.C. § 7266(a).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS government’s motion to dismiss, ECF No.
11, and DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE the complaint for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction under RCFC 12(h)(3). Because the Court dismisses the complaint for lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction, the Court does not address the government’s alternative basis for dismissal
under RCFC 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Loren A. Smith
Loren A. Smith,
Senior Judge
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