In Re: M.L.R.; Apl of: E.L.R., Mother and M.L.R.

[J-35-2025]

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

TODD, C.J., DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, BROBSON, McCAFFERY, JJ.

IN RE: M.L.R., A MINOR : No. 2 MAP 2025

:

: Appeal from the Order of the

APPEAL OF: E.L.R., MOTHER AND : Superior Court at No. 623 EDA

M.L.R., A MINOR : 2024, entered on October 9, 2024,

: Vacating the Decree of the

: Montgomery County Court of

: Common Pleas, Orphans’ Court

: Division, at No. 2022-A0133, entered

: on January 26, 2024.

:

: ARGUED: September 11, 2025

OPINION

CHIEF JUSTICE TODD DECIDED: February 18, 2026

We granted review in the instant case to consider whether Appellant E.L.R.

(“Mother”), who sought to involuntarily terminate the parental rights of Appellee M.V.D.

(“Father”) to their child, M.L.R. (“Child”) under the Adoption Act (the “Act”), 1 must be

provided the opportunity to demonstrate cause under Section 2901 of the Act as to why

she should be excused from the Act’s requirement that she relinquish her own parental

rights when there is no contemplated adoption of Child. As we conclude that Section

2901’s “cause shown” exception to the relinquishment requirement is applicable only

when there is a contemplated adoption of a child, we hold that Mother’s petition for

termination of Father’s parental rights was not cognizable under the Act, and that the trial

1 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101 et seq.

court erred when it terminated Father’s parental rights in the instant case. Accordingly,

we affirm the order of the Superior Court, which reversed the order of the trial court.

We begin with a brief discussion of petitions for involuntary termination of parental

rights under the Act. Section 2511 of the Act sets forth eleven separate grounds for

involuntary termination, which, relevant herein, include the following:

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least

six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition

either has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing

parental claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform

parental duties.

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or

refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without

essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for

his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and

causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or

will not be remedied by the parent.

***

(11) The parent is required to register as a sexual offender

under 42 Pa.C.S. Ch. 97 Subch. H (relating to registration of

sexual offenders) or I (relating to continued registration of

sexual offenders) or to register with a sexual offender registry

in another jurisdiction or foreign country.

Id. § 2511(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(11) (footnote omitted).

Pursuant to Section 2512(a), a petition to terminate the parental rights of a child

under the age of 18 may be filed by: (1) either parent, when termination is sought with

respect to the other parent; (2) an agency; (3) an individual who has custody or stands in

loco parentis to the child and who has filed a report of intention to adopt as required by

Section 2531; or (4) an attorney representing a child or a guardian ad litem representing

a child who has been adjudicated dependent under 42 Pa.C.S. § 6341(c) (relating to

adjudication). See 23 Pa.C.S. § 2512(a).

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Section 2512(b) of the Act sets forth the required contents of a petition for

involuntary termination. First, “[t]he petition shall set forth specifically those grounds and

facts alleged as the basis for terminating parental rights.” Id. § 2512(b)(1). Further,

“[e]xcept as provided in paragraph (3), the petition filed under this section shall also

contain an averment that the petitioner will assume custody of the child until such time as

the child is adopted.” Id. § 2512(b)(2) (emphasis added). 2

Relevant to the instant case, this latter subsection requires that a petitioning parent

“demonstrate that an adoption of the child is anticipated in order for the termination

petition to be cognizable.” In re Adoption of M.R.D., 145 A.3d 1117, 1120 (Pa. 2016).

Further, Section 2711(a)(3) requires that the parent seeking termination consent to the

anticipated adoption. 3 See id. Finally, “absent a qualifying provision appearing elsewhere

in the Adoption Act, it is clear . . . that a legal parent must relinquish his parental rights in

order to consent to the adoption of his child by a non-spouse.” In re Adoption of R.B.F.,

803 A.2d 1195, 1199 (Pa. 2002); M.R.D., 145 A.3d at 1120.

The Act provides two limited exceptions to the relinquishment requirement. First,

under Section 2512(b)(3), a petitioner “shall not be required to aver that an adoption is

presently contemplated nor that a person with a present intention to adopt exists,” if the

petitioner is a parent seeking to terminate the parental rights to a child who was conceived

as a result of rape or incest. 23 Pa.C.S. § 2512(b)(3). Additionally, pursuant to Section

2903, a parent who consents to the adoption of his child by his spouse is not required to

2 Subsection 2512(c) pertains to petitions which do not identify the father of the child.

3 Section 2711(a)(2) provides: “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this part, consent to an

adoption shall be required of . . . [t]he spouse of the adopting parent, unless they join in

the adoption petition.” Id. § 2711(a)(2). Subsection 2711(d)(1) sets forth the

requirements for consent, which includes the following statement by the parent: “I

understand that by signing this consent I indicate my intent to permanently give up all

rights to this child.” Id. § 2711(d)(1).

[J-35-2025] - 3

relinquish their own parental rights to the child. 4 Lastly, and the focus of this case, Section

2901 of the Act allows a court to enter a decree of adoption in cases where the natural

parent has not relinquished their own parental rights for “cause shown,” if the remaining

legal requirements have been met. 5

With this overview in mind, we turn to the facts of this case. Mother and Father

(collectively, “Parents”) were married in 2018, and Child, who is their only offspring, was

born in December 2019. Shortly before Child’s birth, Father was arrested and charged

with possession of child pornography based on conduct which occurred in December

2018, and for failing to register as a sexual offender in Pennsylvania (“Pennsylvania

charges”). Parents divorced in 2020, at which time they were awarded shared legal

custody of Child. Mother was awarded primary physical custody, while Father was

awarded supervised physical custody.

In 2021, while the Pennsylvania charges were pending, Father was arrested in

New Jersey for failing to register as a sexual offender in that state, resulting in his

incarceration from June 2021 through January 2022. On August 16, 2021, while Father

was incarcerated, Parents entered into a stipulated custody order which provided that

Mother would have sole legal and physical custody of Child during any period in which

Father was incarcerated. In February 2022, Father pled guilty to the Pennsylvania

4 Section 2903 provides: “[w]henever a parent consents to the adoption of his child by

his spouse, the parent-child relationship between him and his child shall remain whether

or not he is one of the petitioners in the adoption proceeding.” Id. § 2903.

5 Section 2901 provides: “[u]nless the court for cause shown determines otherwise, no

decree of adoption shall be entered unless the natural parent or parents’ rights have been

terminated . . . and all other legal requirements have been met.” Id. § 2901.

[J-35-2025] - 4

charges, and was sentenced to 5 to 15 years imprisonment, and lifetime registration as a

sexual offender. 6

On August 17, 2022, Mother filed a petition for the involuntary termination of

Father’s parental rights (“Petition”) pursuant to subsections (a)(1), (a)(2), and (a)(11) of

Section 2511 of the Adoption Act. Notably, Mother’s Petition did not include an assertion

that an adoption of Child was contemplated, in accordance with Subsection 2512(b)(2),

and she did not indicate that she intended to relinquish her own parental rights.

Nevertheless, following a three-day hearing, the trial court granted Mother’s

Petition and filed a decree involuntarily terminating Father’s parental rights pursuant to

subsections 2511(a)(1) and (2). 7 The court acknowledged that Mother could not satisfy

the requirements of Subsection 2512(b)(2) because she did not intend to relinquish her

parental rights to Child. However, the court concluded that Mother met the “cause shown”

exception set forth in Section 2901, which provides, in relevant part: “Unless the court

for cause shown determines otherwise, no decree of adoption shall be entered unless the

natural parent or parents’ rights have been terminated . . . and all other legal requirements

have been met.” Id. § 2901 (emphasis added).

In this respect, the trial court opined:

This Court cannot think of a scenario that is more appropriate

for applying the “cause shown” exception. The legislature has

made it clear that father must register as a lifetime sex

offender. This lifetime registration requirement was enacted

to protect children. It seems preposterous that the legislature

6 Additionally, in 2009, prior to Parents’ marriage, Father pled guilty to unlawful contact

with a minor−prostitution, for which he served a 25-month sentence of incarceration and

was ordered to register as a sex offender.

7 Having found that Mother demonstrated grounds for termination under Section

2511(b)(1) and (2), the court then concluded that termination was warranted under

Section 2511(b) (requiring a court to give “primary consideration to the developmental,

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child” when terminating parental rights).

[J-35-2025] - 5

was only seeking to protect those children who are not related

to the offender. If mother had remarried and this petition

involved a stepparent adoption, father would not be able to

challenge on the basis of the “contemplated adoption”

requirement. Mother should not be penalized or restricted

from protecting her child simply because she is a single parent

who does not currently have a partner who wants to

adopt. . . . This Court finds that preventing a mother from

terminating the father’s parental rights unless she remarries

and her new spouse wants to adopt her child or puts the child

up for adoption by terminating her own rights is ludicrous.

It is clear to this Court that the termination of father’s

parental rights given his criminal offenses and admitted

proclivities will promote the best interests of this child.

Therefore, this Court finds that mother has met the

requirements of [Sections 2512 and 2901] and has proved by

clear and convincing evidence that this matter is an exception

for “cause shown” and termination is appropriate under these

circumstances.

Trial Court Opinion, 1/26/24, at 9-10.

Father appealed to the Superior Court, asserting that the trial court erred in relying

on Section 2901 to excuse Mother from Section 2512(b)(2)’s requirement that her Petition

contain an averment that an adoption of Child was contemplated. In a unanimous,

unpublished memorandum opinion, the Superior Court vacated the trial court’s decree

involuntarily terminating Father’s parental rights. In re M.L.R., 2024 WL 4449487 (Pa.

Super. filed Oct. 9, 2024) (unpublished memorandum).

Initially, the Superior Court observed that Section 2512(b)(2) requires that the

petition of a parent seeking to terminate the parental rights of the child’s other parent

contain an averment that the petitioner will assume custody of the child until such time as

the child is adopted, and, further, that “the petitioning parent must demonstrate that an

adoption of the child is anticipated in order for the termination petition to be cognizable.”

Id. at *3 (citing In re Adoption of M.E.L., 298 A.3d 118, 121 (Pa. 2023)). The court further

recognized that Section 2711 provides that “the parent seeking termination must consent

[J-35-2025] - 6

to the contemplated adoption of the at-issue child, which entails relinquishing his or her

own parental rights.” Id. at *3 n.4.

The Superior Court acknowledged that Section 2901 of the Act allows a petitioner

to demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, why, in a particular case, he or she

cannot meet the statutory requirements. Id. at *4. The court noted, however, that it has

interpreted Section 2901 as requiring that there be “a legal impediment to the party’s strict

fulfillment of the Adoption Act’s statutory requirements.” Id. (emphasis original, citation

omitted). The court concluded that, in the instant case, Mother did not offer any reason

why she “cannot abide by the adoption requirement at § 2512(b) aside from her

understandable unwillingness to relinquish custody of [Child],” and, further, that the trial

court “also did not identify any particular impediment that would prevent Mother from

abiding by § 2512(b) aside from her refusal to do so.” Id.

The Superior Court stressed that it was “not unsympathetic to Mother’s position,”

and was “sensitive to the plight of single parents who receive no assistance or benefit

from an absent parent, but are precluded from seeking termination . . . because they do

not have a spouse.” Id. at *5 (citation omitted). However, the court explained that,

“regardless of the wisdom” of the requirement that a petitioner must relinquish their own

parental rights, this Court has made clear that “the judiciary is bound by the provisions of

the Adoption Act, including the spousal and relinquishment requirements, until such time

as they are revisited by the General Assembly.” Id. (quoting In re Adoption of J.M.B., 308

A.3d 1262, 1276 (Pa. Super. 2024)). Thus, the court determined that the trial court erred

in finding, pursuant to Section 2901, that Mother was excused from strict compliance with

the relinquishment requirement, and thus it held that Mother’s Petition seeking the

involuntary termination of Father’s parental rights was not cognizable. Accordingly, the

Superior Court vacated the trial court’s decree granting Mother’s Petition.

[J-35-2025] - 7

We granted Mother’s petition for allowance of appeal to determine whether the

Superior Court, in holding Mother’s Petition for the involuntary termination of Father’s

parental rights was not cognizable, “misapplied and misapprehended the essential

holding” of this Court’s decision in M.E.L, and failed to recognize that, pursuant to Section

2901 of the Act, a trial court may use its “measured discretion to override the Adoption

Act’s legal requirements in a particular case upon a showing of cause.” In re: M.L.R., 332

A.3d 27 (Pa. filed Jan. 6, 2025) (order).

Preliminarily, we note that, when reviewing a trial court’s order regarding a petition

for termination of parental rights, an appellate court must apply an abuse of discretion

standard. In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826 (Pa. 2012). This standard of review

requires an appellate court to accept the findings of fact and the credibility determinations

of the trial court, so long as they are supported by the record. Id. If the factual findings

are supported by the record, an appellate court’s review is limited to whether the trial court

made an error of law or abused its discretion. Id. An abuse of discretion does not result

merely because the reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion; rather, a

decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. Id.

As Mother challenges the Superior Court’s application of our decision in M.E.L.,

and further asks us to reconsider that decision, we begin with a brief discussion of that

case, as well as the decisions that informed our holding therein.

In R.B.F., supra, in two separate cases, parents sought to allow their same-sex

domestic partners to adopt their children. However, they could not meet the statutory

requirements for adoption because the parents did not intend to relinquish their own

parental rights as required by Section 2711. The parents also could not establish an

exception to the relinquishment requirement under Section 2903 – which, as discussed

[J-35-2025] - 8

above, allows a parent to retain their parental rights when consenting to the adoption of

their child by their spouse – because, at the time, the parents and their partners were not

legally permitted to marry. Thus, the trial court summarily dismissed the petitions for

adoption, and the Superior Court affirmed.

On appeal, the parties argued that, pursuant to Section 2901, they should be

allowed to show cause to excuse them from the relinquishment requirement because they

were not legally permitted to marry and, thus, “as in a stepparent adoption, the only means

to guarantee family integrity ordinarily achieved through termination of existing legal

parent’s rights would be through preservation of that parent’s rights.” R.B.F., 803 A.2d at

1201 (emphasis omitted).

We first recognized that, because adoption is purely a statutory right, in order to

effect an adoption, strict compliance with the legislative provisions of the Adoption Act is

required. We then determined that “there is no reasonable construction of the Section

2901 ‘cause shown’ language other than to conclude that it permits a petitioner to

demonstrate why, in a particular case, he or she cannot meet the statutory requirements.”

Id. at 1201-02. We opined that a contrary interpretation of the “cause shown” provision

“would command an absurd result as the Adoption Act does not expressly preclude same-

sex partners from adopting.” Id. at 1202 (citing 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(1) (General Assembly

does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution, or unreasonable)). Thus,

we held that the legal parents must be afforded the opportunity to establish, by clear and

convincing evidence, cause as to why they should not be required to relinquish their own

parental rights in order to allow their same-sex partners to adopt their children, when the

legal parents and their partners could not legally marry.

Subsequently, in M.R.D., supra, we determined that a mother who sought to

terminate the parental rights of her children’s father, and retain her own parental rights

[J-35-2025] - 9

while allowing her own father to adopt her children, could not demonstrate cause shown

under Section 2901 so as to excuse her from strict compliance with the relinquishment

requirement. The mother and her father (“grandfather”) had filed a petition for the

involuntary termination of the children’s father’s parental rights. In order to comply with

Section 2512(b)’s requirement that the termination petition be filed in contemplation of an

adoption, the mother and grandfather averred that the grandfather would adopt the

children and co-parent with the mother. The trial court granted the petition to involuntarily

terminate the father’s parental rights, and the Superior Court affirmed.

In reversing the lower courts’ decisions, this Court reiterated that the “purpose

behind the termination or relinquishment of an existing parent’s rights prior to an adoption

is to facilitate a ‘new parent-child relationship’ between the child and the adoptive parent,”

145 A.3d at 1127-28 (quoting In re B.E., 377 A.2d 153, 156 (Pa. 1977)), and to protect

“the integrity and stability of the new family unit.” Id. at 1128 (citations omitted). We

explained:

In the standard adoption case, termination and relinquishment

of parental rights is necessary so that the child may be

adopted by, and form new bonds with, his or her new family,

unencumbered by the former legal parents. By contrast, in

second-parent adoption cases in which the relinquishment of

a parent’s rights is not required − i.e., stepparent adoptions

and adoptions by same-sex couples − relinquishment of the

parent’s rights is unnecessary, and indeed damaging. In such

cases, the parent and the prospective adoptive parent are

committed partners − that is, they are involved in a horizontal

relationship, are equals as between each other, and are

equals with respect to the child. Adoption in such

circumstances allows the prospective adoptive parent to

create a new parent-child relationship with the legal parent’s

child and a family unit together with the co-parent to whom he

or she is committed. Thus, because the legal parent and

prospective parent in second-parent adoption cases are part

of the same family unit, the relinquishment requirement

undermines, rather than promotes, family stability.

[J-35-2025] - 10

Id. (emphasis original).

We observed that these concerns did not exist in M.R.D. because the mother and

the grandfather were not part of an “intact family unit;” and the grandfather would not live

with the mother and her children. Id. Additionally, we noted the potential for “unique

complications,” such as the creation of “hybrid relationships,” and the ramifications if the

mother ever sought to remarry, in which case the grandfather, by refusing to relinquish

his new parental rights, could prevent the mother’s future husband from adopting the

children. Id. Finally, we expressed concern that allowing the grandfather to adopt his

daughter’s children could

open the door for misuse of adoption proceedings by spiteful

parents as a means to involuntarily terminate the rights of

unwanted parents . . . . Given that the “complete and

irrevocable termination of parental rights is one of the most

serious and severe steps a court can take,” In re Bowman,

[666 A.2d 274, 280 (Pa. 1995)], we must ensure that we do

not open the floodgates to such gamesmanship.

Id. at 1129.

Thus, although we recognized in M.R.D. that “societal norms pertaining to what

constitutes a family are constantly evolving,” and we commended the grandfather for

“stepping up” to provide for his daughter’s children, we found there was no “legal cause

to excuse” the relinquishment requirement. Id. Accordingly, because there was not a

valid anticipated adoption, we held that the petition for the involuntary termination of the

father’s parental rights filed by mother and grandfather was not cognizable.

Notably, our decision in M.R.D. generated several separate writings by the

members of this Court. The majority opinion, which was drafted by this author, was joined

by Chief Justice Saylor, and Justices Dougherty and Wecht. However, this author penned

a special concurrence urging the legislature to revisit the adoption and relinquishment

requirements of the Act in light of the evolving concept of family, which read, in part:

[J-35-2025] - 11

It is clear that the relinquishment requirement for

termination was designed to promote two-parent families.

However, in the nearly 35 years since this requirement was

enacted, the concept of family has evolved—and continues to

evolve—in today’s society, and there are situations where, in

my view, it is unfair to require a single parent to have a spouse

or partner as a prerequisite to seeking the termination of the

rights of the child’s other legal, but absent, parent. Indeed,

there are many families comprised of only a parent and a child

where the single parent is fully capable of raising and

providing for his or her child, and where the absent parent

provides no benefit to − or worse, is a dark cloud over − the

child.

Id. at 1133 (Todd, J., specially concurring).

The late Chief Justice Baer, then Justice Baer, authored a concurring opinion,

wherein he disagreed with the majority’s suggestion that the “test” for establishing cause

under Section 2901 is whether the contemplated adoption will “promote a new family unit.”

Id. at 1130-31 (Baer, J., concurring). Justice Baer observed that such language is not

present in Section 2901, or in any other provision of the Act. He further expressed his

disagreement with this author’s special concurrence urging the legislature to revisit the

relinquishment requirements so as to allow one parent to terminate the other parent’s

parental rights without the requisite contemplated adoption:

The special concurrence’s request seems to overlook that the

interests of children supersede the interest of parents. In light

of the benefits that come with two parents, even when one is

absent, I believe our legislature has adopted a child-focused

statute which should not be changed.

In my view, the law is loath to leave children with only

one parent, as children derive no benefit from having a

parent’s rights terminated, unless a new, committed parent is

ready, willing and able to take that terminated parent’s place.

Terminating a parent’s rights, even one who is currently

uninvolved in the child’s life, removes the child’s ability to

inherit from and through that parent as well as the potential of

future emotional and financial support from that parent.

Terminating an uninvolved parent’s rights does not remedy

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any harm caused by that parent’s absence in the child’s life.

The only benefit of terminating a non-involved parent’s rights

without substituting a new parent is arguably to the involved

parent: it removes the involved parent’s fear that the non-

involved parent will have a change of heart and want a

relationship with the child (which may, in the long term, benefit

the child); it removes the risk to the involved parent of having

to litigate child custody; it dispels the involved parent’s feeling

that his or her efforts are underappreciated in the eyes of the

law, etc.

Id. at 1132.

Finally, Justice Wecht wrote a separate concurring opinion, emphasizing that

“[t]ermination of parental rights is an extreme and last-ditch measure. Its finality is striking.

It is emphatically not a tool to be deployed in custody disputes.” Id. at 1133-34 (Wecht,

J., concurring). Thus, while agreeing with this author’s observation that “there are many

families comprised of only a parent and a child, where the single parent is fully capable

of raising and providing for his or her child,” Justice Wecht disagreed with the suggestion

that the General Assembly “revisit the Adoption Act’s requirement that a parent filing a

[termination of parental rights] petition demonstrate that an adoption is contemplated.” Id.

at 1134.

Finally, and most recently, we considered Section 2901’s “cause shown” language

in M.E.L. Therein, a mother filed a petition to involuntarily terminate the parental rights of

her child’s biological father. At the time she filed the petition, the mother was in a stable,

long-term relationship with another partner, but the mother and her partner were not

married, and had no plans to wed in the future. Nevertheless, in conjunction with mother’s

petition, mother’s partner filed notice of his attempt to adopt M.E.L. The trial court granted

the mother’s petition and terminated the parental rights of M.E.L.’s biological father.

On appeal, the Superior Court vacated the trial court’s order, finding that the

mother failed to strictly comply with Section 2711(d)’s relinquishment requirement. The

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Superior Court recognized that, under Section 2903, a parent may retain their parental

rights when consenting to the adoption of their biological child by a spouse, but noted that

Section 2903 did not apply because the mother and her partner were not married.

The court further acknowledged that, pursuant to Section 2901, a trial court has

“discretion to grant an adoption in limited circumstances where the party cannot meet the

statutory requirements but has demonstrated cause for the noncompliance.” In re

Adoption of M.E.L, 2022 WL 4113115 at *3. Observing that the trial court had not

considered whether the mother established cause under Section 2901 as to why she

could not comply with the relinquishment requirement, the Superior Court remanded the

case to the trial court for further consideration. This Court granted review to determine

whether the Superior Court erred in remanding the matter for a determination regarding

whether the mother could establish the cause exception under Section 2901 when the

proposed adoptive parent was a non-spouse.

In a majority opinion by this author, we affirmed the Superior Court’s decision, we

emphasized:

Critically, unlike in the context of an agency petition, a petition

of a parent seeking to terminate the rights of the child’s other

parent must contain “an averment that the petitioner will

assume custody of the child until such time as the child is

adopted.” Id. § 2512(b) (emphasis added). In other words,

“the petitioning parent must demonstrate that an adoption of

the child is anticipated in order for the termination petition to

be cognizable.” In re Adoption of M.R.D., [145 A.3d at 1120]

(citations omitted). We have explained that “[t]he purpose of

the involuntary termination provisions of the Adoption Act is

not to punish an ineffective or negligent parent, or provide a

means for changing the surname of the child,” but instead “to

dispense with the need for parental consent to an adoption

when, by choice or neglect, a parent has failed to meet the

continuing needs of the child.” In re B.E., [377 A.2d at 156].

M.E.L., 298 A.3d at 121.

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We then considered Section 2901 of the Act, which, as noted above, provides, in

relevant part, “[u]nless the court for cause shown determines otherwise, no decree of

adoption shall be entered unless the natural parent or parents’ rights have been

terminated . . . and all other legal requirements have been met.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2901.

Observing that the Act does not define the phrase “cause shown,” we looked to our prior

decisions interpreting the same phrase, including R.B.F. and M.R.D., and concluded:

[T]o satisfy the cause exception to relinquishment under

Section 2901 two things must be established. A party must

first show why he or she cannot meet the statutory

requirements for adoption. This is consistent with the plain

language of the statute, which provides that, “[u]nless the

court for cause shown determines otherwise, no decree of

adoption shall be entered unless . . . all other legal

requirements have been met.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2901 (emphasis

added). In both R.B.F. and M.R.D., the parties seeking to

adopt were legally unable to marry and, thus, could not satisfy

the Act’s marriage requirement. Upon this showing, the party

may then appeal to the court’s discretion by demonstrating

with clear and convincing evidence why the purpose of

Section 2711(d) would nevertheless be fulfilled or

unnecessary in their case, despite the parties’ inability to fulfill

the statutory requirements.

M.E.L., 298 A.3d at 127 (emphasis original).

With respect to the mother’s claim that she established cause under Section 2901

because the proposed adoption of M.E.L. by her partner would facilitate a new parent-

child relationship between her child and her partner, we found that mother put “the

proverbial cart before the horse,” noting that

before she may demonstrate that the proposed adoption

satisfies the purpose underlying Section 2711(d), she must,

as an initial matter, explain why she is unable to meet the

statutory requirements for adoption. Indeed, while our Court’s

analysis in R.B.F. and M.R.D. centered more directly on the

second portion of the inquiry − i.e., whether the parties could

establish that the proposed adoptions in those cases

rendered the relinquishment requirement under Section

2711(d) unnecessary − that was because there was no

[J-35-2025] - 15

question that the domestic partners in R.B.F., and the mother

and grandfather in M.R.D., were legally prohibited from

marrying and, thus, could not satisfy the statutory

requirements for adoption. By contrast, although Mother

concedes that she and Partner do not satisfy the statutory

requirements for adoption in this case because they do not

intend to marry at this time, she does not allege any legal

impediment preventing her and Partner from doing so, and,

as noted, the orphans’ court made no inquiry on this subject.

. . . Permitting a parent, such as Mother, to simply

waive the relinquishment requirement in circumstances where

she offers her long-term partner as an adoptive resource, but

does not first demonstrate why they cannot marry, would allow

the “cause shown” exception to swallow the rule, as that

parent could proceed with the adoption even if there were no

legal impediment to marrying the prospective adoptive parent,

rendering the spousal requirements effectively optional, and

the stepparent exception to relinquishment under Section

2903 largely unnecessary.

Critically, however, the General Assembly did not

intend for the spousal requirement for adoption to be merely

aspirational. To the contrary, the relinquishment requirement

was designed to promote the General Assembly’s clear goal

of promoting adoptions by a spouse, in the context of an intact

marriage. As then-Justice, later Chief Justice, Baer aptly

articulated in M.R.D., this goal is “rooted in the belief that

children benefit from permanency,” the best indicator of which

“is to have children parented by two parents in a permanent

relationship — a marriage.” M.R.D., 145 A.3d at 1131-32

(Baer, J., concurring).

Moreover, as a practical matter, excusing the

relinquishment requirement and allowing the adoption to

proceed without first requiring Mother to demonstrate why she

and Partner are unable to marry could lead to abuse by

spiteful parents seeking to terminate the rights of unwanted

parents, a scenario we cautioned against in M.R.D. See id.

at 1129 (warning about the potential for misuse in adoption

proceedings “by spiteful parents as a means to involuntarily

terminate the rights of unwanted parents, potentially allowing

grandparents, cousins, pastors, coaches, and a litany of other

individuals who have a close relationship with a child to stand

in as prospective adoptive parents so that termination may be

achieved.”). In addition, broadly excusing the relinquishment

[J-35-2025] - 16

requirement for non-stepparent adoptions would distort the

operation of Section 5326, which, as noted, terminates the

custody rights of grandparents (and great-grandparents) over

their grandchildren where the proposed adoption is by an

individual other than a stepparent.

Id. at 128-29.

Again, this Court recognized that “the relinquishment requirement for adoption and

termination of another parent’s rights over a child may be seen by some as anachronistic

in this day and age, particularly given the changing notion of what it means to be ‘family,’”

but we observed that “the General Assembly has not revisited these provisions, and they

remain the law.” Id. at 129. Accordingly, we held in M.E.L. that, prior to terminating the

father’s parental rights, the trial court should have evaluated whether the mother had

established cause under Section 2901 as to why she and her partner could not marry,

such that she should be excused from the relinquishment requirement, and we affirmed

the Superior Court’s order remanding to the orphans’ court for consideration of that issue.

Justice Wecht authored a concurring and dissenting opinion in M.E.L., wherein he

agreed that the Superior Court’s order should be affirmed, but disagreed with the

majority’s interpretation of the Act. Initially, Justice Wecht disagreed with the majority’s

“two-part framework that all but forecloses an adoption by a parent’s partner if the couple

chooses not to marry.” Id. at 130 (Wecht, J., concurring and dissenting). He further

suggested that the majority disregarded the explicit words of Section 2901, in which the

General Assembly used “broad, open-ended language . . . to vest the trial court with

discretion to deviate from statutory requirements for cause shown.” Id. at 135. In Justice

Wecht’s view, “[t]he legal requirements excusable by Section 2901 extend beyond” the

requirements of parental consent and relinquishment of parental rights, and “any of the

statutory requirements may be excused ‘for cause shown.’” Id.

Justice Wecht further opined that the majority’s interpretation of Sections 2901 and

2903 in M.E.L. was “incongruent” with our decisions in R.B.F. and M.R.D., in that our

[J-35-2025] - 17

decision in R.B.F. was not based on the partner’s inability to marry, and the mother in

M.R.D. “sought to manufacture an adoption by the children’s maternal grandfather,”

whereas the parties in M.E.L. sought to create “a legally recognized parent-child

relationship” between the non-biological parent and the child. Id. at 137. Nevertheless,

regarding the disposition of the case, Justice Wecht found that the trial court “precipitously

terminated Father’s rights” without considering whether the mother and her partner

established that partner’s proposed adoption of the child could proceed in accordance

with the statutory requirements, despite the fact that they were not married, and, thus,

concluded a remand was appropriate. Id. at 139.

With this precedent in mind, we turn to the arguments of the parties. Mother

asserts that the Superior Court below erred in relying on this Court’s construction of

Section 2512(b) in M.E.L., and, specifically, our statement that, “[i]n other words, ‘the

petitioning parent must demonstrate that an adoption of the child is anticipated in order

for the termination petition to be cognizable.” M.E.L., 298 A.3d at 121 (quoting M.R.D.,

145 A.3d at 1120). See Mother’s Brief at 27. As is evident from her brief, however,

Mother’s challenge is based less on the Superior Court’s reliance on M.E.L., but is

directed more toward M.E.L. itself.

Indeed, Mother contends that the language of Section 2512(b) does not require

that “an adoption must be imminently planned or currently contemplated,” id. at 27

(emphasis omitted), and she argues that this Court, in M.E.L., improperly “changed the

words of the Adoption Act when [we] stated and added these words to the statute, even

though such words do not exist[.]” Id. at 26-27 (emphasis added); see also Mother’s Brief

at 28 (asserting that, in M.E.L., this Court “reinvented the words of the statute”).

Mother further submits that, in deciding M.E.L., we erred in relying on M.R.D.

because, in M.R.D., “this Court was concerned with conflicting and confusing horizontal

[J-35-2025] - 18

and vertical relationships, the child not living in a family unit with his would-be adopter,

his grandfather, and custody gamesmanship.” Id. at 27. Mother notes that none of these

concerns exist in the instant case.

Mother also suggests that, in M.E.L., we “misinterpreted part of [our] own rationale

of R.B.F.,” because we recognized in R.B.F. that trial courts “have discretion to permit an

adoption, based upon the best interest of the child and the circumstances of the case,

without requiring the existing parent to terminate his/her own parental rights.” Id. at 30-

31. Indeed, Mother argues that reinstating the trial court’s decision in her favor would be

consistent with our ruling in R.B.F.

Additionally, in arguing that this Court erroneously interpreted the Act in M.E.L.,

Mother relies on Justice Wecht’s concurring and dissenting opinion in that case, and

submits that the General Assembly’s intent in enacting Section 2901 was to allow a trial

court, which is familiar with the parties to a case, “to use its measured discretion to

override the Adoption Act’s legal requirements in a particular case upon a showing of

cause.” Id. at 28-29 (citing M.E.L., 298 A.3d at 130 (Wecht, J., concurring & dissenting)).

Mother avers that the legislature did not suggest that the “cause shown” exception “is

limited to only circumstances where the petitioner ‘cannot’ meet the statutory

requirements,” and she alleges that the “newly created requirement that a petitioner must

first establish that she is unable to meet the statutory requirements,” amounts to “yet

another M.E.L. creation by this Honorable Court,” which is absent from the statute itself.

Id. at 29 (emphasis omitted)

With regard to the construction of Section 2901, Mother contends that this Court

should adopt a “reasonably measured, public policy oriented, child centered approach”

that is consistent with the Adoption Act, and which affords trial courts the “necessary

discretion to scrutinize each non-conforming termination or adoption case, to develop a

[J-35-2025] - 19

record in that regard, and then to determine whether a sufficient showing of cause has

been made to justify the relief requested keeping the child’s needs and welfare as the

guiding touchstone.” Id. at 31-32.

In Mother’s view, the trial court properly exercised such discretion in the instant

case, in light of Father’s status as a lifetime sexual offender registrant, as well as the

evidence that satisfied the requirements of the plain language of Section 2512(b) that she

“would maintain her care and loving custody of the child, forever, whether the child was

ever adopted or not, and certainly through the time the child was adopted, if ever an

adoption of the child was to be perfected.” Id. at 28.

In sum, Mother maintains that M.E.L. was wrongly decided, and she urges us to

“review, revisit, and re-interpret the Adoption Act and [our decision in M.E.L.],” Mother’s

Brief at 20, so as to permit trial courts to exercise their “measured and careful discretion

in determining ‘cause shown’ consistent with Section 2901 of the Adoption Act.” Id. at 17

(emphasis omitted). In this regard, Mother posits that “adherence to precedent is not ‘an

inexorable command,’” id. at 22 (citation omitted), highlighting the United States Supreme

Court’s decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 597 U.S. 215 (2022), which

overturned Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 112 (1973).

Like Mother, counsel for Child maintains that the trial court properly exercised its

discretion in determining that Mother established cause shown under Section 2901 so as

to excuse her from “averring an adoption is contemplated for Child.” Child’s Brief at 13.

Echoing Justice Wecht’s position in his concurring and dissenting opinion in M.E.L.,

counsel for Child emphasizes that the intent of Section 2901 is to vest the trial court with

discretion to excuse non-compliance with any of the statutory requirements for cause

shown, not simply the requirements of parental consent and relinquishment of parental

rights. In this respect, counsel for Child submits:

[J-35-2025] - 20

Mother’s good cause shown includes that adoption is not

necessary as she has been the sole parent, sole provider,

sole caregiver, sole protector, and sole educator to Child for

his entire life. By requiring Mother to identify a partner to co-

parent the child minimizes her role as a successful and loving

single parent and sole provider while preserving an absentee

father’s parental rights until an unknown time. Such an

outrageous and disparaging result flies in the face of the

Adoption Act and the tenants of permanency and stability.

Such an unconscionable result turns the Adoption Act upside-

down by rewarding the unfit and absentee parent for doing

nothing and punishing the present parent for nurturing and

taking care of the child every day.

Id. at 14.

Counsel for Child adds that Mother’s motive in seeking termination of father’s

parental rights is not “to punish or retaliate against Father for being an ineffective and

absentee father,” but, rather, is “simply for the protection of Child and his future

embarrassment and shame because of his Father’s status as a convicted criminal for

crimes against innocent children.” Id. at 14-15. Counsel for Child argues that Mother

“only wants to keep her son safe and protect him from harm, predictable shame, fear,

embarrassment, and trauma.” Id. at 15.

Father responds by observing that this Court has repeatedly held that a parent’s

petition for involuntary termination of the other parent’s parental rights to a child is

cognizable under Section 2512 of the Act only if the petitioning party demonstrates “that

an adoption of the child is anticipated.” Father’s Brief at 9; see M.E.L., 298 A.3d at 121;

M.R.D., 145 A.3d at 1120; In re: T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251 (Pa. 2013); In re Adoption of L.J.B.,

18 A.3d 1098, 1107-08 n.11 (Pa. 2011) (plurality). Father stresses that Mother “neither

alleged nor proved that an adoption of [Child] was contemplated or pending.” Father’s

Brief at 10. Father also highlights that the exception set forth in Section 2512(b) for

petitions filed by agencies, or where the child at issue was conceived as a result of rape

[J-35-2025] - 21

or incest, does not apply. For these reasons, Father avers that Mother’s termination

petition was not cognizable.

Moreover, Father maintains that the Superior Court correctly interpreted and

applied this Court’s case law, including M.E.L., regarding the “cause shown” exception.

Specifically, Father contends that the Section 2901 exception applies only in the context

of a contemplated adoption, and where there is a legal impediment to strict compliance

with the spousal adoption or relinquishment requirements of the Act. In this regard, he

reiterates that the purpose behind the termination or relinquishment of an existing parent’s

rights prior to an adoption is to facilitate a new parent-child relationship, and to protect the

integrity and stability of the new family unit.

Father claims that Mother did not even attempt to plead or prove that there is a

legal impediment to her compliance with the Act’s requirements, and, instead, simply

believes that a petitioning parent should not be required to prove that an adoption is

contemplated, a position that would entail a reversal of our precedent, including our

decision in M.E.L., less than two years after it was decided.

Father further argues that “reinterpreting” our precedent in the manner advocated

by Mother would invade the province of the General Assembly. See Father’s Brief at 17

(noting that, in M.E.L., we held that “[i]nterpreting Section 2901 so as to require Mother

to demonstrate first why she is unable to meet the statutory requirements for adoption . .

. is consistent with our principles of statutory construction”). Indeed, Father observes

that, in 2020, the General Assembly amended the Adoption Act by adding Section 2514,

which dispenses with the adoption requirement if the child at issue was conceived as a

result of rape or incest. Father posits that, through the 2020 amendment, the General

Assembly demonstrated “that it understands exactly how this Court has interpreted the

relevant sections of the Adoption Act, and knows exactly how to amend the Act when it

[J-35-2025] - 22

wishes to do so to clearly indicate when one parent may petition to terminate another

parent’s rights in the absence of an adoption.” Father’s Brief at 20. Father suggests that

the legislature’s “failure to amend any other sections of the Adoption Act, despite being

aware of this Court’s consistent interpretations of the relevant sections, is a clear

indication that this Court’s interpretations have been in accordance with legislative intent.”

Id. at 21; see 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(4) (“[W]hen a court of last resort has construed the

language used in a statute, the General Assembly in subsequent statutes on the same

subject matter intends the same construction to be placed upon such language.”); PPL

Elec. Utils. Corp. v. City of Lancaster, 214 A.3d 639, 647-48 (Pa. 2019) (“[W]hen the

legislature declines to amend a statute in contravention of this Court’s prior interpretation

of the statute, we may presume that our prior interpretation was and remains consistent

with legislative intent.” (citation omitted)).

Finally, Father disputes that there is any issue regarding Child’s safety, as Mother

has sole legal and physical custody of Child pursuant to the stipulated custody order, and

any interactions Father has with Child by telephone or letter occur only with Mother’s

permission and supervision. Moreover, Father notes that even if he is released from

prison before Child reaches adulthood and seeks modification of the existing custody

arrangement, “the family court division of the court of common pleas would be fully

capable of weighing all the facts and circumstances and making a decision that would

ensure Child’s ongoing safety and wellbeing,” just as the court is “tasked with doing on a

daily basis in many other matters.” Father’s Brief at 25.

More than fifty years ago, this Court recognized that “the Legislature intended the

petition for involuntary termination of parental rights to be available solely as an aid to

[J-35-2025] - 23

adoption.” B.E., 377 A.2d at 155 (emphasis added). 8 Accordingly, we have consistently

held that, in order for a petitioning parent to retain their own parental rights while seeking

to terminate the other parent’s rights, the petitioning parent must demonstrate that there

is an anticipated adoption of the child. In certain cases, we have determined that a

petitioning parent must be afforded the opportunity to establish “cause shown” as to why

they should not be required to relinquish their own parental rights. However, in those

cases, there was a contemplated adoption. See R.B.F, supra (parents sought to allow

their same-sex partners to their children); M.E.L (mother sought to allow her long-term

partner, to whom she was not married, adopt her child). In the instant case, based on

Mother’s Petition, no adoption of Child is contemplated. Accordingly, under our caselaw,

there is no basis upon which Mother may invoke Section 2901’s “cause shown” exception

to excuse her from the relinquishment requirement in order to terminate Father’s parental

rights.

Nevertheless, Mother contends that M.E.L. was wrongly decided, and she

requests that we reverse our decision therein, and reinterpret the Adoption Act in a

manner that would allow one parent to petition for the involuntary termination of the other

parent’s parental rights without requiring the petitioning parent to relinquish their own

parental rights or demonstrate that there is a contemplated adoption. Recognizing that

this interpretation would require this Court to overturn M.E.L., Mother offers that

“adherence to precedent is not ‘an inexorable command.’” Mother’s Brief at 22.

Although Mother avers that we “changed the words of the Adoption Act” in M.E.L.

when we held that there must be an “imminently planned or currently contemplated

adoption” in order for a petition for termination of parental rights to be cognizable, Mother’s

8 We recognize that, at the time our decision in B.E., the Adoption Act did not contain a

“for cause” provision similar to Section 2901.

[J-35-2025] - 24

Brief at 26-27, we reiterate that, prior to M.E.L., we consistently interpreted the Act as

requiring that a parent seeking to terminate the parental rights of the other parent

relinquish their own parental rights, unless there was a valid contemplated adoption.

M.E.L. is wholly consistent with this precedent.

Further, as discussed above, this interpretation is consonant with the underlying

purpose of the relinquishment requirement of an existing parent’s rights prior to adoption,

which is “to facilitate a ‘new parent-child relationship’ between the child and the adoptive

parent.” M.R.D.,145 A.3d at 1128; see also In re B.E., 377 A.2d at 156 (“Termination of

parental rights permits the child and the adoptive parent or parents to establish a new

parent-child relationship through adoption.”). As there is no contemplated adoption of

Child in the instant case, excusing Mother from Section 2711(d)’s relinquishment

requirement based on Section 2901’s cause shown exception would not further the

purpose of the Act.

Moreover, it is significant that the General Assembly has chosen not to amend the

specific language of the Act upon which we based our prior decisions. Pursuant to

Section 1922(4) of the Statutory Construction Act, it is presumed that, “when a court of

last resort has construed the language used in a statute, the General Assembly in

subsequent statutes on the same subject matter intends the same construction to be

placed upon such language.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(4). As we explained in Verizon

Pennsylvania, Inc. v. Commonwealth,

One of the most venerable and fundamental tenets of

statutory interpretation is that, whenever our Court has

interpreted the language of a statute, and the General

Assembly subsequently amends or reenacts that statute

without changing that language, it must be presumed that the

General Assembly intends that our Court’s interpretation

become part of the subsequent legislative enactment.

[J-35-2025] - 25

127 A.3d 745, 757 (Pa. 2015). Indeed, “the General Assembly is quite able to address

what it believes is a judicial misinterpretation of a statute.” Id. at 758.

Our decision in B.E. was rendered in 1977, and our decision in R.B.F. was handed

down in 2002. Despite the General Assembly’s awareness of this Court’s construction of

the Adoption Act for almost fifty years, it has not amended the language of the Act in a

manner that would suggest that our interpretation is contrary to its intent, notwithstanding

our observation in M.E.L. that “the relinquishment requirement for adoption and

termination of another parent’s rights over a child may be seen by some as anachronistic

in this day and age.” 298 A.3d at 129.

Notably, the General Assembly did amend the Act in 2020 by adding Section 2514,

which provides that, when a child has been conceived as a result of rape or incest,

“[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary,” when a petition has been

filed by a parent seeking to involuntarily terminate parental rights of the other parent under

Section 2511(a)(7), the petitioner shall not be required to aver that: (1) the petitioner will

assume custody of the child until such time as the child is adopted; (2) an adoption is

presently contemplated; or (3) a person with a present intention to adopt exists. 23

Pa.C.S. § 2514(1). Rather, when a child was conceived as a result of rape or incest, the

“[p]arental rights shall be terminated if all other legal requirements have been met.” Id. §

2514(2). The addition of Section 2514 demonstrates that the legislature is capable of

eliminating, in certain circumstances, the requirement that a petitioning parent aver that

a valid adoption is contemplated before the other parent’s parental rights may be

terminated under the Act. Indeed, under Mother’s interpretation of the Act, it seems the

2020 amendment would have been unnecessary.

For the reasons stated above, we reaffirm our holding in M.E.L. that Section 2901’s

“cause shown” exception to the relinquishment requirement applies only when there is a

[J-35-2025] - 26

contemplated adoption of a child. Accordingly, we hold that Mother’s petition for

termination of Father’s parental rights to M.L.R. was not cognizable under the Act, and

we affirm the Superior Court’s decision, which reversed the trial court’s order terminating

Father’s parental rights.

Order affirmed.

Justices Donohue, Dougherty, Mundy, Brobson and McCaffery join the opinion.

Justice Dougherty files a concurring opinion in which Justices Donohue, Mundy

and Brobson join.

Justice Wecht files a dissenting opinion.

[J-35-2025] - 27